largely determines their respective roles in CEMA affairs, and the undisputed leadership of the U.S.S.R. insures conformity with overall Soviet policy objectives.

Organization

The organizational structure of CEMA comprises the plenum, the conference of CEMA deputies, the secretariat, and the permanent committees for economic and scientific-technical cooperation in all important sectors of the economy.

The plenum provides policy guidance and direction for CEMA. Composed of the chairman of the state planning commissions of the participating countries (high party officials who usually also hold the office of Deputy Premier), the plenum meets once or twice a year in the capitals of the participating countries to review the activities of the permanent committees and recommend, in broad outline form, the course of their subsequent operations.

The conference of CEMA deputies-the permanent country delegates resident in Moscow-is generally responsible for supervising and coordinating the day-to-day activities of the permanent committees to insure their compliance with plenary directives.

The secretariat, headed by the secretary of the Council, usually a Soviet representative, has both administrative and executive functions. It prepares the agenda for plenary sessions as well as a series of economic and statistical reports. In addition, it directs some activities of the permanent committees and organizes ad hoc meetings on problems outside of the jurisdiction of these committees.

The permanent committees for economic scientific-technical cooperation are the most important working bodies of CEMA. They have the responsibility of working out the details of the plenum's recommendations and of providing the machinery for carrying them out. Country representatives on the permanent committees are usually the ministers, state secretaries, or chiefs of the directorates responsible for the economic sector concerned. As As a result, these permanent committees constitute the direct link between the pertinent ministries in the participating countries and CEMA. The permanent committees meet periodically throughout the year; their work is supplemented by bilateral consultations between the participating countries. Functioning

CEMA activities are usually initiated through proposals submitted to the secretariat for transmittal to the conference of deputies. Unanimous agreement by the deputies is then required to place the proposal on the agenda for a session of the plenum, where unanimous agreement is required to formalize the proposal as a recommendation to the permanent committees of the Council and to the state planning commissions of the participating countries. These recommendations have no legal force; they depend for their execution on enabling acts bilaterally agreed to between the countries affected. This has been one of the great weaknesses of CEMA operations, for nationalist attitudes have frequently prevented the signing of the necessary bilateral agreements.

Soviet control over CEMA

As stated earlier, the participating countries in CEMA are formally equal, although Soviet direction and guidance is tacitly accepted.

Soviet control is exerted directly through CEMA channels and indirectly through the Communist Party apparatus. The Soviet delegates to CEMA are believed to be also members of the Soviet state committee for foreign economic relations. In this dual capacity, therefore, the Soviet delegates are in a position to guide CEMA activities in conformity with Soviet policy objectives. Within the limitations of these objectives, CEMA countries are permitted some latitude concerning details of implementation, and the U.S.S.R. does not insist on minute compliance with its proposals. On major issues, however, the U.S.S.R. has not hesitated to use the full weight of its political, ideological, and economic leadership to enforce compliance.

CHAPTER 6. FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Soviet control and coordination of foreign Communist Parties is achieved through a complex-partly overt, partly covert system of communication and manipulation rather than through an organizational pushbutton system. In the absence of any single organizational center comparable in size and bureaucratism to the prewar Comintern, Soviet direction of foreign Communist Parties is exercised through a multiplicity of formal and informal control mechanisms, ranging from institutional channels inside and outside the Soviet Communist Party to direct personal contacts between Communist leaders. Soviet objectives have also been facilitated by the existence of such intangible factors as the adherence of Communists to a common ideologyMarxism-Leninism-and the worldwide impact of Soviet national power and achievement.

Direct contact

Khrushchev has shown great personal interest and leadership in the problem of control and coordination. He has generated and promulgated the basic ideas and concepts of current international Communist strategy and tactics. He generally meets personally with various bloc Communist Party leaders several times a year, and he has traveled extensively in the bloc area. Khrushchev has not participated as frequently in bilateral talks with free-world Communists, but there have been more conferences between free-world Communists and Soviet Communist Party officials since he came to power.

