Pittsburgh Poster Advertising Company vs. Borough of Munhall. man of ordinary intelligence, and said inspection may be made by a police officer while on his rounds and in a few minutes. Defendant produced no evidence and did not contend that inspection of said signboards would impose any expense or charge on the Borough. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. First. Under the guise of regulation, the ordinance is a restricting ordinance and its enforcement would result in irreparable injury to plaintiff. Second. The ordinance, Exhibit "A" of the bill, is invalid and an injunction against its enforcement should issue as prayed for. Third. The costs of these proceedings shall be paid by the defendant. Some of the findings of fact are, at least in substance, embodied in the opinion and some may not be essential to a proper decision, but they are all affirmed, as are also the conclusions of law. Being of opinion that the ordinance in question is null and void and that an injunction should issue as prayed for, it is ordered that the findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with this opinion, be filed, and a decree nisi be entered sec reg. Meyers vs. Jones & Laughlin. Negligence- -Order of Foreman Knowledge of Notice. -Notice on Machine Contrary to Foreman's In an action for personal injuries, the Plaintiff's testimony was that he was told to saw a block of wood on a circular saw which was unguarded and was injured in doing this work. In front of the saw was a good sized sign, stating that only an authorized operator must use this saw. Plaintiff testified that he did not see the notice. Held, that as there was no proof of Plaintiff's knowledge of the notice, there was nothing to show that he was not bound to obey the order of the foreman and the case was for the jury. Sur Motion for New Trial and Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto. No. 2102 July Term, 1913. C. P. Allegheny County. saw. Thos. M. & Rody P. Marshall, for plaintiff. SHAFER, P. J., April 17, 1915.-The action is by an employee against his employer, for injuries received by coming in contact with an unguarded The plaintiff was employed a very short time before the accident, as a craneman. His testimony is that a controller box standing on the crane was loose and in danger of falling down. He says he called the attention of Parker, his foreman, to it and was directed by Parker to take a square block of wood to a circular saw in the shipping department of defendant's plant, and cut it in two diagonally, so as to make a prop for each side of the controller. The saw referred to was not used in any of the manufacturing operations carried on in the defendant's works, but was in the shipping yard and was used to cut blocks which were to be used in fastening heavy castings in the cars in which they were shipped. The platform on which the wood was to be placed to be cut was not movable, but the circular saw itself was to be drawn forward against the wood, by a wheel governed by the operator in front of the platform. When not in use the saw stood under a metal cover which enclosed it except in front, but when in use it had to be drawn out toward the front, and when so drawn out it was not guarded in any way. The plaintiff testifies that upon Meyer vs. Jones & Laughlin. receiving this order from his foreman he took the block to the saw and the sawyer who was in charge of it was not there, and that he asked a foreigner who was standing there to saw the block, and he refused to do so, but agreed to start the machinery for him, and did so; and the plaintiff says he undertook to saw the block, not by drawing the saw towards it by the wheel used for that purpose, which he says he did not see, but by pushing the block against the saw diagonally, and that in so doing he cut his hand. There was attached in front of this saw a sign of some size, upon which was written: "Notice. Only an authorized operator must use this saw." Which notice the plaintiff says he did not see. The motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is founded, as we understand it, upon the claim that Parker, a foreman in the manufacturing department of the establishment, had no right to direct the craneman to use the saw in violation of the notice which was put up by the Safety Department Superintendent, and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not bound to obey his order to do so. If actual notice of the prohibition has been brought home to the plaintiff there might be a great deal in this contention; but as the plaintiff says he did not see the notice at all and as he was not accustomed to working in that part of the establishment, it could not be inferred that he must have seen it by frequently being in the neighborhood. Under these circumstances we are of opinion that the defendant is not entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto. The principal reason urged in support of the motion for a new trial is that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and is excessive. We are inclined to believe the real weight of the evidence was with the defendant, but we are