OI agents carry out traditional law enforcement duties that expose them to threats and violence.

OI agents employ investigative techniques including, but not limited to, surveillance, hostile interviews, consensual monitoring, and undercover operations. OI agents serve both grand jury and Inspector General subpoenas, often to targets of investigations. OI investigators who perform such duties are frequently at great risk and should not be exposed to physical danger without the authority to arrest individuals who may attempt to endanger them or other innocent persons and/or obstruct OI's investigations. Also, subjects and witnesses of OI investigations include individuals previously convicted of violent crimes including murder, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, rape and various drug offenses. Clearly, routine law enforcement activities often involve taking individuals into custody or taking control of their property. Under the very best circumstances, there is a significant element of risk involved, since there is a degree of panic, resistance or unpredictability in each situation. I have enclosed a number of examples which are typical of the dangers faced by OI special agents while carrying out their law enforcement duties.

Under Department of Justice regulations, all OI agents are identified as law enforcement officers authorized to request the issuance of a search warrant. See 28 CFR Part 60. We believe that such authority extends to the execution of search warrants, as set forth in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. OI special agents are additionally designated for coverage protection under 18 U.S.C. § 1114. See 28 CFR Part 64. By incorporation, OI agents are also protected in the performance of their official duties from violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 1117 and 1201 (a) (5). As a practical matter, however, I have grave concerns about permitting OI agents to execute most search warrants without the authority to carry firearms and to make arrests. Proper execution of a search warrant, at a minimum, requires agents to secure the premises and remove any individual who might obstruct the search. Therefore, in order to execute most search warrants our agents must request the assistance of a Federal agent having full law enforcement authority. Inasmuch as the Department of Justice grants search warrant authority, I believe the Department also has a responsibility to provide special agents with the necessary tools to execute these warrants in a safe and effective fashion.

I am aware, of course, that some have previously raised the issue of a potential "proliferation" of law enforcement personnel that would result from any blanket deputation. I would like to reiterate that I am requesting blanket authority for a relatively small number of agents, many of whom are already deputized on a case-by-case basis. These few additional agents with blanket deputation would represent an insignificant increase to the tens of thousands of Federal law enforcement personnel already having this authority. I can assure you, however, that the enhanced value of this authority to our operations in this Department would be significant. It would play an important role in enhancing our abilities and flexibility and it is an authority with which we are certainly experienced and well-qualified to utilize.

As I am sure you are aware, my other investigative component, the Office of Labor Racketeering (OLR), has had a blanket deputation for nearly four years. The record indicates that OLR agents have conducted themselves in the highest professional manner and without incident. Moreover, OLR's effectiveness has been significantly enhanced as a result of the blanket deputation. can personally assure you that OI agents have demonstrated the same high degree of competency and professionalism. Indeed, OI

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agents are sometimes reassigned to OLR and vice versa. OLR and OI agents occasionally work joint cases when there is concurrent jurisdiction. Any DOJ concerns about the blanket deputation of OI agents should be alleviated by DOJ's positive experience with OLR. Historically, DOJ has approved some form of limited deputation, at one time or another, for more than seventy-five per cent of OI special agent positions. Thus, there can be no question that the OI cadre of agents meet DOJ standards for deputation. Of course, I am amenable to having OI submit to DOJ the same extensive quarterly deputation reports which OLR presently files.

Unrelated to my request for blanket deputation, but in view of the international situation, I am also requesting at this time that all deputized DOL OIG agents of the Offices of

Investigations and Labor Racketeering, be granted temporary authority to make arrests for any Federal felonies committed in their presence. This policy would make available additional trained Federal agents to immediately respond to any attack on Federal Government facilities or employees. I suggest that this authority to make arrests for any Federal felonies be limited to the duration of the Gulf crisis and be subject to reevaluation after the hostilities have ended.

Finally, in an era of budget and fiscal restrictions, it does not make good sense from the American taxpayer's point of view, from the perspective of efficient and effective government, or from the ideal of sound government policy, not to maximize our existing resources. Through blanket deputation of OI special agents, I am proposing to get more out of our fully-trained, professional law enforcement personnel, without increasing the costs to the taxpayer. To do otherwise or to do less is simply inappropriate and not good for either the American taxpayer or the public.

