Teng Hsiao-ping Lin Po-chu Tung Pi-wu Peng Te-huai Peng Chen Lo Jung-huan None. Chairman, Chinese People's Republic; Chairman, Premier, State Council, Chairman, Standing Committee of the National Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National Vice chairman, Standing Committee of the National Vice chairman, Chinese People's Republic. Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National Vice chairman, Standing Committee NPC; Vice Chen I Li Fu-chun Liu Po-cheng Ho Lung Li Hsien-nien Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State Planning Commission; Director, Office of Industry and Communication. Vice chairman, National Defense Council; Marshal, Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National Vice premier, State Council; Director, Office of Finance and Trade; Minister of Finance. Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State Economic The party Secretariat The Secretariat created by the 1956 constitution operates "under the direction" of the Politburo and its Standing Committee in attending to "the daily work of the Central Committee." Supervision and coordination of policy, rather than formulation, appears its primary responsibility. The political stature of its membership suggests that the Secretariat's powers exceed the mere monitoring and reporting of measures to implement party policy; it can and does enforce its decisions on party personnel responsible for carrying out policy directives. The Secretariat is directed by Teng Hsiao-ping who, as Secretary General of the party, has overall responsibility for translating Politburo directives into action and for supervising the subordinate departments. Teng is the only top leader concurrently a member of the three most important central organs-Politburo, Standing Committee, and Secretariat. The second through fifth ranking secretaries are also full members of the Politburo. Central organs of the party At least nine central organs function under the Secretariat. From the party standpoint, the Organization Department is probably the most important. In the past it was entrusted with many aspects of party personnel administration, including recruitment, training, promotion, allocation of cadres, and maintenance of personnel records. With regard to the party's top personnel, it has almost certainly given up some of its functions to the higher level Secretariat; but it probably is still very important in party personnel matters anywhere below the top level. The Propaganda Department is responsible for supervising and directing a part of the training-principally indoctrination-of party members through the organization of programs, schools and the like. In the main, however, it acts as the nerve center for a large system of propaganda and thought-control activities carried out at lower party levels and in the government apparatus. Its activities extend to the whole range of literary and educational work. The Social Affairs Department remains one of the most shadowy of the central organizations. It is believed to exercise the function of investigating the loyalty and security of party members, and it probably directs some intelligence, counterintelligence, and public security work. This department exercises close control over the governmental Ministry of Public Security and keeps its separate social affairs or security units in operation throughout the government and the armed forces. Army loyalty is a concern of the General Political Department, empowered by the party constitution with taking "charge of the ideological and organizational work of the party in the army. The United Front Department is concerned with the puppet political parties that exist in China's democratic facade, important non-Communist figures, national minority groups, and overseas Chinese. The department and its local branches are responsible for maintaining liaison with these individuals and groups and enlisting their cooperation and support. The tasks of the Rural Work Department and the Industrial Work Department are parallel. Rural conditions are investigated by the former, and party policy in the field of agriculture is implemented by it. The Industrial Work Department seems responsible for activities in industrial enterprises, and branches of it may exist for heavy, light, and local industry. The Finance and Trade Department has apparently been newly raised to departmental status. Finance and trade committees existed on the provincial level for some years, and the establishment of a department was probably necessitated by the increasingly complex problems in these fields. The department's main concern would be with party committees which supervise governmental activities in finance, trade, taxation, banking, and food distribution. Also relatively new is the Communications Work Department, organized in 1956. This organ replaced the party's older political departments in the ministries of railways, communications, and posts and telecommunications. There is also a Liaison Department for contacts with other Communist parties. Peiping does not identify this department publicly. Under the party constitution, departmental organs are authorized at the local as well as the provincial level of party heirarchy. For example, the central committee of a province has departments responsible to it which are roughly parallel to the organs considered above, and serve to implement party policy at the provincial level. In addition to the party's central departments, various party committees operate under the guidance of the Secretariat. Whereas the departments are standing bodies, the committees appear to be convened irregularly to enunciate policy. For example, the Women's Work Committee periodically states party policy in the realm of women's activities. Branches of the party reach into every government office. The party groups work in two ways: first by stating party policy in the office; and second by sending reports to higher party organizations which can give any necessary instructions to the higher level government office. Such a system must inevitably result in complex and difficult relations between higher and lower governmental offices. This in turn must involve the Communist regime in an even sterner struggle against rank growth in the bureaucracy than is the case in states where the party is not so closely identified with government. However, it does promote continuing vigilance to ensure that executive decisions are consistent with party-formulated policy. III. THE PARTY AND THE ARMED FORCES Although party supremacy over the army is a cardinal Communist doctrine, the "military viewpoint" in China does carry some weight in the formulation of national policy. Five members of the party Politburo made their mark as combat leaders, others attained prominence as political officers in the armed forces. Continuous indoctrination of military personnel is designed to promote viewpoints in line with party thinking on major issues. The party Politburo, or Standing Committee acting for the Politburo, is the ultimate arbiter of military policy. At a lower level in the party, the Military Committee may make policy recommendations. The committee which meets irregularly is important in articulating policy and has explained major policy lines in several long sessions. One meeting ran from late in May to late in July 1958. Construction work by the army was checked, policies for strengthening the army were reviewed, and discussions held on "national defense vis-a-vis the current international situation." Mao spoke at the session, as did a number of army marshals. Aside from its role in policy formulation, the committee may also take an occasional direct hand in deciding on particular details of military work. For example, a "directive" of the Chinese Communist Party Military Committee "stipulated" the integration of the militia and the reserves in 1957. In the government, the Ministry of Defense implements the general directives issued by the party's Military Committee and engages in the routine business of operating the military machine on the mainland. Such weight as the ministry carries in actual policy formation derives from the high party rank of its officials. The present minister is a member of the inner core of power, the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Under the government constitution, one other organization, the National Defense Council, is concerned with military affairs. It has at most an advisory role; more likely it exists as a purely honorific body. It has been convened only four times for sessions of 2 days each since 1954. Many of its members are not Communists. Almost one-third of its members are former Chinese Nationalist generals and it includes a fairly large number of party faithfuls who have been, so to speak, put out to pasture. IV. THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT Insofar as broad national policy is concerned, the government in China is clearly subservient to the party. As the Chinese put it, "In all departments of state, all decisions on important questions are made on the proposal and according to the directives of the party." The correct policy line having been indicated, it becomes the general duty of the government to formulate and execute plans for the implementation of policy. Party committees both inside and outside the various organs of government monitor performance to ensure compliance with policy directives. The National People's Congress In theory, ultimate governmental authority resides in a system of people's congresses on the village, county, provincial, and national level. Popular election is constitutionally provided at the village level, while at higher levels delegates are elected by the next lower congress. But the democratic patina is thin, since all candidates are screened by the party prior to election so that only "safe" candidates stand and are elected. At the apex of the congressional pyramid is a body known as the National People's Congress, defined in the 1954 constitution as "the highest organ of state authority" in Communist China and the "exclusive legislative authority in the country." In practice, the National People's Congress has no real power and acts primarily as a sounding board for Communist policy statements and as a channel for transmitting party policy to the nation. An examination of the congress to date bears this out. Sessions have been short, voting has been characterized by "unanimous decision," and speeches have parroted the party line after it has been explained to the session. |