Mr. PICKETT. How long may he vacillate in that area between where he declared his intention and accomplished his purpose?

Mr. BRADSHAW. The law used to give a man 7 years to become a citizen. I do not know whether that has been shortened or not. The practice has always been, if a man has newly declared his intention to become a citizen, to suspend his entry after the statutory period of 5 years that he is allowed to perfect it, for the remaining 2 years. It is not suspended any further except on good and satisfactory cause shown.

Mr. PICKETT. We have a minimum period that must elapse from the time a man declares his intention to become a citizen, and before he can be declared so by the proper tribunal. What is the maximum period from the time he declares his intention until he must become a citizen or else get out?

Mr. BRADSHAW. The maximum period is 7 years.

Mr. PICKETT. You would not in any event then let the man continue on the land he had settled beyond the 7-year period if he had not prosecuted his declaration with such diligence as to accomplish it in that length of time?

Mr. BRADSHAW. That is correct.

Mr. PICKETT. We have a safeguard against the man who makes a declaration and never gets the citizenship?

Mr. BRADSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORRESTER. I would like to have a complete and definite ruling. If I am not mistaken now, and if I am mistaken, I would like to be corrected, I understood the gentleman to testify that some of these homestead rights were very attractive; that there were many more applications than there were rights. That accelerates my desire that, if there are a lot more applications than there are rights to be obtained, that accelerates my desire to see to it that a citizen of the United States may get his opportunity.

Mr. BRADSHAW. I am not too familiar with this. I came along to explain anything about the public-land laws more than in connection with this bill directly. I am reasonably certain that this is merely an excerpt from a bill, from a law, and that in other places in the law there is that limitation. I know the limitation is on the preceding page in this sense: "Any person who has served and is honorably discharged and thereafter makes homestead entry." Obviously "thereafter makes homestead entry" carries with it the connotation that he must qualify under the homestead law in order to make the entry.

Mr. FORRESTER. I would like to have that fully developed so that we know positively what it says, instead of just having an opinion about it. I want that to apply to all of the sections relating to homestead rights.

Mr. BURRUS. In cases where it is not perfectly clear in the statute, what form of evidence would you want? An opinion of the general counsel of the Department of the Interior?

Mr. FORRESTER. What form have you got?

Mr. BURRUS. If it does not appear on the face of the statute, it will have to be someone's opinion. There may be cases, there may not be. I just wondered what you had in mind. The witnesses have stated in their opinion that you have to be a citizen or to have declared your intentions.

Mr. FORRESTER. I think a written statement from the general counsel might suffice. However, I understand you gentlemen said you do not want any amendments. Why would a short amendment hurt you on that?

Mr. BURRUS. It is purely a practical consideration. As a matter of fact, I think almost everyone has some feeling that they could improve each one of these statutes, and we are afraid that if we went into that it would be a never-ending job. So it is just a practical consideration, that is all. There is no other reason for it.

Mr. FORRESTER. Just one or two words would not hurt you many times. As I have told you and I will tell you again, I am approaching these matters very sympathetically. On the other hand, I think I am pretty well set on the opinion that I just gave you. I do not have a thing in the world against aliens. Do not misunderstand me to be saying that. I think that, if you have these rights, the citizens in these United States should have the privileges, especially where they are being applied for and where you do not have enough to go around. Mr. BURRUS. We will get that evidence for you. I think that that will be the case. There is another point that I think that Mr. Sahm would probably want to clarify. I remember hearing him refer to the veterans who would be entitled to these extended rights as "Korean veterans." That was, I presume, by way of illustration and not by way of legal definition.

Mr. SAHм. That is right.

Mr. BURRUS. It applies to all the veterans who served in the Armed Forces during the emergency period. Is that correct?

Mr. SAHM. Yes. That was just by way of illustration that I referred to the Korean veterans.

