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Propaganda & Agitation AL F. Dichev
Agriculture G. A. Denisov
Heavy Industry A. P. Rudakov
Light & Food Industry
L. L Lubennikov
Transport & Communications ?
Trade, Finance & Planning Organs ?
Administrative Organs N. R. Mironov
Science, Higher Educational Institutions & Schools AV. A. Kirillin
FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
• CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION, CPSU
P. N. Demichev PN. G. Ignatov
Party Organs ?
Agriculture G. L. Vorobyev
A. P. Kirilenko
Propaganda & Agitation AV. P. Moskovsky
*Not definitely identified as members but thought to be
DEPARTMENTS FOR THE RSFSR
I. V. Spiridonov
Industry & Transport
Science, Schools & Culture N. D. Kazmin
Administrative, Trade & Finance Organs ?
DEPARTMENTS FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS
1. A. Grishmanov
N. A. Mukhitdinov
L. L. Brezhnev
THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE
1 DECEMBER 1959
M. A. Suslov
Ye. A. Furtseva
BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR
N. G. Ignatov
N. S. Khrushchev
A. B. Aristov
A. B. Aristov
O. V. Kuusinen
●P. N. Pospelov
Liaison with Bloc
Ya. I. Kabkov
•P. A. Satyukov
Kommunist F. V. Konstantinov
Chief Political Directorate,
F. L. Golikov
Military Commission I
The chief political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is in fact a department of the central party staff and is responsible for political training and loyalty of the armed forces. There is probably also a military commission for considering and approving officer assignments in the armed forces.
Responsibility for relations with foreign Communist Parties is divided between two departments, one dealing with bloc and the other with nonbloc parties. These are the principal working-level channels for Soviet support, direction, and control of the worldwide Communist movement. Recent activities of personnel associated with these two departments suggest that their responsibility may include foreign affairs generally. The possibility that there is a separate “foreign policy” department, however, cannot be excluded. A special “Commission for Travel Abroad” rules on the political reliability and suitability of individuals proposed by any Soviet agency for a foreign assignment.
The "Administration of Affairs” performs general housekeeping functions for the Secretariat and executive staff and a "General department handles sensitive material and secret communications; it may, in fact, be the party's internal intelligence unit. The functioning of the Secretariat
Collectively and through the individual activities of its members, the Secretariat provides day-to-day direction and leadership for the rest of the professional party machine (full-time paid officials) which in addition to the Secretariat and its executive staff includes a highly disciplined hierarchy of subordinate secretariats and staffs corresponding to the republics, oblasts, and lesser administrative divisions of the country. (See Chart B.)
In general terms, the professional party machine performs the following functions:
(i) Disseminates, explains, and interprets party and state policy decisions.?
(2) Implements party policy:
(3) Checks on and insures the implementation of state policy by governmental and other organs.
(4) Mobilizes economic and social pressures for the implementation of party and state policy.
(5) Allocates manpower and resources of the party.
(6) Collects and filters information and prepares reports, memos, and staff studies for the Secretariat and Presidium.
(7) Calls attention of the Secretariat and Presidium to problems and prepares, suggests, and recommends plans for their
solution. The actual operations of the Secretariat are largely unknown. Although most of the Secretaries oversee one or more of the departments in the executive staff, in only a very limited sense are they agents of the particular points of view of their respective groups of departments. Each Secretary is a relatively free agent expressing his own individual opinion as one of the "elected” leaders of the party. His point of view on policy issues, however, is almost certain to be colored somewhat by the range of his experience in handling day-to-day administrative chores and in overseeing the execution of policy in particular fields, and he will presumably gain an expertise in his fields of responsibility which may tend toward parochialism.
7 The apparatus used in this process is described in the annex.
The Secretariat undoubtedly prepares reports and papers for the Presidium and may even determine the agenda for its meetings. As a matter of routine, policy papers prepared by the Council of Ministers or any of the quasi-independent organizations, such as the Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, or the Central Union of Consumers Cooperatives, may be reviewed by the Secretariat before presentation to the party Presidium, but it is doubtful that the Secretariat could prevent Presidium consideration if any of its members were determined otherwise. Certainly Mikoyan and Kozlov have enough personal power and prestige to insure such consideration unless it is adamantly opposed by Khrushchev.
