the central party organizations so as to contribute to the Despite this apparent separation of power, control remains ultimately at the party center, for it is constitutionally stipulated that "decisions taken by lower organizations must not run counter to those made by higher organizations." And, of course, the power to decide whether the decisions are in conflict resides in the "higher organizations." The Party Congress The present constitution of the Chinese Communist Party ordains that the National Party Congress is "the highest leading body of the party." As such, its constitutional functions include the duty to "hear and examine" reports of central party organs, to determine the party's mass line and policy, to revise the party constitution, and to elect the Central Committee. It is nominally, but not really, the principal policymaking organ. The party constitution provides that the convocation of a congress may be postponed indefinitely by the Central Committee elected in the previous session. In other words, the congress does not meet until the party leaders have formulated the party line for the congress to approve. The fact that no National Party Congress was convened from 1945 to 1956 illustrates how readily the Chinese Communist Party found force and direction for policy formulation in other quarters. The National Party Congress is in fact a rubberstamp organization convened as a sop to party "democracy." The position of the National Party Congress is well illustrated by the 1956 meeting. Delegates, elected at lower levels, totaled slightly over 1,000 when assembled in Peiping. Such a large-scale convocation is in itself evidence of ineffectiveness; fruitful debate and positive policymaking can scarcely be carried out in such a meeting. The size of that congress dictated the election of a presidium to coordinate and direct activities. It is in the composition of this body that a picture of effective control by an elite, higher echelon of party members begins to emerge. The 63-man Presidium of the Eighth National Party Congress contained all the full members of the Central Committee, save 4 of minor importance. This Presidium then elected a Standing Committee, which was identical with the membership of the powerful Central Political Bureau, or Politburo, the group at the heart of Chinese Communist policy formulation. A number of special reports were delivered to the congress on foreign affairs, economic planning, military organization, and other topics of national interest, but these reports had been first reviewed and approved by a plenary session of the party Central Committee held shortly before the congress. The reports were also discussed by delegates in preliminary meetings before the opening of congress. When it came time to pass on the composition of a new Central Committee, the power of the higher party echelon again appeared. Through a complex series of straw votes the elections were carefully rigged so that, with one exception, all the old Central Committee membership was reelected and ranked in proper order of precedence. Thus, the congress itself did not formulate policy; it merely listened to explanations of previously formulated policy and gave its stamp of approval. To any serious observer it was clear that major Chinese Communist policy originated at a level no lower than the party Central Committee. The Central Committee Like the National Party Congress, the Central Committee is equipped with a constitutional basis for major policy formulation and execution. Its task is defined as one of directing the entire work of the party, representing it in relations with other parties and organizations, setting up and directing new party organs, and supervising and allocating party cadres. While the constitution provides that the Central Committee shall meet in plenary session at least twice a year, it suffers a legal limitation on this prerogative, as does the National Party Congress, since it is called into session at the convenience of the Politburo. Furthermore, just as the Central Committee acts for the National Party Congress when that body is not in session, so the Politburo exercises the powers and functions of the Central Committee when it is not convened. The fact that only seven plenary sessions were held between 1945 and 1956, and 4 years elapsed between the third plenum in 1950 and the fourth in 1954, illustrates the limited role of the Central Committee in policy formulation. Moreover, meetings from 1945 to 1956 occurred only in connection with the inauguration of new policy lines. At these meetings the policy to be decided upon was served up ready made. For example, the plenum of October 1955 decided on the rapid collectivization of agriculture, admitting its action was "based on the speech of Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the meeting of provincial secretaries." In actual fact, accelerated collectivization was well underway before the October "decision" of the Central Committee. In line with the post-1956 emphasis on a greater display of democratic forms in party affairs, the Central Committee has since met at least twice a year. However, the short sessions and the enlarged size of the body, which reached 192 members in 1958, suggest that as a deliberative group the Central Committee may be a trifle unwieldy to be useful in direct policy formulation. It