it that the Poor Law Commissioners have expressed in what respects they mean those rules to be absolute conditions, and in what respects they are to be mere directions. They have stated in article 15. one particular case in which the indenture is not to be valid; but that language is not repeated in regard to the other matters. It is quite clear that many of these things can only be directory. But, besides this, we have the Magistrate first allowing the indenture, and afterwards, in obedience to these very

rules, certifying that everything required

by them has been done. This adds to the ordinary presumption that everything has been rightly done. I agree that if you shew that there is some condition unfulfilled which can be complied with only by a statement on the face of the instrument, the Magistrate's certificate would not aid it. But this is not so. The first objection is as to the consent of the parents not appearing. But this is not necessary, except it appears that the parent is alive, and his death is not one of the events in which the consent being dispensed with is required to be stated. Then, as to the child's own consent. It is not stated in terms that this is to appear on the face of the indenture; but it is required that he shall sign the instrument without aid or assistance. This, probably, was for the purpose of securing his being able to read and write. If, then, this need not appear on the face of the instrument, there is nothing to rebut the presumption.

WIGHTMAN, J.-There is nothing on the face of the indenture to shew that the rules have not been complied with; and I think the Sessions decided rightly, that these rules, with one exception, which has been complied with, are merely directory. I also consider the certificate of the Magistrate as strengthening the presumption that everything was properly done.

ERLE, J.-I agree in drawing the presumption of fact, and I quite concur in the decision of the Quarter Sessions which held these rules directory and not going to the validity of the indenture. I think much mischief would be done by holding the indenture to be void because some of the regulations are not complied with when everything else has been properly done. It is therefore a salutary view to

read these rules as directory, unless there is something expressly stating that they are to affect the validity of the indenture. Order of Sessions confirmed.

1853. THE QUEEN . THE INHABITANTS OF Nov. 9. LLANSAINTFRAID GLAN CONWAY. Settlement by Estate, Loss of-4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 68. Removability of

Wife and unemancipated Children.

The 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 68, which enacts that no person shall retain any settlement by estate in a parish for a longer term than he shall inhabit within ten miles thereof, operates to extinguish the right of the wife and children of such a person, who were unemancipated at the time of his leaving it, to be removed to that parish.

Upon an appeal, by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Llansaintfraid Glan Conway, in the county of Denbigh, against an order, under the hands and seals of two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the county of Carnarvon, for the removal of Mary Roberts and her four children from the parish of Aber, in the county of Carnarvon, to the said parish of Llansaintfraid Glan Conway, the Sessions confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench on the following

CASE.

The case set out the order, which was for the removal of "Mary, the wife of Thomas Roberts, and their four children, viz., Rebecca, aged seven years, Thomas, aged five years, Robert, aged three years, and Mary, aged six months (the said Thomas Roberts having deserted his said wife and children);" and the grounds of removal, which contained the following statement:-"That at the time of the mar

riage of the said Thomas Roberts to his said wife Mary, which took place about nine years ago, the said Mary was living in the said parish of Llansaintfraid Glan Conway, in a house which she rented from one Edward Jones, of Tygwyn, in the parish of Llandudno, in the county of

Carnarvon, farmer, as tenant from year to year, at the yearly rent of 21. 10s.; and she and her said husband, after their said marriage, continued to reside and sleep in the said house in the said parish of Llansaintfraid Glan Conway for a period of about nine months; and that the said Thomas Roberts deserted his said wife and children about six months ago, while they were residing in the said parish of Aber, in which parish they have ever since continued to reside, and from which parish they are now in receipt of relief; and further, that the said Thomas Roberts has not since returned to his said wife and children, and is not now in the said parish of Aber, and cannot be found.” Upon the trial of the appeal, it was admitted that Thomas Roberts, the husband of the pauper Mary Roberts, gained a settlement in the appellant parish, as stated in the grounds of removal; that about nine months after the marriage, and before the birth of any of the children, the tenancy in the appellant parish ceased, and Thomas Roberts and his wife went to live at a distance of upwards of ten miles from that parish, and continued to reside beyond that distance therefrom for upwards of twelve months; and it was admitted that Thomas Roberts had lost his settlement in the appellant parish thereby. The Sessions

confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench upon the question, whether the paupers were, under the circumstances, entitled to a derivative settlement in and to be removed to the appellant parish.