Mr. FORRESTER. I am glad you brought that up. There is a question that I want developed. On this section, dealing with those who have served with our allies, other than the Koreans, what countries would we have the right to anticipate that now some of our citizens would be serving with other countries instead of with the United States Armed Forces?

Mr. BURRUS. I would presume that it would cover allies who are fighting with us in Korea against the Koreans.

Mr. PICKETT. Might it apply to the action in Indochina that_the French are now carrying on if we had some men who wanted to volunteer and join the French?

Mr. BURRUS. I would say so; yes. Certainly to the extent that they are Communists.

Mr. PICKETT. Would it apply to any United States citizen who joined in the Greek revolution 3 or 4 years ago and fought there? We are interested in knowing that.

Mr. BURRUS. I will concede that we have that difficulty with respect to the meaning of the word "allies."

Mr. PICKETT. We have almost as much difficulty with that word as we have with the word "enemy."

Mr. BURRUS. Not quite. I presume that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be considered allies rather clearly. There are cases that are not clear, I agree with you.

Mr. PICKETT. Could it conceivably apply to anybody who fought on either side of the Spanish civil war several years ago?

Mr. BURRUS. Before World War II? I would say "No" in that

case.

Mr. POLLAK. May I ask a question, also for clarification? There is only one provision here which in terms confers any right on citizens of the United States by reason of their service in the armed forces of another country. The question that I should like to ask the gentleman from the Department of the Interior is whether the rights conferred by this one section-talking about those people-are the same rights which are conferred by these various sections describing the rights of persons who served in our own Armed Forces.

Mr. SAHM. No, sir. There is a distinction there. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 provides, insofar as the public lands are concerned, that if a man makes entry upon the public lands, and subsequent to the time he enters the lands he goes into military service, the status quo is retained. His rights are held in suspense, you might say. So that when he returns from military service his rights pick up at that point insofar as proving up and eventually getting patent to his land is concerned. That applies only to citizens of the United States who serve with forces allied with the United States. That is to be distinguished, that particular factual situation is to be distinguished from the reduced requirements in order to prove up and get patent to a homestead, and the 90-day preference which is given to veterans, as distinguished from nonveterans. The latter two situations apply to citizens of the United States who served in the United States Armed Forces. The first situation, the suspension of those rights, refers only to citizens of the United States who served with forces allied with the United States.

Mr. PICKETT. These rights and privileges that are extended to our citizens who fought in our own Armed Forces, or who may have fought in the Armed Forces of countries allied with us in World War II, have they been suspended yet or are they still in existence?

Mr. SAHм. That is still in existence.

Mr. PICKETT. And will continue in existence until the termination of the Japanese war and 6 months thereafter? Is that right?

Mr. SAHм. Are you referring, sir, to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940?

Mr. PICKETT. I am talking about these three or four sections that you want extended and the rights and privileges under them.

Mr. SAHм. There is a distinction there. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, which suspends those rights that we are speaking about as far as the public lands are concerned, will continue in force until terminated by an act of Congress. The termination of the Japanese-rather the ratification of the Japanese treaty will have no effect upon the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 because in 1950 Congress enacted a law which said that that particular lawthat is the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Law of 1940-shall remain in full force and effect until terminated by act of Congress.

Mr. FORRESTER. We are not dealing with the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act in this proceeding.

Mr. SAHM. That is right. In this section which has to do with citizens of the United States who served with our allied forces, that section, section 512 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940 is worded in such a way that it is not taken care of by this 1950 act that

I am referring to because the 1950 act that I am referring to extends the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940 to those persons, citizens of the United States, who are serving with the Armed Forces of the United States.

So that it does not catch up this particular section which refers to citizens of the United States who are serving with our allied forces. In order to extend the benefits during the national emergency to that particular class, to wit, citizens of the United States who served with our allied forces, we had to make provision for them in this bill because the 1950 act which I referred to does not extend section 512 of the 1940 act beyond the termination of World War II.

Mr. PICKETT. There has been no termination of rights and privileges to date of any of these people. Is that right? Those who are covered under any of these sections.

