STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss the implications of our human rights policy and how our human rights concerns relate to our scientific exchange program.

This issue obviously was raised to a high level of international interest and concern as a result of the recent trials and as a result of the character of those trials which clearly violated standards of international human rights.

As Ambassador Shulman noted a week ago:

The heightening of Soviet police actions against Soviet dissidents, American correspondents and an American businessman, and the continued harassment of Soviet citizens who apply for emigration, reflected a lack of regard for commitments under the Helsinki agreement.

I think that the key point here—and it stems from some of your discussions with Dr. Press-is that had we remained silent in the aftermath of those trials it would have sent the message that the United States, and the international community for that matter, condoned those actions, and that clearly was not the case. Both the U.S. Government, private U.S. citizens, and other countries, and professional organizations presented quite clearly their protests at the actions of the Soviet Government.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do you have any feeling that it made a difference?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If you look at some of the recent events. They seem to me to make clear that the international community rejects a certain standard of conduct; it rejects a certain character of abuse of individual rights.

Mr. SCHEUER. That may be a right, a moral imperative, in itself. It may make people feel better. If I protest it, it probably makes me feel that at least I've done my thing. Is there any evidence that it produces a change in conduct on the part of the Soviets?

Mr. SCHNEIDER, It's very hard to make the linkage. If you were to cite, as Ambassador Shulman did last week, a series of subtle shifts: He noted that the Soviet rate of Jewish emigration has not only been substantially higher this year than last, but in the last month, for example, was probably at its highest since 1972 for a single month. Mr. SCHEUER. I find it difficult to be impressed by that because you're starting off with such a painfully, pitifully low base, that even if the present figure doubles, or triples, or quadruples, it's still an infinitesimal figure. I was in the Soviet Union six years back and had a chance to spend a long evening with Dr. Alexander Lerner, who was formerly head of the Department of Cybernetics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. As a result of that meeting I was taken into custody by the KGB. I think that's the first time they ever took a Member of Congress or a U.S. Government official into custody.

But be that as it may, there was a group of scientists there, about a dozen of them, including Lerner, and their consensus was that, if the Soviets ever stopped the harassment and the intimidation, then of the somewhere around 32 million Jews in the Soviet Union, over a period of 4 or 5 years, one-half or two-third would opt to leave. So we're talking about somewhere between 1 and 2 million people

over a period of 5 years; and about 200,000 to 400,000 a year. Whether that rate goes from 10,000 to 20,000, or 20,000 to 30,000, you're talking about an infinitesimal fraction of the poor people who are ready to pull up stakes and opt out. I'm not impressed by these fluctuations of such a miniscule order of magnitude.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I guess all I'm saying is that 20 is better than 10. Mr. SCHEUER. On the other hand, there's also the danger that there would be the case of "throwing in the hand" just to keep it quiet, not pressing on for the main thrust, which is to open up the doors.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think we've clearly indicated our desire that there be emigration for Soviet citizens who desire emigration; that is, both in accordance with Soviet commitments under the Helsinki Act and under other international obligations.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Schneider, we are here dealing at the margin of these scientific exchanges in terms of what the Soviets really want. It's probably quite true, as Dr. Press told us, that they can learn more from personal meetings and personal contact, eye-to-eye contact, than they do by any publication. But one way or another, they can easily get what our scientific establishment is producing. It may be that in order to help them concentrate on all of these brutalities, we have to figure out what they really want from us. It may be that what they really want is not scientific exchange, but other things that they really need, like wheat.

Have you thought about what the Russian posture would be if we urgently needed wheat from them to feed our people, and whether they would have any moral hesitation about producing a long list of things that they want from us, as concessions, in exchange for that wheat?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don't think that we've explored that question in that sense.

Mr. SCHEUER. You haven't even explored it?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The reverse of the situation? No.

