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I am very much discouraged about some of the things I have heard this morning.
Back 40 years ago, when I was studying this thing, we were saying the same things, but what the juvenile court could or could not do, and how it could be coordinated-private agencies.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Why do you think we are still making relatively little progress? Certainly it is not the question of knowledge. It is just a question of will in arousing the country to do something about this? Dr. COTTRELL. Well, I do not want to give you my lecture in soci
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I am sure I would benefit. Dr. COTTRELL. There are several things.
One, when we made the area studies in Chicago, we laid it on the line and made it very clear that the root problems were problems of a disintegrated commmunity that could not act as a community, could not cope. It was dog eat dog—the slum situation, the communities were disintegrating under the growth of the great cities.
Now, we pointed the finger at this area as the one that needed enormous effort, and we started in a small way to develop what we call the local area programs, trying to mobilize the resources. We had no conception of the massiveness of the task that that presented.
Furthermore, we had no people trained to think in terms of community organization, development of new programs.
Another very important reason for this language of progress is that in those days, and from those days until just recent years, our professional people have been trained to deal with problems in delinquency on the medical model; that is, a delinquent is a sick person, and you deal with him as an individual.
But our data showed, and every study that has been conducted since shows, that the massive problems of delinquency are derived from large social processes that are affecting the life of the community.
We are only coming now—and I think the President's Committee was largely instrumental in awakening us to this necessity--we are only now coming to see that we have to train people to deal with delinquency at that level, and that approach. Not to take the brand from the burning, give him clinical treatment, send him back into that disorganized community and expect miracles to happen. You cannot do it that way.
So we have not made any progress.
Furthermore, there is this inertia of agencies that are long established, have their practices established, have their personnel trained in a certain way, and they simply have not broken out of it.
The break is coming the break is here.
The President's Committee was one major break in that traditional line.
But until we can learn the lessons from that committee, we are still going to be bogged down with the same kind of stodgy rigidity that does not enable us to get people involved in new approaches.
Furthermore, we have only come recently to see that the American people, especially in these disorganized areas, have lost the capacity, have not learned to act like communities. And it is a hard job to learn this lesson, with all the conflicts that are popping up, and the diffi
culties from dissident groups, reaching consensus on values and goals and putting their shoulder to the wheel to accomplish it.
Now, I have been out in some of these 16 cities, and while OEO came with its hundreds of millions and flooded out the $5 or $6 million a year programs of the delinquency program of President Kennedywe were flooded out, never got a chance to show what these little experiments could do--but I have been there and lived with these people enough to know that they are ideas that are growing, and skills and techniques that are developing, that will meet this kind of gap in the thinking, philosophy, theory, and practice in this country.
The social work profession itself is now in the midst of what might be described as a revolution in some respects. It is changing from relying on the individual case approach, and seeing that its major attack has to be in these coordinated, communitywide programs, and they have got to train the people to do that.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I would also like you to comment about the House prohibition against giving JD funds to programs funded under OEO.
Dr. COTTRELL. Yes. I simply could not understand that provision.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Would you expand on that point to some extent ?
Dr. COTTRELL. As I understand the provision, it would prohibit the use of these funds, if the House bill prevailed, for activities that were coordinated with or geared in with any of the activities of OEO. I may misread the bill, but that is the way I read it. And I simply do not understand why, if you have a productive community program, a job opportunity program, a Headstart program, that that could not be coordinated with a comprehensive program of delinquency prevention and control under this bill. It just does not make any sense to me.
Now, what the honorable Congressman had in mind, I do not know. Maybe they were afraid that OEO was too much of a political football, or whatnot. I do not know what it was. But it just is not possible to keep that kind of insularity between programs that are aimed at the same communities, and the same problem.
I speak, as I say, as a layman. I do not know how to interpret that provision.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Well, as I understand it, it is even worse than you have suggested, because it prohibits contributions to any of the agencies that are receiving OEO funds.
Dr. COTTRELL. Oh, yes.
Senator KENNEDY Of Massachusetts. So it is even more extensive and expansive than was suggested by you.
Dr. COTTRELL. It is worse than I imagined.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. And I think your comments on this are extremely helpful to us.
