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When the National People's Congress is not in session, its Standing Committee acts for it in conjunction with the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. Constitutionally the Standing Committee is empowered to interpret laws, issue decrees, ratify treaties, declare war, proclaim martial law, and order mobilization. It appoints or removes, on the Premier's recommendation, vice premiers, ministers, and heads of commissions. On its own initiative it can appoint or remove many other less important state officials. It is also empowered to supervise the State Council and can annul decisions of this body when such contravene the constitution or other laws and decrees. All such powers appear to be formal rather than actual, however; there is no evidence that the Standing Committee has contravened any previous action of the State Council.

The Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic

The formal head of state is the Chairman of the Republic, elected by the National People's Congress. This office is invested by the constitution with broad administrative and appointive powers. These include nomination of the Premier and members of the National Defense Council, together with the right to preside over that body and sessions of the Supreme State Conference. Most of the Chairman's rights are procedural, however, and require the concurrence of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee. The Chairman has no direct control over the State Council or the ministries which comprise the day-to-day administrative centers of government. The office of Chairman of the Republic in itself, therefore, is unimportant either for the formulation or implementation of policy. The office has been reserved for the highest ranking members of the party, Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, and the party attaches great symbolic importance to the post, since its occupant can be cast in the traditional paternal image of the Emperor.

Two bodies are directly responsible to the Chairman of the Republic: the aforementioned National Defense Council, and the Supreme State Conference. The Supreme State Conference is theoretically an advisory body consisting of the ranking personnel of all major agencies of the central government. It is convened whenever necessary by the Chairman, and sessions are usually attended by more than 300 government officials. The Supreme State Conference, as in the case of many of the other organizations described above, appears to provide merely another convenient sounding board for the explanation and publication of policy formulated by the party.

The State Council and the Premier

The State Council supervises the formulation of national plans to implement party directives and makes the necessary high-level decisions for carrying out policy. Envisioned by the constitution as the "highest administrative organ of the State," it is made up of the Premier, 16 vice premiers, and over 30 ministers and heads of commissions, together with the secretary general. The high-level membership of the State Council includes a wide range of occupational backgrounds; thus experience and competence characterize Communist China's top executive personnel.

A plenary session of the State Council is scheduled monthly to include all the above-mentioned officials. There is, however, an informal Standing Committee or "inner cabinet"-composed of the

Premier, vice premiers, and the secretary general as available-which appears to meet much more often. Premier Chou En-lai and 12 of the vice premiers belong to the Politburo of the party and the other vice premiers are important Communists. In this inner group, the Premier seems to carry by far the most weight. It is likely that in making executive decisions, the Premier is guided but not bound by the advice of his associates in the council.

The formal administrative purview of the State Council is very broad, including such diverse fields as the development of defense forces, conduct of foreign relations, formulation and execution of the national economic plan, and direction of governmental activity in the fields of culture and education, nationality affairs, and overseas Chinese.

In carrying out its duties, the State Council directs and coordinates the work of 30 ministries, plus a number of commissions and special agencies. The power of the State Council to annul or reject any "inappropriate directives" issued by the agencies for which it is responsible gives it effective control over the entire central administrative structure of government.

To date, the operation of the State Council suggests that it has in fact as well as in theory carried out its constitutional function and is the most important and active agency in government engaged in the execution of national policy. Administrative coordination by the State Council is exercised primarily through six staff offices and secondarily through the personnel in a secretariat and a premier's office. Two of the staff offices are headed by members of the Politburo, and the remainder by members of the Central Committee. The areas of concern for the staff offices are: foreign affairs, internal security and related judicial matters, education and culture, finance and trade, industry and communication, and agriculture and conservation. These staff offices are supervised by central departments of the party Central Committee. Several party leaders in effect supervise themselves, holding concurrently the central department and staff office posts.

Below the staff-office level, an extensive reorganization of the various ministries and commissions, as well as the bureaus and special agencies under the State Council, was commenced in 1957. The reorganization apparently was designed to streamline a governmental apparatus which had become increasingly topheavy and bureaucratic. Superfluous staff has been reduced by reassigning cadres to more "productive" jobs at lower levels. From a high point of 48 ministries and commissions, the number has been reduced to 39. The majoritysome 23-are concerned with economic matters, four with social matters, two with political affairs, and one with military affairs. Reorganizations of this sort have been fairly frequent since the regime was established in 1949, as the Communists keep striving for better machinery to carry out the policy lines set by the party. Foreign affairs

The especial importance of foreign policy in Communist China is indicated by the fact that until 1958, Premier Chou En-lai was his own Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is believed that the Premier still takes a direct hand in activities of the Ministry, despite his withdrawal from the post. His rank of No. 3 man in the party assures him of a continuing role in foreign policy formulation.