is possible, however, that an issue on which the topmost party leaders were seriously divided could be referred to the Central Committee for decision. While the Central Committee as an organization has been relatively unimportant in the formulation of broad national policy, many of its members are responsible for policy execution at a lower level of party and government. The present membership of the Central Committee is drawn in roughly equal proportions from four major groups: central party organizations, provincial party organizations, central and provincial government organizations, and the armed forces. By approving party policy as elaborated to them while in session, the members of the Central Committee are better equipped to implement it at their own official level. The exact relationship of the Central Committee to government, mass organizations, and the armed forces is spelled out explicitly in the party's 1956 constitution. The Central Committee is charged with guiding "the work of the central state organs and people's organizations of a national character through leading party members' groups within them." This task is partly accomplished by the election of four smaller executive agencies, composed of Central Committee members, who exercise daily supervision over party affairs. One of these, the Central Control Commission, has no policymaking function. The remaining three-the Central Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau, and the Central Secretariat-are examined below. They constitute the central core of the policy-formulation and policy-implementation machinery in Communist China. The Central Political Bureau The Central Political Bureau (Politburo) is authorized by the party constitution to exercise the powers and functions of the Central Committee when that body is not in session. This is a sweeping grant of power to the top of the party hierarchy. As of August 1959, the Politburo consisted of 26 men, all long and faithful party members. Twenty were full (voting) members, and six (nonvoting) alternates. A variety of background and talent was represented, providing the competence for decisions cutting across many fields. The position of Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the party is of paramount importance and has been singled out for discussion below. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen seem to have special responsibility for party affairs. Chou En-lai and Chen Yun appear primarily concerned with governmental affairs. Chou and Chen Yi carry special weight in foreign policy decisions, while Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin, and Po I-po are the party's most prominent economic specialists. Lin Piao seems to be the principal military leader. A range of collective experience in propaganda, minority affairs, military affairs, disciplinary concerns, and ideologyall important questions for the regime-are represented in the remaining Politburo personnel. The Politburo is very important as a discussion group and perhaps. also as a voting body with respect to major policy decisions. It seems highly probable that a definitive stand by Mao on any major issue prevails, since there is little evidence that the members will not vote with the Chairman on those questions where his position is known. In the absence of a definitive personal stand, however, Mao probably is responsive to counsel from different groups in the Politburo. The strongest apparent group, of "party-machine" leaders, is headed by Liu Shao-chi. The group is so called because its members are linked by long and close association in key party posts, as distinguished from those who have made their mark primarily as government administrators or army leaders. Should conditions be right (e.g., in the selection of a successor after Mao's death), the various groups in the Politburo might struggle for power. Once policy has been formulated, its execution is readily promoted through the interlocking system of concurrent key posts held by many Politburo members in the government. Politburo Vice Chairman Liu is concurrently chairman of the government and thus the formal head of state. Chou En-lai, third-ranking Politburo member, is Premier, while 16 other members serve concurrently as Vice Premiers. The Standing Committee of the Politburo Before 1956, a Politburo Standing Committee was not provided for in the party constitution. In its place there was a Secretariat which attended "to the daily work of the Central Committee, according to the decisions of the Politburo." Composed of the five ranking Politburo members, this Secretariat became an inner cabinet, lending a final degree of centrality and exclusiveness to party policymaking and execution. In the party constitution of 1956, this locus of real power was formally identified as a Standing Committee, practically identical in membership with the pre-1956 Secretariat. Presumably it acts on the many occasions when Mao does not choose to convene the full Politburo, and its decisions have the force of full Politburo decisions. The leadership, however, apparently considers meetings of the entire Politburo desirable to consider and sanction major policy shifts. For example, the Chinese party line which took issue with the Soviet criticism of Stalin was announced after an April 1956 meeting of the Politburo. With few exceptions, the