therefor, in the words and figures follow-deed. F. H. HALL, Manager of Pomona ing: "$50. Pomona, September 30, 1882. Land & Water Company." [Seal.] Recd. of W. M. Bayles fifty dollars on ac--That on the 24th day of January, 1883, the count for lot 6, block 32, for which a con- said Bayles, for a good and valuable considtract will be given on payment of balance eration, assigned and transferred to the of one-third of contract price of two hun- plaintiff all his interest in said lot and said dred dollars. F. H. HALL, Agt. for Pomo- agreement, and the plaintiff thereupon enna Co." That within a few days there- tered into possession of said lot, with the after, on the 30th day of October, 1882, in knowledge and consent of Hall, agent as pursuance of their plan for the sale of said aforesaid, plowed the whole of said lot, and lots and lands, said Mills and Wicks formed put substantial improvements thereon; with others a corporation by the name of that said Bayles and the plaintiff kept and the Pomona Land & Water Company, with performed all the conditions of said agreeits capital stock divided into 5,000 shares; ment to be kept by them, paid the sum of that Mills and Wicks owned 4,180 of said $66, the first payment of said purchase price, shares, and the other three shareholders and tendered to the Pomona Land & Water necessary to form a corporation represented Company the sum of $67, and interest there820 of said shares, and for the purpose of on to date, according to the terms of said carrying out said enterprise for the sale of agreement; that on the 28th day of Sepsaid lots and land they transferred the tember, 1883, and on the 29th day of Sepsame to said corporation, excepting from tember, 1884, plaintiff tendered the said the operation of said assignment all lots company the sum of $134, and interest thereand land already conveyed to them by on to date, being the whole balance of said Louis Phillips, and that Hall continued to purchase money, according to the terms of act as agent for the sale of said lots in the said agreement, and demanded the execusame manner as before said transfer; that tion of a deed of conveyance; and the comsaid Hall made 39 sales of said lots and pany refused to accept said payments and lands, including the sale of the lot in ques- execute the deed, but made no objections to tion to Bayles, as such manager and agent the terms thereof, or to said tenders; that for Mills and Wicks; that before they as- on the 27th day of November, 1886, he tendsigned the same to said company, and aft-ered to the defendant the sum of $176.90, erwards, the said Mills and Wicks supplied said agent, Hall, with printed blanks, containing the name of the said Pomona Land & Water Company, printed thereon as vendor, and instructed the said agent, Hall, to use the same in making contracts for sales thereof to be made, and expressly directed and instructed said agent to fill out said blanks with the terms of sale, and deliver them to all purchasers, including said Bayles, to whom sales of lots had already been made by them in their individual capacity; and that Hall carried out said instructions, whereby Bayles was induced to believe that said agreement was adopted by said company; that on the 21st day of September, 1882, Bayles, under and in pursuance of his said agreement, paid to Hall, then acting as the manager and agent for the sale of said lots and lands, the further sum of $16, and that Hall, pursuant to said instructions given as aforesaid, filled out and delivered to Bayles one of the said printed blanks, supplied by Mills and Wicks for the purpose, in the words and figures following:

66 POMONA LAND AND WATER COMPANY. "Pomona, Los Angeles, September 28, 1882. Received of William Bayles, fifty dollars, deposit on contract for purchase of lot six, (6,) in block thirty-two, (32,) according to the map of Pomona. Contract duly recorded in book 3, pp. 90 and 91, of miscellaneous records of Los Angeles county, subject to the conditions in a formal contract as to cleaning streets, improvements, etc., said price being $200, and terms of payment, $16 to make the one-third on demand, $67 payable September 28, 1883, $67 payable September 28, 1884. Deferred payments to bear 8 per cent. interest, payable annually. And the said William Bayles, in consideration of the premises, hereby agrees to purchase said property for the same price and on the terms above set out; this to be surrendered on delivery of formal contract or

