Conley vs. Allegheny County Light Company. building, together with its conditions, was important in determining the duty of the defendant to employees working in and about the building. A photograph which admittedly did not show the relative positions of and the distance between the wire and the building would have misled the jury and was therefore not competent. That its exclusion did not prejudice or affect plaintiff's rights is manifest by the verdict. The plaintiff offered in evidence a letter, dated November 29, 1911, from the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company to the defendant company. The letter was admitted for the "sole purpose of showing that the defendant company had notice that the building was in course of erection and for the further purpose of showing the distance claimed between the poles and wires and the building line." The letter stated that the wire was in a dangerous condition, an opinion which, if competent, could only be expressed after the writer had appeared and testified to facts sufficient to justify the giving of an opinion. The first of defendant's requests for instructions was affirmed and might well have been qualified the more clearly to express the effect of the pole being out of plumb and thereby bringing the wire closer to the building, but in view of the verdict of the jury, it does not appear that the affirmance without such qualification did the plaintiff any injustice. As a basis for the ascertainment of the damages the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that John Chris Conly by occupation was a carpenter, contractor and builder. When employed as a carpenter or as a foreman he earned from $4 to $5 per day. As a contractor and builder it was testified he erected houses on contract, purchased property, erected buildings thereon and sold the same. It was competent to show the profits realized by Mr. Conly from the management of his business conducted as a contractor and builder, Wallace vs. R. R. Co., 195 Pa., 127. Profits mean the excess of receipts over expenditures. In other words, net earnings, and that should always be kept in mind in the trial of causes of this character, Boggs vs. R. R. Co., 232 Pa., Neither Mrs. Conly, the widow, nor Mrs. Dora Barone, the daughter, witnesses called by the plaintiff, knew or testified to the amount of business done by Mr. Conly, nor to the receipts and expenditures during the period he was engaged in an independent business. They were interrogated as to the income for certain years but could not give an approximate estimate of the receipts or expenditures either for the entire year nor upon any of the contracts. Of the buildings erected they did not know the contract price nor the cost of erection. Their testimony was not sufficient to qualify them to give the amount of an income depending upon facts which admittedly were not within the knowledge of the witnesses. The Carlysle Tables were admitted in evidence, nor was anything said minimizing their effect. In a case tried during the week in which this trial was had the accuracy of the tables as printed in Digby's Rules of Court was questioned. This was called to the attention of counsel. After discussion confined to the method of proof, the objection was withdrawn, the tables were admitted, commented upon by counsel in their concluding addresses and referred to in the court's instructions to the jury. The plaintiff alleges that she was prejudiced by the alleged action of the court in arguing and discussing the case with counsel for the defendant. At no time was the case discussed by the court nor, with but few exceptions, was counsel heard on questions raised during the trial. In the trial of a case counsel, as is probably their duty, repeatedly press upon the court questions wherein the ruling is considered erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of their client. We are not disposed to review the happenings of the trial except to say that the reason we are now considering and Conley vs. Allegheny County Light Company. the language in which it is expressed is not justified by anything that was said or done in the trial. At about 2:30 P. M., after being out for about three or three and a half hours, the jury in writing informed the court that they could not agree on the basic fact of negligence. Counsel being present, the jury were called and in the presence and hearing of counsel instructed to attempt, by conferring the one with the other, to agree. They were not instructed that they must agree, nor that they would be recalled at 3:00 P. M. Shortly before three o'clock counsel for plaintiff and defendant were in court and at three o'clock or about three o'clock the jury came into court and rendered their verdict. They were not sent for by the court. The verdict was taken in the presence of both counsel and without objection from either. The verdict in the case of Mrs. Conly, widow of John Chris Conly, was in the sum of $1,000. The plaintiff alleges that the verdict is inadequate. In this class of cases it is with reluctance that the verdict of a jury is disturbed unless it appears to have been the result of sympathy, prejudice or that the jury has disregarded the testimony or the instructions of the court. In this case, the verdict, though not large, is substantial. The verdict might have been larger, yet it was the province of the jury to determine the amount and we are not persuaded we should set the verdict aside. ORDER. November 14, 1914, new trial is refused. Sullivan vs. Catts, et ux. Sheriff's Sale—Proceedings to Obtain Possession--Act of April 12, 1905. In proceedings to obtain possession of land after Sheriff's Sale, under the Act of April 12, 1905, the petition must conform in all particulars to the Act, and must set forth the names of the persons in possession and that they are the defendants in the execution or derived title therefrom or otherwise. The petition, however, may be amended under Section 12 of the Act. Act of April 12, 1905. No. 1203 April Term, 1914. C. P. Allegheny County. W. J. Graham and Geo. L. Schuyler, for petitioner. FORD, J., November 14, 1914.