Kaufmann vs. Bankers Surety Company. required to pay $41,250, leaving in his hands for protection against mechanics' liens $951.73. The power house was not built and the $3,000 was not advanced and in the final liquidation of Kaufmann's judgment he gave credit for that amount so that the total of his loan was reduced to $45,000. Whether the case be viewed from the standpoint of one considering the question of becoming surety upon the modified agreement or it be looked at in the light of the result, the modification was manifestly a very material one and to the disadvantage of the surety and increased the chance of risk of unpaid prior mechanics' liens. It is true that under the original contract more buildings were to be erected and more money would be required, but there was a much larger sum to be retained against liens. We have construed the contract to mean that the payments when the buildings were completed were not to be affected by the amounts charged in advance. It provides first "the following amounts to be advanced on said buildings during construction," etc., following this with the provision that the "commission," insurance premium, interest and attorney's fees "shall be paid by party of second part in advance and shall be charged against the proceeds of said mortgage." Even if the advances were to be deducted the proportionate decrease in the amount to protect against liens would be the same. Another change is that in the original contract it was stipulated that the cost of the buildings was to be $100,000, the contract of November 19th did not fix any cost. If the surety paid prior liens and was subrogated under the criginal contract its claim would follow a mortgage of $70,000 on a property with buildings costing $100,000. As modified it would follow a mortgage of $48,000 on property with buildings of uncertain cost. It is not an answer that Mrs. Engel was to provide $30,000 and that the outcome shows that she did not have that sum, for the test is not the result but whether a person of reasonable judgment and prudence would on consideration of the proposed change regard it as "substantially increasing the chances of loss." Reid was the local representative of the company which had its office in Cleveland, Ohio. Kaufmann testified that when the original proposition was presented he asked Reid: "What chance is there of your company giving me a bond?' And he said, 'Well, I will know in a short time. I will take it up with the company.'" This shows that Reid did not hold himself out as having authority to fix the terms of the contract and that this must be done by the company. When it had agreed and Reid had signed the bond as attorney in fact Kaufmann asked for evidence of his authority and Reid wrote to the company, "Kaufmann was rather uncertain that my power of attorney covered the execution of this bond, so you might be good enough to send me a special authorization for the execution of it," and a power of attorney authorizing him to execute this bond was forwarded and delivered to Kaufmann. A general agent is one whom a man puts in his place to transact all his business of a particular kind. An authority of this kind empowers the agent to bind his employer by all acts within the scope of his employment and that power cannot be limited by any private restriction not known to the party dealing with the agent: London Svg. Fund Society vs. Hagerstown Bank, 36 Pa., 498. In Anderson vs. National Surety Company, 196 Pa., 288, the agent was not only the general agent, and held himself out as such, solicited and negotiated surety bonds for it, received the premiums and transmitted them to the company and delivered the bonds as he did in that case. It was not a defense that he had no authority as to a contractor's bond, for "such secret restrictions will not avail the company after his appointment as a general agent to deal with the public," and there was a ratification of the agent's act. No doubt a principal is bound by the acts of the agent within the apparent scope of his authority, but when the agent does not assume to have the authority and the one dealing with him requires evidence of his right to exe Kaufmann vs. Bankers Surety Company. cute the contract he is not misled. The mere fact that he is called a general agent is met by the knowledge of Kaufmann that the bond must be submitted for approval and by the request for evidence of his authority. It was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the contract of November 19, 1910, was agreed to by the company or one who had authority to act for it, and he has not done so. January 12, 1915, new trial refused. In re Registration of Voters in Uniontown Borough Fourth Ward. Elections-Registry of voters. The Acts of Assembly relating to registry of voters must be followed strictly and fully by the officers charged with that duty. Proceeding to purge and correct registry list of false and fraudulent registrations. No. 287 December Term, 1914. C. P. Fayette County. E. C. Higbee, of Sterling, Higbee & Matthews, for petitioner. UMBEL, P. J. October 26, 1914.-It has been suggested that the purging and correcting of registry lists is a matter of small concern and of no particular consequence in preventing false and fraudulent voting and "that the majority of the men whose names were stricken from the lists will vote next Tuesday." As indicated in our first case, it may occur occasionally that a name is stricken off of a legally qualified voter and that does not deprive him of his right but we are satisfied that the names of very few, if any, legally qualified voters have been stricken off in any of the districts we have had before us and the above prediction as to voting next Tuesday is a careless and reckless one and if it is carried out a great many illegal votes will be cast and there will be a large number of private citizens and a number of election officers subject and liable to fine and imprisonment and if the honest, law-abiding citizens of the respective districts will take the proper interest and lend a helping hand the persons so offending will be punished as