There is controversy over Gen. Miller's alleged recommendation regarding the use of dogs. According to Col. Thomas Pappas, the top U.S. intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib, Gen. Miller, "said that they used military working dogs at Gitmo |Guantánamo], and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which, you know, you could get information" from the prisoners.313 Pappas said that Gen. Miller said the use of the dogs "with or without a muzzle” was "okay." Gen. Miller is said to deny this.314 Gen. Fay found that:

Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at
Abu Ghraib on 20 November 2003. By that date, abuses of detainees was
already occurring and the addition of dogs was just one more abuse device. Dog
Teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG
G. Miller's assessment team from JTF-GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended
dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues, especially in instances
where there were large numbers of detainees and few guards to help reduce the
risk of detainee demonstrations or acts of violence, as at Abu Ghraib.315

Gen Karpinski said that Gen. Miller told her that prisoners "are like dogs, and if you allow them to believe at any point that they are more than a dog then you've lost control of them."316 Gen. Miller denies this.

Other Generals in Iraq

Because all of the published probes have focused on the event at Abu Ghraib, the public record is more developed than for the other theatres of abuse. Other generals identified in the Pentagon reports who may bear liability for the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib arc:

Major General Barbara Fast: Described in the Jones report as the "senior intelligence officer" on Gen. Sanchez's staff (the “C2” of CJTF-7), Gen. Fast was responsible for “|p|riorities for intelligence collection, analysis and fusion."317 The Jones report states that Fast was responsible for designing the new intelligence-gathering “architecture” put in place at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 and was centrally involved in defining intelligence gathering needs at Abu Ghraib.318 The Fay report states that directions as to interrogation needs from Col. Pappas, who played a central

313

314

Jeffrey R. Smith, "General Is Said to Have Urged Use of Dogs," The Washington Post, May 26, 2004.

Ibid. ("Miller never had a conversation with Colonel Pappas regarding the use of military dogs for interrogation

purposes in Iraq. Further, military dogs were never used in interrogations at Guantánamo," said Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq.)

role in the abuse (as discussed in more detail below) were “coming from I.TG Sanchez directly as well as from MG Fast, the C2."319

Major General Walter Wojdakowski: deputy commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), (ie. Sanchez's Deputy). According to the Schlesinger report, Gen. Sanchez "delegated responsibility for detention operations to his Deputy, MG Wojdakowski.”3: Pappas told Taguba that interrogation plans involving the use of dogs, shackling, “making detainees strip down,” or similar aggressive measures followed Sanchez's policy, but were often approved by Gen. Wojdakowski,321 Gen. Wojdakowski was also reportedly aware from meetings with the ICRC in November 2003 of allegations of crimes at Abu Gharib and failed to take action 322 The Schlesinger report found, among other criticisms, that “Wojdakowski failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention and interrogation operations."323

Brigadier General Janis Karpinski: commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade with authority over the U.S. prison facilities in Iraq. Gen. Taguba noted that "following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees."324 The Fay report noted that throughout 2003, Gen. Karpinski received ICRC reports regarding abuses at Abu Ghraib.325 Nevertheless, as noted by the Schlesinger panel, Gen. Karpinski "failed to ensure that soldiers had appropriate SOPs [standard operating procedures] for dealing with detainees."326 Taguba wrote that “LTG Sanchez also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor leadership climate that 'permeates the Brigade.' I totally concur with LTG Sanchez' opinion regarding the performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade." The Schlesinger report agreed and found:

that the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the
800th MP Brigade [Karpinski] and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI
Brigade [Pappas] allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib. There were serious lapses of
leadership in both units from junior non-commissioned officers to battalion and

321 Jeffrey R. Smith, "General Is Said to Have Urged Use of Dogs," The Washington Post, May 26, 2004.

322

Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of Mixed Messages to GI's," The New York Times, June 24, 2004. ("[S]everal senior Army officers knew by last November that the Red Cross had complained about problems at the prison, including forced nudity and physical and verbal abuse of prisoners. Among those aware of the concerns were General Sanchez's top deputy, Maj. Gen. Walter Wojdakowski.")

323 Schlesinger report, p. 25.

brigade levels. The commanders of both brigades either knew, or should have known, abuses
were taking place and taken measures to prevent them...The independent panel finds
that BG Karpinski's leadership failure helped set the conditions at the prison
which led to the abuses, including her failure to establish appropriate standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and to ensure the relevant Geneva Conventions
protections were afforded prisoners, as well as her failure to take appropriate
actions regarding ineffective commanders and staff officers.327

Abu Ghraib-based Officers

Gen. Taguba wrote:

T

suspect that COL. Thomas M. Pappas, J.TC. Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCI) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability 328

The Fay report found that Col. Pappas, Col. Jordan, Maj. David Price, Maj. Michael Thompson, and Capt. Carolyn Wood, among others, bore individual responsibility for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and that their cases should be forwarded to their chains of command for appropriate action.