Hugh Hill and Corner, in support of the order of Sessions.-The loss of the settlement, by ceasing to reside within ten miles, was personal only to Thomas Roberts, and did not affect those who derived their settlement from him. A new principle was introduced by the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 68. The old law was, that a settlement once gained could not cease by any other method than acquiring a new settlement. The Queen v. Hendon (1) expressly decided that the effect of that section does not extend to those taking a derivative settlement from the party settled by estate.

(1) 2 Q.B. Rep. 455; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 3.

[LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-Is there not a new settlement created in the parish where the party was settled before?]

It does not appear whether Roberts had any settlement before. If that is relied upon, it should have been proved by the appellants-The King v. Harberton (2), The Queen v. Yelvertoft (3), The Queen v. Birmingham (4).

[COLERIDGE, J.-In The Queen v. Hendon the son lived with his father on the estate until he was emancipated. He therefore became settled there in his own right.] [LORD CAMPBELL, C.J. - Here, the children, being unemancipated at the time of the removal, follow their father's settlement, as the wife does that of her husband.]

The wife has not lost her settlement by virtue of the 68th section. Being deserted by her husband, she is removable to the settlement which she acquired by marriage, as it does not appear that she is settled elsewhere The Queen v. St. Marylebone (5).

[COLERIDGE, J.-If the same state of facts had existed before the statute, the wife and children would have been removed to Llansaintfraid Glan Conway, not as their own settlement, but as that of Thomas Roberts. If so, the statute having deprived him of the settlement, their right to be removed there must be gone also.]

Pashley and Morgan were not called upon to argue in support of the rule.

LORD CAMPBELL, C.J.-I am of opinion that the order of removal is bad. It is quite clear to me that neither the wife nor children had any settlement in Llansaintfraid Glan Conway. They could only be removed there in respect of the settlement of Thomas Roberts, which he formerly had, but which he has lost by virtue of section 68. of the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. It is, therefore, the same as if he never had a settlement in that parish. If the children had been emancipated at the time when he lost his settlement by estate as in

(2) 13 East, 311.

(3) 6 Q.B. Rep. 801; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 78.

(4) 8 Ibid. 410; s. c. 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.)

M.C. 65.

(5) 16 Q.B. Rep. 352; s. c. 20 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 61.

The Queen v. Hendon-they would have retained the settlement; but that is not the case. An unemancipated child, or a wife, cannot, after the settlement is destroyed, be removed to that parish.

COLERIDGE, J.-I am of the same opinion. It seems to me that the 68th section may admit of a very simple construction if we look at the law as it stood before, and as it is intended to be preserved by that section. Suppose a husband had an ascertainable settlement, he and his wife and unemancipated children may be removed there, but it would be in right of his settlement. If he has no settlement which can be ascertained, the same principle still applies; and the right of removing the wife and children must still depend upon his settlement, if they have not acquired an independent settlement. Here the only settlement which he is shewn to have had has been put an end to by the statute, and the case is, therefore, as if he had no settlement at all. The Queen v. Hendon decides that where a man has acquired an independent settlement, although derived from his father's settlement by estate, he does not lose it by reason of his father losing his settlement under this section. The child there was emancipated when his father lost his settlement, and the decision applies only to such a state of things, and is quite consistent with this decision.

WIGHTMAN, J.-In the present case neither the wife nor the children have gained any independent settlement of their own. If they were removed to the appellant parish, it could only be in right of the father's settlement. But as soon as he ceased to reside within ten miles his settlement was gone, and consequently they could not, after that, be removed there. I have had some difficulty in seeing how any doubt could be entertained on this point.

