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SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on personal impressions of subcommittee members as a result of the Far East visit. They are not intended to be inclusive, nor do they necessarily constitute legislative judgments to be included in the drug abuse bill scheduled to be reported by the subcommittee within the next few weeks. They do, however, represent recommendations by members who have become convinced that the drug abuse problem in this country and among our servicemen stationed overseas has reached a critical stage, and that actions such as those outlined below must be taken immediately. 1. That our government urge the United Nations to take firm action requesting the governments of Thailand, Laos and Burme to take more positive steps to combat the growth of the poppy in those countries. Specific requests to Secretary General U Thant of Burma are recommended.

2. That highly trained BNDD and customs officials familiar with the language of the country to which they are assigned be stationed in every major city in the Far East through which drug traffic passes as soon as possible and that these agents have only one major city within their assigned area. Several additional BNDD agents should immediately be assigned to Thailand, Hong Kong and the Republic of Vietnam.

3. That Department of State should immediately review and take appropriate action with respect to the $1.193 million request of the Illicit Drug Control Committee submitted through the United States Embassy in Thailand.

4. That a massive air photo detection program be immediately initiated in coordination with the parent nations over Burma, Laos and Thailand, and in any event prior to the 1972 harvest. The detection program should be directed at locating both refineries and poppy fields. Specific locations should be immediately reported to appropriate BNDD officials. Reports of the extent of poppy growth in this area should be made public.

5. That in cooperation with Thai narcotics officials, flexible checkpoints should be established along the Mae Sai-Bankok highway to deter the shipment of opiates.

6. That military postal officials in the Far East be given authority for on the spot inspection of first class mail.

7. That the Public Safety Division of USAID make modern weapons, such as the M-16 rifle, ammunition, mortars and transportation equipment available to the Thai Border Patrol.

8. That BNDD officials no longer be attached to our Embassies except for logistical support and that, to insure that every U.S. government official stationed in the Far East supports our efforts to eradicate drug traffic in these countries, one government official be given total responsibility for all efforts of BNDD, USAID, other State Department agencies, the Bureau of Customs and other agencies responsible for the drug control effort in all Far East countries. This official should be a member of the Special Action Office on Narcotics and Drug Abuse.

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9. That U.S. military officials in Vietnam, Thailand, Okinawa and the Philippines immediately initiate periodic, unannounced urinalysis tests of all servicemen in Vietnam. Such tests should be conducted of every serviceman stationed in the Saigon, Long Binh and Bien Hoa areas at least every two months. Every serviceman should be test within six months of his arrival in Vietnam. Training of necessary technicians and the procurement of proper equipment should be expedited.

10. That the military services administer urinalysis tests ten days to two weeks prior to a serviceman's return to the United States and again within two days of his scheduled departure.

11. That more emphasis be placed on treatment programs conducted by the Veterans Administration, Community Mental Health Centers and other community facilities. The military must initiate positive controls to insure an accurate follow-up for discharged servicemen who have been found to abuse drugs. These controls should include reports to the treatment centers nearest the home of each serviceman found to have a drug abuse problem prior to discharge.

Mr. ROGERS. The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:15, the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, October 27, 1971.)

SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE

PREVENTION

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice in room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul G. Rogers (chairman) presiding.

Mr. ROGERS. The subcommittee will come to order. We are continuing hearings on legislation to establish a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, and we are also looking into the closing of the Fort Worth Clinical Center.

We have as our first witness today Dr. Jerome Jaffe, Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We welcome you again to the committee, Dr. Jaffe.

As I understand it you are not going to make a statement but simply be available for questioning.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEROME H. JAFFE, SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL L. PERITO, GENERAL COUNSEL AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Dr. JAFFE. I can make a brief comment.

As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, the primary focus of this hearing is to discuss the Fort Worth Clinical Center and the decision to transfer that to operate as a center under the Bureau of Prisons for the rehabilitation of individuals who are Federal prisoners who are also drug addicts.

That decision was made prior to my becoming a member of the Federal Government but I think, in all candor, I should tell you that I chaired a committee of nongovernmental experts who were familiar with the field of drug addiction sometime last November. One of the issues we took up was the role of Lexington and Fort Worth. It was the unanimous feeling of that committee that, given the progress made in the field of rehabilitation of drug addiction, the continued operation of a large center such as Fort Worth, where people were away from their communities for prolonged periods and then sent. back with no linkage, was no longer justifiable but that kind of rehabilitation is best accomplished in the community for people who have not otherwise been convicted of crimes.

So, I can say, although I did not participate in the decision to transfer Forth Worth, had I been in the Federal Government, I would probably have participated heartily and endorsed it if not initiated it. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

According to the letter signed by the Attorney General and Secretary of HEW, you approved the closing of Fort Worth.

Dr. JAFFE. I never approved any closing. We approved a transfer of that facility which will continue to operate in the same physical plant, and which will have a major focus on working with prisoner addicts. If it is being closed, that is news to me. It is my understanding it continues to operate.

Mr. ROGERS. But closed to clinical research as had previously been done and to take care of the public, NARA people.

Dr. JAFFE. As I understood it, the demand for space for civil commitment had fallen off appreciably. There was sufficient capacity at Lexington and, furthermore, the facility had been closed to the public in terms of voluntary patients since 1966. It had been available only as a civil commitment facility and, with respect to clinical research, that was largely a euphemism. In fact, no research I know of has ever emanated from that facility.

One cannot conduct research on people who are civilly committed unless one spends years building up that kind of imminent staff to make the research worthwhile.

Mr. ROGERS. That is not the testimony we received at Forth Worth when we visited there. Have you ever visited the facility?

Dr. JAFFE. I have seen the facility. I have never been within it, per se. I am familiar with Lexington and the layout is similar.

Mr. ROGERS. But you have never been in the Fort Worth facility! Dr. JAFFE. That is correct.

Mr. ROGERS. Because the testimony was that they have done research there. Particularly the psychiatrist, I believe, who was from Forth Worth or Dallas went into that in some detail.

Dr. JAFFE. As I said, I have looked for the reports of their research and the literature. They have not appeared. I have not seen any evidence of that research.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the inpatient capacity presently of our facilities that are federally run for the NARA program?

Dr. JAFFE. If you ask for the NARA program, I cannot give you a specific figure. It is continously changing as people write new contracts. I can say that we do not know, in all honesty, the total Federal capacity for inpatients in the entire United States, let alone NARA. Our first step, when we were created, was to modify a contract which was designed to conduct a survey of the 6,000 known treatment programs in the United States so that it would at least give us some estimate of the capacity for inpatients, for residential care and for outpatients. This had not been part of the original contract. That contract was finally signed several weeks ago in its modified form and, hopefully, within several months we can report to you on what our inpatient capacity in this country is.

Mr. ROGERS. HEW testified yesterday that they had 100 slots where they could treat people. In other words, they could treat 1,000 people with inpatient care.

Dr. JAFFE. 1,000 slots?