provide funds for public objects. The privilege of voting, consequent thereon, is incidental and collateral, established by a distinct constitutional provision, and is not to be regarded as one of the purposes and designed effects of the act. Such effect, therefore, cannot be much regarded in its construction. The direct object of the act being to raise a revenue, by laying a tax and burden upon the people, an exemption from such burden must be regarded as a benefit conferred on those entitled to it. It is a general rule of law, that what is intended for one's benefit, he may claim or waive, at his election, and this rule applies with increased force, when other and incidental consequences, important to himself, depend upon such election. So when a grant or bequest is made to one, being apparently for his benefit, he may accept or waive it; this right is of the higher importance, where such grant or bequest is made upon some trust attended with responsibility, or upon other onerous conditions. So we think the exemption in question was intended as a benefit to those who by reason of age, infirmity or poverty, are unable to contribute, and one which, if they so elect, they may waive and in such case, it would not be in the power of the assessors to omit them in the assessment, or abate their taxes, against their consent, with a view either to affect their elective franchise, or for any other purpose. The language of the act is, that the assessors may exempt, which implies, we think, that it is to be done, with their consent, express or implied. It is true, that the word "may," is sometimes construed as imperative, and equivalent to "shall"; but it is only where the context and general purpose of the act or instrument, manifestly require it. Here we think the context and general objects of the act require a different construction, and imply, that the word "may" was used in its ordinary sense, as permissive, granting power to the assessors to allow the exemption, at the election of those entitled to the benefit of it. On the whole, our opinion is, that the persons in question are not excluded from the right of voting as paupers; that they are not entitled to vote, without paying taxes, as citizens exempted by law from taxation; and that if they have actually paid no tax, assessed within two years next preceding such election, though such non-payment was occasioned by an exemption or abatement, under the discretionary authority of the assessors, such persons are not entitled to vote; but if they have in fact paid any tax assessed within two years previous, that they are entitled to vote in any election for governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives.' LEMUEL SHAW. SAMUEL PUTNAM. February 14, 1832. 1 See Rev. Stat. c. 3, § 1, and c. 15, § 17; Supplement, 18 Pick. 575; Capen ▼ Foster, 12 Pick 485. VOL XI. 47 558 INDEX. ABATEMENT. See PRACTICE, 7. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See EXECUTOR, &c. 1, 2. ACTION. An action may be sustained in this See EXECUTOR, &c. 5. ACTION ON THE CASE. An action on the case for the fraud of ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. ADULTERY. See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 2. AGENT. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AMENDMENT. 28 1. In a criminal trial, a clerical error See VERDICT, 3. APPEAL. A plaintiff in an action, having ap- 1. Where a debtor made a general 76 2. A debtor assigned goods by deed chargeable as trustee. Brewer ▼ 298 See MORTGAGE, 1, 2. ASSUMPSIT. 363 |