Improving Interagency Coordination for the Global War on Terrorism and Beyond: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held, April 4, 2006, Volume 4

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U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007 - 82 pages

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Page 1 - To this end, the study is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).
Page 17 - ... looked like and in many respects we knew what to expect, and the intelligence was there which gave us the capability to deal with it. Around about 1992 and 1993, as was expressed back at that time by our Vice President, who was then Secretary of Defense, he said I have got good news and bad news. The good news is the Soviet Union is going to go away, the bad news is the threat isn't. It is just going to change some. Beginning in about 1993, soon after the Vice President made that statement, we...
Page 40 - Our recommendations include the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies.
Page 11 - We are working with ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat and devise collaborative strategies, actionable initiatives, and policy recommendations.
Page 73 - Manned and led by personnel from the various agencies and countries with a counter-drug mission, the JIATF organizational structure embodies the force-multiplying effect of a task force.
Page 27 - Over the years the interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to provide the vast power of the US Government on problems. You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, across our foreign policy, and in our response to Katrina.
Page 39 - It also provides the foundation for the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.
Page 71 - Agreement. The prompt release proceeding and the proceeding on the prescription of provisional measures, like the procedural phases other than that on the merits, had already been completed or were in the process of being completed before the Tribunal at the time the 1998 Agreement was concluded.
Page 68 - Transportation, Communications, Public Works and Engineering, Firefighting, Emergency Management, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, Resource Support, Public Health and Medical Services, Urban Search and Rescue, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Energy, Public Safety and Security, Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation, and External Affairs.
Page 74 - IRTPA was a fundamental reorganization of the 1C, close, if not equal, in magnitude, to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols reform in the Department of Defense.

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