being the full amount of the purchase money remaining unpaid, and tendered a deed of bargain and sale for execution, and the defendant specified no objections to said tender, nor to the terms of said conveyance, but declined to receive said purchase money, and refused to execute said conveyance; that by a deed dated December 4, 1882, Louis Phillips conveyed said lot to said Mills and Wicks, and by a deed dated February 23, 1883, said Wicks conveyed his interest therein to said Mills, and by a deed dated September 21, 1883, while plaintiff was in possession of said lot under said agreement, Mills, knowing that plaintiff was so in possession, conveyed said lot to one Charles French, who had full knowledge of plaintiff's possession under said agreement, and the other facts herein set forth, and that French was in the employ of said Pomona Land & Water Company under said Mills and Wicks, and paid no consideration for said conveyance; that Mills died on the 20th day of April, 1884, and his wife was appointed his administratrix, and included this lot in the inventory of the property of said estate; that in May, 1883, the plaintiff had notice that the Pomona Land & Water Company repudiated the alleged agreement; that said French, from the time of his deed from Mills, asserted to plaintiff his ownership of the lot, and disputed the possession thereof; that French, some time in 1884, removed plaintiff's improvements, but plaintiff replaced them within two or three months, and for a short period of that year leased the premises; and that the house and fence erected by him remained on the property until removed by the defendant in October, 1886; and that French, for a short time just previous to his deed to defendant, leased the property; and that the defendant entered on the lot October 20, 1886, but did not oust plaintiff; that in February, 1883, said Wicks, as attorney for the Pomo na Land & Water Company, wrote the

findings where they support their case, and where they are against them the findings are ignored, and the evidence in respondent's favor, and against said findings, is used instead. By thus combining the two, and holding fast only to that which seems to them to be good, they have convinced themselves that "the case is too plain for argument." This we cannot do, and perhaps for that reason we are unable to agree with counsel. Taking the facts as we have them in the findings we consider the points relied upon by the respondent:

1. As to the point that the original receipt given at the time the first payment of $50 was made was not sufficient, we agree with counsel; but this was not intended to constitute the contract, but simply as a memorandum showing the payment of the money, and it was stated therein that a contract would be given upon the payment of the balance of the one-third payment; and such a contract was afterwards executed. For this reason we regard this receipt as of no great importance.

plaintiff a letter, notifying him that Hall | contract subsequently given by Hall, were had acted without authority in making the not executed by the then owners, Wicks and contract, and that the same was repudi- Mills, but by the Pomona Land & Water ated, and offered him $100 if he would re- Company, in its name, and were otherwise turn the receipt for cancellation, but that indefinite and insufficient. (4) That the Wicks had not been authorized by the com- action was commenced too late. In discusspany to write such a letter; that neither ing these questions counsel for respondent Wicks nor Mills knowingly or intentionally have not confined themselves to the findratified or confirmed the contract, or vol-ings, but have very ingeniously used the untarily accepted any benefits or obligations thereof; that the said Mills and Wicks, by their acts and conversation aforesaid, induced the said Bayles to purchase said lot from them by their said agent, Hall; that said printed blank was used, and the agreement in the name of the Pomona Land & Water Company delivered as aforesaid by Hall, agent as aforesaid, and accepted by Bayles because Mills and Wicks instructed Hall to use the same for that purpose, and not by reason of any fault or neglect of said Bayles or the plaintiff, and the use thereof caused Bayles to believe that said agreement was adopted by said company, promoted by said Mills and Wicks as aforesaid; that the use of said printed blanks caused the plaintiff to believe that said sale was in fact originally made by said company, as therein specified; that Mills and Wicks never demanded payment of the balance of the purchase money of said lot, nor communicated to plaintiff the fact that said sale was made by them in their individual capacity, but, on the contrary, further gave the plaintiff cause to believe that said sale was made by said company, and denied that plaintiff had any interest in said lot, and attempted to disaffirm said sale, alleging as a ground that said Pomona Land & Water Company never acquired title to said lot, and that, therefore, said Hall never had authority to sell the same; that all the deeds of conveyance referred to above were recorded immediately after their respective dates, and the plaintiff had constructive notice thereof; and that about the time the defendant ousted plaintiff, as aforesaid, plaintiff first learned that said sale was made in the act-request of one of them, the money paid was ual presence of said Mills and Wicks, under their direction, for them, in their individual capacity, by said agent, Hall, and that said Mills and Wicks had taken a conveyance of said lot from said Louis Phillips to themselves, and recorded the same on the day preceding said transfer of their said contract with Louis Phillips to said company, and thereby prevented said company from acquiring title to said lot; that the plaintiff's supposed cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations. This suit was commenced December 10, 1886. On these findings the court concluded in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals. It is contended by the plaintiff that he was entitled to judgment on these findings, and that the cause should be reversed on that ground. In this contention the appellant is clearly right. We do not know upon what ground the court below concluded that the plaintiff's case was not made out, but counsel for respondent attempt to justify the decision on four grounds: (1) That the original receipt given by Hall did not constitute a sufficient contract of sale. (2) That Hall had no authority to make the sale, not having been authorized in writing. (3) That the original receipt, and the