I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss this further and to provide any additional information that you may need. Your early and favorable consideration will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Sulian aktrisa

Julian W. De La Rosa
Inspector General

Enclosure

The following are a few examples illustrative of the various kinds of dangers and problems confronted by Office of Investigations (OI) special agents during the course of their investigations: dealing with witnesses with criminal backgrounds and a history of violence; working in unsafe urban or remote areas; experiencing the removal of evidence due to the inability to execute search warrants; facing hostile and dangerous arrest situations; failing to obtain help from, or be able to offer assistance to, other law enforcement agencies; tracking fugitives; and investigating former law enforcement officers who are defrauding the government.

OI agents, with the assistance of Postal Inspectors, participated in executing arrest and search warrants at the place of business of a former Bureau of Prisons Corrections Officer, who was fraudulently receiving federal workers' compensation benefits. Prior to the execution of the warrants, the agents determined that the subject possessed a firearms permit and owned a weapon. During execution of the warrants, the subject pulled a switchblade, dropping it only after the Postal Inspectors drew

their own weapons. OI agents found themselves in a lifethreatening situation, unable to defend themselves or to provide support for the other law enforcement officers also threatened.

OI has conducted investigations that have led to the convictions of former law enforcement officers from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Customs Service. Such individuals are familiar and proficient in the use of firearms, attuned to tactics used by criminal investigators, and imminently aware of the potential of imprisonment. Presumably they also are aware that OI agents do not have statutory authority to carry firearms.

An OI investigation of fraud against the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security disclosed that 162 false claims had been filed using seven fictitious employers. of the 24 individuals ultimately indicted in federal court, 23 had prior criminal records, many for violent crimes. One defendant was even arrested for armed robbery while he was awaiting trial on the above charges. Although a number of OI agents participated in the investigation, only one OI agent was deputized during the entire investigation.

OI participated in a joint investigation of a $1.25 million unemployment, insurance fraud scheme which initially identified 50 subjects for investigation. Criminal record checks of the subjects targeted for prosecution indicated that most of the individuals had criminal records ranging from theft offenses and narcotics violations, to aggravated assaults, manslaughter and murder. The subjects resided in extremely dangerous areas of Cleveland, and so all investigative work (surveillances, interviews, service of subpoenas, etc.) was performed in teams that included an agent with full law enforcement powers. ΟΙ agents and Postal Inspectors teamed together to investigate potentially dangerous individuals as well as individuals attempting to avoid service of subpoenas. Unfortunately, the investigation was often delayed because of the unavailability of the Postal Inspectors to assist OI agents.

In an attempt to obtain specific information relating to a complaint letter to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), an OI agent and a MSHA civil investigator traveled to the complainant's home in Manchester, Kentucky in separate cars. The lone access to his apartment building was a long and extremely narrow alley which exited into a small parking area with no space to turn either vehicle around. When the OI and MSHA investigators arrived to interview the complainant, he was seated outside his doorway with an unobstructed view of the alleyway. As the investigators approached him, they noticed the complainant was armed with an automatic pistol. With no safe way to retreat from the premises, the agents remained and conducted the interview with the complainant, who appeared to be either mentally unstable or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Because the OI agent was not armed, he was unable to safely extract the MSHA employee or himself from what was potentially a dangerous situation.

An OI agent and three accompanying Secret Service agents, investigating Job Corps related thefts, were on a tenement staircase in a high-crime neighborhood of New York City, when the lights went out and a commotion began ahead of them. The Secret Service agents drew their weapons, while the OI agent had to resort to using his briefcase as a "shield". Only ten days after being questioned by OI agents, one of the subjects of the investigation was killed by a spray of bullets from an Uzi weapon while she was seated in a car parked in front of her home.

Police surmised that her murder was related to the on-going Job Corps investigation.

An OI investigation resulted in an `indictment for a false billing scheme involving medical equipment supplied to Black Lung claimants." The subject is currently a fugitive, and is being sought for trial on those charges and additional charges of kidnapping. He had a prior arrest record for firearms violations, resisting arrest and armed robbery, and is a known drug and alcohol abuser who is believed to be armed at all times. When asked to assist in the search for this fugitive, OI agents were deputized in January 1991. However, OI agents were, unarmed during the actual investigation they had conducted that lead to the May 1989 felony indictment.

