Mr. MCKAY. Yes. In fact, the Department of Defense also exercises control over their contractors.

MS. ABZUG. Are you familiar with Priority Air Dispatch?
Mr. MCKAY. Yes.

Ms. ABZUG. I have reference to that kind of operation, which I believe testimony revealed had about 120 violations.

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. They are no longer in business. They surrendered their airtaxi certificate to the FAA in September of 1974.

MS. ABZUG. Well, now, we are dealing with an operation where we probably have less control than we would over a large commercial operation or a military operation when we deal with these taxi services. That is what concerns me.

Mr. MCKAY. We exercise the same control in our field offices. The thing about Priority Air Dispatch

MS. ABZUG. Excuse me. Are they not governed by a different set of safety regulations that are less stringent than those which govern airline type operations which handle both passengers and cargo?

Mr. MCKAY. Their operating rules are less stringent, but they must comply with the same hazardous materials regulations which is part

103.

MS. ABZUG. Is there not a large gap in the safety records of the airtaxis as compared to the airlines or large aircarrier operations? Mr. MCKAY. There is a gap. I do not know to what extent. MS. ABZUG. In view of that, would you supply for the record a statement as to how many exemptions are being granted to these airtaxi services, on what grounds, for how long a time, and how you justify these kinds of exemptions and how they came about?

I find this a very disturbing operation.

As I asked in the previous case of BAI, I would like you to also supply for the record the kind of inspection and examination and check and compliance with conditions that would guarantee safety precautions that you have made.

[The material is in the subcommittee files.]

Mr. FERRARESE. I would like to make one comment on these exemptions. One thing you want to keep in mind-we issue the exemption only after the FAA has satisfied itself that it meets the safety standards and the aircraft can be operated safely.

Ms. ABZUG. I have to differ with you entirely.

I understand what you are saying, but the thing that gives me concern is, for example, you have granted an exemption to the BAI on this nuclear radioactive material. Now we all know that there is a whole series of problems which come out as a result of radiation, and you have enumerated in your exemption a radiation protection program to which you are complying with standards set forth in many areas the occupation, safety, and health administration for employees who work in the area, the question of what happens to the plane and the atmosphere itself, that it requires a certain examination of contamination inside the aircraft after the carriage of radioactive materials, you have to have a statement that there is no physical material present. There is a whole series of things in which you have to assess exposures on a monthly basis, and so on.

[The material is in the subcommittee files.]

Ms. ABZUG. I want to see whether you are doing that. I tell you if you grant an exemption to carry this kind of material to June 1976, that there is going to be many a slip between the time of exemption and June 1976. And you are playing games with some very serious

matters.

You have already indicated that they are probably carrying and transporting materials under your exemptions for industrial uses, and I say that violates the statute. I think it is time we dealt with the people in this country instead of commercial uses and profits and so on. Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, Ms. Abzug.

We will have to take a recess very shortly. We are not going to be able to hear any witnesses from the Department of Defense.

I want to look back here at Ben Davis. You say you doubt his facts. He was making them seriously. He was standing up there in San Francisco. By the way, is General Davis still with you?

Mr. FERRARESE. No, sir, he is not. He is no longer with the Department of Transportation.

Mr. RANDALL. Some time in 1975 he was with you, and he said that 75 percent of all shipments were in violation.

Then we had the same fact stated in a different way by ALPA. The Under Secretary of Transportation, John W. Barnum, over in the other body, said that the percentage of shippers who were in compliance were about 20 to 25 percent. So he is just putting it a different way.

One said there was 75 percent in violation; the other one said there was 25 percent in compliance. So those fit together pretty well, don't they.

Mr. FERRARESE. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to imply that I am not taking Mr. Barnum's or General Davis's word. What I am saying is that it is a matter of semantics. I think perhaps they may have heard from their staff people. I think you might want to question the Director of the Materials Transportation Bureau, when he gets up here, on that particular point. I think he will verify that he does not believe that 75 percent are in noncompliance with the regulations. Mr. RANDALL. We are going to be very generous with the gentleman you referred to. What is his name?

Mr. FERRARESE. I presume the Director of the Materials Transportation Bureau will testify. That is Mr. Curtis.

Mr. RANDALL. We understood it was to be someone by the name of Mr. Curtis who has been on the job 2 days. We are not going to be too rough on him because he just doesn't know anything about what is going on.

Mr. FERRARESE. I am sure he will have some help.

Mr. RANDALL. He is going to require quite a bit of help to help us out here.