We regard the question of Hall's authority to make the sale as of no greater consequence, in view of the other facts found. It may be conceded that an appointment in writing was necessary to authorize him to make a binding sale, (Civil Code, § 1624,) and that no subsequent parol ratification or acknowledgment by the principal is sufficient. Videau v. Griffin, 21 Cal. 390; Blum v. Robertson, 24 Cal. 142. But here the sale was in legal effect made by the principals. Videau v. Griffin, 21 Cal. 391, 392. It was made in their actual presence, and, at the

handed to the other immediately. It is true the court finds that the sale was not made under the personal direction of the owners, and that they did not knowingly or intentionally ratify or confirm the said contract of sale, nor voluntarily accept any of the obligations or benefits thereof, but these conclusions are clearly disputed by the facts found. They did voluntarily receive the cash payments at the time it was made, and the court finds that they afterwards instructed Hall to make a contract for the property. The facts show that the only reason for the finding that they did not knowingly or intentionally ratify or affirm the contract of sale was that they did not know the location of the lot, or, in other words, the lot was a better one than they supposed when they sold it and accepted the purchase money, and therefore they wanted to escape from the contract.

The findings further show that the purchaser took possession under his contract, and made valuable improvements on the property with the knowledge of these partics. Besides, the court finds, throughout these findings in various places, that Hall was the agent of these parties, and that they did the acts relied upon by the plain

by their said agent, Hall," which, it seems to us, presents the strongest possible case against them. If they did not know the location of the lot that was being sold, as claimed, their want of knowledge must be attributed to their own want of care. They cannot, in view of these facts, be heard to deny such knowledge. It is contended that this was not the contract of Mills and Wicks, but of the Pomona Land & Water Company. It is true, the contract is signed by Hall as the manager of the company, but the findings show clearly that the con

they had, before the organization of the corporation, adopted and used the name afterwards given to the corporation, and that they instructed their agent, Hall, to prepare and sign the contract in that form. They had the right to adopt and contract in a name not their own, and, having contracted in that name and received the benefits thereof, they cannot be allowed to impeach it on that ground.

