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86TH CONGRESS 1st Session

SENATE

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REPORT No.

NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Mr.

-Ordered to be printed

from the Committee on Government

Operations, submitted the following

REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a study of Communist China's machinery for formulating national policies and for implementing those policies by appropriate executive decisions. The opening chapter describes the all-important role of the party, both in the formulation of policy and in monitoring the execution of policy. Succeeding chapters set forth the role of the government, which is to draw up detailed national plans consistent with the policy guidelines prescribed by the party and to see they are carried out.

The last two chapters describe how this party-government apparatus of policymaking and execution has worked in two rather specialized fields-in economic affairs and in scientific affairs.

On the whole, the distinctive features in Communist China's policy machinery we would emphasize are:

1. The theoretical formulations of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung give a sense of direction and purpose to Chinese Communist policymakers.

2. Broad national policy is not formulated in the government, but by the party. Within the party, it is the Politburo-and particularly its Standing Committee-which is the real center of national policy formulation.

3. The party also has organs to monitor the execution of policy. The powers of these organs are not merely to coordinate but to direct and enforce.

4. Policy implementation is further controlled by the assignment of individuals to interlocking positions in party and government.

5. National viewpoints are represented in Communist China's top policymaking council. The responsibilities of the individuals in the Standing Committee of the Politburo cut across departmental lines. 6. No effort is made to assure the representation of disparate political viewpoints in the Standing Committee. The Communist

Party is of course supreme, and the party is dominated by Mao Tse-tung and his longtime associates.

7. Mao Tse-tung occupies a special position of authority in policymaking. He considers the views of his associates, but he has on occasion authorized policies that did not meet with their wholehearted approval.

8. Mao considers that his responsibility for policymaking requires time for reflective thinking and freedom from administrative details. He holds no government post.

9. The top leaders in China have had long experience in policymaking roles. They are knowledgeable and confident to the point of cockiness.

10. Survival of the fittest is the rule in Communist politics; only the boldest and most ruthless reach the top. This fact tends to make for aggressive policies.

11. Consonance with existing public opinion is not an all-important criterion for deciding whether policies are workable. The feasibility of public indoctrination and exhortation-i.e., of making public opinion follow policy-is regarded as more significant. The mass propaganda campaign is an invariable ingredient of policy implementation efforts.

12. A prominent role in this process of indoctrination and exhortation is taken by organs of the party and government which are ostensibly loci of power. Actually they serve primarily as soundingboards for informing lesser officials and generally popularizing new policy lines.

It will be observed that not all the features in this listing relate to methods and organizational forms. Perhaps the most significant derive from intangibles such as philosophical doctrine and individual personality.

II. THE PARTY

A very potent force in the present-day organization for policymaking in Communist China is the implicit set of objectives arising out of the philosophical context of Marxism-Leninism and the writings of Mao Tse-tung.

Rightly or wrongly, the Chinese Communists hold the abiding conviction that they are unswerving Marxist-Leninists. They are motivated by Marxist faith in the redemptive historical process and the Leninist concept of the Communist Party as the only reliable agent of that process. There is thus no need to reconcile the disparate political biases that are accepted in any multiparty state.

The outlook of Communist China's policymakers is strongly conditioned by the Leninist doctrine of imperialism, which holds that imperialism is a phenomenon peculiar to a certain stage of capitalism. This forces Chinese policymakers into a posture of antagonism to the West and gives them a sturdy philosophical link with the general Asian resentment of Western colonialism.

Chinese Communist Party leaders are all committed to the dogmas of the triumph of "socialism," the need for bloc "unity" against the West, the need for party monopoly of power, and the need for rapid development of the economy (including the military establishment). Thus their policies can vary only within the limits set by these points of dogma.

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The supremacy of the party

Basic to an understanding of the present-day organization for policymaking and execution in Communist China is an appreciation of the all-powerful position of the Chinese Communist Party. At the end of 1958, it numbered 14 million members, whose position explicitly defined in the country's constitution as "the vanguard of the Chinese working class"-juridically entitles them to lead the workerpeasant alliance, the theoretical basis of the Chinese People's Republic. As further insurance that it will continue to dominate the country's policymaking apparatus, the party makes use of two other principles. The first involves the organic structure of the Chinese People's Republic; no provision is made for a balance of power between legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government to check undue concentration of authority. Rather, authority is merged in a system of overlapping and interlocking organs, which makes effective control from the center possible.

The other principle, that of "democratic centralism," requires that "the minority shall obey the majority, lower organizations shall obey higher organizations, and organizations shall uniformly obey the control organization." This principle is illustrated, for example, during party conferences. Whenever a party unit convenes, there is present a representative of the next higher organ who is expected to tell the conference what it ought to achieve. This is very often done when he addresses the conference at its opening session. He may then sit through all other sessions and even take part in the deliberations. Occasionally he may be called on to explain the wishes or policies of the higher party organs. Finally, he is expected to sum up in a concluding address the outcome of the conference and his comments. The Chinese Communists call these "conclusions," and they cover practically all of the major decisions the conference is supposed to reach. When the conference is over, the representative has to report back to his own organ on the proceedings of the conference, adding his own observations and recommendations. In other words, this representative serves as a party whip for the conference, whose duty it is to see that the party line is strictly observed.

As the central nervous system of the entire body politic, providing direction and purpose, and coordinating many diverse activities, the party accomplishes its task by placing a host of members throughout the government. These individuals serve as catalytic agents, imparting momentum, guiding and goading the government bureaucracy. The party is thus the activating and directing force, but Communist theoreticians stress that it must remain organizationally distinct from government agencies, to which is delegated the actual work of administration. Ordinarily, the presence of party members in governmental organizations assures the implementation of policy at all levels without formal orders to the agencies concerned. The system requires a party apparatus roughly parallel, in its organizational hierarchy, to the governmental apparatus. The duplication extends to local areas.

The party constitution makes a point of delineating the policyformulation role of the central and local units.

All questions of a national character or questions that require
a uniform decision for the whole country shall be handled by

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