The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American PerspectivesJayne Susan Werner, Luu Doan Huynh M.E. Sharpe, 1993 M03 31 In addition to Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, the contributors are Mark Bradley, William Duiker, David Elliott, Kristin Pelzer, George Vickers, James Harrison, George Herring, Ronald Spector, Paul Joseph, Jeffrey Clarke, Ngo Vinh Long, Benedict Kiernan, Marilyn Young, David Hung, Keith Taylor, and Tran Van Tra. |
Contents
| 3 | |
Waging Revolutionary War The Evolution of Hanois Strategy in the South 19591965 | 24 |
Tet The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising | 37 |
Hanois Strategy in the Second Indochina War | 66 |
Love War and Revolution Reflections on the Memoirs of Nguyen Thi Dinh | 95 |
The War from the American Side | 111 |
US Military Strategy and the Vietnam War | 113 |
Historys Heaviest Bombing | 130 |
CivilMilitary Relations in South Vietnam and the American Advisory Effort | 187 |
The SevenPoint Proposal of the PRG July 11971 and the US Reaction | 198 |
PostParis Agreement Struggles and the Fall of Saigon | 203 |
The Impact on Cambodia of the US Intervention in Vietnam | 216 |
Retrospective and Postwar Issues | 231 |
The War That Should Not Have Been | 233 |
The American War in Vietnamese Memory | 243 |
The Vietnam War in American Memory | 248 |
The Strange Dissent of Robert S McNamara | 140 |
How Do You Know If Youre Winning? Perception and Reality in Americas Military Performance in Vietnam 19651970 | 152 |
Direct and Indirect Effects of the Movement against the Vietnam War | 165 |
The War in the South and Cambodia | 185 |
The Antiwar Movement after the War | 258 |
China and Vietnam Looking for a New Version of an Old Relationship | 271 |
Index | 287 |
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Common terms and phrases
administration American antiwar movement areas armed forces attacks balance of forces battlefield bombing Cambodia casualties Center China Chinese combat Command Communist conflict decision defeat defense diplomatic DRV's Duan effort enemy enemy's escalation fighting foreign French guerrilla Hanoi Ibid impact Indochina initiative insurgents Johnson Khmer Laos Le Duan leaders Liberation Lon Nol MACV McNamara ment Military History Minh National negotiations Ngo Dinh Diem Nguyen Huy Thiep Nguyen Thi Dinh Nixon North Offensive and Uprising Office operations Paris Agreement Party peace movement Pol Pot political and military President Press puppet reported revolution role Saigon regime situation South Vietnam Southeast Asia southern Soviet strategy struggle tactics targets Tet Mau Tet Offensive Thach Thanh Thieu tion Tran Tran Van Tra Truong U.S. Army U.S. forces U.S. intervention U.S. military U.S. troops United veterans victory Viet Cong Vietnam War Vietnamese government village Washington Westmoreland York
Popular passages
Page 51 - Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president.
Page v - The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.
Page 113 - The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature,
Page 225 - ... take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been gouged out and scorched. . . . The ordinary people . . . sometimes literally shit in their pants when the big bombs and shells came. . . . Their minds just froze up and they would wander around mute for three or four days. Terrified and half-crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. . . . That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over.
Page 59 - more of the same' in South Vietnam, with an increased commitment of American lives and money and its consequent impact on the country, accompanied by no guarantee of military victory in the near future, had become unacceptable to these elements of the American public. The optimistic military reports of progress in the war no longer rang true after the shock of the Tet offensive. "Thus, the President's decision to seek a new strategy and a new road to peace...
Page 224 - They are using damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme of their propaganda. The cadre tell the people that the Government of Lon Nol has requested the airstrikes and is responsible for the damage and the "suffering of innocent villagers.
Page 224 - the massive destruction of the country" is to ... defeat Lon Nol and stop the bombing. This approach has resulted in the successful recruitment of a number of young men ... Residents ... say that the propaganda campaign has been effective with refugees and in areas ... which have been subject to B-52...
Page 142 - I stated that the odds were about even that, even with the then-recommended deployments, we would be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level of conflict and with "pacification