| Douglass C. North - 1990 - 164 pages
...frequently erroneous; the information feedback is typically insufficient to correct these subjective models. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created...interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules. In a zero-transaction-cost world, bargaining strength does not affect the efficiency of... | |
| Cathy A. Rakowski - 1994 - 352 pages
...regulatory institutions exist, they always reduce transaction costs. However, as North points out, "Institutions are not necessarily or even usually...to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules"... | |
| John Harriss, Janet Hunter, Colin M. Lewis - 1995 - 382 pages
...frequently erroneous; the information feedback is typically insufficient to correct these subjective models. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. In a zero transaction cost world, bargaining strength does not affect the efficiency... | |
| Lee J. Alston, Þráinn Eggertsson, Douglass C. North - 1996 - 380 pages
...frequently erroneous; the information feedback is typically insufficient to correct these subjective models. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. In a world of zero transaction costs, bargaining strength does not affect the efficiency... | |
| Avinash K. Dixit - 1998 - 220 pages
...these concerns, not general principles of fairness in trade. As North (1994, pp. 360-361) expressed it, "Institutions are not necessarily or even usually...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules." It may be useful to draw a distinction between two functions of constitutions, setting... | |
| Jean Chun Oi, Andrew George Walder - 1999 - 372 pages
...efficiency or not. "Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially eff1cient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules," Douglass North argues.54 The present study of land and township enterprises has... | |
| Peter Robson, Asbjorn Kjønstad - 2001 - 217 pages
...bound to suffer from rules enacted, not in the general interest, but to promote particular interests. "Institutions are not necessarily or even usually...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules" (North, 1994: 361). All these factors prevent the poor from knowing and using the... | |
| Mary C. Brinton, Victor Nee - 2001 - 352 pages
...frequently erroneous; the information feedback is typically insufficient to correct these subjective models. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. In a world of zero transaction costs, bargaining strength does not affect the efficiency... | |
| Hector Fix-Fierro - 2003 - 281 pages
...'because allocative efficiency and adaptive efficiency may not always be consistent'. 111 Moreover, institutions are not necessarily or even usually created...interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules. 112 Despite such theoretical difficulties, policymakers around the world seem to agree more... | |
| Ray Forrest, James Lee - 2003 - 294 pages
...decollectivization (Nee 1989). Instead as Guo Xiaolin ( 1 999: 84) has noted when quoting Douglass North ( 1 994): 'Institutions are not necessarily or even usually...the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules.' Is there any reason to expect that privatization of a public asset such as urban... | |
| |