economies. They are working hard to develop democratic control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and respect the sovereign rights outside their borders. And they are working hard to make their military forces compatible with NATO.

For those partner countries that are embracing PFP as a passage to NATO membership, these actions are a key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become the rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. It is providing the same overlapping consensus that NATO membership engenders in NATO countries, making compromise and reconciliation possible.

In Hungary, all six major political parties in the Parliament united to pass a resolution in support of IFOR [implementation force], the Bosnia peace implementation force, by a vote of 300 to 1. In Poland, the new president — a former member of the former commu- ^■■■■■■i nist party — reaffirmed Poland's NATO aspirations. In Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, governments are quietly resolving border disputes and putting into place protection for ethnic minorities. For these countries, the Partnership for Peace is becoming a passage to democracy and market reform, as well as a passage to security cooperation with the West.

But even those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership are realizing many of the same political and social gains from active participation in the PFP. Moreover, PFP is providing them the tools and the opportunities to develop closer ties to NATO, and learn from NATO — even as they choose to remain outside the alliance. And PFP is building bonds among the partner nations — even outside the framework of cooperation with NATO.

That is why defense ministers from many partner nations have said to me that even if, or when, they eventually join NATO, they want to sustain their active participation in PFP. In short, by ^h^hbb^^^h creating the Partnership For Peace, NATO is doing more than just building the basis for enlargement. It is, in fact, creating a new zone of security and stability throughout Europe.

That is why I believe that the creation of the Partnership for Peace has been one of the most significant events of the post-Cold War era. By forging networks of people and institutions working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and build free markets, the PFP today is a catalyst for transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the '40s and '50s. It is the passage this half of Europe did not take in 1947; it is the door that we never

opened.

To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen and thai we actually proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady, process of outreach and enlargement to the East, NATO enlargement is inevitable. And if NATO enlarge ment is a carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot continually out of reach. So it is critical that we implement the second phase of NATO enlargement agreed upon at the NAC (North Atlantic Council) Ministerial Meeting in December.

And even as some countries join NATO, it will be important to keep the door open for others down the road. We must make sure that PFP continues to provide a place in the security architecture of Europe so that we keep the door open to Marshall's Europe even for those nation! that do not aspire to become NATO members.

For Marshall's vision to be truly fulfilled, one of the ^mmm—m—mmmmi^m nations that must walk through this door is Russia. Russia has been akc\ player in Europe's security for over 300 years. It will remain a key playet in the coming decades, for better or for worse. Our job is to make it tot the better.

Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today has chosen to participate in the Partnership tor Peace. And in the spirit of Marshall, we welcome Russia's participation and hope that over time it will take on a leading role in PFP commen surate with its importance as a great power.

But for Russia to join us as a full and active partner in completing Marshall's vision, NATO and Russia need to build on our common ground, even when we don't agree with each other's conclusions It is fair to say that most members o: Russia's political establishment do not welcome or even accept NATO's plans for enlargement. Anybody tha ■HMHHMiH^H doubted that yesterday, if you heard Mr. [Andrey] Kokoshin's [first deputy minister of defense' speech, realized the extent of the opposition to NATO en largement in Russia.

When I was in Russia last June, I had a number of conversations with Russian government leaders and Dunn members about the future of European security. I offered them a series of postulates about that future. I told them if I were in Russia's shoes, I would want the future security picture in Europe to have the following characteristics:

First, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want the United States to be involved in the security of Europe They agreed with that postulate.

Then, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want to see Germany an integrated part of the European securiff structure. And they agreed with that postulate.

And third, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want Russia to be in the security architecture of Europe, not isolated outside of it. They agreed with this postulate

also.

Finally, I asked them how could a Russian leader best achieve these goals?

I concluded they could only be achieved through a healthy and vibrant NATO. That is, NATO, far from being a threat to Russia, actually contributes to the security of Russia as well as to the security of its own members.

