2. TITLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS This title was enacted into positive law by Act July 30, Rules of construction Acts and resolutions; formalities of enactment; repeals; sealing of Instruments 3. Code of Laws of United States and Supplements; District of Columbla Code and Supplements Seo. 101 - 201 TABLE Showing where former sections of Title 1 and the laws from which such former sections were derived, have been incorporated in revised Title 1. Title I Former Sections .R.S., § 1 Revised Statutes .... ... Title I New Sections 6. .June 11, 1940, c. 325, § 1, 54 Stat. 305 6 .Mar. 3, 1933, c. 202, § 3, 47 Stat. 1431 .Mar. 2, 1929, c. 586, § 1, 45 Stat. 1540 113 114 201 202 203 204 .... .... 205 Title I Sections 54b... 54c.. 54d. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59... 60.. Revised Statutes Statutes at Large .Mar. 2, 1929, c. 586, § 5, 45 Stat. 1542 Positive Law; Citation. Title I New Sections 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 . Rep. This title has been made positive law by section 1 of Act July 30, 1947, c. 388, 61 Stat. 633, which provided in part that: "Title 1 of the United States Code entitled 'General Provisions', is codified and enacted into positive law and may be cited as '1 U.S.C., § Repeals. Section 2 of Act July 30, 1947, c. 388, 61 Stat. 633, repealed the sections or parts thereof of the Statutes at Large or the Revised Statutes covering provisions codified in this Act, insofar as such provisions appeared in Title 1, U.S.Code, 1940 edition, with a proviso that "any rights or liabilities now existing under such repealed sections or parts thereof shall not be affected by such repeal." Congressional Comment: For legislative history and purpose of Act July 30, 1947, see 1947 U.S.Code Cong.Service, p. 1511. Sec. CHAPTER 1-RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 1. Words denoting number, gender, etc. 2. "County" as including "parish", etc. Sec. 5. "Company" or "association" as including successors and assigns. 3. "Vessel" as including all means of wa- 6. Limitation of term "products ter transportation. American fisheries." "Vehicle" as including all means of land transportation. § 1. Words denoting number, gender, and so forth of In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things; words importing the plural include the singular; words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well; words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present; the words "insane" and "insane person" and "lunatic" shall include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non compos mentis; the words "person" and "whoever" include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals; "officer" includes any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office; "signature" or "subscription" includes a mark when the person making the same intended it as such; "oath" includes affirmation, and "sworn" includes affirmed: "writing" includes printing and typewriting and reproductions of visual symbols by photographing, multigraphing, mimeographing, manifolding, or otherwise. July 30, 1947, c. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633, amended June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 6, 62 Stat. 859; Oct. 31, 1951, c. 655, § 1, 65 Stat. 710. 1951 Amendment. Act Oct. 31, 1951 amended section by substituting, in fourth clause after opening clause, "used" in lieu of "use". 1948 Amendment. Act June 25, 1948, cited to text, amended section to include within the definitions the words "tense". "whoever", "signature", "subscription", and "writing" and a broader definition of the term "person". Effective date. Section 20 of Act June 25, 1948, cited to text, provided that the amendment of this section should be effective as of Sept. 1, 1948. Section 48 Continental United States. of Pub.L. 86-70, June 25, 1959, 73 Stat. 154, provided that: "Whenever the phrase 'continental United States' is used in any law of the United States enacted after the date of enactment of this Act [June 25, 1959], it shall mean the 49 States on the North American Continent and the District of Columbia, unless otherwise expressly provided." Writs of error. Section 23 of Act June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 990, amended section 2 of Act Jan. 31, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, to provide that: "All Acts of Congress referring to writs of error shall be construed as amended to the extent necessary to substitute appeal for writ of error." Cross References. Affirmation in lieu of oath, see section 43(b) of Title 11. Bankruptcy. Definitions applying to Internal Revenue Code, see section 7701 of Title 26. Internal Revenue Code. Word "person" as including associations, see section 1401 (d) of Title 19, Customs Duties, section 801 of Title 46, Shipping, and section 30 of Title 47, Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Affirmation in lieu of oath, see Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43. Title 28, U.S. C.A. Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Act Oct. 31, 1951, see 1951 U.S.Code Cong.Service, p. 2578. 2. Construction with other laws Section 835 of Title 18 making Interstate Commerce Commission regulations pertaining to safe transport of dangerous articles binding on all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce and providing that whoever knowingly violates such regulations shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, must be construed in light of this section setting forth rule that in determining meaning of Act of Congress, unless context indicates otherwise, the words "person" and "whoever" includes partnerships, and in light of congressional intent to insure compliance by all motor carriers, whether organized as corporations, joint stock companies, partnerships or individual proprietorships, with Commission's safety requirements, and consequently word "whoever" includes partnerships. U. S. v. A & P Trucking Co., N.J.1958, 79 S.Ct. 203, 358 U.S. 121, 3 L.Ed.2d 165. Construction of section 102 of Title 35 that one is not entitled to patent if invention was patented or described in printed publication in United States or foreign country or was