not convinced that it was so clearly so as to require a new trial. Fortunately the plaintiff was not very seriously hurt, as he might have been in coming in contact with such a saw, and the real damage to his hand is not very great. We are of opinion that the verdict, under the circumstances, is excessive, and that one thousand dollars would have been an ample verdict for the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is, therefore, refused; and it is ordered that if the plaintiff will remit five hundred dollars of the verdict, within twenty days after notice hereof, a new trial will be refused. Otherwise a new trial will be granted. Causey et al. vs. McSorley. County Court-Appeal-Practice -Jurisdiction -Set-Off. An appeal from the County Court of Allegheny County on the ground that the jury erred in its verdict, will not be allowed when the appellant attaches to the petition for appeal only part of the testimony and all the testimony is necessary to determine the justice of the verdict. The jurisdiction of the County Court is not ousted in a suit for less than $1,500 because the set-off claimed by the defendant exceeds $1,500. Sur Motion of Defendant for Leave to Appeal from the Judgment of the County Court Rendered Upon a Verdict of a Jury. No. 2303 January Term, 1915. C. P. Allegheny County. W. L. Dipple, for plaintiffs. J. F. McNaul, for defendant. HAYMAKER, J., April 5, 1915.—The plaintiffs' action as originally brought was to recover $431.17, as extras in a painting contract, in which there was a jury trial. On the trial below the Court struck out certain items claimed by the plaintiffs, submitted the right of plaintiffs to recover $322.25, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs for $307.50. Then defendant moved for a new trial. The plaintiff, having filed a stipulation to remit so much of the verdict as was in excess of $230.22, the motion was refused and judgment was entered on the verdict. The defendant in his affidavit of defense claimed a set-off of $4,167.04, and gave notice therein that he would ask for a certificate in his favor for that amount on the trial of the case. It would appear that on the trial the defense limited itself to a denial of the extras charged, claiming that they were included in the contract, and to the claim, by way of set-off, that the I work upon the hard-wood floors was so defectively performed as to require it to be done by defendant at a cost of about $1,600.00. The defendant gives two reasons why he should be allowed an appeal to the Common Pleas Court; (1) that the jury manifestly erred in finding for the plaintiffs; and (2) that inasmuch as the defendant's set-off exceeded $1,500 the County Court was without jurisdiction to try the case. As to the first reason it is sufficient to say that in his petition for an appeal the defendant has attached only a part of the testimony given on the trial, and the plaintiffs in their answer to that petition say, "it will be noted by the Court that the defendant has failed to produce the entire record of the Court below, only the testimony of two witnesses being included in the record submitted. This is noted for the purpose of calling the Court's attention to the fact that the plaintiff established his case by the testimony of numerous witnesses, the trial occupying two days and a half." With that state of the record before us we could not pass upon the merits of the case below, even if we were so disposed. From the Charge of the Court below, and the opinion overruling a motion for a new trial, it would appear that the evidence raised a question of fact for the jury, and in that opinion the Court expresses its approval of the verdict. If we are asked in any case to allow an appeal on the ground of manifest error on the part of the jury, we could reach a decision only after the consideration of all the evidence, and that we do not have before us. The question raised by the second reason is: Has the County Court jurisdiction in a suit brought upon a contract for less than $1,500 in which a set-off is claimed by the defendant in excess of $1,500? We do not agree with the plaintiff, that because the defendant took his chances in a trial in the County Court he is precluded from raising the question of jurisdiction thereafter. There being no adjudicated cases involving that question in Causey et al. vs. McSorley. relation to the County Court, the counsel for both parties call our attention to a number of authorities bearing on the same question which has arisen in actions brought before justices of the peace, and appealed to the Common Pleas Court. The defendant cites these cases in support of his contention that where an action is brought in a court of limited jurisdiction to recover the amount within the jurisdiction, and the defendant claims a set-off in excess thereof, the jurisdiction of the trial court is thereby ousted. Those cases do not sustain the defendant's position, but are authority in support of the proposition advanced by the plaintiffs, that where the claim of set-off exceeds the amount over which the court has jurisdiction it should be rejected by the