tiff through him. The court finds in one place that Hall did not have "full" authority; but what is meant by the word full in this connection is left to conjecture. The finding on the point is: "All allegations of the several paragraphs of the complaint, which are respectively numbered and marked 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, are true, except that F. H. Hall did not, as alleged in paragraph 2, have full authority to act for the said Mills and Wicks in the sale of the lots and lands referred to therein but, if it be essential, I am unable, from the evidence, to define with exactness the extent of his gen-tract was that of Mills and Wicks, and that eral authority." This finding as to authority relates, not to this sale particularly, but to an allegation in the complaint that Hall was appointed to be manager at Pomona, "with full authority to act for them" in the sale of all of the lands then held for sale by them at that place, and the following specific allegation of the complaint, relating to this particular sale, is found to be true: "That on the 28th day of September, 1882, the said Mills and Wicks were in pos- Again, it is urged that the contract was session of the said lot of land hereinabove too uncertain and indefinite to authorize particularly described, under said agree- the relief sought. We do not think so. ment for the purchase thereof from Louis The land is accurately described; and the Phillips, and did then at Pomona aforesaid, amount, and time of making the payments, by their said agent, F. H. Hall, make and are clearly stated. There are but two eleenter into a verbal agreement with one ments of uncertainty in the contract. It is William Bayles, whereby the said Mills and made "subject to the conditions in a forWicks agreed to sell, and the said William mal contract as to clearing streets, imBayles agreed to purchase, the said lot of provements," etc. This evidently refers to land described as lot 6, as aforesaid, for the a "formal" contract that was expected to sum of $200, on the terms set out in the sev-be made in the future, and, if it was too unenth paragraph of this complaint." And certain to uphold this clause or to bind the the court further finds in express terms that vendee to the condition attempted to be the allegation of the complaint is true that imposed, it can furnish no ground upon they instructed their said agent to make which the vendors could repudiate the conout this and the other contracts, where tract. It is nowhere shown that the resales had been made, and how to make and fusal to consummate the agreement was execute them, and that in pursuance of ever placed on any such ground, or that any these instructions he did execute the con- question was ever made as to the conditions tract, and that the plaintiff, as the assignee intended to be imposed by this clause in of said contract, entered into possession the contract. If such a "formal" contract and made improvements. This, it seems to existed, and the parties contracted with us, was a sufficient finding of the agency; reference to it, the question might have but, if not, the conduct of the vendors of been raised in respect to the form of the the property was such as to estop them deed, when demanded, and, if a deed with from denying it, or asserting any claim to the conditions relied upon had been refused, the property on the ground of his want of the vendors might have been justified in re authority. To permit the vendors of land fusing to execute one without such condi to repudiate the acts of their supposed tions. But we do not regard this as such agent, under such circumstances, would be an element of uncertainty as will vitiate to sanction a clear and palpable fraud, and the whole contract. The court finds that this cannot be done, even under the guise no objection was made to the form of the of the statute of frauds. Sedg. & W. Tr. deed tendered for execution when the purTitle Land, §§ 844-847; Fry, Spec. Perf. 259, chase money was tendered. The further 260; Bigelow, Estop. (3d Ed.) 470, 513. It objection made to the contract is that it is a well-settled rule of estoppel that one provides that it shall be surrendered “on who with knowledge accepts the proceeds delivery of formal contract or deed." The of an unauthorized sale of his property is apparent reason for having drawn the conestopped to dispute the validity of the sale. tract in such form as to call for either a Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410,433; France contract or a deed is that at the time the v. Haynes, 67 Iowa, 139, 25 N. W. Rep. 98; contract was executed the vendors had no Schenck v. Sautter, 73 Mo. 46; Moore v. Hill, deed, but were holding under a contract. 85 N. C. 218; Field v. Doyon, 64 Wis. 560, 25 It was the evident intention that if they N. W. Rep. 653; Booth v. Wiley, 102 Ill. 84, procured a deed before the final payment of 107. See, also, as bearing on this point, Es- the purchase money a deed was to be execolle v. Franks, 67 Cal. 137, 7 Pac. Rep. 425. cuted; if not, a contract for a deed. But, In this case the vendors stood by and saw whether this be so or not, it clearly appears the sale made, and accepted the purchase from the contract itself that the vendee money, in the presence of the vendee, and was to have their title to the property the court finds that they, "by their acts upon payment of the purchase money, and and conversation aforesaid, induced the the time was definitely fixed by the time of said Bayles to purchase said lot from them the final payment of the purchase money,

and surrender of the contract. We think | render judgment on the findings in favor of the contract was sufficient to authorize the the plaintiff.

relief prayed for.

We concur:

(80 Cal. 82)

MARSHALL et al. v. HANCOCK et al. (No. 13,058.)

(Supreme Court of California. Aug. 2, 1889.) APPEAL-PROOF OF HANDWRITING.

1. The refusal of a court to allow a question to be answered by a witness will not be considered on appeal, where there is nothing in the record to show what the proposed testimony was.

3. The evidence of a deceased person, given in a suit between different parties and involving another subject-matter, is not competent, under Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1870, subd. 8, rendering the testimony of a deceased person, given in a former action between the same parties, competent.

In bank. Appeal from superior court, San Bernardino county; E. PARKER, Judge.

Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1870, subd. 8, provides that the testimony of a deceased witness, given in a former action between the same parties, relating to the same matter, shall be competent.

Paris, Goodcell & Fox, John McIntyre, and J. J. De Puy, for appellants. Barclay, Wilson & Carpenter, Rowell & Rowell, H. C. Rolfe, Harris & Gregg, and M. T. Allen, for respondents.