-This proceeding is under the provisions of the act of April 12, 1905, P. L., 239. The vendee of a purchaser at sheriff's sale presented his petition setting forth that C. F. Schuyler and W. H. Schuyler were the purchasers of a certain lot or piece of ground situate in the Fifth Ward of the City of Pittsburgh sold at sheriff's sale under Fi. Fa., No. 730, October Term, 1912, and that the purchasers by deed duly recorded granted and conveyed the property to the petitioner, R. P. Sullivan. The petition further alleges that James Catts and Mrs. James Catts or Miss Brown are in possession and, though notified to deliver the premises to the petitioner, refused so to do. The prayer is that the defendants be cited to appear and show cause why possession of the property should not be delivered to the petitioner. The defendants, James Catts and Lucy, his wite, formerly Lucy Brown, filed an answer in which they aver that the fi. fa. in execution whereof the property was sold was based on judgment confessed at No. 429, October Term, 1912, Sullivan vs. Catts, et ux. D. S. B., wherein one C. F. Schuyler was plaintiff and Robert Smothers was defendant; that the interest levied upon and sold by the sheriff was that of Robert Smothers who had no right, possession or right of possession in the property sold and that the respondents are not the defendants as to whose property the real estate was sold and are not in possession either mediately or immediately through a right or title derived from Robert Smothers. The respondents further allege that the interest of Robert Smothers claimed to have been sold at sheriff's sale is based upon a deed dated May 5, 1912, purporting to have been made, executed and delivered by Maria Brown, conveying the property to Robert Smothers; that at and prior to the date of the alleged deed Robert Smothers was the agent of Maria Brown, who was old, of feeble mind and unable to manage her estate; that Maria Brown did not know, nor was she informed, that she was executing a conveyance, was paid no consideration and made her mark only by reason of her confidence in Robert Smothers, her then agent, and in reliance upon certain false and fraudulent statements by him made; that Maria Brown died October 4, 1913, intestate, leaving her daughter Lucy, now Mrs. James Catts, as her sole surviving heir; that from the date of the deed until her death Maria Brown was in sole and exclusive possession of the property and since her death her daughter Lucy has continued in possession thereof. The answer prayed a jury trial on the issue raised by the pleadings and by way of demurrer the respondents say that the petition should be dismissed for the reason that the facts alleged in the petition are not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. The petition in all particulars should conform to the act of 1905, Lutz vs. Matthews, 37 Supr. Ct., 354, which provides that the petition shall set forth: (a) A description of the real estate sold and averment of petitioner's title and a reference to the proceedings under which the sale was made; (b) That the persons in possession are defendants as to whose property such real estate was sold, or That such persons came into possession mediately or immediately through a right or title derived from the defendant, or An averment that the manner of obtaining possession is unknown to petitioner; (c) If other than defendants in the execution, the petitioner's brief of title to said real estate commencing at a point covering the title, if any, by right of which the persons in possession claim to retain possession. The petition by which these proceedings were instituted does not conform to the requirements of the act in failing to set forth the persons in possession as to whose property the real estate was sold or that the respondents' hold title under the defendant named in the writ. The petition does not state the name of the defendant against whom judgment was had and execution issued, nor is there an abstract of title annexed thereto; necessary when the respondents are not defendants in the original proceedings. The petition, however, may be amended under Section 18 of the act. The case was set down and argument had on petition and answer. Though the answer may supply certain requirements omitted in the petition, yet in view of respondent's answer being also in the nature of a demurrer, it cannot be said they have waived the defect in the petition. If the averments contained in the answer for present purposes be taken as true, yet the allegation of fraud is inadequate, stating conclusions, and is otherwise indefinite. To determine the rights of plaintiff and respondent on petition and answer, the petition should conform to the act of assembly and the answer should set forth with reasonable certainty the facts upon which is based the inference of fraud. Sullivan vs. Catts, et ux. ORDER. Now, November 14, 1914, leave is granted R. P. Sullivan to amend his petition within ten days, with leave also to respondent to reply thereto in ten days after notice of the filing of an amended petition. Locomobile Company of America vs. Malone. Foreign corporation—Suit by-Registered place of business--Art. XVI, Sec. 5, of the Constitution and Act of June 8, 1911. Under Art. XVI. Sec. 5 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, providing that no foreign corporation shall do business in this state without having one or more known places of business and an authorized agent upon whom process may be served and the Act of June 8th, 1911 relating to and regulating the same subject, a foreign corporation need only have one registered agency in the state and in a suit by such foreign corporation to recover a claim in Allegheny County a motion on behalf of the defendant for judgment on the pleadings will be dismissed where it appears that the registered agency of the plaintiff is in Philadelphia. Motion for judgment on the pleadings. No. 2281-1914. C. C. Allegheny County. Evans, Noble & Evans, for plaintiff. George M. Hosack, for defendant. KENNEDY, J., December 19, 1914.