The full extent to which the Secretariat prepares plans for approval or rejection by the Presidium is not clear. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the Secretariat does a good deal of the actual shaping of plans. So far as is known, there is no planning body as such attached to it. The departments of the executive staff combine the functions of planning with those of policy execution, and then only in their assigned fields. The elaboration of plans cutting across those narrowly defined fields apparently is done in the Secretariat itself, either by the whole body of Secretaries or possibly by ad hoc subcommittees of three or more Secretaries. The Secretariat is, of course, no more capable of producing finished, coherent, well-meshed plans than the Presidium. It may be assumed that much of the planning consists simply of dovetailing material derived from policy papers and information reports prepared by the departments of the executive staff or other agencies, with liberal interjection of the ideas and points of view of the individual secreta ries.
Under the supervisory direction of one of the Secretaries, each department of the executive staff, in its assigned field, gathers and processes information, highlights problem areas, prepares reports and staff studies, and recommends courses of action. Information and policy recommendations flow from the departments as the result of direct requests from the Secretariat or an individual Secretary, or as a byproduct of the department's function of checking on policy execution and the operations of agencies in the department's field of responsibility.
The departments maintain constant contact with the lower echelons of the party. The bulk of communications is probably handled by post, telephone, and radio, but personal contact also plays an important role. Responsible representatives of a department are sent into the field and may spend as much as three-fourths of their time visiting agencies, organizations, and operations. They check on conditions, resolve many local problems on the spot, and report the results of their investigations to their department in Moscow. Also, the regional party and Government officials, despite the long distances they often must travel, spend a remarkable amount of time in Moscow conferring with officials in the executive staff, explaining their local problems and seeking solutions. Frequently, departments organize conferences on topics of general concern, and these conferences are participated in by appropriate officials from all over the country:
In these various ways emerging problems are identified and ideas generated for their solution, but though this process may result in the
fragments and pieces of a national strategic plan, because it is carried out on a largely departmental basis, it seldom produces a complete plan. The fashioning of such an overall plan is performed by the top party leaders in the Secretariat and the Presidium.
As noted earlier, formulations of state policy emanating from the Presidium are sometimes vague and often incomplete. Much of whatever unity and coherency Soviet national policy possesses arises out of the process of explaining, interpreting, translating into concrete tasks, and resolving conflicts as they arise in the course of trying to implement the Presidium decisions. The Secretariat, through the departments of its executive staff, probably does as much as or more than any other agency in the Soviet Union in performing this function.
CHAPTER 5. SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Although the Soviet system of government is in theory a constitutional democracy, the all-pervading influence of the Communist Party has prevented the formal governmental system from achieving any independent life of its own. The Government is a major administrator of the policy decisions emanating from the party Presidium, implementing them as quickly and efficiently as it can, but influencing them only with the indulgence of the top party leaders. This influence, however, is easily felt through the presence of several Presidium members at the directing helm of the governmental machinery.
The governmental structure, to an even greater extent than the party structure, is designed to create and maintain the fiction that it is based on popular support and that the
will of the mass of people finds accurate expression in its activities. The stellar role in the facade of democratic processes is played by the Supreme Soviet, which according to the Soviet Constitution, is “the highest organ of state power in the U.S.S.R.” Ostensibly composed of popularly elected deputies and performing the usual functions of a Western legislature, the Supreme Soviet is neither popularly elected nor entrusted with any real role in the decisionmaking process.
The Supreme Soviet (see chart K) is formally a bicameral legislature with coequal houses, the deputies of one house, the Soviet of the Union, elected on the basis of population, and the deputies of the other, the Soviet of Nationalities, elected on a territorial basis by nationality unit.
"Elections” of deputies are held every 4 years and are the occasion of a major propaganda effort to popularize the regime and emphasize the “popular” base of the Soviet system. In actual practice, however, only one deputy-selected by, or with the consent of the party is allowed to run from any constituency. Being selected as a nominee by the appropriate party body is tantamount to election. Thus the electorate has no effective choice on election day and traditionally votes over 99 percent for the single candidate in each electoral district. Although the party represents less than 7 percent of the adult population, 76 percent of the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet at the last election (March 1958) were party members. The others were members of the so-called nonparty bloc, i.e., not party members but considered by the party to be reliable adherents of its program. While most of the deputies are important party or government officials,