When I reached that conclusion, most of the Russians I talked to fell off the cliff. They agreed with each of my premises, but they did not agree with my conclusion. But in the absence of NATO and its partnership arrangements, I do not see any way of achieving those goals — our shared goals — of a safe and peaceful Europe. ^h^^^^^^^h

I have to tell you that I did not persuade my Russian colleagues with my irgument. But I do believe that as Russia deepens its involvement with NATO, t will come to believe in the truth of ny conclusion as well as my premises. \nd I believe that Russia will want to lave a cooperative relation with NATO ind a leading role in the Partnership for 'eace and that Russia will come to unierstand that NATO enlargement means nlarging a zone of security and stabilty that is very much in Russia's interst, not a threat to Russia.

But the way for this new understandig to occur is for NATO to continue o reach out to Russia not only from he top down but from the bottom up. .ast year at Wehrkunde, I proposed that JATO and Russia begin a separate plan f activities, outside the Partnership for eace. Since then, we have all discussed id even agreed upon this proposal in rinciple, but we have not yet put it on aper. We must do so. We cannot let sagreements over the "theology" of jilding NATO-Russia relations get in ^bbbbhb^^^^h le way of "here and now" opportunities to work together here our interests clearly overlap. Instead of letting theogy dictate our practice, we should let our practice shape It theology.

3ne example of where the United States is already doing this is with our program of bilateral training excises with Russia. We have held four such exercises in the >t year, each a great success, and each conducted in a irit of trust and good will. This summer, the United States d Russia will move beyond the bilateral and jointly paripate in a major regional Partnership For Peace exercise th forces from Ukraine, Russia, United States and other gional powers.

Our bilateral contact program with Russia is not confined to joint exercises or even to just the security field. Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it extends to the fields of science and technology, space, defense conversion, business development, the environment, health care and agriculture.

Just this past week the commission met in Washington, and Mr. Kokoshin and I both participated in the defense conversion program of this commission. I urge all NATO nations to build on this model. These contacts provide important exchanges of information. They help break down years of distrust and suspicion. They weave the Russians into the kind of personal and professional networks that have long characterized relations among all of the allies. These are the kind of activities that will build trust between Russia and NATO. And these are the kind of activities that will keep Russia on the passage toward integration with Europe, to pass through that open door. ^^^^^mm—m^^^m Mr. [Russian Defense Minister army Gen. Pavel] Grachev and I attended the joint U.S.-Russia exercise in Kansas last October. And we met after the exercise with the American and the Russian soldiers conducting that exercise, and talked to them. He told the Russian soldiers what they were doing was very important, that they should extend their friendship and cooperation with the American soldiers and that this was the basis for creating a peaceful world for their children. The American soldiers were as much interested in what he was saying as the Russians were, I can assure you.

Jronically, the place where a dis

tinct NATO-Russia relationship is occurring in practice is in Bosnia. Today, as we speak, a Russian brigade is serving in the American Multinational Division of IFOR. It took an enormous amount of work to make this happen. Minister Grachev and I met four times over a two^^■^mmh^^ month period to iron out the details. Gens. [Army Gen. George] Joulwan and [Army Maj. Gen. William] Nash work closely every day with their counterparts, Gen. [Col. Gen. Leontiy] Shevtsov and Col. [Alexandr] Lentsov. NATO and Russia do have a special relationship today in Bosnia, and Russia is demonstrating its commitment to participating in the future security architecture of Europe.

The reason we are all working so hard to make this relationship successful is not just because of the additional troops Russia brings to Bosnia, but because Russia's participation in Bosnia casts a very long shadow that will have an impact on the security of Europe for years to come. When we deal with the most important security problem which Europe has faced since the Cold War was over, we

era. NATO was not well structured for the Bosnia mission. At a time when our political and geostrategic thinking has been completely reoriented, symbolized by our partner ship in peacekeeping with former adversaries, and at a time when our individual military forces have streamlined and modernized for the battlefield of the future, NATO's com mand and decision-making structure is still geared for the challenges and the battlefields of the past. The time has come to streamline and modernize NATO, recognizing that our challenge is no longer simply to execute a known plan with already designated forces, as it was during the Cold War.

