this vessel should be released." The Japanese delegation submitted the same rule as the British, but made the following exceptions: 1. if the vessel is in the military or naval service of the enemy, or under his control for military or naval purposes; 2. if the vessel forcibly resists visitation or capture; 3. if the vessel tries by flight to escape visitation or capture.

The Russian delegation, on the other hand, made the exception to the rule prohibiting destruction a very elastic one; it proposed that the exception should be made in those cases where the preservation of the captured ship "might compromise the safety of the captor or the success of his operations." The argument upon which the delegation based this broad exception was that "absolute prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes by belligerents would have as a consequence the establishment of a position of marked inferiority for those powers having no naval bases beyond the coasts of their own countries." The Russian naval delegate, in a speech before the commission, illustrated this argument by reference to the case of a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent in close proximity to a superior naval force of the enemy, or at a long distance from the belligerent's ports, or when the belligerent's ports are blockaded by the enemy.

Sir Ernest Satow, of Great Britain, replied to the Russian argument by insisting that if a belligerent, because of geographical location or of the insufficiency of maritime resources, finds it impossible to exercise effectually the right of seizing neutral ships carrying contraband of war | or seeking to violate a blockade, then he should leave them at liberty; for, to give to belligerents the right of sinking neutral prizes would lead inevitably to abuses and would

expose every neutral ship to the risk of being sunk every time it met a belligerent war ship, whose captain would not fail to exercise the right as seemed good to himself, despite the orders which he may have received to act circumspectly. By such a rule, the neutral vessel would find itself in the same position as an enemy's vessel; and its position would be even worse than that, since its government would have no means of redressing the wrong done it, short of itself declaring war on the belligerent captor.

The United States delegation supported the British view of the question; while the German delegation took the Russian side. Count Tornielli, of Italy, said that the absolute prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes would probably be acceptable to powers with few or no widely scattered colonial ports and naval bases beyond the coasts of their own countries, provided permission be granted to belligerents to convoy their prizes into neutral ports, to be kept there under sequestration; he proposed, accordingly, that the two questions be discussed in a joint meeting of the two committees of the III and IV Commissions. This proposition was adopted; but the result of the joint meeting was the practical failure of both the prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes and the permission to convoy them within neutral ports.1 The rule that neutral powers may admit to their ports prizes either belligerent or neutral was finally adopted by the conference; but it was deemed impossible to adopt any rule concerning the destruction of neutral prizes. Hence this latter subject, also, was left to be

1 Eleven delegations voted for the prohibition, four against it, and two abstained; nine voted for the permission, two against it, and six abstained.

included within the programme of the next conference, under the head of the laws and customs of naval warfare.

E. THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF NAVAL
WARFARE

a. THE CONFERENCE OF 1899

When the revision of the laws and customs of warfare on land was under discussion, Count Nigra, of the Italian delegation, endeavored to have extended to naval warfare the rules adopted in regard to bombardment on land; and Ambassador White and Captain Crozier, of the United States delegation, endeavored to have extended to naval warfare the rules adopted in regard to the treatment of private property on land. But the utmost that could be secured from the conference was the adoption, almost unanimously, of the desire that these two phases of naval warfare should be referred to the next conference. The great work of codification, accomplished by the Conference of 1899, was performed solely within the field of warfare on land; but its success in this field stimulated the Conference of 1907 in its noteworthy attempt to codify the laws and customs of warfare on the sea.

b. THE CONFERENCE OF 1907

The Russian programme for the Conference of 1907 included the following paragraph:

"As for maritime warfare, whose laws and customs differ on certain points from country to country, it is necessary to establish definite rules harmonious with the rights of belligerents and the interests of neutrals. A convention concerning these matters will have to be

elaborated, and it will form one of the most remarkable portions of the task devolved upon the approaching conference."

the

As parts of this convention, the programme mentioned the subjects of bombardment, mines, the transformation of merchant vessels into war ships, the private property of belligerents, the delay of favor accorded to merchant vessels at the beginning of hostilities, contraband, the conduct of belligerent war ships in neutral ports, and the destruction of neutral prizes. All of these subjects have been discussed above, and they form, of themselves, no small part of a naval code. After mentioning these, programme continued: "In the said convention there should be introduced rules of warfare on land which would be applicable equally to warfare on the sea." And in outlining the work of the IV Commission, President de Martens's last question was: "Within what limits is the convention of 1899 relative to the laws and customs of warfare on land applicable to the operations of warfare on the sea?" This question, which necessarily involved a wide range of consideration, was not discussed by the commission itself, but referred to its committee of examination, which, in turn, referred it for consideration and report to Jonkheer van Karnebeek, of the Netherlands. This last-named gentleman, with the assistance of M. Beernaert, of Belgium, the president of the II Commission (which had to deal with questions of warfare on land), examined and reported upon the applicability of each one of the fifty-eight articles adopted in 1899 to control warfare upon land. He reported to the committee that forty-six of the fifty-eight articles were applicable, that four were not applicable, and that there was doubt as to the applica

bility of the remaining eight. The committee decided that time would not admit of the discussion of the report by the existing conference;1 and recommended that a special desire (veu) be adopted in plenary session that the codification of maritime laws of combat be made a specific part of the programme of the next conference. This vœu was unanimously adopted, and, on motion of Sir Ernest Satow, of Great Britain, the further vau was adopted that "meanwhile, the powers shall apply as far as possible to naval warfare the principles of the convention of 1899 relative to warfare on land."

1 The report was not commenced until August 28, and presented to the committee until September 6.