which by their nature could only be used on a vessel of war, might be treated as absolute contraband without notice. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds, and, further, floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts, might only be treated as conditional contraband, but might be so treated without notice. During the World War the Allies adopted these rules of the Declaration of London.1 II CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 391. the Muni gerents. § 398. The guaranteed freedom of commerce making Carriage the sale of articles of all kinds to belligerents by subjects band of neutrals legitimate, articles of conditional as well Penal by as absolute contraband may be supplied by sale to cipal Law either belligerent by these individuals. Moreover, the of Bellicarriage of such articles by neutral merchantmen on the open sea is, as far as International Law is concerned, quite as legitimate as their sale. The carrier of contraband by no means 2 violates an injunction of the Law of Nations. But belligerents have, by the Law of Nations, the right to prohibit and punish the carriage of contraband by neutral merchantmen, and the carrier of contraband violates, for this reason, an injunction of the belligerent concerned. It is not International Law, but the Municipal Law of the belligerents, which makes carriage of contraband illegitimate and penal.3 The question why the carriage of contraband articles 1 See above, §§ 393, 394. 2 Most writers, especially British and American, nowadays agree with this statement, although there are still some left who assert that a carrier of contraband violates an injunction of International Law. It is to be regretted that Pyke, The 3 See above, § 296. Direct Carriage may be prohibited and punished by the belligerents, although it is quite legitimate so far as International Law is concerned, can only be answered by reference to the historical development of the Law of Nations. In contradistinction to former practice, which interdicted all trade between neutrals and the enemy, the principle of freedom of commerce between subjects of neutrals and either belligerent has gradually become universally recognised; but this recognition included from the beginning the right of either belligerent to punish carriage of contraband on the sea. And the reason obviously is the necessity for belligerents, in the interest of self-preservation, to prevent the import of such articles as may strengthen the enemy, and to confiscate the contraband cargo, and, in certain cases, the vessel also, as a deterrent to other vessels. The present condition of the matter of carriage of contraband is therefore a compromise. In the interest of the generally recognised principle of freedom of commerce between belligerents and subjects of neutrals, International Law does not require neutrals to prevent their subjects from carrying contraband; 1 on the other hand, International Law empowers either belligerent to prohibit and punish carriage of contraband just as it empowers either belligerent to prohibit and punish breach of blockade.2 § 399. The simplest case of carriage of contraband of Contra- occurs where a vessel is engaged in carrying to an enemy port such goods as are contraband and have a hostile destination. In such cases, it makes no difference band. 1 See Ex parte Chavasse, in re Grazebrook, (1865) 34 L. J. N. S., Bank. 17. The same applies to blockade-running and rendering unneutral service; see The Helen, (1865) L.R. 1 A. and E. 1. 2 See above, § 383. The destination of the cargo being hostile, it does not matter that the cargo is intended to be reshipped to a neutral country after having undergone a certain course of treatment. The hostile destination makes it contraband; The Axel Johnson, (1917) 2 B. and C. P. C. 532. whether the fact that the vessel is destined for an enemy port becomes apparent because her papers show that she is bound to such a port, or because she is found at sea sailing on a course for an enemy port, although her papers show her to be bound to a neutral port. Further, it makes no difference, according to the hitherto prevailing practice of Great Britain and the United States of America at any rate, that she is ultimately bound for a neutral port, and that the articles concerned are, according to her papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she is to call at an intermediate enemy port, or if she is to meet enemy naval forces at sea in the course of her voyage to the neutral port of destination; 1 for otherwise the door would be open to deceit, and it would always be pretended that goods which a vessel was really carrying to the intermediate enemy places were intended for the neutral port of ultimate destination. For the same reason, a vessel carrying such articles as are contraband when they have a hostile destination is considered to be carrying contraband if her papers show that her destination is dependent upon contingencies under which she may have to call at an enemy port, unless she proves that she has abandoned the intention of calling there in any event.2 The unratified Declaration of London distinguished between carriage of absolute and of conditional contraband : As regards absolute contraband, a vessel was, according to Article 32, considered to be carrying contraband whether the fact that she was destined for an enemy port became evident because her papers showed that she was bound for such a port, or because she was 1 See Holland, Prize Law, § 69. The Imina, (1800) 3 C. Rob. 167; and The Trende Sostre, (1800) cited in The Lisette, (1806) 6 C. Rob. 390, n. See also Holland, Prize Law $ 70. Circuitous of Contra found at sea sailing for an enemy port, although her papers showed her to be bound for a neutral port. Moreover, according to Article 31, it was to make no difference that the vessel was bound for a neutral port and that the articles concerned were, according to her papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she was to touch at an intermediate enemy port, or was to meet armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port to which the goods in question were consigned. As regards conditional contraband, a vessel was, according to Article 35, to be considered as carrying contraband if her papers showed her to be destined for an enemy port, or, if being clearly found out of her course to a neutral port indicated by her papers, she was unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. Articles 32 and 35 both stipulated that ship-papers were to be conclusive proof as to the destination of the vessel and of the cargo, unless the vessel was clearly found out of the course indicated by them; but the Report of the Drafting Committee emphasised that this rule must not be interpreted too literally, since otherwise fraud would be made easy. Ship-papers are conclusive proof so ran the Report-unless facts show their evidence to be false. From the outbreak of the World War until July 1916, the Allies adopted Articles 32 and 35 as regards direct carriage of contraband, though they modified Article 35 in other important respects. By the Maritime Rights Order in Council of July 7, 1916, they abandoned the rules of the declaration altogether. § 400. A more usual case of carriage of contraband Carriage occurs when a neutral vessel carrying such articles as band. are contraband if they have a hostile destination is, according to her papers, ostensibly bound for a neutral See below, § 403a. port, but is intended, after having called there, and perhaps delivered her cargo there, to carry it on (reshipping it if need be) from there to an enemy port. There is, of course, no doubt that such vessels are carrying contraband whilst engaged in carrying the articles concerned from the neutral to the enemy port. But, during the American Civil War, the question arose whether they may already be considered to be carrying contraband when they are on their way from the port of starting to the neutral port from which they are afterwards to carry the cargo to an enemy port, since they are really intended to carry the cargo from the port of starting to an enemy port, although not directly, but circuitously, by a roundabout way. The American Prize Courts answered the question in the affirmative by applying to the carriage of contraband the principle of dolus non purgatur circuitu, and the so-called doctrine of continuous voyages.1 This attitude of the American Prize Courts has called forth protests from 1 The so-called doctrine of continuous voyages dates from the time of the Anglo-French wars at the end of the eighteenth century, and is connected with the application of the so-called rule of 1756. (See above, § 289.) Neutral vessels engaged in French and Spanish colonial trade, which had been thrown open to them during the war, sought to evade seizure by British cruisers and condemnation by British Prize Courts according to the rule of 1756, by taking their cargo to a neutral port, landing it and paying import duties there, and then re-loading it and carrying it to the mother country of the respective colony. Thus in The William, (1806) 5 C. Rob. 385, it was proved that this neutral vessel took a cargo from the Spanish port of La Guira to the port of Marblehead in Massachusetts-the United States being neutral-landed the cargo, paid import duties there, then re-shipped the greater part of it, and, in addition, other goods, and sailed after a week for the Spanish port of |