in refrigerator efficiency are desirable, are harmonized standards for refrigerators therefore an appropriate tool? Even if we could definitively answer this question, it seems doubtful that we will succeed in the time available to us in harmonizing the complex appliance sector. In this regard, we note that it has proven impossible, after decades of effort, to standardize the voltage or even the size of electrical outlets within the OECD, a standardization that would certainly benefit consumers in purchasing the most efficient appliances wherever produced. A gasoline tax is another example of a commonly applied policy that is not fully harmonized. All countries have set taxes on gasoline; these are usually fed directly into national, state and local treasuries as revenue raising measures. In the United States, taxes are considerably lower than those in Switzerland - or for that matter in other countries in Europe. Clearly our countries have managed to decide to impose gasoline taxes without the need to coordinate. The differences between our taxes reflect historical choices about the sources on which to put the emphasis when raising revenue (for example, income taxes, VAT, property taxes). Harmonization certainly has a role in environmental management, yet it can be a double edged sword. Harmonized standards are not always consistent with compliance or implementation flexibility. Despite attempts to avoid it, harmonized standards often tend to the lowest common denominator. Harmonized standards are not necessarily consistent with innovation — while harmonization at a high level of environmental protection at one point in time may be successful, the standard can tend to dampen innovation. Finally, setting harmonized standards and measures will always be complex and will undoubtedly entail high transaction costs. In light of the problems that... are clearly foreseeable, we must ask whether efforts to harmonize or coordinate measures that are already common to a large number of Parties is the best use of the time available to us under the Berlin Mandate. Mr. Chairman, several key points emerge from the considerations we have discussed here: 1) While we must reduce the number of variables to a manageable set for purposes of analysis and assessment, we should clearly acknowledge that such a narrowing down will be counterproductive if carried forward into our negotiations - if anything, we will need more options, not fewer, if we are to set meaningful targets and timetables as we are called upon to do by the Berlin Mandate. 2) In constructing a common menu of available actions, we should seek to learn from the experience of others - if specific and effective actions have been adopted only by a few countries, we should seek to determine why, and whether they may be of interest more broadly. 3) While it is desirable to construct a common menu of available actions, seeking to 4) Also in constructing a common menu of actions, we should pay particular attention to those that hold significant promise to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and to be the most economically beneficial and environmentally sustainable. U.S. Second Intervention on Policies and Measures Third Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on The Berlin Mandate Thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me the floor for a second time on this issue. I would like to respond briefly to my distinguished colleague from the Netherlands. From his remarks, I am pleased to note several areas of convergence in our views on policies and measures. We agree especially with the Netherlands' point that markets often benefit from coordination of standards. We would add, for example, that coordinated design codes of product standards for energy efficiency may be attractive to countries with emerging markets, so as to promote efficient growth and thereby avoiding unnecessary stresses on these countries' production capacity. Mr. Chairman, we meant to stress in our intervention yesterday that harmonization can be over-emphasized, and to underscore that the option of harmonization can be a double edged sword. Harmonized standards are not always consistent with compliance or implementation flexibility. Despite attempts to avoid it, harmonized standards often tend to the lowest common denominator. Harmonized standards are not necessarily consistent with innovation -- where harmonization at a high level of environmental protection at one point in time is successful, the standard can tend to dampen innovation. Finally, setting harmonized standards and measures will always be complex and will undoubtedly entail high transaction costs. It is for this reason that we suggested yesterday that we must ask whether efforts to harmonize or coordinate measures that are already common to a large number of Parties are the best use of the time available to us under the Berlin Mandate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. United States Statement on Advancing Article 4.1 Commitments Mr. Chairman; I would like to take this opportunity to convey our thoughts on this very important aspect of the Berlin Mandate: advancing the implementation of the Parties' existing commitments under Article 4.1 to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. I note that the Secretariat has once again prepared several useful documents relevant to this discussion and I would like to thank the Secretariat for its valuable and timely work in this area. At the second session of the AGBM, we heard presentations from a number of parties emphasizing the positive and diverse activities they are undertaking to implement their existing commitments under Article 4.1. We listened with interest to these presentations and were impressed with the wide array of activities. We are pleased that our cooperative work with many other countries through the U.S. Country Studies Program has played a valued role in their programs and activities addressing climate change. As the Secretariat has noted in document FCCC/AGBM/1996/1/Add.1, advancing the implementation of Parties' commitments under Article 4.1 entails more than reporting on their current activities. The United States believes there is a tremendous potential for all countries, including developing countries, to further their objectives for economic development and growth and to protect the earth's climate system at the same time. The IPCC Second Assessment Report concluded that there is a range of policies and actions to mitigate greenhouse gases that are appropriate, feasible, and cost-effective for all Parties. The IPCC report noted that many opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at little or no cost, or even at a profit, are available to developed and developing countries alike. By seizing these opportunities, all countries can, and must, contribute to changing the path of dramatic emissions growth that the world currently faces. Finding and seizing these opportunities are, we believe, at the heart of the obligation of