The Jones report states that Sanchez used Colonel Marc Warren, the staff judge advocate for CJTT -7 and Gen. Sanchez's senior legal advisor, “to advise him on the limits of authority for interrogation and compliance with the Geneva Conventions for the memos published.”329 Colonel Stephen Boltz, the second-ranking military intelligence officer in Iraq under General Barbara l'ast, was centrally involved in administering intelligence gathering efforts in Iraq, including at Abu Ghraib. The journalist Mark Danner obtained an e-mail sent by an intelligence captain at Abu Ghraib in August 2003 that reads: "The gloves are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees, Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these individuals broken.”330

Some of the individuals named above are looked at here in more detail:

330 Mark Danner, Torture and Truth; America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terrorism (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2004), p. 33.

Colonel Thomas Pappas: commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade with “tactical control" of Abu Ghraib from November 19, 2003 to February 6, 2004. Col. Pappas visited Abu Ghraib regularly, even occasionally staying overnight. As of November 16, 2003, he took up residence at Abu Ghraib.331 Col. Pappas saw the ICRC report on abuse at Abu Ghraib, and twice refused to allow the ICRC teams access to specified detainees, including one detainee who was "abused by the use of dogs."332 According to the testimony of Capt. Donald J. Reese, commander of the 372nd Military Police Company, on November 4, 2003, he witnessed a group of intelligence personnel standing around the body of a bloody detainee discussing what to do. Reese said that Pappas, one of those present, said “I'm not going down for this alone.” Reese said no medics were called, the detainee's identification was never logged, and the death was covered up.333 Fay reported that after a female soldier stripped a male detainee as punishment for uncooperative behavior and forced the detainee to walk semi-naked across the camp, Pappas left the issue for Jordan to handle, and his failure to take sterner action sent the wrong message to the troops.334 The Fay report found that Col. Pappas, inter alia.

Improperly authorized the use of dogs during interrogations. Failed to properly
supervise the use of dogs to make sure they were muzzled after he improperly
permitted their use. Failed to take appropriate action regarding the ICRC reports
of abuse. Failed to take aggressive action against Soldiers who violated the ICRP,
the CJTF-7 interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy and the Geneva
Conventions.

Taguba, Jones, and Schlesinger were similarly critical of Pappas,335

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Jordan: director of the Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center (JIDC) in Iraq, which included all of the interrogators at Abu Ghraib. According to Capt. Donald J. Reese, commander of the 372nd Military Police Company, “Jordan was very involved in the interrogation process and the day to day activity that occurred."336 Reese also implicated Col. Jordan in the covering up of the death of a detainee (see above),337 Col. Jordan also

333 See Fay report, p. 53; Jackie Spinner, "MP Captain Tells of Efforts to Hide Details of Detainee's Death." The Washington Post, June 25, 2004.

Taguba report, p. 45. See also Jones report pp. 5, 17 and Schlesinger report, p. 15.

335

336

Captain Donald J. Reese's sworn statement and interview on January 18, 2004. (Appendix to Taguba report, [online], http://usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/040709/Pappas.pdf.)

337

See Fay report, p. 53; Jackie Spinner, "MP Captain Tells of Efforts to Hide Details of Detainee's Death," The Washington Post, June 25, 2004.

supervised "the first documented incident of abuse with dogs" which became a "chaotic" situation.338 Fay concluded that:

Jordan is responsible for allowing the chaotic situation, the unauthorized
nakedness and resultant humiliation, and the military dog abuses that occurred
that night.... The tone and the environment that occurred that night, with the
tacit approval of Ltc. Jordan, can be pointed as the causative factor that set the
stage for the abuses that followed for days afterward related. 339

Col. Jordan reportedly told Col. Phillabaum that “it was common practice for some of the detainees to be kept naked in their cells." According to Gen. Fay, Col. Jordan's failure to adequately punish soldiers who walked a semi-nude detainee across the camp "did not send a strong enough message to the rest of the JIDC that abuse would not be tolerated."341 Col. Jordan also reversed earlier policy to allow the CIA to conduct interrogations without the presence of Army personnel which "eroded the necessity in the minds of Soldiers and civilians for them to follow Army rules.”342 General Fay also concluded that Col. Jordan: “Failed to prevent the unauthorized use of dogs and the humiliation of detainees who were kept naked for no acceptable purpose while he was the senior officer in charge, Failed to accurately and timely relay critical information to his superior officer about the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross report.”313 The Schlesinger report found that leadership problems by Col. Jordan allowed the abuses to occur at Abu Ghraib.344

To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, however, no criminal investigations are underway regarding any of the officers or contactors listed above.

V. Non-Governmental Attempts at Accountability

Because the United States has failed to date to allow for an independent criminal investigation into the role and responsibility of high-ranking civilian and military officials for widespread crimes against detainees, victims and human rights activists have sought alternative routes to justice.