trial court. They equally support the plaintiff's position that where the set-off is inadmissible for that reason in the trial court, it will not be admissible on a trial in the Common Pleas on appeal. Our attention has not been called to any case holding that when a plaintiff brings an action before a justice of the peace to recover a jurisdictional amount the defendant can turn him out of court by claiming a set-off in excess of the magistrate's jurisdiction. The authorities are to the effect that the set-off should be rejected and the defendant remitted to his action against the plaintiff for its recovery. The jurisdiction of the County Court is limited, by the 6th Section of the Act of April 2, 1913, P. L. 21, to actions where the sum demanded does not exceed $1,500; and the 10th Section thereof limits the defendant's set-off or demand to the same amount. In view of the provisions of that Act and the authorities relating to claims of set-off before justices of the peace, we think the County Court would have been justified on the trial, in rejecting the defendant's evidence of set-off, on the ground that it was in excess of the jurisdiction of that court. The record before us, however, indicates that the County Court permitted the defendant to prove his set-off, not with the view of a certificate in his favor, but for the purpose of having the jury determine whether the defendant actually owed the plaintiff any sum whatever, and of this the defendant certainly has no reason for complaint. We are of opinion that the defendant was given every opportunity of trying out the facts, and we are unable to say that the jury reached a wrong conclusion. We are equally of opinion that the County Court had jurisdiction to try the cause, which could not be ousted by the defendant's inter posing a set-off in excess of its jurisdiction. The motion for an appeal is refused. Charge of Court- Potter vs. Pittsburgh Railways Company. -Consultation of Jurors-Suggestions of Jurors to Each In an action for personal injuries, the court in charging the jury said that no one of them would likely remember every detail of the evidence, but some would remember one part and some another, and they would likely receive suggestions from each other. Held, that the charge was not objectionable, as suggestions necessarily referred to facts proved and could not relate to facts not in evidence. Motion by Plaintiff for New Trial. No. 2614 April Term, 1913. C. P. Allegheny County. N. R. Daugherty and John M. Henry, for plaintiff. CARPENTER, J., April 8, 1915.-Plaintiff's counsel have assigned two reasons in support of their motion for a new trial. Under the second they have specified six excerpts from the charge as grounds for complaint. The cause has been tried twice, the first trial having been before Judge Shafer. That trial resulted in a disagreement, and this in a verdict for the defendant. In neither trial was plaintiff successful in her effort to satisfy the jury by the weight of the evidence that she ought to recover. We do not think that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and, even if in doubt, would be invading the province of the jury if we set the verdict aside. The second reason relates to the charge and has received careful consideration. The complaints are as follows: a. "It is quite probable that no one of you will remember every detail of the testimony. Some will remember one part; some another, and you will probably all have a general knowledge of all of the evidence; but when you come to consider the questions you will likely receive suggestions from one another, and so be able to group all the facts in relation to the case.". b. "Of course, you understand, gentlemen, that in trying to reach a correct conclusion as to the child in this case, that is, Emma Potter, you are to take into consideration the child as you saw her here, although she is now a little more than two years older than she was when the accident happened. You will consider her physical appearance to some extent." turned and came c. "Substantially the story is that this girl * * down the street and crossed over at least one track, that is, the inbound track, of the Railways Company, at the intersection of Second Avenue and Tecumseh Street. * * * She heard two bells which she knew was a signal for starting the car, and stepped back on the inbound track and was struck by the car approaching the City." d. "There is quite a difference, a radical difference, between the witnesses for the plaintiff and the witnesses for the defendant in regard to the speed of the car." e. "A number of other witnesses on behalf of the defendant, say that it stopped either just at the corner of Tecumseh Street and Second Avenue, or a little in the street-Tecumseh Street-which would show that it was stopped very promptly, if their testimony is correct." f. "Remember this, however, gentlemen, that the mere fact that an accident happens, does not of itself justify a jury in taking money from one person and giving it to another, and it does not make the slightest difference whether the controversy is between individuals, or between an |