in public use or on sale in United States more than one year prior to date of application is subject to this section providing that in determining meaning of any Act of Congress, words importing singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, unless context shows that words were intended to be used in more limited sense. ter, 1965, 343 F.2d certiorari denied 88 966, 16 L.Ed.2d 307, S.Ct. 1441, 384 U.S. 1. "Words importing singular or plural number" Application of Fos980, 52 CCPA 1808, S.Ct. 1270, 383 U.S. rehearing denied 86 934, 16 L.Ed.2d 535. Though Tariff Act of 1930, § 522 (c) of Title 31, speaks only of certification of "buying rate" by Federal Reserve Bank of New York, use of the singular does not preclude certification of more than one rate for particular foreign currency. Barr v. U. S., 1945, 65 S.Ct. 522, 324 U.S. 83, 89 L.Ed. 765 Where under reorganization of government of District of Columbia, a single commissioner was assigned executive functions while council was assigned quasi-legislative functions and, under former law, both functions had been exercised by three-member board of commissioners, this section providing that, in determining meaning of act, words imparting plural include singular was not applicable to permit prosecution under D.C.C. E. 8 22-702 prohibiting receiving money for procuring any office or promotion from the commissioners of District of Columbia. U. S. v. Bishton, D.C.App.1970, 264 A.2d 139. 8. "Person" Where Congress made express provision in this section for the term "person" to extend to partnerships and corporations and to associations, the absence of any comparable provision in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, sections 101115 of Title 29, extending the term to sovereign governments implied that Congress did not desire the term to extend to them. U. S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 1947, 67 S.Ct. 677, 330 U.S 258. 91 L.Ed. 884. Under this section providing that, in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, the words "person" and "whoever" includes corporations as well as individuals, the term "corporation" clearly includes corporations formed under state law. U. S. v. Polizzi, C.A.Cal. 1974, 500 F.2d 856, certiorari denied 95 S. Ct. 802, 803, 419 U.S. 1120, 42 L.Ed.2d 820. Officer 6. An officer of the Army or the Navy is in general, a person holding office under the United States. 1943, 40 Op.Atty. Gen. Dec. 23. 7. Oath Where defendant is follower of minority religion which is unpopular with many persons in community, it is better practice to permit him to affirm and have any questions on subject of his religion asked out of presence of jury. U. S. v. Rabb, C.A.N.J.1968, 394 F.2d 230. § 2. "County" as including “parish", and so forth The word "county" includes a parish, or any other equivalent subdivision of a State or Territory of the United States. c. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633. Library references: Statutes 199; C.J.S. Statutes § 338. July 30, 1947, § 3. "Vessel” as including all means of water transportation The word "vessel" includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. July 30, 1947, c. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633. Cross References. "Vessel", definition as relating to Contraband articles, see section 787 (a) of Title 49, Transportation. Medical care of seamen under public health laws, see section 201 of Title Prize captures, see section 7561 of Title 10, Armed Forces. Shipping laws, see sections 170(1), 183, 188, 248, 713. 801, 888, 971 and 1271 Water carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, see section 902(f) of 1. "Transportation" ca sense in"Vessel" in the broadest cludes every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used, or pable of being used, as a means of transwater portation on Trinidad Corp. v. American S. S Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, C.A.N.Y.1956, 229 F.2d 57, certiorari denied 76 S.Ct. 1032, 351 U.S. 966, 100 L.Ed. 1486. As respects whether deceased was excepted from section 903 of Title 33 as "a member of the crew of any vessel," word "vessel" generally includes any description of water craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, C.C.A. Fla.1938, 94 F.2d 190. Under section 183 of Title 46 describing "vessel" as artificial contrivance used, or "capable" of being used, as a means of transportation on water, "capable" is to be read as "practically capable." Petition of Kansas City Bridge Co. (D.C.Mo.1937) 19 F.Supp. 419. 2. Manner of propulsion A rowboat less than 16 feet long, capable of carrying three men and propelled by one oar at its stern, is not a "vessel" S. Barges, canal boats, etc. Law а For purposes of determining existence of admiralty jurisdiction, showboat, which was capable of being used as means of transportation on water, was a "vessel" within broad definition of term. Clinton Bd. of Park Com'rs v. Claussen, D.C.Iowa 1976, 410 F.Supp. 320. A barge, even without motive power of its own, is a "vessel" within definition of this section and can have a crew. Johnson v. C. F. Harms Co., 1946, 55 A.2d 165, 25 N.J.Misc. 457. were classified as articles not specially provided for, in chief value of steel, under par. 397, former section 1001 of Title 19, and though plaintiff claimed that the midbodies were not "articles" within the purview of Tar iff Act of 1930, chapter 4 of Title 19, but at the time of their arrival in the United States, were, in fact, barges and entitled as "vessels" to exemption from duties under section 1401(a) of Title 19 and this section, the record established that the the United midbodies were towed to States, not as a means of transportation on water, but were designed and intended solely to serve as midsections between the separated bow and stern sections of tankers available in the United States, for the purpose of enlarging the cargo carrying capacity of the tankers, and since the midbodies, at the time of their arrival in the United States, were not designed or intended as a means of transportation on water, they were not barges, and so were not vessels. Todd Shipyards Corporation v. U. S., 1969, 63 Cust.Ct. 165, C.D. 3891. So-called "midbodies" |