all countries to advance the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4.1. There is much scope for developed and developing countries to work together in this endeavor. Through the Country Studies program, which I have already mentioned, the United States has been able to provide developing countries and countries with economies in transition with technical and financial help to understand the sources of greenhouse gas emissions and identify attractive options to reduce them. Through this process, and similar efforts by other countries, a number of countries have built invaluable planning capacities and technical capabilities for dealing with climate change. A few examples may help illustrate the breadth and significance of these opportunities: Improved refrigerator designs consume less energy while-eliminating ozone-destroying CFCs. More efficient refrigerators translate directly into reduced pressure on scarce capital for expansion of power production and transmission capacity. And with power demands reduced, the path of greenhouse gas emissions growth can be reduced. Design codes and product standards for buildings, appliances and other equipment may also be useful to developing countries. Nutritional supplements can improve the health and productivity of cattle and reduce their methane Methane gas can be profitably recovered from coal beds before coal is mined, recovering fuel and reducing accident risks while preventing greenhouse emissions. Countries can also improve conditions for economic development, climate protection and overall environmental quality by identifying and eliminating market imperfections, barriers to technological development and diffusion, administrative inefficiencies and constraints, and legal instabilities. Such actions lay the foundation for a cost-effective and comprehensive long-term strategy for addressing the climate change problem. The United States believes that all parties have the opportunity to learn from one another in carrying out their Article 4.1 commitments. The open exchange of experiences and information is critical to understanding and overcoming barriers and identifying win-win solutions. To this end, we support the proposal of the G-77 and China for additional workshops as a valuable contribution to this process. There may also be value in additional meetings, perhaps on a regional basis, on opportunities to adopt best practices and other means to promote economic growth and climate protection at the same time. We would also like to suggest that consideration be given to the possibility of using the multilateral consultative process yet to be defined under Article 13 as a vehicle for facilitating the implementation of commitments for all parties. Such a process could draw upon the expertise of a range of technical experts from both developed and developing countries. The experts would provide advice and guidance on an asneeded basis to assist parties with questions, concerns and problems relating to the full range of commitments: national inventories, assessment of mitigation and adaptation options, development of climate response strategies and programs and preparation of national communications. An additional component of the AGBM's work to advance the implementation of Article 4.1 must be a firm commitment to an ongoing workprogram on technology. We fully support the decisions of the SBSTA and SBI on these matters and urge that the Secretariat's valuable work in this area serve as a initial step in a multipronged effort on technology. Advancing the implementation of existing commitments will be a long-term process for all parties. We see it not as an objective, in and of itself, but rather as a foundation laying exercise. What we are seeking to do, at a national and global level is to lay the groundwork for a long-term strategy to meet the threat of climate change. The successful implementation of such as strategy is the key to our sustainable development. Statement of the U.S. Delegation on Possible Features of a Protocol or Another Legal Instrument March 7, 1996 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by noting that the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) will meet twice more this year and two times next year prior to the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties. While my delegation has strongly supported analysis and assessment in the early stages of our negotiation, we are also very much aware that time is of the essence. We must move forward sensibly, but progressively not only because we are required to do so under a decision taken last year in Berlin, but because the scientific evidence of climate change continues to mount. The Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) now indicates that there is discernible human influence on the climate system. Over two thousand of the world's leading scientists have now concluded that recent trends can no longer be attributed solely to natural variability. Clearly, there are still uncertainties, but it has become increasingly certain that we cannot seek refuge in scientific uncertainty. The stakes are simply too high the costs of inaction are too great. We must proceed resolutely on the course set in Berlin. I make these observations about the urgency of our work because they may have a significant bearing on the choice of instrument we will use to adopt the results of our work next year. The United States urged strongly in Berlin, and we continue to urge, that the specific instrument chosen is only a vehicle we must ultimately choose a specific legal instrument that provides the swiftest, most efficient means of reaching our common objective. What is important in the first instance is defining an objective. We should then be in a position to choose the specific vehicle. - Need to Resolve Rules of Procedure At present, whether a protocol or amendment offers the clearest advantages is not discernible. Our vision is clouded, in part, because of continuing uncertainty regarding the rules of procedure we will follow in adopting a protocol. To lift the fog, we urge that COP2 in July spare no effort to resolve this issue. Possible Advantages of an Amendment Meanwhile, however, we think it important to restate as clearly as possible the advantages we see in an amendment -- if only to ensure that this option continues to remain at hand. Mr. Chairman, let me underscore that the United States has not as yet taken a position to support one form of legal instrument over another. To attribute even a preference to us would be to misunderstand our position in and since Berlin -- that the choice of legal instrument will depend on the commitments it is intended to reflect. So let me say in the clearest terms that we are not opposed to a protocol per se.. With regard to an amendment, we note the following points: The negotiation of an amendment could focus on a handful of convention provisions, as opposed to requiring negotiation of all the provisions that the creation of a separate legal |