Dr. COTTRELL. Well, the gentleman should understand, if their bill prevails, that they are going to get a very fragmented, impossibly unworkable program so far as delinquency is concerned.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Could vou give us some idea as to what you think could usefully be spent by the Federal Government in these programs?
Dr. COTTRELL. What could
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Usefully be spent by the Federal Government.
Dr. COTTRELL. You mean size of funds?
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Yes. Have you any thoughts about this?
Dr. COTTRELL. Well, judging from the efforts that we made, to spend the 1961 act funds—it was $10 million a year for 3 years, and then it was renewed, but we never got the full $10 million in any one yearwe had $6 or $7 million—but to spend that wisely, to get the programs that we wanted to see developed planned, it took time and it could not be spent fast. And I would say it would be a mistake to simply dump $50 million, $100 million, $150 million into this thing now, and say, "Spend it.” I think you have got to go into the thing at a slower pace.
I would like to see the proposed figure of $25 million made available, and such portions of it spent in well-planned, well-conceived, innovative, imaginative programs, developed, and give us time.
You know, I would like to register here å real "beef” about the attitude of the Federal Government-I used to get it when I worked for the military, I get it every time I work in any Government agency. They pass a bill, they make an appropriation, and then next year they want to see results. And they want to clear out delinquency between now and December 1968.
We have got to have time perspective on this, and we have got to have the feeling in the Government that you do not just dump the money in and now it is ready to be spent. We have to develop programs, we have to have planning.
Congresswoman Green criticized me and the Technical Advisory Panel very severely on our emphasis on planning. She would shake her finger at us and say “You have spent so many hundreds of thousands of dollars over the past year, and you have not touched a single delinquent.” What we were doing in that first year was to try to get wellconceived plans and coordinated plans in the communities to get the comprehensive approach.
Well, I am going around the barn in answering a very simple question.
I say that I think we could spend the proportional amount of a $25 million appropriation in the time that is left now in the fiscal year, but I would like to see plans made for increasing that roughly in the order that has been suggested from time to time-about $25 million a year.
I think if we could have about a year, a year and a half, or possibly 2 years, to get programs moving, I think we could demonstrate in various parts of the country that this problem can be really attached at fundamental levels. But we have to have time, we have to have planning. We have to train people, not only professionals, but we have to train indigenous people to work into this. They have proved to be one of the most valuable resources in some of these areas.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Of course, this is really what we have been doing since 1961, have we not?
Dr. COTTRELL. Yes. That is exactly it. We learn.
experience, that amount of know-how, that amount of knowledge. Do we really have to once again go slow?
Dr. COTTRELL. No—we don't have to simply go over the same kind of ground we went over. We could start now, and instead of waiting for a year or 2 years to learn, we could train indigenous nonprofessionals to be very effective in some of these programs. We could start these processes much more rapidly now than we could then. We had to find these things out. And we had to convince the communities of them.
Senatory KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Haven't we already gone through our trial, our shakedown!
Dr. COTTRELL. If I were Star and say, “Take this money and do it,” I would say, “Yes, we have learned a lot." I don't think the communities have absorbed as much as we think they have—there are a lot of political fears and anxieties when you get communities more articulate and organized, and able to cope, there are all sorts of local problems. And you say we learned, and we have. We have the knowledge. But American communities, particularly disorganized communities, and communities in which this kind of activity becomes politically effective or threatening or what-not, that they have to have time to sort of soak it in.
I do not think you can count on a very rapid movement, but I think you can count on a faster movement than we had in the 1961–64, 1965 period. And I might say that was one of the most invigorating and stimulating experiences that I have had and the professionals who participated in it testify to the same thing. This was a shot in the arm for the imagination of the people who are in this field.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Well, I want to thank you very much.
Dr. COTTELL. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss it with you.
Senator KENNEDY of Massachusetts. We appreciate your appearance here.
(The prepared statement, with attachment, of Dr. Cottrell follows) : PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST AND
SECRETARY OF THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION, AND CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CITIZENS ADVISORY COUNCIL
I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Act of 1967 (S. 1248). I have had an interest in the problem of juvenile delinquency for many years and have been involved actively in Federal efforts to deal with the problem, first as a member of an National Institute on Mental Health Review Panel, and later as the first Chairman of the Demonstration Review Panel which helped to develop and guide the policies of the programs initiated under the provisions of the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961.