We must make NATO's command structure more re sponsive and more flexible, and streamline the planning and force preparation process, and simplify and speed up the entire decision-making process. And we must complete the task of giving NATO's European members a stronger identity within the alliance. These kinds of internal changes will ready NATO for enlargement and will allow us to better respond to the future challenges to European security and stability.

It is in this context that we welcome the French decision to participate more fully in NATO's military bodies. And we look forward to working with France as we transform the alliance and realize Marshall's vision of a Europe united in peace, freedom and democracy.

In 1947, Marshall told America that it must "face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon our coun try," Today, it is not only America, but also Russia; is not only NATO nations, but all of Europe — all of us must face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon us. This means reaching out to each other not only in the spirit of friendship, but also in the spirit of self-interest This means working towards our goals not only from the top down, but also the ground up. And it means recognizing that when the outside world changes, we must look inside our institutions and see what changes are needed there.

If we do these things, then next year, when we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, we will be able to say that we made Marshall's vision our own; that Partnership for Peace is a strong, permanent pillar of Europe's security architecture; that NATO and Russia have a relationship where trust, understanding and cooperation are givens, not goals; that all the nations of the former Yugoslavia are adding, not detracting, from Europe's security; and that we have taken the passage to a new Europe and opened the door to a new era of peace, freedom and democracy.

Thank you very much.

VOLUME 11

NUMBER 3

"Y*% EHIND MY DESK ax the Pentagon hangs a portrait of the great statesman George C. Marshall. Marshall, who was the third secretary of defense in the United States, is a role model of mine. He had a great vision for Europe — a Europe which from the Atlantic to the Urals was united in peace, freedom and democracy — and a strong trans-Atlantic partnership sustained by bipartisan political support in the United States.

Marshall not only had this vision, he also had a plan to make this vision a reality in postwar Europe. And in a famous speech at Harvard University in 1947, he outlined what came to be called the Marshall Plan.

A little known fact is that joining Marshall on the dais that day was the famous poet T.S. Eliot, who 10 years earlier had written:

Footfalls echo in the memory

Down the passage we did not take

Towards the door we never opened.

These words by T.S. Eliot fore;hadowed the fate of Marshall's plan n Eastern and Central Europe, be:ause on that day 50 years ago, as the "ootfalls of World War II still echoed icross a shattered continent, the vlarshall Plan offered Europe a new >assage toward reconstruction and relewal. Half of Europe took this pasage and opened the door to pros>erity and freedom. Half of Europe M^mhbmmmb^h yas denied this passage when Joseph Stalin slammed the loor on Marshall's offer. And for 50 years, the footfalls of ^'hat might have been echoed in our memories.

desired most was to rebuild their societies and economies. And the Marshall Plan provided a path for achieving this goal. By taking this passage, the nations of Western Europe built an economic powerhouse. And along the way, they built strong democracies and a strong security institution called NATO.

mm^m^m^mmmm^ Today, countries in the other half of Europe are struggling to rebuild their societies and economies, and the one thing they all desire is greater security. NATO's challenge is to provide these Europeans a path for achieving their security goal. And along the way, we want them very much to develop strong democracies and strong economies.

* J his other half of Europe includes

the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states. It includes Russia, and it includes the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Today, NATO is reaching out to all three areas and providing a path to Marshall's Europe.

The primary path NATO has provided is the Partnership for Peace. Just as the Marshall Plan worked because it was rooted firmly in the self-interest of both the United States and Europe, so too does the Partnership for Peace work because it is rooted firmly in the self-interest of both NATO and the partner nations.

PFP is bringing the newly free nations of Europe and the former Soviet Union into the security architecture of Europe as a whole. Our nations are working and training together in military joint exercises. But make no mistake, the Partnership for Peace is more than just joint exercises. Just as the Marshall Plan had an impact well beyond the economies of Western Europe, PFP is echoing beyond the security realm in Central and Eastern Europe, and into the political and economic realms as well.

