Police surmised that her murder was related to the on-going Job Corps investigation.

An OI investigation resulted in an indictment for a false billing scheme involving medical equipment supplied to Black Lung claimants. The subject is currently a fugitive, and is being sought for trial on those charges and additional charges of kidnapping. He had a prior arrest record for firearms violations, resisting arrest and armed robbery, and is a known drug and alcohol abuser who is believed to be armed at all times. When asked to assist in the search for this fugitive, OI agents were deputized in January 1991. However, OI agents were, unarmed during the actual investigation they had conducted that lead to the May 1989 felony indictment.

During an investigation, OI agents discovered that business records belonging to the subject were being maintained in a storage facility. With this information, a search warrant was obtained. On account of the remoteness of the area, no other law enforcement agency was available to expeditiously execute the warrant. By the time the warrant could be executed, the subject had returned to the storage facility and had removed some of his items.

Arrest warrants in a bribery case were issued by a federal magistrate. OI agents sought to serve the warrants as quickly as possible, to secure the cooperation of those arrested and to develop evidence of other bribe offers. Agents from an agency with full law enforcement powers waited with an OI agent to arrest the bribery suspect. However, because those agents with arrest authority had to leave the stakeout, the arrest, had to be postponed until a later date. If OI agents had been authorized arrest powers, the suspect could have been arrested as scheduled and his cooperation could have been obtained at a much earlier stage in the investigation.

OI conducted a surveillance of a business establishment in Hoboken, New Jersey. At one point during the surveillance, two of the subject's employees pulled their van alongside the surveillance van, blocking it. The two employees approached the surveillance van and began banging their fists on the exterior, looking through the window, grabbing the handles and yelling obscenities. Fortunately, they were unsuccessful in gaining entry into the van. The OI agent immediately discontinued the surveillance since there was no way to protect himself from further attacks and threats.

The subject of an OI investigation had been convicted of fraud involving the unemployment insurance program (UI) and was sentenced to five years in prison. He escaped from a federal prison camp and began another scheme to defraud the UI program. He was finally arrested in Victorville, California, after an automobile chase by OI agents and local sheriff's deputies. subsequent search of the subject's vehicle produced a handgun. The OI agents, who had spotted the subject and had contacted the local authorities, had been unarmed.

A

The subject of an OI investigation, who had a drug/alcohol addiction for which he had received treatment, was confronted by an OI agent 'regarding stolen workers' compensation checks. After several attempts, the lone OI agent located the subject at his place of business and asked to interview him. As the agent entered the subject's place of business, the subject stepped behind his desk, drew a gun from his briefcase, and placed it in a desk drawer. The agent completed the interview, withdrawing in a manner so as to not provoke the subject.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL-U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

March 12, 1991

The Office of Investigations (OI), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Labor (DOL) employs approximately 90 special agents who are assigned to seven regional offices and 11 smaller offices known as field offices. Ol special agents conduct a full range of felony investigations, including investigations of allegations of conspiracy, fraud, embezzlement, racketeering, bribery, extortion, and corruption. Further, the witnesses and subjects of these investigations include individuals who have been convicted or are suspected of committing violent crimes such as murder, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, rape and drug related offenses. Although OI special agents are classified as General Schedule 1811s, the same position classification that designates all statutory law enforcement positions (e.g., agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and Postal Inspection Service (PIS), Ol special agents lack full law enforcement authority. Specifically, OI special agents are not authorized to carry weapons or make arrests. As set forth below, this subjects OI agents to unreasonable risks and adversely affects the efficiency of Ol operations.

The OI is composed of a relatively small number of agents, including increasing numbers of women and other minorities whose ages range from the early 20s through the mid 50s, and whose criminal investigative experience vary from less than a year to over 20 years of Federal service. Many have previous law enforcement experience including service with federal agencies such as the FBI and PIS or service with state and local law enforcement agencies.

Not only do OI agents have the same position classification as other federal agents, but they either receive the same law enforcement training provided the traditional law enforcement agencies at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); or, have previously received particularized criminal investigator training with other Federal law enforcement agencies. They have received extensive training in the full range of law enforcement subjects including firearms, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and investigative techniques. On an agent-by-agent basis, additional modules of specialized law enforcement training are also provided OI special agents. and investigative techniques. On an agent-by-agent basis, additional modules of specialized law enforcement training are also provided OI special agents.

The locations of OI investigations are no different than those where other Federal law enforcement agencies must visit and conduct their work. They are frequently dangerous urban, high-crime rate areas, known for activities such as illicit drug trafficking and related killings, assaults with dangerous weapons, prostitution and fencing of ill-gotten property. Ol investigations also extend to the sparsely populated rural areas of the nation where an agent finds himself or herself not only alone and unarmed, but potentially confronted by hostile subjects and their associates and unable to rely upon the immediate response from a local law enforcement agency. Furthermore, in some states it is not illegal for residents to carry firearms.

Like other federal agents, OI special agents utilize the full range of investigative techniques, such as: undercover operations; approved electronic recording and monitoring; covert-overt surveillances; records analyses; and, interviews, which are sometimes confrontational, hostile and dangerous. Frequently, these techniques and others result in special agents requesting search warrants and the execution of OIG or grand jury subpoenas in the same dangerous environments.

Inefficiency abounds as a result of the way by which OI must rely upon others to assist it in carrying out its law enforcement mission. For example: On request, the Department of Justice (DOJ) will consider granting special agents limited law enforcement authority by deputizing them as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals. The requests are granted on a case-by-case basis, for a specific investigation, based upon a review of the situation and an agreement by the local U.S. Attorney, the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Associate Attorney General. The deputations are limited to actions associated with a specific criminal investigation or personnel security assignments (e.g., the Secretary of Labor's security detail or witness protection). The deputations terminate on either June 30, or when the investigation/assignment is concluded, whichever occurs first.