The broad-scaled programs authorized by the 1961 juvenile delinquency legislation signaled the beginning of a totally new approach to the perplexing problems of juvenile delinquency and I feel privileged to have had a part in its development.
Bold in concept, but limited to the $47 million appropriated from 1961 to 1967, the congressional mandate to develop a fresh approach to juvenile delinquency and youth crime was implemented through a series of comprehensive, communitybased programs. Up until that time programs bad been sporadic and limited in scope; and research and demonstration programs had concentrated primarily on the problems of the individual, often overlooking the powerful impact on youth of social and economic conditions. Then comprehensive programs foensed national attention on those forces in the environment which spawn delinquency.
Concentrating primarily on the deprived inner-city areas which have the highest delinquency rates, these pioneering projects organized and mobilized community resources to attack the conditions which brought about delinquency.
They emphasized prevention as well as control, and they included intensive efforts and coordination on the part of educational employment, health, welfare, law enforcment, correctional, neighborhood organizations and other agencies concerned with youth problems. Many of the hallmarks of these juvenile delinquency programs have become official policies and programs in such Federal efforts as the Anti-Poverty Program, the Demonstration Cities Program, the Labor Department's Youth employment programs and educational programs for the disadvantaged.
Veighborhood law officers, offering legal services for poor families, begun in New York, New Haven, Boston and Washington, D.C. as integral features of delinquency prevention programs have served as models for similar programs throughout the country.
The Neighborhood Youth Corps is modeled in part after the pilot youth employment projects funded initially by the Federal delinquency program.
Neighborhood service centers to make a battery of needed services visible and easily accessible to poor families were initiated under funds from the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act. In 1961 there were few if any such centers. Today they are essential components of the service system in nearly every large city in the Country.
New Careers for the Poor now a large scale Federal program, had its origins in the comprehensive programs. Beginning in 1962 with Mobilization for Youth in New York City, each of the comprehensive delinquency projects tested new new ways of training and employing low-income neighborhood residents to provide urgently needed services to their neighbors, while at the same time being helped in finding ways out of poverty.
The Juvenile Delinquency demonstration projects have joined the school systems in various partnerships to break the bonds of out-moded curricula, obsolete traditions, and inadequate resources to fit emerging needs. They have frequently enlisted the help of others, such as universities, social agencies, neighborhood residents and students themselves in determining how the schools can help. This new interaction has helped to make the schools more responsive to changing needs and times and to broaden the school's involvement in the community.
Demonstration grant funds made possible the development of work-study programs designed specifically to prevent school failure and the likelihood of delinquency. Similar programs are now supported on a larger scale with other Federal funds.
A central goal of each comprehensive project has been to help low income residents to become more potent forces in their communities and in the lives of their youth. These efforts have helped to shift apathy, hostility and alienation to active concern and constructive action. They have also provided guidelines for other agencies at all levels of Government in their attempts to secure effective citizen participation in solving community problems.
They have opened up a range of new career lines for delinquent and disadvantaged youth-as non-professionals in health, education, welfare, recreation, day care and community service. These programs go well beyond training and employment. They provide young people with a sense of satisfaction from doing meaningful work and having it publicly recognized and valued ; a feeling of making a useful contribution to the community and society; and most important-hope for the future. The positive effect of those programs on delinquency, school failure and dropping out of school has encouraged other Federal agenciessuch as the Office of Education, OEO and the Labor Department to implement them on a large scale.
Efforts to involve delinquency youth have gone well beyond employment. They have gone to all levels of operating youth programs and into other areas of community life. Youth have been involved as members of the board or staff of youth agencies; they have worked in partnership with adults to find solutions to community problems such as the prevention of mass violence and improvement of police-youth relationships. These efforts have shown that when youth are given opportunities to be responsible, they begin to behave responsibly. The effectiveness of these programs led the Crime Commission to recommend that efforts to help delinquents should involve them.
Finally, the comprehensive programs have begun to break down the barriers between community, youth-serving systems and the correctional system. There