hand, this is your problem, as well as it is mine, and so I throw this out to you this afternoon with the hope that you will think about it and that you will make your suggestions available to me, to Members of Congress, and to the public generally, in the months that lie ahead. In fact, I invite you to appoint a committee from the Governors Conference to meet with me to determine what changes in the national law appear desirable.

Governors Meyner, Ribicoff, and Harriman have the same problem in the New York area, which is the toughest area in the world, that Mayor Clark has in Philadelphia. And we may have to come to some type of a regional organization there. I don't know the mechanics of that yet. That would take very, very careful thought, because we're dealing here with an extremely serious problem, an intricate problem of governmental mechanics, as all of you know, but we might have to come to some sort of system where someone could be set up who had direction of civil defense within that type of area.

I want to say this while Secretary Wilson is here because you may want to question him-personally I would be very happy if we could turn this whole problem over to the Secretary of Defense and just say, "You go ahead and solve it." But, as I mentioned a while ago, I don't think it is that simple. First of all, the Secretary of Defense and the military have a primary mission that is not this one. And, secondly, they do not have at the moment-though they could gain it-the know-how in this field. And, thirdly, the problem is bigger than the one you can solve by hiring someone to do it, creating an army of men to fight it. We are going to have to fight this one out ourselves, and we need your help, and we need it desperately because it may be later than you and I think.

The Russians have the ability to attack this country today. It will be a greater capability in 6 months, in a year, and in 2 years some people think they will close the gap considerably. They won't be equal to us, but they may close the gap rather effectively between our striking power and their striking power. And this thing may occur.

I want to say just one more thing, deliberately but as friendly and as cheerfully as I can say it. I know that you gentlemen are harassed by many other problems, and I know that war has seemed rather remote, and some of you may think it seems remote today. And I hope and pray it is remote, because when you're dealing with weapons that will eliminate entire cities you can't afford the luxury of war any more. Those people who are hasty and urge haste about plunging into a war with the Chinese Communists or anybody else simply are not thinking in terms of the human misery and the cost in lives and in dollars that will result-granting that there's one thing worse than war and that's dishonorable peace or the enslavement of the American people by the masters of the Kremlin. All of us will fight sooner than have that, and we're all willing to be destroyed sooner than to have that. But this problem may be closer than we think, and I am not trying to speak in an alarmist fashion. Civil Defense is the only thing that can save the lives of the people if the attack comes. It's a serious responsi

ernor.

bility, and I'm sorry to say that I have had one Civil Defense Director in an important State in this country tell me that he can't even see his GovAnd if that kind of thing ever hit the front pages of the United States newspapers, somebody is going to be in disrepute around this country. So you had better look to your own houses.

Senator Kefauver has had me as the person responsible for Civil Defense in the Administration on the pan in recent weeks. I think that's good in a democracy. But somebody may have you, Mr. Governor, on the pan some day in this very same field. So we're going to have to grab hold of this thing and fight it out. There are many problems involved, and I haven't begun to cover the field. We're considering at the Federal level the utilization of the National Guard in the event of attack, ground elements of the National Guard. We're considering all kinds of problems that I can't take time to discuss here with you today.

Remarks of Carter L. Burgess,
Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Manpower and Personnel

Governor Pyle, Governor Kennon, and distinguished leaders of the States, I will move rather rapidly in the few remarks that I have to make about the President's National Reserve Plan. I will assume that through your Adjutants General and the material that we have sent out to you that you have an excellent picture of the program. I would like to say that this plan will move us from a Ready Reserve position of about 700,000 participating ready reservists today to about 2,900,000 by the end of 1959, and in addition will give us a nonorganized but trained available Standby Reserve estimated to be 2,000,000 men by that time.

Now, the President and the Secretary of Defense, in calling for the revitalization of the reserve establishments, had these cardinal policies in mind: First, our need to have over the next 4 years a plan that meets the valid requirements of our defense-active and reserve.

Second, to provide trained manpower to the reserve organization in numbers sufficient to provide unit strengths and integrity, a balance of skills and leadership derived from prior service personnel, and to take no chance in achieving full utilization of existing facilities along with the vast new program of installations and equipment that is planned all along the line for the Guard and the Reserve.

Third, a plan that provides the Reserves and the Guard with men who have had at least 6 months of basic and specialist training in the Armed Forces prior to taking up their Reserve obligation.

Now, in just a very few minutes I would like to run through the points which seemed to crop up most frequently in the correspondence that we have had from you and in the talks and communications that we have had over a period of time with the National Guard Association and with each of the Adjutants General.