Mr. SCHEUER. I can hardly believe you haven't thought about it. Mr. SCHNEIDER. Setting aside SALT and other arms control negotiations that we consider on their merits, we have considered virtually every other aspect of the United States-Soviet bilateral relationship, including exchanges, as a legitimate area for possible modification to reflect the U.S. concern with human rights violations. Mr. SCHEUER. What have you done about the wheat?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The President recently stated that the arrangement that had been arrived at with the Soviet Union with regard to wheat purchases at a certain level would continue.

The judgment here again is twofold. Considering all aspects of U.S. interest, and our human rights concern is part of that interest, it must be decided what action is most appropriate in a given aspect of our relationship. On balance, that was the decision regarding wheat purchases. I believe that's the case with regard to exchanges as well. Exchanges by themselves have a benefit by providing a window, as Dr. Press has said, into Soviet societies. They also provide an opportunity to have U.S. scientists make personal contacts with Soviet dissidents and, to a degree, reduce their sense of isolation. As a result, we basically have gone along with the apparent majority in the scientific community, who feel that a blanket U.S. Government

freeze is not appropriate, and that instead, individual scientists should have the opportunity to determine whether or not they want to continue participating in the programs, according to their sense of conscience.

Obviously, in the aftermath of the trials, many scientists decided to demonstrate their concern for violations of human rights by not participating.

Mr. SCHEUER. Do we have any single fact from the Soviet Union as to what impression that made on them?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There was press reaction at the time. They clearly took note of it and indicated in a variety of ways that they had.

What we're saying is that we're making clear how deeply this concern exists, not only within the U.S. Government

Mr. SCHEUER. But you're not answering my question. I know we've made that impression. I'm saying has anything happened over there that gives you a clue as to how that's been received, as to whether it's producing a change?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I'll give you the three things that Ambassador Shulman cited last week.

The problem is you can't ever show any direct linkage, and they're very modest in terms of change.

First, you had the termination of the court actions against the two U.S. journalists. You had, after what was clearly a contrived trial against the American businessman, permission for him to leave. You had some indication that certain families, who had previously been denied, would be given permission to emigrate, a relatively small number.

Now in one sense, those are very minor actions, but they're different than the previous trend of events in the early summer. Does that indicate that that's a result of any of the actions that we took? It's not clear that we can know.

Dr. SIMKIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes.

Dr. SIMKIN. It may well be that what we might get from the Russians is not any change in the character of their policies, but rather that they would pursue existing policies less vigorously. In effect there might simply be a slowing down in the increase in the number of repressions and in the severity of those repressions.

Mr. SCHEUER. But that's not the change that we're looking for. Dr. SIMKIN. But you could only detect such a change some months after our actions. We're going to have to put it in perspective.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The additional point that I would like to comment on with regard to one I made in the testimony is that by allowing the individual scientists to continue or not, in a sense, you have two benefits in terms of human rights and contact with Soviet dissidents. Individual scientists who travel to the Soviet Union and make contact with their colleagues do provide some benefits in terms of lessening their sense of isolation. At the same time those who individually decide not to continue to participate in those programs send a clear message of concern with regard to human rights violations.

The only other point that I'd like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that in the testimony from the scientific panel there was one comment that indicated some confusion with regard to U.S. policy on individual

scientists participating in exchange programs. The question is whether or not there is U.S. policy against their making contact with Soviet dissidents. There was the other question about whether they should raise the human rights issue with their Government contacts. I just wanted to clear that up.

The U.S. Government does believe it's legitimate and, I think, desirable that they raise the human rights issue. With regard to the contacts themselves there is no prohibition against American participants in exchange programs contacting Soviet citizens.

Mr. SCHEUER. There is no prohibition against anybody in the Soviet Union contacting a Soviet citizen?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. There's a difference. The comment was that there's a feeling that the U.S. policy was against that. The point I wanted to make is that it is an explicit policy of this administration not to prohibit that contact. As a result of some of this earlier confusion, we have gone out to the agencies who participate to indicate that.

