Finally, it needs to be repeated as often as possible-- CSTs are designed to be the Governor's assets. Training and funding may come from federal sources, but ultimately they are employed at the Governor's discretion. As such, the Governor should have the ability to establish and refine their mission to ensure that it best meets the needs of the home state and those they are likely to support. This model is being employed in Virginia and, I think, with beneficial results. Department of Justice Programs and Initiatives: Virginia has a good working relationship with the Department of Justice. Justice has provided funding to assist Virginia law enforcement organizations for many years. Operationally, the Virginia State Police maintains a strong relationship with the FBI. In more recent years, the Department of Emergency Services has forged a strong relationship with the FBI, providing hazardous materials training to some of their personnel and establishing operational relationships for response where FBI Field Office and VDES missions overlap. Two new Department of Justice Offices have been established to assist state and local responders and managers in the area of WMD response. The Offices of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) and the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) both provide significant opportunities for assistance to states and localities. Observers at the state and local level, however, have identified several operational difficulties with these two Offices. While well-intentioned, the implementation of these Offices has been problematic. OSLDPS is tasked with granting federal funding to states and localities. These funds are critical to VDES as they provide a mechanism for states to purchase WMDspecific equipment and technology that does not exist through other federal funding sources. Start-up issues and federal priorities however, have made it difficult for OSLDPS to disperse these grants. Virginia only recently received a grant application package for funds from FY 1999, which were appropriated in October, 1998. This delay in funding has impacted Virginia's ability to plan and to train first responders. OSLDPS has experienced many false-starts in its efforts to disperse these funds. These funds are a critical support to states and localities. Every effort should be employed to streamline the grant process and push these funds to the level they can do some good. The Department of Justice has a track-record of providing funding to states and localities, but at least some potential difficulties involve the lack of a well-defined end state. Without a national strategy, it is difficult to evaluate the success of the funding efforts. The establishment of the NDPO is a very positive step. Created at the behest of state and local officials, NDPO is intended to serve as the single point of contact within the federal government for all terrorism consequence management activities. This is a far-reaching charter. While a great idea-- one for which the Attorney General and the Department of Justice should be commended-- NDPO has not yet realized its potential. As with the CSTs, it would seem prudent to define the requirements of the Office, the actual mission, and the authority of NDPO as quickly as possible. Once these are in place, the funding, position, and authority of NDPO should be enforced and honored across all agencies of the executive branch. While I have read a mission statement for NDPO, I am not sure that all of the requirements have been identified and I am not sure that the position and authority have been established. Lacking this support it is not possible for NDPO to meet its charter. Based upon our understanding, NDPO has been under-resourced. It has not received the resources necessary to accomplish its mission statement, one defined in concert with state and local stakeholders. NDPO is a good idea. It was established because a single federal point of contact was identified as a requirement by state and local officials. To date it is not truly operational. It deserves to be supported. I would raise a question whether the placement of NDPO within the Department of Justice is the most logical position for it. Since the customers for their services are primarily state and local authorities-- including those in law enforcement, the fire service, emergency medical, and emergency management-- it might more logically be placed in an agency with an historical mission of support across many disciplines, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As a final issue, our experience has taught us that continuing competitiveness among federal agencies may preclude a meaningful implementation of a concept like NDPO. Placement within one agency versus another automatically inhibits its ability for success. Careful consideration should be given to placement of the nation's Domestic Preparedness efforts in an office at a level that exercises coordination across all federal executive branch agencies. I appreciate this opportunity to provide these thoughts to the Subcommittee. Thank you. Statement of James R. Clapper. Jr. (Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Retired) Vice Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction before the Subcommittee on Investigations, Oversight, and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure United States House of Representatives April 6, 2000 James R. Clapper, Jr. 4350 Fair Lakes Court Fairfax, Virginia 22033 703-805-1500 STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR. Madam Chairman and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to submit the following statement to you on the issue of domestic response to terrorism. As you know, I have the honor and privilege to serve as Vice Chairman of a Congressionally-mandated commission of distinguished Americans, known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is chaired by Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia. The enabling legislation for that entity -- Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998) -- directs the Panel to assess Federal efforts to enhance domestic preparedness, the progress of Federal training programs for local and State emergency responses, and deficiencies in Federal programs for response to terrorist incidents involving WMD; to recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination of Federal agency response efforts and for ensuring fully effective local and state response capabilities for WMD terrorism incidents; and to assess appropriate State and local funding for response to WMD terrorism. Today, I will outline the work of that panel to date, provide an overview of the Panel's first annual report to the President and the Congress, which was submitted on December 15, 1999, and describe the work yet to be done by that body. The possibility that terrorists will use "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)" in this country to kill and injure Americans, including those responsible for protecting and saving lives, presents a genuine threat to the United States. As we cross the threshold of the twenty-first century, the stark reality is that the face and character of terrorism are changing and that previous beliefs about the restraint on terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear devices may be disappearing. Beyond the potential loss of life and the infliction of wanton casualties, and the structural or environmental damage that might result from such an attack, our civil liberties, our democratic ideals could be threatened as well. The challenge is daunting. We must first attempt, by a variety of means, to deter terrorists from perpetrating any attack. Failing that, we must bring forces to bear to detect and interdict terrorists before they strike Despite our best efforts at deterrence, detection, and interdiction, should an attack occur, we must be confident that local, State, and Federal authorities are well prepared to respond and to address the consequences of an entire spectrum of potentially extremely violent acts. In recent years, efforts have clearly been focused on more preparations for such attacks. The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 in New York and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995 in Oklahoma City, coupled with the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo and the U.S. embassy bombings this past summer, have heightened American concern and have already prompted an array of responses across all levels of government. At the same time, the country's seeming inability to develop and implement a clear, comprehensive, and truly integrated national domestic preparedness strategy means that we may still remain fundamentally incapable of responding effectively to a serious terrorist attack. The vast array of weapons conceivably available to terrorists today can be used against humans, animals, crops, the environment, and physical structures in many different ways. The complexity of these terrorist threats, and the variety of contingencies and critical responses that they suggest, requires us to ensure that preparedness efforts are carefully planned, implemented, and sustained among all potential responders, with all levels of government operating as partners. These threats, moreover, will require new ways of thinking throughout the entire spectrum of local, state, and Federal agencies. Effecting true change in the culture of a single government agency, much less achieving fundamental changes throughout and among all three, presents formidable hurdles. Nonetheless, the nature of these threats and their potential consequences demands the full commitment of officials at all levels to achieve these goals. Indeed, the need to ensure that a strategic national vision regarding domestic preparedness is in place, so that the country is better able to counter these threats and to respond effectively to the challenges that they present, is among the reasons that Congress established this Advisory Panel. To meet the objectives established in the enabling legislation, the Panel determined that it must first understand the full range of potential threats from terrorists, based on the belief that, without a fundamental understanding of the threats, preparedness efforts by Federal, state, and local entities could be misguided, uncoordinated, and wasteful. The Panel's analysis of such threats, contained in its First Annual Report to the President and the Congress, submitted on December 15, 1999, points out that terrorism especially unconventional terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices has emerged as a U.S. national security concern for several reasons: There has been a trend toward increased lethality in terrorism in the past decade. • There is an increasing focus on the apparent dangers posed by potential terrorism, especially with unconventional weapons. |