same handful of men have remained at the top of the old Secretariat or on the Standing Committee since 1949. A high degree of consistent force and direction has thereby been supplied. The small size of the body and the continuity of membership probably facilitates policy decisions without intricate formal machinery for reaching consensus. A conversation between members would in effect constitute a meeting. Personality factors are of extreme importance at this level, in particular the traits and methods of Mao Tse-tung. The special position of Mao Tse-tung At the present time Mao is unquestionably the supreme authority in Communist China. Within the confines of Marxist philosophy he has exercised considerable imagination and originality in applying principles to indigenous Chinese conditions. The personal factors which brought Mao to the top and allowed him to maintain his position include great self-confidence, ability to evoke strong loyalties from subordinate party members and the military, and an ability to maintain a balance of power among competing individuals and factions. Recognition that Mao is the ultimate arbiter minimizes serious factional disputes. While consolidating his control in earlier years, Mao did resort to the liquidation of rivals. More recently the Chairman has treated opposition more magnanimously, preferring as a rule (not always) to reindoctrinate and thus rehabilitate opponents, or, as he puts it, "treat the disease and save the patient. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party has attained a degree of unity and stability at its higher levels which is unequaled by other major Communist parties. Mao's reputation as national leader was slowly acquired. By the mid 1930's he had outdistanced most of his major rivals for party leadership, although he was still to consolidate his leading position. In the 1940's he followed the world Communist tactic of the "united front" and thus appeared as the sponsor of resistance against Japan. Chinese Communist guerrilla operations during the war added to his reputation. Later, especially following the death of Stalin, his writings on doctrine have been hailed as significant "enrichments" or "additions" to Marxist theory. Mao feels that his all-important position in policy formulation requires freedom from the administrative and ceremonial tasks that beset the top men of many countries. Currently, he holds no position in government and allows himself almost full time for the observation and reflective thinking he regards as the essential prerequisite to sound policy formulation. In recent years he has apparently made very little attempt to intervene in matters of detail and has, in the main, left the execution of programs to his trusted subordinates. Very little reliable information exists on the degree to which Mao accepts subordinate opinion in his consideration of policy issues. It is asserted that he permits and even encourages private expression and polite argument against his views. Reportedly, he likes to listen to the comments of people outside the Politburo. Certainly it can be said that Mao's actions as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party have not been limited to simple affirmation of policy recommendations from the Standing Committee or the full Politburo. On several occasions he seems to have taken a position quite apart from the policy recommendations offered him. For example, the "one hundred flowers" campaign of intellectual liberalization from early 1956 to mid-1957 was apparently initiated and insisted upon by Mao, despite the disagreement of other major figures like Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. He abruptly reversed the Central Committee on the cooperativization of agriculture in 1955. Factors favoring bold policy in Communist China Survival of the fittest in the Communist political system allows only the boldest and most ruthless to reach the top. These are men, moreover, who are indoctrinated with the need to maintain an atmosphere of struggle to inspire accomplishment and are therefore disposed to formulate policies that present continually fresh challenges to the Chinese people. The party's inclination toward bold policies is enhanced by the freedom it enjoys from harassment by press and parliamentary bodies, since both are the practical and obedient tools of the party. The Communists cannot disregard public opinion entirely, but they do not compromise with it to the extent necessary in other countries. Policies are adjudged practical not so much by their consonance with existing public opinion, but by the feasibility of influencing and directing public opinion. The breadth of responsibility entrusted to the men in the nation's top policy-formulation council-the Standing Committee of the party Politburo-means that there is less tendency toward "least common denominator" policies. Men like Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Premier Chou En-lai have responsibilities which cut across departmental lines, and they do not bring to policymaking sessions the parochial views of particular departments. Despite the misgivings of "conservatives" from economic ministries and the military establishment in 1958, for example, the regime decided on a crash economic program to achieve a "great leap forward" under a slogan of "let politics take command." |