Mr. SCHEUER. Had there been a policy of prohibiting American citizens from visiting Soviet citizens?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Denying?

Mr. SCHEUER. No. Had there been a policy on the part of participants under prior administrations of prohibiting American citizens, scientists, or anybody else, from visiting Soviet citizens in their homes?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not so far as I know. But there had been some confusion about it. It was that confusion also registered in the testimony that we had taken some action during the summer to clear up.

Mr. SCHEUER. The record should be clear that there is absolutely no Soviet law or administrative ruling or regulation of any kind prohibiting anybody from visiting any Soviet citizen anywhere outside of a place of incarceration. Even though these refuseniks, and so forth, are under a cloud and they've had their reputations and their careers blighted pitifully and painfully-they've lost their jobs, lost their publication rights, and what not-but so long as they haven't been charged with anything and incarcerated, any Soviet citizen or any foreigner is quite free to visit them in their homes.

Now, as a practical matter, Soviet citizens may hesitate to fraternize with a refusenik when they feel that that would jeopardize their status, and undoubtedly it would. But it seems to me that we should recognize that. We should continue to hold out a hand and support the friendship, and it should be very clear that in doing that we violate absolutely no Soviet law or administrative ruling or regulation whatsoever.

Dr. WELLS. Mr. Schneider, how actually do you allocate your time in your, as I understand, very hard pressed office, that ranges broadly across a lot of fields, since you are responsible for the administration's entire human rights policy in your agency? How do you allocate your time to the science and technology area? Is it a high priority, or low priority? Do you listen to the scientific community, or the Academy, or the science organizations, or Federal organizations to help you?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would say we deal with it in two ways.

We break down, in terms of regional human rights officers. One officer looks at the question of scientific exchanges within the context

of the United States-Soviet relationship and within the context of the CSCE and Helsinki Final Act review.

We participate in the Interagency Committee that reviews United States-Soviet bilateral relationships and in the preparation of policy with regard to the Helsinki Final Act. It is in that context that we look at the question of exchange programs.

We also maintain contact with scientific groups, many of which are testifying here today, not only about the United States-Soviet scientific exchange programs but also about the condition of scientists in other parts of the world. In fact, the testimony today notes the violations of rights of individuals, who happen to be scientists, in Latin American countries.

So the regional officer generally will focus on this as one aspect of the overall relationship.

Dr. WELLS. It has been suggested in testimony yesterday that at least one group of people feel that the desired objectives that all of us seek would be better served by a low profile and less public discussion, less public pressure, less public action on the part of individuals or the administration, and to use more quiet diplomacy. What is your view on this set of beliefs?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Essentially I think you have to look at it case by case. You make a judgment in terms of tactics whether at certain clear given points you're more likely to be effective in achieving some improvements by maintaining solely private, quite dramatic channels of communication.

Or you judge whether additional actions, symbolic or substantive, will express your concern more deeply, or pressure the other government. You also judge whether there should be some public expression.

I don't think it is a question that can be answered with a given rule. You have to look at the situation and how you evaluate the posture or response of the other government.

Dr. WELLS. OK.

Then following up, did your office participate in providing options for President Carter when Basket III was conceived?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not directly. The general question was discussed again within the Interagency Committee, and our views were made known to them.

Dr. WELLS. So you were part of that committee process that came up with the alternatives?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is precisely right. It's called ICCUSSA. It is the Interagency Coordinating Committee on United States-Soviet Affairs. It is within that context that we make what we believe are the appropriate recommendations for furthering our human rights con

cerns.

Dr. WELLS. How do you draw upon various sources to develop your information about conditions, say, specifically in the Soviet Union? Is it possible to get a profile of individuals, to try to gather this information systematically? How do you pull together the profile of a country to make an assessment of the overall so-called human rights? I suppose you come up with a human rights impact statement, but how is your assessment pulled together?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. You begin with the rights that we're concerned about, which stem from international agreements, the Helsinki Final