Mr. SAHM. Of the 1940 act?

Mr. PICKETT. I have to get away from that because I am confused by it already. We are dealing in the legislation before this committee with four sections as I understand it, at least part of which is involved in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 as amended in 1950. I want to get away from the soldiers' and sailors' relief part of the business so that I can get myself straightened out. These four sections that we are dealing with grant certain rights and privileges that have not yet terminated. Is that right?

Mr. SAHм. That is right, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. They will not terminate until the conclusion of the Japanese war and 6 months thereafter.

Mr. SAHM. That is right.

Mr. PICKETT. So all veterans of World War II and others to whom these provisions may have applied at any time since their enactment are still entitled to benefits under them and will be for some time. Under the existing situation we have some veterans of the Korean conflict who have been discharged. Is their entitlement in existence today?

Mr. SAHм. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. When will it terminate unless these various sections are extended?

Mr. SAHм. It will terminate with the ratification of the Japanese Treaty.

Mr. PICKETT. There are no citizens of Korea who are entitled to any benefits under this program?

Mr. SAHM. No, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Only citizens of the United States who are members of our Armed Forces?

Mr. SAHM. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Have you given any thought to making this permanent legislation?

Mr. SAHM. I do not follow you, sir, on the question of permanency, because anyone who qualifies as a veteran of let us say World War II, he can assert these rights any time in the future; I mean at any time at all.

Mr. PICKETT. In other words, his rights will never terminate; is that right?

Mr. SAHM. Whether we continue this statute or not?

Mr. PICKETT. Except that the statute is worded this way: in order to qualify you have to be a veteran of World War II. When the Japanese Treaty is ratified there will no longer be World War II, and then we have to consider or we are considering those men who will be in service during the time of the national emergency. It is to take care of that category of persons that this legislation is directed toward.

Mr. PICKETT. Insofar as the law is concerned, whether these powers are extended or not the veteran of World War II as such will have his rights in perpetuity. What we are trying to do is take care of the veteran of the Korean conflict or such other situations as may arise to make him a veteran of some other conflict.

Mr. SAHM. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. This will not terminate as an emergency at any time in the immediate future. I just hate to continue things on ad infinitum on an emergency status. I am wondering if I should not go back to your basic legislative committee for consideration of a real revision of the law for that purpose, Mr. Sahm. I do not know of any but I would like to get your ideas.

Mr. SAHM. We think that the basic law is steeped so much in the American tradition of according to veterans of the wars these preferences insofar as public lands are concerned that I think it is part of our American tradition. So that the substantive parts of these laws I do not think there is any question about them, about the policy behind the Congress in enacting them, that is, the policy of the Congress in seeing that these public-land preferences and benefits are granted to our returning war veterans. The question as I see it is extending these benefits which go back over a good many years, to those men who are now in the military services during the time of the present national emergency.

Mr. FORRESTER. It is your contention that if it is steeped in the American tradition that you ought to put it on a permanent basis of legislation rather than on the emergency basis from time to time? If that is our tradition it looks like it ought to be written into our law permanently.

Mr. SAHM. If I understand Mr. Pickett's contention, if I understand his allusion to the word "permanent," it is permanent. The law is here. The only question is including within its provisions an additional class of people. That additional class of people is those men who are now in our military services and who are serving during the present national emergency. Because with the ratification of the Japanese Treaty, World War II would come to an end. Since our statutes here only cover veterans who serve up to and including World War II, we have to take care of this additional group.

I might put it this way, Mr. Chairman. The amendment that you are speaking of may be answered this way: I am not certain of this, but I think it illustrates the point. When these preference statutes were first enacted, they included veterans of the Spanish-American War, then World War I came along, then they were amended to include veterans of World War I.

Mr. FORRESTER. With this type of legislation?

Mr. SAHм. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORRESTER. I think the objection Mr. Pickett is raising is, the substance of what he is saying that he does not want to become a party