First, it was felt in the National Reserve Plan that the language of the original bill providing for the assignment of obligated reservists to the National Guard would in effect create two categories of Guardsmen: one with dual State and Federal status, and one with primarily Federal status. Such a procedure was characterized as constituting a long step toward the Federalization of the National Guard. Now in the final version of the bill, and in accordance with the wishes expressed by the several States, the word "assigned" has been changed by the House Committee to the word "trans

ferred," and language referring to training "in accordance with the purof this Act" has been deleted.

poses

A second exception which was brought to our attention was taken to the fact that we proposed a 10-year obligation for the 6-months' programand this was stated as being too long an obligation-and to the $30 a month pay for the initial 6-months' training as being too low. It was felt that these features would make the program so unattractive as to discourage enlistments.

The final version of the House bill now reads that the obligation will be for 8 years, and the rate of monthly pay in the 6-months' program will be $50 to be followed by new increased career incentive rates of pay for men as they take up their service.

And the third was the exception taken to the provision in the bill which would have restricted the authority of the Governor to employ the National Guard during emergencies proclaimed by the President. This provision would have required that the Governor obtain approval of the President to employ the Guard in such circumstances. The provision requiring such Presidential authorization has been deleted at the suggestion of the Department of Defense.

Another concern was that the language of the legislation presented to the Congress would permit membership in the National Guard of the United States without the prerequisite of membership in the National Guard in the appropriate State, Territory, or District of Columbia. Wherever appropriate, there is incorporated in the present version of the bill the traditional provision that no one can become a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States without first becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard.

Originally the National Defense plan provided for the permissive peacetime establishment of organized militia in addition to the National Guard under regulations formulated by the President. I think this particular provision of the bill relates very closely to the remarks of Governor Peterson. There was no statutory limitation on the sizes of the forces to be so organized. At the suggestion of State representation, the bill now contains provision for permissive use by the States, in the establishment of State defense forces utilizing Federal equipment in peacetime under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. These forces will be limited to the size needed for organizing and planning and will serve as a basis for future expansion.

There was great concern expressed over the fact that we were only going to take 100,000 men into the 6-months' program. That is an announced goal for the first year of our plan, and it is a net figure. In other words, as men come into the Reserves and decide to enlist in other services, or because of other attritional factors, those men will be replaced.

And, of course, the House version of the bill that is now before the full House provides for a goal of at least 100,000 net with a maximum of 250,000

net, and it will be up to the President to decide the numbers to meet requirements within those two ranges.

It was felt that eliminating the provision under which young men may enlist in the National Guard prior to age 182 and be draft deferred, subject to satisfactory participation in National Guard training, would deprive the National Guard of its principal source of personnel.

The National Guard Association felt that the substitute program involving 6 months of initial training for young men entering the Reserve Forces would not provide the needed number of personnel. To overcome the concern in this connection there was incorporated in the bill a statutory guarantee that the personnel program strengths of the National Guard will be met by the Department of Defense.

And to meet the statutory requirements various reserve manpower procedures will be utilized and made available to the Air and Army National Guard.

These procedures contemplate no change in the traditional dual StateFederal status of the National Guard, nor in the controls exercised by the appropriate Governor over the National Guard.

Under the National Reserve Plan, the volunteer character of the Guard will be retained to the greatest extent possible. Through the 6-months' program the Guard will be provided with a supply of initially trained men, making it unnecessary to devote time to the instruction of recruits in basic drill.

And, as we move along with examples of the State, I am reminded of a visit that I had to New Jersey Guard Armory just several months ago. One of the Captains in that Guard unit wearing Korean and World War II medals pointed out to me that he was spending a lot of time giving basic drill and manual of arms training to green recruits and he was not having the opportunity to pass on the arts of war that he had learned under actual circumstances.

The successful Navy type program, which allows a man to enlist for 24 months in the reserves prior to undertaking 2 years of active service will be made available to the Guard. This provision would assist in transition from the present to the proposed system, while the 6-months' program is getting into operation, and whenever manpower is not forthcoming from other methods.

Another avenue available to the National Guard involves the voluntary enlistment of men with prior service, and here the inducement to the individual to maintain skills acquired in the active forces should prove effective. The known quality of the National Guard program applies here, and vigorous recruitment policies should rightly make full use of that fact.

It is our firm intention to make the reserve training program every bit as exacting and as professional as that of the National Guard. In other words service in a Reserve is in no case going to appear as an attractive alternative to service in the National Guard, thus hampering the Guard in its recruitment effort.