This is an excellent outline of what might constitute a sociological survey if not a complete sociological theory of the state. Spencer's fulfilment of this task in the section of his Principles of Sociology dealing with "Political Institutions," and in numerous essays and parts of other works, is doubtless among the most extensive treatments of political problems which any sociologist, with the possible exception of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, has attempted.

2. Fundamental political concepts and definitions.-Spencer seems to have distinguished in a fairly definite manner between the concepts of society and state, though he makes no attempt at a formal treatment of this somewhat academic subject. He unquestionably regards the state as society politically organized. He conceives of the state as that conscious organization of co-operative activity in a society which concerns the group as a whole. "Political organization," he says, "is to be understood as that part of social organization which consciously carries on directive and restraining functions for public ends."

Spencer thus does not make the state coextensive with society or a further refinement of society, but simply regards it as society organized as a political unit. Society, as a whole, is supported by two types of co-operation: the private spontaneous co-operation which is concerned with matters which do not affect the group as a unit except in indirect ways; and the "consciously devised" co-operation which deals with the public activities of the group as a totality. It is the latter only which directly originates and supports the state."

He does not, however, distinguish so clearly between the state and the government3-something that is hard for an Englishman to do, since in England legal sovereignty and the law-making power reside in the same body. At the same time, it seems reasonably clear that Spencer would have defined government as the particular form of structure which the political organization might assume, in other words the correct notion of the government as the mechan

'Principles of Sociology, II, 247.

a Ibid., pp. 244-48.

Cf. Ritchie, op. cit., p. 23 and note.

♦ Cf. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, Lecture II.

I

ism of administration. Speaking in terms of the organic analogy, the state is the system which has for its function the regulation of the social organism; the organs which perform this function are known as the government. As to the distinction between the terms state and nation, it seems that Spencer used the word nation, in general, as meaning the state in its objective political and geographic aspects-the conventional use of the term, though not the same connotation that is given to it by the strict terminology of political science.3

Spencer agrees with the usual conception as to what constitutes the fundamental attributes of the state as far as territory, population, and governmental organization are concerned, but he balks at the notion of an unlimited sovereign authority. To an archindividualist like Spencer, the conception of an irresistible power in society against which the individual had no legal rights or power of resistance was most repugnant. Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin are as scathingly attacked by Spencer as Blackstone was by Bentham. "Analyze his assumption, and the doctrine of Austin proves to have no better basis than that of Hobbes. In the absence of admitted divine descent or appointment, neither single-headed ruler nor many-headed ruler can produce such credentials as the claim to unlimited sovereignty implies."4 Natural, or perhaps better, individual, rights rather than sovereignty were the cornerstone of Spencer's political theory. But individual rights, as conceived by Spencer, are neither those which may be assumed by metaphysical ethics nor those artificial rights conferred by a governmental agent. Rather they are those indispensable rights which must be guaranteed to an individual in order that society may exist and function properly. Such a doctrine of

1 Principles of Sociology, II, 310-17; Justice (New York, 1891), p. 193.

2 Principles of Sociology, I, 491-97, 519-48.

3 Ibid. II, 615; Social Statics, p. 120; Man versus the State, p. 410.

♦ Man versus the State (with the abridged and revised Social Statics) (New York, 1892), pp. 380-81. As Ritchie points out, part of Spencer's confusion with respect to the problem of sovereignty was due to his tendency to personify the abstract philosophical concept.

s Ibid., pp. 387 ff., particularly pp. 405-6; see below, section 6.

natural rights is perfectly valid, and is not as, Barker intimates, entirely incompatible with the most sweeping doctrine of a social organism. It is chiefly the excessive extent of this field of indispensable natural rights insisted upon by Spencer which may be called in question, rather than the theoretical aspects of the problem. It must be admitted that it is rather a difficult problem philosophically to reconcile this doctrine of indispensable rights with the notion of an absolute sovereign power, which, on the one hand, is the sole power able to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights, and yet, at the same time, has an undisputed theoretical right to wrest them from the individual. The best way out of the situation is to give up trying to perfect a metaphysical reconciliation and admit that in practice these rights are more likely to be guaranteed by the presence of a sovereign authority than without it. This admission, however, Spencer was unwilling to make.

