tions reached in theoretical sociology, but it is built up independently on the basis of the experience of social workers, the results of social surveys, and the analysis of social statistics. Probably the most striking exception to this rule is the attempt of socialists to build up a practical social order on the basis of the theorizing of Marx and other doctrinaires. Robert Minor finds justification for the policies of Lenin in the conclusion of Engels that the state has its origin in the institution of private property, and hence that the only road to the abolition of the state lies through communism. Most sociologists however take the theories of ethnology much less seriously than this, and close the book of social theory before they open the volume of applied sociology. This seems to the present writer an eminently sound procedure. The question whether communism is a practicable and desirable form or social organization must be decided, not on the basis of the prehistoric origin of the state, but on the basis of whether present human needs can be better served by a condition of communism than by any other form of society.

If sociologists were seriously to adopt the utilitarian point of view, it would mean a tremendous change of emphasis in social research. Instead of being absorbed primarily in social origins and philosophical generalizations as to the basis of human association, the social scientist would bend his major energy to the solution of specific problems related to human happiness as conditioned by the social environment of man. The objectives of pure sociology may be stated as the development of a logical system of theories which shall most completely explain the origins, the evolution, and the current phenomena of social relationships. The objectives of applied sociology may be stated as the discovery of socially practicable means for minimizing undesirable social conditions and for maximizing desirable social conditions. Social theorists are prone to defend pure sociology on the assumption that it is the surest road to the achievement of the ends of applied sociology. The present writer, on the contrary, maintains that not only has social theory proved fruitless for the ends of social betterment, but that the achievement of the rational system of social theory sought by pure sociology can be greatly promoted by means of the direct The Liberator, October, 1920, pp. 6, 11.

attack on social problems. He frankly avows a dominant interest in social welfare and in research for directly useful ends clearly envisaged at the start.

What scientific methods then are available for the discovery of socially practicable means for minimizing undesirable social conditions and maximizing desirable social conditions? The writer proposes to classify under five heads the more or less scientific inductive attempts to arrive at truth: namely, the common-sense method, the historical method, the museum or census method, the laboratory or experimental method, and the statistical method. The past use of each of these methods by sociologists, and their availability for promotion of the ends of sociology as defined above, will be discussed briefly below.

The common-sense method may be defined as generalization on the basis of whatever experience, information, and tradition chance to come to hand. It might be called the armchair method, or the casual method. The person who uses it builds up his theories and his conclusions by means of pondering upon the occurrences which have happened to come under his personal observation, or to have been described in his reading or conversation, utilizing the results of the thinking of writers and scientists whom he has studied, or with whom he has come into contact.

This method, if such it may be called, consists simply in carrying on a little more extensively and intensively than the average man does, the ordinary mental processes. The five steps in scientific investigation may be stated as definition, classification, measurement, enumeration, and correlation. The mind is a mechanism for performing these five functions in a proximate fashion, and, conversely, these processes are merely refinements of ordinary mental acts. The child early begins to perceive differences between his sensation complexes, and thus has embarked instinctively upon the process of definition. A little later likenesses begin to be observed, and thereby the rudiments of classification have been achieved. Everyone acquires the ability to estimate more or less approximately the size of objects, the intensity of their characteristics, and the speed and direction of their movements, and so performs rudimentary measurements. Everyone

learns to approximate the number of certain types of objects with which he comes into contact, and thus carries out rudimentary enumerations. Everyone learns by habit to observe the repeated sequences and groupings of ordinary events, and so engages in rudimentary correlation. In these senses everyone is a rudimentary scientist. Science consists merely in introducing accuracy, impartiality, and generality into these ordinary mental processes.

To indulge in a bit of casual estimation, the writer would judge that over three-fourths of the books in the average library are the products of the common-sense method. Surely the proportion is no smaller than this among sociological writings. The casual observer may be a man or woman of wide experience, of broad reading and study, of extensive travel, of logical mind, and of brilliant capacity for generalization. In proportion as he or she has these qualities the resulting output will be of interest and value.