they deserve, and this matter will not stop with merely purging the lists, and this applies throughout the county whether the lists have been purged or not. The matter of registration was before and considered by our Supreme Court in 1890 in Cusick's Election Case, 136 Pa., 459, where, in a most exhaustive opinion covering almost thirteen printed pages, the then Chief Justice discusses and clearly sets forth the law; the importance of the matter appears in the following paragraph from that opinion, viz: "Lightly as many persons appear to regard the right of citizenship, the history of the government fully bears out the assertion that the exercise of the elective franchise has been productive of a vast amount of fraud. And it is a kind of fraud that strikes at the integrity and imperils the existence of free government. This assertion is not made at random; we have judicial knowledge whereof we speak. Our books are full of cases where such fraud has been developed. In Page vs. Allen, 58 Pa., 338, it was held by the late Mr. Justice Read: 'I was counsel for Mr. Kneass in 1851, and of Mr. Mann in 1856, and from what I saw in those contested election cases I was fully convinced that the election laws were utterly insufficient in preventing fraud, and subsequent experience has confirmed me in my opinion. In some districts of the city-plague spots'-fraudulent voting is the rule, and honest voting the exception. I am fully convinced that nothing but a registry law, honestly and firmly administered, can cure an evil which strikes at the root of our republican institutions'." In re Registration, Fourth Ward, Uniontown. Page vs. Allen above, in a twenty-four page opinion by the then chief Justice was decided in 1868 and was responsible for our registration Act, now under consideration, of 1874. Further, in the Cusick case the Court quotes in full, covering a page and a half, section 10 of the Act of Jan. 10, 1874, P. L. 31, which sets forth what is necessary to be done by and for an unregistered qualified voter before he can vote, and the same law applies to one whose name has been stricken off. In that case it was contended by and in behalf of those who violated or attempted to evade the law, that in consequence of the numerous and complicated provisions of the Act of 1874 in that regard it was unconstitutional, unreasonably inconvenient and its enforcement a hardship, &c., but the Supreme Court held that it was a proper and constitutional enactment and must be complied with strictly and was mandatory and not merely directory, saying that if it were only directory it was little better than a rope of sand. The language of the Act of 1874 is strong, positive and direct, in such case it provides specifically "No man shall be permitted to vote at the election on that day whose name is not on said list" (registry list) "unless he shall make proof of his right to vote as is hereinafter required," and these requirements are fully set forth in section 10 above. The said act imposes a strict duty on election officers and provides severe penalty if they fail, as follows, viz: "If any election officer shall refuse or neglect to require such proof of the right of suffrage as is prescribed by this law, or the laws of which this is a supplement, from any person offering to vote whose name is not on the list of assessed voters, or whose right to vote is challenged by any qualified voter present, and shall admit such person to vote without requiring such proof, every person so offending shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced for every such offense to pay a fine not exceeding $500 or to undergo an imprisonment not more than one year, or both, at the discretion of the court." Likewise the provisions are strict as to what is required of the unregistered voter or man whose name is stricken from the registry list and those who may be witnesses. Any of the election officers may administer oaths and ask questions of any such person offering to vote and of the witnesses and "any wilful false swearing by any person" (whether party offering to vote or witnesses) "in relation to any matter or thing concerning which they shall lawfully be interrogated by any of said officers or overseers, shall be guilty of perjury," and subject to a penalty of $500 fine and seven years imprisonment. The Court in the Cusick case sums the matter up as follows, viz: "(a) The primary object of the Act is to prevent fraudulent voting. Hence, it must be so construed as to best carry out the intent of the legislature, and not to defeat it. (b) The affidavit of a known registered voter must be sufficiently specific as to show upon its face, without reference to any other fact or circumstance, that the voter has the right to which he claims; and, (c) It must also be sufficiently specific to found thereon an indictment for perjury in case any of the material allegations therein are wilfully false." We think this sufficient to show that it is very important and how it was considered by our Supreme Court, that it is not a light or trifling matter, and likewise to show that any citizen who would endeavor to create the impression to the contrary belongs to and should reside in the "plague spots" where "fraudulent voting is the rule and honest voting the exception" and he would "strike at the integrity and imperil the existence of free government." If any unregistered voter or any man whose name is stricken off is legally qualified to vote he should have no difficulty in bringing himself with the law by having a reputable, well-known, legally qualified voter of the district as his witness and when he does so fairly and honestly his vote should be accepted without further question but if he cannot do so by a legally qualified well-known reputable citizen of the district as his witness, as above indicated, the interests involved are so important it is the duty of the election officers to investigate fully and carefully In re Registration, Fourth Ward, Uniontown. and if in their honest judgment either the applicant or the witness testified falsely it is as much their duty under their