In recent years many Soviet leaders and their aids have traveled abroad-sometimes with delegations to local Communist Party congresses and conferences, sometimes on special missions-for review, orientation, and on-the-spot coordination.

For the purpose of discussing and coordinating Communist plans and activities on a worldwide scale, free world and bloc Communist leaders gather periodically in Moscow under the cover of Soviet Party congresses or other official occasions. The Soviet leaders have also initiated a series of smaller functional meetings of less important freeworld Communist leaders for the purpose of stimulating discussions of ideological and theoretical problems of international significance. Bloc parties

For bloc Communist Parties, coordination and control is effected chiefly through frequent and close contacts between bloc and Soviet leaders. In addition to these general and high-level contacts and

exchanges, there are numerous functional contacts involving party specialists, trade union officials, organizational experts, etc. The Soviet party keeps a close watch on developments in the bloc parties and sends in its own experts when weaknesses become apparent.

For the bloc, governmental coordination is a part of party coordination. Thus, the Warsaw Treaty (military), CEMA (economic), and numerous treaties involving scientific, cultural, and other types of affiliation and exchange buttress the inherent interdependency of the bloc parties and enhance the position of the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet diplomatic establishments in bloc countries provide for immediate, on-the-spot consultation either on the party or government level. Central soviet organs

The principal working-level agencies handling Soviet relations with foreign Communist Parties are the two departments of the Soviet party Secretariat dealing with bloc and nonbloc parties respectively. Divided into geographic subsections and staffed by area specialists, these departments are a direct channel between the foreign Communist Parties and Moscow. They provide advice and guidance to other Communist Parties and are responsible for all correspondence and exchanges with them. These departments also administer the program whereby foreign Communists are trained in Soviet party schools. In their contacts with foreign Communists, the departments seek implementation of policy decisions made by the Party Presidium. The extent and nature of the advice and guidance given vary. Some powerful Communist Parties, headed by veteran Communists of international reputation, would not be amenable to direct advice and instructions from department representatives, but in the case of smaller, less sophisticated parties particularly those which have been outside the mainstream of the Communist movement advice and guidance from any level are welcomed.

Training and guidance

Under Khrushchev's aegis, the U.S.S.R. has greatly increased its training program for free world and bloc Communists. The leadership training program of the Soviet Communist Party serves as a mechanism for indoctrinating foreign Communists and strengthening their allegiance to the U.S.S.R. Since 1956, for example, about 1,000 trainees from over 25 Communist Parties in the free world have been trained in the U.S.S.R. at the higher party school under the Central Committee.

The Soviet-controlled monthly Problems of Peace and Socialism, published in Prague in 19 languages, serves as a channel for exchanging information-theoretical and operational-between foreign Communist parties. The headquarters staff of the publication is headed by a leading Soviet party official who has several Soviet specialists working with him, and there are representatives from all bloc parties and from an estimated 20 Communist parties from the free world. Transmissions of the Soviet wire service, TASS, to foreign countries often contain guidance for foreign Communist parties and front organizations in the guise of "news" items, and the Soviet party newspaper Pravda and journal Kommunist also are used to inform foreign Communists of changes in Soviet policy and to provide guidance for their activities.

Diplomatic channels

Soviet diplomatic installations in the free world frequently serve as a cover for specific technical coordination activities. The extent to which Soviet "diplomats" take the risk of exposing themselves to accusations of "interference" depends largely on the political and security climate of a given country. In several cases, Soviet Ambassadors have secretly dealt directly with the Secretary General of a given free world Communist Party when the need for specific briefings has arisen. Secret subsidies for the local Communist Party are often channeled through the Soviet Embassies or other diplomatic installations abroad, to be recovered by the local Communist Party through clandestine methods. Soviet Embassies are known to have arranged for the travel and training of free world Communists in the bloc and to have investigated security and other problems in the local Communist Party, presumably for the benefit of Moscow. Representatives of the Soviet intelligence services under diplomatic cover are known to have contacted local Communist Party representatives for the coordination of espionage activities. In areas where Soviet establishments are few, several Communist parties may utilize one establishment for contact.

