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World War II. The subcommittee members observed a team of Mieo hill tribe volunteers equipped with Springfield '03 rifles prepared to commence a combat operation. They are unable to secure U.S.-made M-16s due to the apparent belief of officials within the Public Safety Division of USAID that, because the unit is referred to as "police", it does not conduct military operations.

The four man Central Bureau of Narcotics in Chiang Mai, whose responsibility includes the four northernmost provinces, is equipped with one vehicle and three carbines. Obviously, theirs is an impossible task.

Another obstacle to meaningful control is the remoteness, both geographic and political, of northern Thailand from the Bangkok government. As a result, stern measures against the Thai government, such as threats to cut off aid, would have little effect on the hill tribesmen. One embassy official believes that if the Thai government were to mount a strenuous campaign against opiates, an action which would pose an economic threat to the tribesmen, the government would lose the northern provinces to the communists.

Background

VIETNAM

Four months ago, a report drafted by the participants in a conference and workshop on drug rehabilitation, composed of 182 officers and enlisted men, was withheld from the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, to whom it was intended to be directed. The report described in shocking detail the seriousness of the drug abuse problem in Vietnam. It recommended that a task force directly responsible to the Commanding General be established in order to alleviate "the demand for immediate information to combat this nemesis". The report stated:

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A disparity presently exists between the reports shown on the level of drug abuse in Vietnam and the consensus held by the conferees. The conference established that the "gut-feeling", undocumented reports from people who live with the problem, placed heroin addiction among lower ranking EM in the US Army at 25%. A USARV Task Force would provide the Commanding General with a more realistic base, from which to judge the accuracy of this "gut-feeling”. Hard statistical data, based on surveys presented to the conference, showed a range of heroin use between 10% and 44%. Time is essential! This Task Force should be established as soon as possible in order to present the accurate status of the drug problem to the Commanding General. Most conferees were openly skeptical of the accuracy of the information thus far presented to the Commanding General on drug abuse. The Task Force will be an action agency. It must focus all of its attention on this problem.

The report which ultimately was placed on the General's desk contained none of this information. Nor did it recommend the establishment of the sorely-needed task force. To the best of the subcommittee's knowledge, the Commanding General still has not seen the original report.

Spurred by an increasing awareness of the magnitude of the problem, as well as pressure from Congress and the White House, the various armed services in Vietnam have developed educational and treatment programs. Although the educational programs appear to be having a positive effect, treatment programs suffer from a lack of trained personnel and facilities.

The extent of drug addiction in Vietnam

The subcommittee members believe that it is insignificant whether the rate of drug abuse by our troops in Vietnam is five percent or forty percent. Whatever the rate, military commanders and the United States Government must marshal all possible efforts against the availability and use of heroin and other crippling drugs. Nevertheless, in order to enact meaningful legislation, the subcommittee must receive information concerning the nature and extent of the problem. Despite repeated requests, members of the subcommittee were not given statistical information which would indicate the extent of the use of heroin in Vietnam by U.S. servicemen. This refusal results in further difficulties for those charged with the responsibility for finding solutions to the drug abuse problem and undermines confidence in statistics which have been released to the public. Officials at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, stated that the instructions to withhold information came from the White House.

The only statistical information afforded the subcommittee members in Vietnam was that previously provided by Dr. Jerome Jaffee, Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs during testimony in Washington. Dr. Jaffee's figures indicated that between 5.33 percent and 5.46 percent of all servicemen who had undergone urinalysis prior to leaving Vietnam had been determined to have abused hard drugs during the previous forty-eight hour period. While the subcommittee has no basis on which to contest the urinalysis statistics, they are not an accurate indication of the extent of the drug addiction problem in Vietnam. These percentages probably are not even indicative of the number of Army personnel who fail the urinalysis tests at the centers located at Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh, because the figures are based on total military population in Vietnam: generals, as well as admirals, and sailors stationed aboard ship are included in the percentages released to the public.

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At Long Binh, from 1000 to 1200 samples are taken per day. On August 13, 1971, the day before the subcommittee visited the Long Binh testing facility, 87 positive urines were found, indicating a percentage of from 7.25 to 8.7.