Just as the Marshall Plan used economic revival as the catalyst for political stabilization — and ultimately the development of the modern Europe — the PFP uses security cooperation as a catalyst for political and economic reform. PFP members are working to uphold democracy, tolersity, respect the rights of minorities and respect f -vnivMinn Thev are working to build market University of Virginia Library

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economies. They are working hard to develop democratic control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and respect the sovereign rights outside their borders. And they are working hard to make their military forces compatible with NATO.

For those partner countries that are embracing PFP as a passage to NATO membership, these actions are a key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become the rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. It is providing the same overlapping consensus that NATO membership engenders in NATO countries, making compromise and reconciliation possible.

In Hungary, all six major political parties in the Parliament united to pass a resolution in support of IFOR [implementation force], the Bosnia peace implementation force, by a vote of 300 to 1. In Poland, the new president — a former member of the former commu- ^^^mmh■m nist party — reaffirmed Poland's NATO aspirations. In Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, governments are quietly resolving border disputes and putting into place protection for ethnic minorities. For these countries, the Partnership for Peace is becoming a passage to democracy and market reform, as well as a passage to security cooperation with the West.

But even those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership are realizing many of the same political and social gains from active participation in the PFP. Moreover, PFP is providing them the tools and the opportunities to develop closer ties to NATO, and learn from NATO — even as they choose to remain outside the alliance. And PFP is building bonds among the partner nations — even outside the framework of cooperation with NATO.

That is why defense ministers from many partner nations have said to me that even if, or when, they eventually join NATO, they want to sustain their active participation in PFP. In short, by B^^h^m^^bbh creating the Partnership For Peace, NATO is doing more than just building the basis for enlargement. It is, in fact, creating a new zone of security and stability throughout Europe.

That is why I believe that the creation of the Partnership for Peace has been one of the most significant events of the post-Cold War era. By forging networks of people and institutions working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and build free markets, the PFP today is a catalyst for transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the '40s and '50s. It is the passage this half of Europe did not take in 1947; it is the door that we never

opened.

To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen and that we actually proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady, process of outreach and enlargement to the East. NATO enlargement is inevitable. And if NATO enlarge ment is a carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot continually out of reach. So it is critical that we implement the second phase of NATO enlargement agreed upon at the NAC (North Atlantic Council) Ministerial Meeting in December.

And even as some countries join NATO, it will be important to keep the door open for others down the road. We must make sure that PFP continues to provide a place in the security architecture of Europe so that we keep the door open to Marshall's Europe even for those nations that do not aspire to become NATO members.

For Marshall's vision to be truly fulfilled, one of the H^^^^^^^MMHi nations that must walk through this door is Russia. Russia has been a key player in Europe's security for over 300 years. It will remain a key player in the coming decades, for better or for worse. Our job is to make it for the better.

Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today has chosen to participate in the Partnership for Peace. And in the spirit of Marshall, we welcome Russia's participation and hope that over time it will take on a leading role in PFP commensurate with its importance as a great power.

ut for Russia to join us as a full and active partner in completing Marshall's vision, NATO and Russia need to build on our common ground, even when we don't agree with each other's conclusions. It is fair to say that most members of Russia's political establishment do not welcome or even accept NATO's plans for enlargement. Anybody that ^^^^^^h^^^^b doubted that yesterday, if you heard Mr. [Andrey] Kokoshin's [first deputy minister of defense] speech, realized the extent of the opposition to NATO enlargement in Russia.

When I was in Russia last June, I had a number of conversations with Russian government leaders and Duma members about the future of European security. I offered them a series of postulates about that future. I told them if I were in Russia's shoes, I would want the future securinpicture in Europe to have the following characteristics:

First, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want the United States to be involved in the security of Europe. They agreed with that postulate.

Then, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want to see Germany an integrated part of the European security