Lastly, it is claimed that the action was PATERSON, J.; THORNTON, brought too late. Cases are cited by coun- J.; MCFARLAND, J.; SHARPSTEIN, J. sel in which shorter delays were held to be fatal, but each case must depend upon its own circumstances. There is no absolute bar short of the time fixed by the statute of limitations. There is nothing of unfairness or injustice in allowing the appellant his remedy in this case after the delay complained of. It is perfectly apparent from the findings and the evidence that there was a systematic and persistent effort all 2. To show that a signature to a deed was that of along on the part of Mills and Wicks to mislead the plaintiff and prevent his get-tice of the peace, and his docket was identified, and one W., deceased, it was proven that he was a justing title to the property. It was not trans- certain signatures shown to have been those of W. ferred to the corporation, but he was al- Held, that under Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1944, prolowed to believe it was, if not led to that viding that evidence respecting handwriting may belief by these parties. Wicks conveyed to be given by comparison with writings shown to be Mills, and Mills conveyed to one French, an genuine, an expert could testify that the signatures on the record and the one on the deed were in the employé, without consideration for the consame handwriting. veyance, and French, acting undoubtedly for Mills, endeavored to get possession of the property, and claimed that he was the owner, and tore down the appellant's improvements. That French held the title for Mills, and with the sole purpose of attempting to deprive the appellant of the property, is apparent from the fact that upon the death of Mills, although French held Mills' deed for the property, it was inventoried by the widow as a part of the estate. French conveyed the same to the respondent, who admits in his brief in this court that he holds it as a trustee for the widow. In other words, so far as it affects this question of delay in bringing the action, this property must be regarded as having been the property of the original vendors all along, and that they have been attempting to keep it out of the appellant's reach. Besides, one of the very material facts in the case, and one without which probably he could not have recovered, was that this contract was The controverted question in the court made in the actual presence of the owners, below was as to the genuineness of a deed and the money paid to and received by from one Michael White and wife to Henry them, and this was not discovered by the Hancock, under which the defendants appellant until a very short time before claimed to be the owners of one-half of the bringing this suit. Without a knowledge real estate in controversy. The deed apof this fact, if there were no others tending peared upon its face to have been regularly to excuse his delay, he might well have hes- executed and acknowledged. The plainitated about bringing the suit; and, taking tiffs claimed it to be a forgery, and that this circumstance together with the conduct Michael White was out of the state at the of the vendors, we are not inclined, on the time it purported to have been signed and mere ground of delay in bringing the action, acknowledged. The court below, after to deny the appellant his rights. The hearing testimony as to the execution of court finds that the deeds bringing the title the deed, held the same to have been exedown to the respondent were recorded im-cuted, and admitted it in evidence. The apmediately after their execution, and were pellants assign several errors upon rulings constructive notice to the appellant. Con- made during the hearing, and claim that ceding this, it makes the effort to mislead the decision of the court that the deed was the appellant only the more apparent; but genuine was not sustained by the evidence. the doctrine of constructive notice has ap-A witness called by the plaintiff testified plication only to a subsequent purchaser that he knew White; that he was at or incumbrancer, and can have no bearing White's house, on the ranch, cultivated his on the question presented here. The find-land, and had a conversation with him. ing that the Pomona Land & Water Com- He was then asked what the conversation pany notified the appellant that it repudiated the contract was immaterial, for the reason that that company never had any title to the property, and was not a party to the contract, or interested in it in any way. Judgment and order reversed, with instructions to the court below to conform its conclusions of law to this opinion, and

WORKS, J. Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendants. Motion for new trial overruled. Plaintiff appeals.

was. To this question the defendants objected, and the objection was sustained. This is assigned as error. We do not know from the record before us whether the court erred in this ruling or not. Where the ques tion itself does not indicate whether the answer to it will be material evidence or not, the party seeking to introduce the evi