This Assistant Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Barnum, is he still with you?

Mr. FERRARESE. Yes; he is. He is the Deputy Secretary.
Mr. RANDALL. All right.

Ms. Abzug has emphasized quite adequately the atomic dangers. The Chair happens to be still interested in the contamination, the disease-spreading aspect of the blood-spill. You say someone down in Miami is doing something about that case. Who?

Mr. FERRARESE. Yes, sir. The U.S. attorney.

Mr. RANDALL. Well, who was responsible? That door is wide open; there is nothing classified about this. What was the company? Who was doing it?

Mr. FERRARESE. Mr. Randall, I have said that I would supply it for the record, as to the reason why there was such a delay in taking action, I do not know. I will get that information. I am saying that the U.S. attorney has the case.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Ferrarese, are you responsible, do you think? Mr. FERRARESE. No, sir.

Mr. RANDALL. We are going to find out who is responsible, some way, somehow. I do not know what kind of sanctions can be worked. Somebody has to be responsible for that. We are very exercised about this. You were just patting somebody on the back of the hand down here in Miami for about 2 years, weren't you, sir?

We understand now that you didn't do anything until this subcommittee had written to you.

Mr. MCKAY. May I comment on that, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. RANDALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKAY. We were aware that this incident happened, and we did check into it. Our Federal Air Surgeon advised us that it was not infectious hepatitis. Nevertheless, there is a potential for it happening with something that is really dangerous. But from a medical standpoint, I have been told that this was not a particularly harmful shipment.

Mr. RANDALL. If your surgeon said it was not infectious, why are you still going ahead with the criminal proceedings?

Mr. MCKAY. That really does not correct the problem.

Mr. FERRARESE. There was still a violation.

Mr. RANDALL. Yes.

Mr. FERRARESE. Mr. Chairman, before you terminate, I would like to clear the record on one thing, if I may.

Mr. RANDALL. Go ahead.

Mr. FERRARESE. I am surprised you did not ask me the question as to why we rejected NTSB's recommendation No. 74-26. You will recall Chairman Reed said we had rejected that.

Mr. RANDALL. Yes. We are going to find out.

Mr. FERRARESE. I am going to tell you why. It was not rejected

at all.

Mr. RANDALL. What?

Mr. FERRARESE. We did not reject it.

Mr. RANDALL. Just part of it?

Mr. FERRARESE. No. Let me read it to you.

Mr. RANDALL. Well, all right.

Mr. FERRARESE. This is the answer.

Mr. RANDALL. We will put this into the record. Without objection, it is entered into the record.

[The material follows:]

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1974. Hon. ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (S) A-74-20 THROUGH 26

On February 11, 1974, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded its public hearing into the Pan American World Airways accident which occurred on November 3, 1973. The aircraft was a jet freighter carrying nearly 16,000 pounds of restricted cargo.

The Safety Board heard extensive testimony that shippers, packers, manufacturers, and carriers of restricted cargo or dangerous articles are either unaware of, or not complying with, current regulations which govern the carriage of hazardous materials by air. Therefore, the Safety Board is concerned about the lack of compliance with these regulations.

The Safety Board realizes that Federal manpower to enforce all aspects of the regulations governing the transportation of hazardous materials is not available. Therefore, it seems appropriate to focus on a limited number of check points at which noncomplying shipments can be halted. The Safety Board believes that the principal check point is the air carrier's receiving dock.

The Safety Board received several recommendations from witnesses and parties to the hearing intended to remedy the shortcomings in the handling of hazardous articles. The Air Line Pilots Association formally recommended to the Safety Board that "... all hazardous materials be banned from interstate air transportation." The Safety Board shares the Association's concern, but believes that conscientious compliance with current regulations and procedures would obviate such a drastic step. Therefore, the immediate emphasis should be on a concerted program by the carriers and the FAA to assure compliance with current regulations.

The recommendations submitted herein are intended to be interim measures, pending a more definitive resolution of the hazards disclosed during this inquiry. Accordingly, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of each air carrier's procedures for compliance with 14 CFR 103 and 14 CFR 121.433(a), specifically with regard to receiving, palletizing, consolidating, and aircraft loading, as well as the related training. This inspection should be completed at the earliest possible date and not later than 60 days from the date of this recommendation.

2. Develop, in cooperation with the Department of Transportation, Office of Hazardous Materials, a compliance checklist to determine whether or not a shipment conforms to Federal hazardous materials regulations. This checklist should be circulated to all involved agencies and organizations.