-This is a motion by the defendant for judgment on the pleadings. The plaintiff, a foreign corporation, doing business in Pittsburgh, claims of the defendant the sum of $899.62 for work and material furnished. The defendant admits owing $169.15, which amount he has paid the plaintiff since suit was brought, but denies further indebtedness, and in addition denies the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action because it has not registered with the Secretary of the Commonwealth a statement and the location of its agency in Pittsburgh, and avers that Article XVI, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that "No foreign corporation shall do any business in this State without having one or more known places of business and an authorized agent or agents in the same, upon whom process may be served," requires an agency upon whom process can be served in each place of business in the State. It is admitted that the plaintiff has a registered agency in Philadelphia. We are not convinced that the clause demands the interpretation placed upon it by defendant. We are aware that the cases cited by defendant-Phoenix Silk Mfg. Co. vs. Reilly, 187 Pa., 526, and Hegerman vs. Empire Slate Co., 97 Pa., 534, are open to that construction, but they are based not only upon Article XVI, Section 5 of the Constitution, but mainly upon the Act of April 22nd, 1874, P. L. 108, which did require an authorized registered agent in each place of business. This act, however, was repealed by the Act of June 8th, 1911, P. L. 710, which provides that a foreign corporation shall have but one authorized registered agent in the State. The constitution requires the plaintiff to have one (or more) known places of business and an authorized agent (or agents) in the same upon whom process may be served. Inasmuch as the legislature has seen fit to sc limit the language of this clause that under it one agent is sufficient and that service upon him may be made through the Secretary of the Commonwealth of any process issued by any court, magistrate or justice of the peace having jurisdiction of the subject matter in any county where the right of action arises, we are, unless such construction is clearly repugnant to the clause quoted, bound thereby, and therefore the motion of the defendant for judgment on the pleadings is dismissed and rule discharged. Commonwealth vs. McKinnie. Insanity Proceedings under Act of June 26, 1895--Irregularities in proceedings-Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Court to overrule decision of Quarter Sessions Court. The Court of Common Pleas has no jurisdiction to overrule or revise a decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions on the ground of irregularities in the proceedings where it is unquestioned that the Court of Quarter Sessions had full jurisdiction over the subject matters, as in a commitment for insanity under the Act of June 26, 1895. The remedy is by application to the Court making the order for correction of the errors or by appeal to a higher court. It is proper however for the Common Pleas Court in such a case upon habeas corpus proceedings to pass upon and determine the question of insanity. Habeas corpus. No. 1410 January Term, 1915. C. P. Allegheny County. C. B. Prichard, for petitioner. H. H. Hanna, for respondent. HAYMAKER, J., December 17, 1914.-The petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleges, inter alia, that the relator, Mrs. Sarah E. Walters, was neither legally committed nor insane at the time she was sent to the City Home. On November 24, 1914, R. H. Jackson, the District Attorney of this County, presented his petition to the Court of Quarter Sessions, alleging that the relator was committed to the county jail by an alderman, on a criminal charge of assault and battery, that she was insane, and praying for an order of that Court for her examination by two physicians as provided by the Act of June 26, 1895, P. L. 388. On the same day an order was made and the physicians were appointed. On the day following their appointment they made their report, in which they found and certified that she was insane and should be committed to a proper institution or hospital for treatment. The Court directed that the report be filed, and a copy thereof be given to the County Commissioners. On November 28th, 1914, the County Commissioners, with the approval of the Court of Quarter Sessions, issued their commitment directing her removal to the Poor Farm at Marshalsea, there to be maintained at the cost of this County, as indigent insane persons are now kept and supported. On November 28th, 1914, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to the Common Pleas Court, and the writ was issued, returnable December 1, 1914. On the return day of the writ the relator filed an amended petition, and thereupon the case was taken up and many witnesses examined on the question of the relator's sanity. We are now asked to release the relator for the following reasons: (1) There was no notice given to the relator of any of the proceedings that resulted in her removal to the City Home; (2) There was no averment in the petition of the District Attorney that she was indigent; and (3) she was not insane. It is true that no notice was given to either the relator or any of her friends, and the petition contains no averment of indigency. Those two objections, if well grounded, go to the legality of the proceedings of the Quarter Sessions Court, and the Common Pleas Court, being one of coordinate jurisdiction, is asked to declare as a matter of law that the proceedings of the former were illegal and to release the relator. We know of no authority that would warrant us in revising the proceedings of the Quarter Sessions Court, in a matter over which it had unquestioned jurisdiction, by assuming and discharging the functions of an appellate court, no matter what our opinion might be as to the regularity of those proceedings. There can be no question that the Quarter Sessions Court had jurisdiction to dispose of the relator, under the Act of 1895, and if that |