During an investigation, OI agents discovered that business records belonging to the subject were being maintained in a storage facility. With this information, a search warrant was obtained. On account of the remoteness of the area, no other law enforcement agency was available to expeditiously execute the warrant. By the time the warrant could be executed, the subject had returned to the storage facility and had removed some of his items.

Arrest warrants in a bribery case were issued by a federal magistrate. OI agents sought to serve the warrants as quickly as possible, to secure the cooperation of those arrested and to develop evidence of other bribe offers. Agents from an agency with full law enforcement powers waited with an OI agent to arrest the bribery suspect. However, because those agents with arrest authority had to leave the stakeout, the arrest, had to be postponed until a later date. If OI agents had been authorized arrest powers, the suspect could have been arrested as scheduled and his cooperation could have been obtained at a much earlier stage in the investigation.

OI conducted a surveillance of a business establishment in Hoboken, New Jersey. At one point during the surveillance, two of the subject's employees pulled their van alongside the surveillance van, blocking it. The two employees approached the surveillance van and began banging their fists on the exterior, looking through the window, grabbing the handles and yelling obscenities. Fortunately, they were unsuccessful in gaining entry into the van. The OI agent immediately discontinued the surveillance since there was no way to protect himself from further attacks and threats.

The subject of an OI investigation had been convicted of fraud involving the unemployment insurance program (UI) and was sentenced to five years in prison. He escaped from a federal prison camp and began another scheme to defraud the UI program. He was finally arrested in Victorville, California, after an automobile chase by OI agents and local sheriff's deputies. subsequent search of the subject's vehicle produced a handgun. The OI agents, who had spotted the subject and had contacted the local authorities, had been unarmed.

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The subject of an OI investigation, who had a drug/alcohol addiction for which he had received treatment, was confronted by an OI agent regarding stolen workers' compensation checks. After several attempts, the lone OI agent located the subject at his place of business and asked to interview him. As the agent entered the subject's place of business, the subject stepped behind his desk, drew a gun from his briefcase, and placed it in a desk drawer. The agent completed the interview, withdrawing in a manner so as to not provoke the subject.

law enforcement agencies due to Ol's lack of full law enforcement authority. Their safety and well being are often cited as uppermost in their decisions to transfer. Also of concern to our agents is the OI's dependency upon others to carry out fundamental criminal investigative functions. Clearly, the lack of full law enforcement authority has adversely affected Ol's ability to retain some investigative resources in which OI has made long-term training and expertise development investments.

There have been several attempts in recent years to overcome this disparity in full law enforcement authority for the OIG community. In 1987, U.S. Senators DeConcini,

Domenici, D'Amato and Moynihan introduced S.1975. In 1990, U.S. Senator Boschwitz introduced S.2080; while, in the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Staggers introduced H.R.4149. All of these bills addressed the OIG community's need for full law enforcement authority, proffering essentially the same language which is indigenous to the law enforcement authority which cloaks the traditional Federal law enforcement agencies. DOJ has opposed each attempt, for reasons that appear to be based on a desire to protect the investigative jurisdiction of DOJ investigative agencies.

The enactment of statutory law enforcement authority for the OI would entail minimal additional costs, which would probably be immediately off-set by the return on the more efficient means by which OI could operate without having to rely on the assistance of other agencies.

Those who do not support statutory law enforcement authority for OI have failed to make the case that it would somehow adversely affect either the Federal Government at-large or specific federal law enforcement agencies. In the meantime, Ol agents are conducting criminal investigations in the same dangerous environment and are being confronted by the same violent element as other law enforcement officers, without any of the benefits and protection of statutory law enforcement authority.

It is for these reasons, that the Department of Labor OIG should be accorded statutory law enforcement authority.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator HARKIN. The subcommittee will stand in recess until 2 p.m., Tuesday, March 5, when we will meet to hear Secretary Sullivan, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Thank you all. [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., Tuesday, March 5, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]