3. Develop and disseminate information about Federal regulations which apply to air carriage of hazardous materials to the air carriers' marketing or sales representatives and their appointed agents.

The Board believes that recommendations two and three should be acted upon immediately inasmuch as they are within the scope of current regulatory authority.

The Board recognizes that the following recommendations may require additional research and evaluation before they can be implemented. However, they should be implemented as quickly as possible in light of the hazards involved.

4. Amend 14 CFR 121.597 to require the person authorized to exercise operational control over the flight in the case of supplemental air carriers and commercial operators of large aircraft to inform the captain of any dangerous articles aboard the flight, as outlined in 14 CFR 103.25. Further, amend 14 CFR 121.601 to make the dispatcher responsible in the case of scheduled air carriers, for informing the captain of dangerous articles aboard the flight, in addition to the notification required by CFR 103.25.

5. Amend 14 CFR 135 to require each operator under this part to develop procedures to insure that the captain is informed of any dangerous articles aboard. This notification should contain the information outlined in 14 CFR 103.25.

6. Rescind the provision in 14 CFR 103.3(a) which allows the aircraft operator to rely on the shipper's statement as prima facie evidence that the shipment complies with the requirements of this part. Instead, require the air carrier to institute a monitoring system to assure that all dangerous articles shipped by air are inspected against all regulatory safety controls which can be verified at the air carriers receiving point.

7. Institute rulemaking to require that air carriers notify the shipper and the FAA when a shipment, or its documentation, deviates in any manner from Federal or air carrier regulations. Further, require that when non-conforming shipments are detected by the air carrier, they may not be moved until the deficiency is remedied, or the transportation of the deficient packages-with prescribed safety controls is authorized by the cognizant Federal agency. The deficiencies should be entered on the shipping documents, a copy of which should be retained by the carrier and be made available to the cognizant Federal agency. REED, Chairman, McADAMS, THAYER, BURGESS, and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations.

Hon. JOHN H. REED,

L. M. THAYER for JOHN H. REED, Chairman.

MARCH 29, 1974.

Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have reviewed your Safety Recommendations A-7420 thru 26. They are quite timely and, in large measure, are in accord with actions contemplated or underway by this agency.

As you point out, manpower is a major problem and we are trying, as quickly as possible, to fill 18 field Hazardous Material Coordinator positions. These people will work full-time in the surveillance and inspection of air shipments of these materials. As you probably know, our Flight Standards Service has established a Hazardous Materials Staff at Headquarters and the three authorized positions are presently filled.

The following comments are on each of the seven recommendations listed and in the order presented:

A-74-201. With regard to the provisions of Section 121.433a requiring hazardous materials training, the Director, Flight Standards Service on March 4 wrote all of our Regional Directors requesting follow-up by each district office to assure operator compliance with the training requirements. Last week, our Headquarters Flight Standards Evaluation Staff began a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of agency and air carrier programs, which include compliance inspections at air carrier receiving docks. This effort will cover cities having a high volume of hazardous materials shipments. As soon as the evaluation team makes its recommendations, we will be in a position to direct field surveillance of deficient areas. This could well require a 60-day effort, as you recommend.

Α-74-212. Our Hazardous Materials Staff has developed a compliance check list and it will be printed and distributed to the field in the near future. A-74-223. We believe this is an excellent recommendation and we will get on it immediately. We will include in the package the compliance check list recommended in No. 2 above.

A-74-234. We would like to give this recommendation further thought. As you know, Part 121 requires all categories of air carriers and commercial operators to include in their manuals procedures for notifying the captain whenever dangerous articles are on board. I think our decision in this regard will largely be determined by the results of the ongoing evaluation.

A-74-245. Again, since Part 135 requires each operator's manual to contain procedures for notification of the captain, we will consider this recommendation in the same manner as discussed in No. 4 above.

A-74-256. We wholeheartedly concur with this recommendation. We will establish a regulatory project to amend Part 103, to rescind the provision which allows the aircraft operator to rely on the shipper's statement as prima-facie evidence that the shipment is in compliance.

A-74-267. The recommendation that air carriers notify the shipper and FAA when a shipment or its documentation is in non-compliance has merit. Accordingly, we will initiate a rules project in this regard. Part 103 presently prohibits air carriers from carrying hazardous materials that are not packed, marked, and labeled in accordance with the provisions of 49 CFR Part 173 for shipment