ERLE, J.-The question is, what is the effect of the 68th section on the unemancipated members of the family of a person whose settlement by estate is thereby extinguished. Is their inchoate contingent interest also extinguished, or does it become eo instanti a settlement in respect of which they may be removed? I am of opinion that the extinguishment of the father's settlement extinguishes the in

66

On the trial of a prisoner for felony, a juryman, by mistake, delivered the verdict not guilty," when the jury meant "guilty." The prisoner was discharged from the dock, but some of the jury then interposing, he was immediately brought back again, and the jury were again asked what their verdict They said "guilty;" the prisoner was, therefore, sentenced:-Held, that the original mistake was corrected within a reasonable time, and, therefore, that the conviction was right.

was.

The following CASE was reserved from the Glamorganshire Quarter Sessions.

66

On the trial of the prisoner for larceny, at the above Sessions, Owen Hughes, one of the jurors, delivered a verdict of not guilty," which was entered by the clerk of the peace on his minutes from which the record is made up, and also by the chairman, who heard the words "not guilty," in his note-book. The prisoner being thereon discharged out of the dock, others of the jury, interfering, said the verdict was "guilty." The prisoner being brought back into the dock, the chairman asked the jury what the verdict was. All the twelve jurors answered that it was "guilty," and that they had been unanimous. The chairman then asked Owen Hughes why he had said "not guilty," to which he replied that he had said guilty." The chairman then directed a verdict of guilty to be recorded; and sentenced the prisoner to be imprisoned for two calendar months, with hard labour. The question was, whether the conviction was right.

66

Giffard, for the prisoner.-After the

* Coram Jervis, C.J., Pollock, C.B., Parke, B., Coleridge, J., Williams, J. and Platt, B.

jury have delivered their verdict of "not guilty" by the mouth of their foreman, and after an interval of time had elapsed, the verdict cannot be altered. Had it been an instantaneous correction of a mistake, it would have been different; but here the man had left the dock, being discharged by permission of the Court, before any alteration was proposed. After the verdict was recorded, it cannot be changed.

[PARKE, B.-It is not recorded until it is put on parchment.]

It was entered in the clerk's minute book, from which the record would be made up, which is equivalent.

[COLERIDGE, J.-Surely the jury have a right to correct their own mistake.]

[PLATT, B. Recording the verdict. means recording the verdict to which the jury have agreed. Here one juryman said "not guilty," but the rest did not agree to it.]

[POLLOCK, C.B.-I remember the clerk of the Court used to say, "Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict while the Court records it. You say that the prisoner is not guilty; and that is the verdict of you all." Had this form been adopted, it would no doubt have been competent to the jury, when so called upon, to have corrected the mistake.]

It is a matter of importance to know how great an interval of time may elapse before the power of alteration ceases.

[POLLOCK, C.B.-We cannot lay down a rule as to what interval is sufficient.]

[PARKE, B.-It was the mistake of a single juryman, corrected on the spot, and before any other business was done.]

The Court will infer that everything was done in due form.

[PARKE, B.-I infer from the case that the ancient form of calling on the jury to hearken to their verdict was abandoned, which is a great error.]

POLLOCK, C.B.-We are all of opinion that this conviction is right. The mistake was corrected within a reasonable time, and on the very occasion on which it was made.

Conviction affirmed.

This was a case stated, by Jervis, C.J. on the trial of the prisoner for forging an order for the payment of money, at the last Summer Assizes for the county of Suffolk.

On the 30th of March last, the prisoner called at the bank of the Messrs. Alexander, at Hadleigh, where Mr. Ramsey, a farmer, of Holton, kept an account, and said that she had called for 800l. which she had deposited with Mr. Ramsey; that Mr. Ramsey had told her that she might have it if she called, but that she did not know whether it was in her name or his. The clerk told her that he could not pay her without an order, to which she replied that Mr. Ramsey had said an order would not be necessary, and went away. Upon the next day she came again to the bank and handed to the cashier a forged paper of which the following is a copy :

66

"Holton, March 31, 1853.

Sirs, Pleas to pay the bearis, Mrs. Smart, the sum of eaight hundred & 50 47. ten shillings for me. James Ramsey."