oaths and as loyal, patriotic citizens to take the necessary steps to have the parties punished, if they are guilty of false swearing, as it is to execute the law regarding any other of their duties. The election officers must swear that they will faithfully and honestly carry out the law, that their returns are true and correct, and they cannot do so unless they are satisfied that the votes cast in their respective districts are of legally qualified voters and they should be sufficiently interested in that regard to take a hand in the prosecution and punishment of any person who violates the law and imposes on them by casting false and fraudulent votes. What we said in criticism of the registry list of the borough of Brownsville, in our opinion at No. 260 December Term, 1914, applies with equal force in this case, “it can hardly be considered in any wise a registry list of the qualified voters * * * as required by law" and it should have been suppressed, in this case it is only a list of names arranged in alphabetical order, with post office address and occupation. A study and consideration of the evidence submitted satisfies us that there are registered in the Fourth Ward of the Borough of Uniontown at least eighty-three (83) names which in law are false and fraudulent and will be stricken off accordingly. Now, October 26, 1914, this matter came on for hearing; and now, October 29, 1914, upon and after due consideration and for reasons set forth in opinion herewith and opinions at Nos. 145 and 181 December Term, 1914, it is ordered and directed as follows, viz: I. That the following names entered on the Registry List of the Fourth Ward of the Borough of Uniontown returned to the County Commissioners' office September 3, 1914, viz: Able Charley (and eighty-two [82] others, naming them), be and the same are hereby stricken from the said Registry List of the Fourth Ward of the Borough of Uniontown. III. That the County Commissioners shall not include any of the said eighty-three (83) names hereby stricken off in, but must omit and exclude them from the alphabetical list which they shall have prepared and delivered to the officers of the election of the Fourth Ward of the Borough of Uniontown. II. That H. L. McIntyre, Assessor of the Fourth Ward of the Borough of Uniontown proceed forthwith to correct said Registry List accordingly. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Allegheny County. Sunday law of April 22, 1794 -Allegheny county-Violation of-FinesDisposition of— -State sinking fund-Payment to Act of May 15, 1850. The payment of a fine resulting from a conviction under the Sunday Law of April 22, 1794, and fixed at $25 for Allegheny County by the Act of April 26, 1855, is not payable to the county under the Act of 1794 but is payable to the state sinking fund under the Act of May 15, 1850. The 78th section of the Act of March 31, 1860, known as the law prescribing a criminal code does not repeal the Act of 1850. Case stated. No. 1945 January Term, 1913. C. P. Allegheny County. J. E. B. Cunningham, Deputy Attorney General, for plaintiff. MACFARLANE, J., January 19, 1915.-H. Wein was summarily convicted before a justice of the peace in violation of the first section of the Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Sm. L. 177, Purdon 4485, and in accordance with the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 321, fixing the fine at $25 in this county he was sentenced to pay a fine of that amount. The justice assuming that the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 315, governed, included this fine in his quarterly return and it was paid to the treasurer of Allegheny County. The Commonwealth contends that under Section 6 of the Act of May 15, 1850, P. L. 772, Purdon 4489, the fine should have been paid into the State treasury for the use of the sinking fund, made a demand, and the case stated submits the question for the opinion of the court. Under the Act of 1794 one moiety of the forfeiture was to be paid to the prosecutor and the other to the overseers of the poor of the city, borough or township, but the sixth section of the Act of May 15, 1850, provided "That the penalty inflicted by the first section of the Act of Assembly entitled, 'An Act for the prevention of vice and immorality and unlawful gaming and to restrain disorderly sports and dissipation,' shall hereafter be paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the use of the sinking fund." This reference is to the Act of 1794 and the sinking fund is that of the Commonwealth. It is conceded by counsel for the County that the sixth section aforesaid was not changed by the local statute of 1855, this question having been riecided in the case of Allegheny County vs. Com., 1 Mona., 199. The question now raised that the County is entitled to the fine by the 78th and 79th sections of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, Purdon 1048, known as the Criminal Code, was not raised or passed upon in the case above referred to. That act is entitled, "An Act to consolidated, revise and amend the laws of this Commonwealth relating to penal proceedings and pleadings," and section 78 is, "All fines imposed upon any party by any court of criminal jurisdiction shall be decreed to be paid to the Commonwealth; but the same shall be collected and received for the use of the respective counties in which such fines shall have been imposed as aforesaid as is now directed by law. Section 79 is, "The following named Acts of Assembly and parts thereof and all other parts of the criminal laws of this State and forms of procedure relative thereto, so far as the same are altered and subject to the act to consolidate and revise the penal laws of this Commonwealth, be and the same are hereby repealed." It is contended that the Act of 1860 repeals the Act of 1850, both being general acts and inconsistent with each other. The Act of 1850 is not enumerated and counsel for the Commonwealth refers us to the case of Jefferson County vs. Reitz, 56 Pa., 44, in support of his contention that the former act is not repealed by implication. It was |