The dangers of the common-sense method are too obvious to require emphasis. The usual crudeness of the definitions employed, and of the classifications, measurements, enumerations, and correlations made, opens the door wide to logical fallacies. Moreover, selective errors are introduced in a variety of ways. In order to generalize soundly upon casual experience it is necessary to be certain that that experience is a fair sample of the data with regard to which the generalizations are made. This, however, is not likely to be the case. First, the events and objects presented to a given individual are not likely to be a fair sample. Secondly, the individual himself selects from the accessible materials the data which interest him. Thirdly, when the individual gets to formulating his theories, the items which fit his hypotheses recur to his memory, while conflicting data are likely to be forgotten or subordinated. Hence the data upon which the casual thinker generalizes are quite unlikely to be a fair sample.

As safeguards against these grave drawbacks in the commonsense method the chief resources are critical comparisons between independent studies and a checking of theories against facts. If different students independently arrive by casual methods at similar conclusions, the weight to be attached to the results is greatly increased. If the inquiries are not really independent,

however, agreement may indicate simply a copying of errors. Failure to approximate the same results on the part of independent students of similar problems indicates fallacious thinking on the part of one or both. The lack of any large body of sociological truth verified and accepted by independent students is strong evidence against the soundness of the bulk of sociological thinking.

If it is possible to check the conclusions of casual thinking against impartially selected facts the results are capable of proof or disproof. To do this usually involves, however, the use of the more strictly scientific methods described below. The absence of any adequate checks upon most theorizing is a great social weakness.

It should be acknowledged in passing that the present paper is a product of the common-sense method. The ultimate test of its value will be the results achieved by the methods which it proposes.

Deductive reasoning must of course be used in conjunction with any of the inductive methods. The tremendous liability to logical fallacy, however, places deduction in a class closely related to the casual method. The conclusions of logic are of value only when closely checked, by criticism and experiment. The chief function of the common-sense and deductive methods is to provide hypotheses to be tested out by more rigorous scientific methods.

The historical method is characterized by its use of documents as its basic materials. The documents used are almost entirely the result of the common-sense method as applied by contemporary observers. That is to say, they are the records of the experiences, the acts, and the observations of individuals not attempting rigid definitions, classifications, enumerations, measurements, or correlations, and not seeking to make exhaustive investigations. In some cases-particularly in connection with legal documentsconsiderable accuracy may be predicated of the data involved, but in proportion as comprehensiveness and precision are introduced into the original documents the method ceases to be typically historical and becomes more properly classifiable under the museum or statistical methods. Although based upon casual materials, the historical method is a great advance over the casual method in that the attempt is made to take into account all of the pertinent

documents in arriving at conclusions. If the historian is openminded and industrious, he may eliminate much of the error of his original materials by comparisons of the observations of independent students. If he is biased by patriotism or prejudice he may, of course, introduce his own errors of selection into his results.

Even with the best intentions, however, certain handicaps are inherent in the historical method. The original documents tend to be selective in the data which they report, for they reflect for the most part the viewpoints of the educated and privileged classes and are colored by the superstitions, prejudices, and limitations of the times when they were written. The casual observers who produced the documents on which history is based were for the most part unable to observe with complete impartiality, because of their lack of training and of scientific information. They did not know what to look for or where to find it. Modern historians have been developing technique for guarding against these errors.

It is a development of the historical method which Small has suggested as the ideal procedure in sociological research. His plan would be for a group of specialists in the various social sciences all to investigate concurrently the same historical epoch, such, for example, as the French Revolution. The method used by Thomas in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America is perhaps allied more closely to the historical than to any other of the methods listed above. Its scientific value testifies to the rich rewards awaiting the student who is willing to collect and compare social data systematically and impartially. Such work is useful to the degree that it is precise in definition, that it gathers impartially all pertinent data, and that it discovers the degree and significance of the correlations between the variables involved. Any procedure which adds accuracy, impartiality, and comprehensiveness to the processes of definition, classification, measurement, enumeration, and correlation, promotes progress toward scientific methods.

The museum or census method, as herein defined, is concerned primarily with definition, classification, and enumeration of items. Many of the biological sciences proceed chiefly by the museum method. Geology and paleontology utilize it extensively.

The Meaning of Social Science, pp. 156 ff.