Front organizations

The U.S.S.R. also has machinery to make international front organizations responsive to its requirements and control.

a total of 13 such organizations, 6 have their headquarters behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet officials, frequently from obscure positions, covertly control the activities of these organizations. The staffs of international front organizations are supplemented by bloc and free world Communists and are of sufficient size to coordinate and support the vast networks of affiliated Communist fronts throughout the world. The international front organizations coordinate their programs through various means-international and regional meetings, field travel of headquarters personnel, regional relay points, special training facilities, and material and motivational support provided by the U.S.S.R.

Soviet bloc subsidies to foreign Communist parties and international front organizations are regularly employed as a covert means of insuring Soviet control. These subsidies cover a wide range of activities, including travel to and from bloc countries, election campaigns in the free world, and support for front organizations. Effectiveness

The main Soviet technique for coordinating the international Communist movement consists in ever-increasing direct personal contacts, obviating the need for frequent written directives. Since Khrushchev's advent to power, every Communist Party has had repeated direct contact with the Soviet center and its auxiliaries. Given the output of the overt Soviet press and radio, which is accessible to free world Communist Parties, the international Communist movement in the free world is much more intensively briefed than during the last period of Stalin's life.

This does not mean that free world Communist Parties are always told of Soviet plans and intentions. At the Soviet 20th party congress in 1956, for example, the foreign delegates did not know of Khrushchev's secret de-Stalinization speech in advance. At the

November 1957 meetings in Moscow, the Soviet leaders did not inform the foreign Communists of the agenda in advance. Some advance information on subjects to be discussed at meetings of bloc and free world Communist leaders during the Soviet 21st party congress in January 1959 was communicated to a few free world Communist Parties. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulates most of the policy for the international Communist movement on the basis of national requirements of the U.S.S.R. and without intensive prior consultation.

Introduction

IV. ECONOMIC POLICY

In the U.S.S.R., there are four unusual and important characteristics. in the method of formulating national economic policy and in the functioning of the machinery formally charged with this task.

First, economic policymaking carries the full weight and authority of law. In the Soviet "command" economy, policies are imperatives, to be ignored only under penalty of law.

Second, policymaking for the economy is truly a massive enterprise. The state decides what is to be produced, in what quantities, by what combinations of labor, capital, and other inputs, and to what ends, whether investment, consumption, or defense. With few exceptions the state makes these decisions not only for the national domain as a whole, but also for its subdivisions down to and including the individual plant or farm.

The

Third, policymaking for the economy is highly regularized. process characteristically takes the form of periodic programing. At various intervals of a year or several years, detailed economic plans are formulated and carried out in accordance with predetermined schedules.

Fourth, policymaking for the economy is closely coordinated with policymaking with the other realms of state activity. Economic planning is closely associated with planning of foreign and domestic political affairs.

Beside the supreme organs themselves (the state's Council of Ministers, the party's central committee, and their respective presidia), the principal Soviet organs involved in these operations are: at the center or national level, Gosplan and certain specialized state committees; at the republic level, the Republic Councils of Ministers and Gosplans; and at the lower levels, the sovnarkhozes of the economic administrative regions and the executive committees of oblast and

rayon.

Central organs

The all-union Gosplan, or state planning committee, is the economic general staff of the Council of Ministers. It is the instrument for translating broad policy decisions affecting the economy into concrete programs and for monitoring fulfillment thereof. Its importance is reflected by the fact that whereas all other major organs of the Council of Ministers are represented in it by their chiefs only, the chief of Gosplan and no less than 10 of his deputies are members of the council. Gosplan numbers several thousand persons in Moscow alone. These are organized into sections for aggregate planning (labor and wages, capital investment, etc.), sector planning (agriculture, defense,