Moreover, the much-publicized five percent figure does not include servicemen who have been arrested for drug-related crimes, participants in amnesty programs, deaths as a result of overdoses or hospital discharges for drug related illnesses. The percentage of servicemembers identified through these means is higher than the percentage identified through urinalysis. Table B is a United States Army listing of cases involving possession or use of narcotic drugs identified by these means during the period January through May 1971, prior to implementation of the urinalysis program. The figures rose from a percentage of 9.23 in January-February to 11.6 during April-May, despite the absence of the testing procedures being employed today. Figures for subsequent months have been suppressed.

Subcommittee members were advised by one knowledgeable Army medical officer that the heroin use in his brigade approximated 30 percent. One serviceman undergoing detoxification under an amnesty program stated that 95 percent of his unit smoked or snorted heroin. Another stated that "everyone but the First Sergeant" in his unit abused drugs. Both statements may be exaggerations, but they do point out the extent of the problem in the mind of those involved-the addicts.

The subcommittee members conclude that the extent of drug abuse among servicemen in Vietnam far exceeds the recently publicized figure of five percent. While figures obviously vary considerably between units and branch of service, the members do not quarrel with estimates that drug addiction by enlisted men in many units ranges from 15 to 40 percent and believe the estimates that 10 percent of enlisted men stationed in Vietnam are addicted to heroin to be cautious.

66-841 O 72 pt. 4 --6

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Present military programs

During the past four months, the military has responded to the drug abuse crisis in Vietnam with social and medical programs. At Long Binh Post, home of the Third Regional Army Command, the Army's Pioneer House is capable of assisting up to 65 volunteers at a time by means of its "cold-turkey", therapeutic community approach to the problem. Although the Pioneer House has in the past suffered from the recidivism of "ex-addict" counsellors, the program appears to be stabilizing. The remaining brigade of the Army's First Cavalry Division, headquartered at Bien Hoa, conducts an amnesty program. The "cure" rate is reported to be as low as ten percent, however.

The security features built into the urinalysis testing procedures at the centers in Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh appear to be adequate. However, it might prove possible for servicemen to cease using drugs for three or four days prior to departure and thus, to "beat the tests." The Army treatment centers retain a serviceman only until the results of the urinalysis tests are known to be negative, and a serviceman may be discharged for home within 18 hours of his tests. The desire to return home to family and/or to civilian life is a strong motivation and could lead some to curtail their habits temporarily with no efforts or even desire for total rehabilitation.

When the results of the tests are positive, there is no "treatment" afforded the serviceman, but merely a "drying out" process. He is retested until the results are negative and then released for home. Therefore, it is critical that treatment centers in the United States be strengthened to provide the necessary rehabilitative measures for the serviceman.

The Air Force Treatment Center at Cam Ranh Bay retains its men for seven to ten days after testing confirms heroin use. The Air Force emphasizes the psychological factors in the determination of a man's readiness to return to the United States and submit himself for further treatment. Because of the relatively small number of Air Force personnel who become addicted to heroin, the Air Force provides a more comprehensive approach.

The Air Force centers, however, are without recreation facilities, and patients are retained in beds in Quonset huts. The Army, on the other hand, does allow patients to move in a confined area outdoors and to have swimming periods at Cam Ranh Bay.

Several counter-offensive measures have been effected by the Navy in Vietnam in an effort to discourage the use of and traffic in narcotics. Most of these measures parallel the Army's drug program, at least in a broad sense. Teams of six petty officiers who have attended a drug education course in San Diego brief all incoming naval personnel on the facts about drugs and drug abuse. The Navy has used former addicts as counselors and advisors to those participating in the exemption program. The Navy's experience with former addicts working in these programs has not been good, though two ex-users are still being used. All personnel departing the area, whether for rotation, separation or temporary leave, as well as those who request an extension in Vietnam are screened by urinalysis. Exemption, the Navy's designation for amnesty, is extended to those detected by the screening if they voluntarily surrender for rehabilitation within 24 hours of the test. Many drug users, realizing that they will eventually be caught by the urinalysis screening, voluntarily apply for detoxification. Exemption is available only once.