The Foreign Ministry itself is probably the executor rather than the formulator of general policy lines, but it is possible that the recommendations of the Ministry carry considerable weight. The temporary recall of diplomats just prior to important party conferences suggests that Foreign Ministry viewpoints are solicited by the party. Party respect for Foreign Ministry views probably has grown over the years with the increase in experience and competence of Ministry officials. In organization, the Foreign Ministry seems to have undergone a steady growth in complexity during the Communist decade. It is divided into five offices on a geographical basis and seven departments on a functional basis. The detailed structure of this organization reveals a mature administrative concept of departmental responsibility.

Geographically, there is a department for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe which is primarily concerned with Occidental bloc affairs. The Department for Asian Affairs is split into the First Asian Department, concerned with non-Communist oriental countries, and a Second Asian Department with responsibility for relations with oriental Communist countries. There is also the West Asian and African Department, concerned with the Middle East and Africa both north and south of the Sahara. The West European Department is responsible for non-Communist Europe, and the American and Australasian Department is concerned with the Western Hemisphere, Australia, and New Zealand.

Functionally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs contains a General Affairs Office, apparently of a coordinative nature, a Protocol Department, an Information Department, a Treaty and Law Department, a Consular Department or International Department-apparently concerned with international organizations—and a Personnel Depart

ment.

In March 1958, Peiping announced the apparent organization of a new office whose duties appear to overlap in some degree those of the Foreign Ministry. Called the "Office in Charge of Foreign Affairs," it has been given the status of a staff office under the State Council. It is headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but most of its top personnel do not appear to have been previously associated with the Foreign Ministry. All, however, are ranking Communists. The composition of the office indicates that its responsibility involves coordination of international activities among all ministries whose work touches international areas. This includes the Ministry of Foreign Trade, perhaps the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. One could surmise that failures in the coordination of foreign policy programs which cut across ministry lines occasioned the formation of this new staff office.

The Ministry of Public Security

The Ministry of Public Security is the center of a nationwide system of police controls which reach all the way to the local level. It does not appear to have specific responsibilities in the collection of foreign intelligence, but probably conducts such covert operations in Macao, Hong Kong, and other border areas as may be necessary to do its assigned job; a limited amount of foreign intelligence, therefore, is a byproduct of its work.

On the mainland, the Ministry is responsible for maintaining public order, preventing sabotage, guarding important government installations, and suppressing all political activity the party regards as hostile. Its components on all working levels conduct investigations, run surveillance, censor mail, make arrests, and carry out interrogations.

There probably are close ties between the Ministry of Public Security and the Social Affairs Department of the party. It is the latter which plays the more important role in formulation of national policy pertaining to matters of internal security.

V. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Economic policy in Communist China is formulated by about 10 leaders of the Communist Party and is based on the Marxist-LeninistStalinist aims of (1) socialization of private property, (2) expansion of heavy industry, (3) restriction of increases in consumption in order to channel a maximum of increases in output into investment, and (4) maintenance of large armed forces for protection in a hostile capitalistic world.

The greatest possible increase in output is a basic objective of economic policy decisions in Communist China. Just as the Soviet Union has its "storm" and "Stakhanovite" tactics, so Communist China has its "struggle targets" and its "leap forward" programs. Maintaining a balance in output is generally a secondary but nevertheless important consideration. The endeavor is to use every possible resource in order to drive the economy forward at a rapid pace, but the drive is not evenly sustained, as there are periods of ebb and flow in the energies of the drivers and the driven.

The formal method of carrying out party policy decisions on economic matters is through the government structure. In a command economy such as Communist China's, broad policy decisions of the party are translated into specific programs of action by the formulation of a national economic plan. A party structure paralleling and sometimes interlocking with that of the government, it should be noted, provides to the top leadership of the party an effective means of overseeing the economy at all levels and of exerting pressure on administrators and workers alike in order to spur them on in carrying out their economic tasks.

The division of labor between the party and the government organization in the formulation and execution of economic policy may be compared with that between the prospective homeowner, the architect, and the contractor in the building of a new home. The party has the same role as the homeowner in telling the government in general terms how it wants the building of the economy to be carried out for the next year or period of years. The government, in its role of architect, draws up the plans and, in its role of contractor, accepts the task of building the economy for the given period. At any stage the party may step in and revise the plans or complain about the manner in which the work is being done, but if the party interferes too often, the final product may be more costly and take more time to complete than originally planned. Of course, the analogy falls down with respect to the punishments that can be meted out if the construction comes off poorly.

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