The question of the existence of a social mind is one of interpretation rather than of fact, since the meaning of the term is, itself, in doubt. It is not an idle question, for it is answerable, in the sense that one may hope to reach a sounder judgment by addressing himself to it, and it is also useful, for it implies a practical attitude. The urgency of the question is the result of a reaction against the extreme individualism of the eighteenth century, along with the multiplication of "corporate groups." Five characters may be applied to groups. (1) Class. Class is an aggregate of individuals of which the same thing is true. If by a social mind we mean "a class of minds" then there is such a thing, but we need a term less formal and more dynamic. (2) Whole. By this is meant an aggregation of which something is true which is not true for the individuals. There is no doubt that "wholes" are composed of individual human beings, but wholeness must not be identified with causality. (3) Individuality. This term has been badly overworked, meaning either a member of a class, or uniqueness, or identity. In all three respects society may be said to be an individual. (4) System. This refers to the connecting relations rather than to the members of the relation. Societies may be systems. Now while a society is a class, a whole, an individual, and a system, so also is a row of books. Thus the term is deflated and our idolatrous proclivities are left unaroused. But the suggestion is that the characters which attach to the members of the whole also attach to the whole. This we shall examine.

The question which forms the title of this essay is not, strictly speaking, a question of fact, but rather one of interpretation. It is not as though we all knew precisely what we meant by a "social mind," and were concerned only to establish the fact of its existence. This would be comparatively easy. If we desired to know whether there was a two-hundred-pound man, there would be so little doubt as to the meaning of the conception that it would be

possible to devise a purely mechanical method of obtaining the answer. But in the present question the issue lies mainly if not wholly in the meaning of the conception. If we were asked whether there was a Christian in the room, there would be no acceptable acid test. Someone would be sure to remark, "That depends on what you mean by Christianity." Or he might say, "Here are my opinions. Whether you call that 'Christianity' or not, I cannot say." The discussion would then turn on the meaning of the term "Christianity." Similarly, a rapidly accumulating and illdigested mass of facts regarding human relations has led to the question of the propriety or legitimacy of applying to these facts the conception of "a social mind"; and the question inevitably turns on the meaning which we propose to give to the conception. It is to be remarked that in such cases it is rarely possible to prove the answer, though it may be possible to obtain agreement. In circles in which terms like "Christianity" are fixed by scholastic definitions, it would be possible by applying these definitions to the opinions in question to prove the answer with something like mathematical exactness. But if an emancipated and heterogeneous group were to debate the issue it would assume a wholly different form. They would soon be asking whether the conception of Christianity should or should not be so constructed as to apply to the defendant's opinions. We should not only be considering the circumstances in the light of the conception, but the conception in the light of the circumstances; and the discussion might result not only in an interpretation of the case, but also in the clarification, or extension, or even modification of the idea employed in the interpretation. In the course of one's dealing with a doubtful case of belief Christianity might acquire a new meaning. So in the case before us, in the course of attempting to apply to a social group the conception of mind which is ordinarily applied to a single man, one might in the end attach a new and maturer meaning to the conception itself.

One may perhaps feel that this sort of question is an idle sort of question; idle in the double sense of being both unanswerable and useless. Whether the question is deemed answerable or not depends on one's standards. Answerable in the sense expected