This limited type of law enforcement authority is inadequate and the administrative requirements are time consuming. Case-by-case deputations are at the discretion of DOJ officials, are frequently conditional, and even when approved, the process often requires weeks to accomplish. The delays and possible rejections adversely impact the criminal investigations for which the deputations are needed. Evidence has been lost, investigations have been prematurely terminated, and Ol has withdrawn from ongoing joint criminal investigations because its agents did not possess statutory law enforcement authority. Federal, state and local prosecutors and investigators from other law enforcement agencies have expressed dismay that OI agents lack this authority.

Moreover, due to potential danger, OI agents require the accompaniment of other law enforcement officers for the most routine investigative processes, e.g., subpoena service. This not only commits two officers and two agencies to carry out an otherwise "oneman"/one agency function, but requires unnecessary coordination and frequently compromises the timeliness of service. This same problem exists, but to a greater extent, when Ol agents request a search and seizure warrant or an arrest warrant and must coordinate and rely upon the availability of other law enforcement officers to execute the warrant. These warrants, of course, cannot be executed without the presence of armed agents to facilitate safe compliance with the warrant. Because of delays caused by executing these warrants on the schedule of another agency, subjects may flee or evidence may be destroyed. Further, when unarmed OI agents participate in these arrests and searches, as they usually must, the risks increase for all participants. Not only are the unarmed agents at risk, but so are the armed agents who must direct their attention to their unarmed companions.

In addition to Ol's law enforcement responsibilities, OI is responsible for the security of the Secretary of Labor. Heretofore, that responsibility has been carried out by a maximum of ten agents (limit set by DOJ) scattered throughout the country and deputized for this purpose. However, there are two problems with this procedure. First, it is costly to move these agents throughout the country as they are needed. Second, it restricts the resources available to the IG who is responsible for the Secretary's security. This is especially troublesome given the turbulent world situation.

There is another factor that is troublesome regarding deputation on a case-by-case basis. Agents are only authorized to carry their weapons when they are working on the case for which they are deputized. Inasmuch as agents generally work on several cases on any particular day, they are faced with a dilemma. Do they leave the weapon in a locked but unattended vehicle or must they drive, perhaps many miles, to the office to secure the weapon? The problem is even more acute when agents travel, as they often do, and work for a week or more in another state.

The lack of full law enforcement authority has adversely affected the retention of agents. Although OI attracts, recruits and trains many exceptional law enforcement, career-minded men and women, a percentage of our agents transfer to the traditional

law enforcement agencies due to Ol's lack of full law enforcement authority. Their safety and well being are often cited as uppermost in their decisions to transfer. Also of concern to our agents is the OI's dependency upon others to carry out fundamental criminal investigative functions. Clearly, the lack of full law enforcement authority has adversely affected Ol's ability to retain some investigative resources in which OI has made long-term training and expertise development investments.

There have been several attempts in recent years to overcome this disparity in full law enforcement authority for the OIG community. In 1987, U.S. Senators DeConcini,

Domenici, D'Amato and Moynihan introduced S.1975. In 1990, U.S. Senator Boschwitz introduced S.2080; while, in the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Staggers introduced H.R.4149. All of these bills addressed the OIG community's need for full law enforcement authority, proffering essentially the same language which is indigenous to the law enforcement authority which cloaks the traditional Federal law enforcement agencies. DOJ has opposed each attempt, for reasons that appear to be based on a desire to protect the investigative jurisdiction of DOJ investigative agencies.

The enactment of statutory law enforcement authority for the OI would entail minimal additional costs, which would probably be immediately off-set by the return on the more efficient means by which OI could operate without having to rely on the assistance of other agencies.

Those who do not support statutory law enforcement authority for OI have failed to make the case that it would somehow adversely affect either the Federal Government at-large or specific federal law enforcement agencies. In the meantime, Ol agents are conducting criminal investigations in the same dangerous environment and are being confronted by the same violent element as other law enforcement officers, without any of the benefits and protection of statutory law enforcement authority.

It is for these reasons, that the Department of Labor OIG should be accorded statutory law enforcement authority.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator HARKIN. The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 p.m., Tuesday, March 5, when we will meet to hear Secretary Sullivan, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Thank you all. [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., Tuesday, March 5, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992

TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 1991

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:40 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Harkin (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Harkin, Specter, and Gorton.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

STATEMENT OF FRANKLYN G. JENIFER, PRESIDENT

OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR HARKIN

Senator HARKIN. The subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education will come to order.

Again, I apologize, Senator Gorton, to all of you for being a little late this morning.

Today, we will hear from Howard University, Gallaudet University, the National Technical Institute for the Deaf, and the American Printing House for the Blind, the four special institutions funded through the Department of Education.

The fiscal year 1992 request for Howard University is $190.9 million, a decrease of $4.2 million below the 1991 level. While an increase of $1.5 million is requested for the endowment grant, no funding is requested for construction.

The elimination of the construction program in fiscal year 1992, which was funded at $5.8 million in fiscal year 1991, accounts for the decrease in the overall funding for Howard University.

Howard offers undergraduate, graduate, and professional degrees through the 18 schools and colleges which comprise the university. The university also administers the Howard University Hospital. Today, we will hear for the first time from Howard's new president, Dr. Franklyn Jenifer.

Now, a total of $70.8 million has been requested for Gallaudet University. Again, Gallaudet provides elementary, secondary, col