This paper was folded in the shape of a letter, and was addressed outside "Mrs. Smart." The cashier asked the prisoner if her name was Smart. She said yes. He then asked if she had seen Mr. Ramsey write the order. She said no; he had handed it to her. The cashier did not pay the money mentioned in the paper. On cross-examination he said that if he had seen Mr. Ramsey write it, or had known that it was his writing, he should have treated it as an order, and paid the money, although it was not addressed to Messrs. Alexander. Mr. Ramsey proved that the

Coram Jervis, C.J., Pollock, C.B., Parke, B., Coleridge, J. and Williams, J.

paper was a forgery, and the prisoner having been convicted, I reserved the question whether the paper above set forth was, under the circumstances, an order for the payment of money within the statute.

Dasent, for the prisoner.-The conviction cannot be sustained. The indictment is for forging an order to pay money, but the document upon which the prosecution is founded is not an order within the statute 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 66. s. 3, as it is not addressed to any person.

[JERVIS, C.J.-The question here is not whether the document is shewn in the indictment to be an order, but whether it is an order capable of supporting an indictment.]

To constitute an order for payment of money, there must be three parties named in it; the person giving the command, the person for whose benefit it is given, and the person to whom it is addressed. This last party is deficient here; or if it be addressed to any one, it is addressed to the prisoner herself.

[JERVIS, C.J.-Suppose I have an account at Coutts's bank, and I call there and say, I will send M. D. with a cheque for 100%. in an hour or two, and I afterwards give M. D. an order,-Pay M. D. or bearer 100l.-but do not address it to any one, is not that an order for payment of money?]

It is submitted not. It is not such an order as Messrs. Coutts would be bound to obey.

[POLLOCK, C.B.-Would it not have discharged the banker had he obeyed it? If it would have been a valid discharge to them, is it not an order?]

Had Ramsey called on Messrs. Alexander, and said that he should send such an order, and sent it, the case might have been different. If genuine it might have estopped him from saying that the payment was not to be allowed in account; still, as regards the Alexanders, it would not have been an order, but only a request to pay the money, which does not come within the statute.

[PARKE, B.-The question is, whether the defect in the want of an address may not be supplied by parol evidence. In The King v. Cullen (1) and The King v. (1) Moo. C.C. 300.

NEW SERIES, XXIII.-MAG. CAS.

Carney (2) the Court thought that the omission of an address in a request might be made good by evidence.]

That depended upon a custom or established practice of dealing in trade. The Queen v. Rogers (3) is distinguishable on the same ground. But the case of The King v. Clinch (4) is a direct authority in favour of the prisoner.

[JERVIS, C.J.-There is no doubt that the prisoner meant to represent it as addressed to Messrs. Alexander.]

Ramsey may have had an account at another bank. Suppose the prisoner had presented it at the second bankers, with the same story, it would have been said with the same shew of reason that the order was addressed to them.

[COLERIDGE, J.-Suppose there had been no uttering at all.]

That is a fair way of testing it. On whom, then, is it an order? The uttering cannot properly be prayed in aid to prove the antecedent fact of forgery of the order or no forgery. There is nothing to shew that this document was addressed to any particular banker. It is no order on any one; it is, therefore, no order at all. referred also to The King v. Ravenscroft (5).

He

Worlledge, for the prosecution.-The instrument is an order. The test is, whether, if it were genuine and the alleged facts true, and the bankers had paid the money, the payment would have been binding as against Ramsey-The Queen v. Dawson (6).

[WILLIAMS, J.-Suppose the instrument were genuine, and intended for one banker, but presented to a wrong banker, would that have discharged the banker who paid it ?]

That would depend upon how it was presented. If brought by a servant of Ramsey who had been in the habit of bringing cheques for his master, it would have bound the master. The statute does not require in terms that the order should be addressed to any one. Orders and requests to deliver goods stand on the same footing; and The King v. Carney and The

(2) Moo. C.C. 351. (3) 9 Car. & P. 41. (4) 2 East, P.C. 938. (5) Russ. & R. 161.

(6) 2 Den. C.C. 75; s. c. 20 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 102.

C