3. The foundations and justification of political authority.The question of the origin of the state and the government Spencer treats both analytically and historically. In both senses the immediate basis of political control, and that which has made it possible through the ages, is the "fear of the living" in the same way as the "fear of the dead" is the basis of religious control. Of course, this fundamental distinction is not perfect, for in some cases political control is furthered by the fear of the dead, as when a chief is believed to be able to control the ghosts of his ancestors, and likewise the fear of the ecclesiastical government is an important element in effective religious control, but in general this must be admitted to be a vital differentiating principle.

In an analytical sense, the state and government arise because society cannot function properly without them. A society is not established by the mere physical contiguity of a mass of individuals, but is only constituted when there is a developed system of co-operation among these units. The state and government not only supply one of the two great types of co-operation, that which controls the group as a whole concerning public ends, but they also further 'Principles of Sociology, I, 437

the development of private co-operation. They do this by removing the obstacles to private co-operation through the elimination of conflict among individuals and by increasing the size of the group in which the co-operation develops. The larger the group the greater the amount of division of labor and specialization that is possible. In like manner, legal rights and their enforcement have their philosophical basis in the fact that only under such conditions can society continue its existence and function properly.' Speaking in terms of the organic analogy, the explanation of the state is identical in principle, since in any perfected organism there must be a definite regulating system in order to insure the proper functioning of the sustaining and distributing systems.3

The structure of government similarly is easily amenable to analysis. There is a natural triune structure due to the inherent differences in mankind. Whether one takes for example a primitive tribe or a modern state the organization for governmental purposes falls into three classes: (1) a leader; (2) the small minority of able and distinguished men-i.e., the consultative body; (3) the vast mass of inexperienced and mediocre citizens who simply listen to, and agree with or dissent from, the acts and opinions of the leader and council-i.e., the representative body. Despotism, oligarchy, or democracy are simply a condition of the undue prominence of one of these three components of government." The great force behind political organization and the particular forms through which it is manifested is "the feeling of the community." This is based to a certain degree upon the reaction of the community to present problems, but depends to a far greater extent upon that long-inherited attitude which is crystallized into custom and tradition. Political organization is simply the agency for applying this "feeling of the community." Thus, this unconscious fear of the dead, which is the psychological content of custom,

4 Ib'd. II, 310-17. The similarity of this analysis of the structure of government to those of Aristotle and Polybius is too obvious to escape notice. Cf. Gidding's theory of "protocracy" in his Responsible State, pp. 17-20.

aids the fear of the living in maintaining political control. This notion Spencer sums up in the following manner:

We are familiar with the thought of the "dead hand" as controlling the doings of the living in the use made of property; but the effect of the "dead hand" in ordering life at large through the established political system, is immeasurably greater. That which, from hour to hour in every country, governed despotically or otherwise, produces the obedience making political action possible, is the accumulated and organized sentiment felt towards inherited institutions made sacred by tradition.1

4. The historical evolution of political institutions.-Spencer's account of the historical evolution of political organization is very elaborate, but his conclusions are open to the same degree of skepticism as his account of the general evolution of institutions. His method was one-that of the classical anthropologists—which is abandoned by all scholarly and critical ethnologists at the present time. He would gather together illustrative material from his Descriptive Sociology bearing upon the evolution of any particular institution, absolutely regardless of the relation of the particular practice to the whole cultural complex of the particular localities from which the information was drawn, or of the different stages of culture which contributed evidence in support of his thesis. The Shoshonean Indians and the Italian cities at the time of the Renaissance might thus be offered as supporting evidence for any particular process or "stage" in social evolution. The mass of material offered to the reader, its seeming comprehensiveness, as apparently drawn from all parts of the world and from all ages, and the incomparable logical skill with which Spencer marshaled his evidence, all tended for years to make Spencer's historical sociology the sine qua non of the subject. The application of more refined methods in ethnology, and the cumulative evidence of intensive original investigation of cultural areas by competent ethnologists, have, however, tended to call in question many of Spencer's generalizations. Aside from his faulty methodology, the general assumptions of the classical school of anthro

1 Principles of Sociology, II, 317-27.

For his own description of his method see his Autobiography, Vol. II, chap. xlvii, particularly pp. 325-27.