dence must, in order to present the question | the deed in controversy. The admission of to this court, make an offer of what he pro- this testimany was erroneous. 1 Greenl. poses to prove, so that the court below Ev. §§ 125, 163; Code Civil Proc. § 1870. But and this court can determine whether the we have examined the evidence carefully, proposed proof is material or not. There and find nothing in it to prejudice the apis nothing in the record to show what the pellants. Therefore, the ruling of the court, proposed testimony was. The question in- although erroneous, was harmless, and we dicated nothing of the kind. The witness cannot reverse the case on that ground. is asked for a conversation between White Certain other items of evidence are objectand himself. The conversation, if there ed to, on the ground of immateriality. was one, may have been about a matter The court seems to have given rather too entirely aside from the matter under inves-wide a range to the evidence on the questigation. Therefore the record fails to tion as to the genuineness of this deed, but, show any error in this ruling. In order to upon a careful examination of the evidence, show the absence of White at the time the it does not appear to us that there was deed purported to have been executed, the anything in the rulings or in the evidence plaintiffs proved by his wife that he left admitted that could have worked the aphome, and that she accompanied him part pellants any injury. The point is made of the way. She was then asked if, when that the decision of the court on this quesshe bid him good-bye, he told her where he tion was not sustained by the evidence, but was going. This was objected to, and the we think otherwise. Judgment and order objection sustained. This question is like affirmed. the one above referred to. There was no offer to prove any statement that would have tended to corroborate the testimony J.; SHARPSTEIN, J. of other witnesses that he went to Lower California, nor did the question indicate

We concur: MCFARLAND, J.; PATERSON,

(No. 12,684.)

(80 Cal. 189)

August Heilbron and three co-tenants of land lying on Kings river brought this action against the 76 Land & Water Company, a corporation, to enjoin it from an illegal diversion of the water of said stream. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

that such would be her answer. We can- HEILBRON et al. v. 76 LAND & WATER CO. not assume error in order to reverse the case, nor can we, for the purpose of sustaining the appellants' position, presume (Supreme Court of California. Aug. 5, 1889.) what he fails to show, viz., that the anRIPARIAN RIGHTS-INJUNCTION. swer of the witness would have been maWhile an upper riparian owner cannot divert terial if it had been allowed. The defend-water for sale or use on non-riparian lands, or ants, in order to prove that the name of unreasonably use or divert the water to the injury White to the deed was in his hand writing, of owners further down the stream, it is error, proved that White had, prior to that time, upon enjoining him from such unauthorized diver been a justice of the peace. A record from into a canal constructed by him for the purpose of sion, to require him to permit no water to flow the clerk's office, shown to have been irrigating non-riparian land, but which, though his docket, kept by him as such justice, not so intended, can be used to irrigate his riparian was offered in evidence, and certain sig-land, and compel him to close up his canal, as he natures of White appearing therein were may hereafter desire to use it legitimately, either shown by a witness to have been in to water riparian land, or to carry off surplus water White's handwriting. This was followed in time of flood, when no one below him would be by expert evidence to the effect that the sig-injured thereby. natures in the record and the one to the In bank. Commissioners' decision. Apdeed were in the same handwriting. The peal from superior court, Tulare county; appellants contend that the record admit- WILLIAM W. CROSS, Judge. ted in evidence was not sufficiently authenticated or proved to be a public record kept by White. But this was entirely unnecessary. The evidence was not offered to prove the contents of the record, or to establish any fact. The name appearing therein was the only material thing. It could make no difference whether the name offered appeared in a public record, a private writing, or on a blank piece of paper. If admitted, or proved to the satisfaction of the judge, to be genuine, it could BELCHER, C. C. Action to enjoin the diproperly be compared with the handwrit- version of water. The complaint was filed ing in controversy, for the purpose of show- November 18, 1884, and the facts alleged ing that the latter was genuine. Code therein are, in substance, as follows: The Civil Proc. §§ 1943, 1944. Of course, the rec-plaintiffs are, and for more than two years ord introduced did not prove that the name have been, seised and possessed as tenants of White, appearing therein, was his genu-in common of a tract of land situate in the ine signature; but there was positive evi- counties of Fresno and Tulare, known as dence to that effect, which we must presume was proof to the satisfaction of the Judge that it was genuine. The defendants were permitted to introduce in evidence the testimony of White, given in an action not shown to have been between the parties to this action, or to have involved the matter in controversy here. The object was to show declarations of White, who was deceased, tending to show that he executed

Wigginton & Hawes, for appellant. D. S. Terry and Brown & Daggett, for respondents.

the "Kings River Ranch," and containing about 54,000 acres. A natural water-course known as "Kings River," flows for a distance of over 30 miles along and forms one of the boundaries of the ranch. A branch of the river, called "Cole Slough," flows through the ranch for a distance of about 10 miles, and at ordinary stages carries the greater portion of the water of the river. In its course through and along the bound.