[Jones v. N. O. & S. R. R. Co. and Im. Asso.] dered intrinsically worthless; it would be unjust to compel the owner to accept as compensation its intrinsic value in that condition. That result would necessarily be reached, if the valuation of the land was, under such circumstances, to be made as of the time when the condemnation was effected." The value of the land when taken, before the construction of the road, and before any injury to the land taken resulting from construction, and the injury, the diminution in value of the contiguous lands, is the true and just measure of compensation. Lyon v. G. B. & M. R. R. Co., supra. Delays in condemnation may occur, from many causes, and may result from the mere negligence of the corporation. The land-owner can always quicken it into diligence, and prevent any other loss or injury, than that for which compensation must be paid. Such delays, it may be, would often find encouragement, if the period of condemnation was fixed as the time of assessing the compensation, when by the taking the value of the land may have been, if not destroyed, materially reduced. On the other hand, the delay of the land-owner to compel compensation would be encouraged, if he could claim that it should include the value of the structures which have been erected on the lands. In neither claim is there right or justice, and neither comes within the letter or spirit of just compensation, which the constitution requires shall be made before or concurrently with the taking of the land. The land-owner is entitled to the value of the lands at the time of the taking and appropriation, whether the damages are assessed, as they should be, by condemnation proceedings, before the entry for the purposes of constructing the road, or subsequently, after there has been an actual taking and appropriation, without such proceedings, and without making payment of compensation. So, he is entitled, as of the same time, to the injury to his contiguous lands. It is this measure of compensation the constitution requires shall be paid before or concurrently with the taking. Interest upon these sums should, generally, in a case like the present, be computed. The liability for interest is not now presented, and it may be that there are circumstances connected with this case which would render the payment of interest inequitable. More than this measure of compensation the land-owner is not entitled to receive. When it is paid, the land, with all the structures thereon placed, will pass to the appellee. There is no error in the rulings of the City Court, and the judgment is affirmed. [Steele v. Brown; Mastin v. Brown.] Steele v. Brown; Mastin v. Brown. Bills in Equity by Widow, for Assignment of Dower. 1. Widow's right to dower; proof of husband's siezin during coverture. Under a bill by the widow to obtain an assignment of dower in lands of which the husband is alleged to have been seized and possessed during coverture, if the seizin of the husband is denied, it must be affirmatively proved by the demandant; and although strict proof is not required, where the defendant is in possession under the husband, or claims under him through mesne conveyances, yet it is not sufficient to prove a purchase by the husband at administrator's sale, without proof of title in the decedent, and possession under the purchase, or that the defendant held under the husband, mediately or immediately. 2. Allotment of dower by metes and bounds; rents and profits.-When dower is allotted to the widow by metes and bounds, rents and profits should be awarded from the filing of the bill, and not from the death of the husband; nor should the allotment be made by metes and bounds, when the lands were sold under execution against the husband, and valuable improvements have since been erected on them. APPEALS from the Chancery Court of Madison. The bills in these two cases were each filed on 17th July, 1880, by Mrs. Elizabeth Brown, as the widow of William Brown, deceased, against James W. Steele and Celia Mastin, respectively; and sought an assignment of dower in two lots, of which the defendants were respectively in possession, and of which the said Williain Brown was alleged to have been seized and possessed during his coverture with the complainant, with rents, or mesne profits. It was proved that the complainant and said William Brown were married, in Tennessee, in 1836, and soon after removed to Madison county, Alabama, where they resided until the death of said William Brown, which occurred in September, 1877; that the lots in which dower was claimed, each containing about a half-acre, more or less, were parts of a larger lot containing about two and a half acres, which was sold and conveyed to said Brown, by John W. Eldridge, as the administrator of the estate of R. C. Rathbone, deceased, by deed dated the 12th March, 1846; and that said lot was sold, under execution at law against said William Brown, some time prior to the year 1856, the precise date not being shown. Each of the defendants filed an answer to the bill, requiring proof of its allegations, and denying seizin of the lots by the said William Brown; each alleged that, since the sale of the entire premises under execution against him, valuable im 70 235 98 149 [Steele v. Brown; Mastin v. Brown.] provements had been erected on each of the lots; and each claimed title under mesne conveyances from Wilson & Herstein, who entered into possession in June, 1867, under a conveyance from Joseph P. Doyle and wife. On final hearing, on pleadings and proof, the chancellor held the complainant entitled to relief in each case, and appointed commissioners to allot her dower by metes and bounds in each lot; and also held her entitled to one-third of the rents from the death of her husband, and ordered a reference to the register to ascertain the amount. The chancellor's decree, and each part thereof, are now assigned as error. CABANISS & WARD, for the appellants. WALKER & SHELBY, contra. STONE, J.-These two cases are substantially identical in law and in fact, and we propose to decide them together. To obtain dower, it was necessary for the complainant to allege and prove her marriage, legal or complete equitable seizin of the husband during the coverture, and the death of the husband. The first and third of these propositions are proved. Is the proof of seizin sufficient? The averment of seizin, or title, being put in issue, it became necessary to prove it. After the answers of Mrs. Brown to the fifth and sixth interrogatories were suppressed, the proof of this material averment was insufficient. True, in Scribner on Dower, vol. 2, 199, it is said: "It is well settled, that the demandant in dower is not required to make strict proof of her husband's title, under the issue of non seizin." But he explains what he means by making strict proof. He says: "Where the defendant is in possession under a conveyance from the husband, or by virtue of a title derived through mesne conveyances from him, proof of this fact is sufficient to establish, as against the defendant, the seizin of the husband. So, also, proof that the husband of the demandant was in possession during the coverture, claiming title, or that he was in receipt of rents from the person in possession, is prima facie sufficient evidence of seizin, to warrant a recovery against one whose possession commenced subsequently thereto; and unless impeached or explained, such possession is conclusive evidence of title." Now, conceding that Mrs. Brown, the demandant, is not required "to make strict proof of her husband's title," the proof in the present record falls very far short of each of the illustrations which this author gives. It is not shown that "the defendant is in possession under a conveyance from the husband, or by virtue of a title derived through mesne conveyances from him." There is no attempt to trace a chain of title from the purchaser at {Maas & Block v. Long.] sheriff's sale, down to the defendant. Nor is there proof that Mr. Brown, husband of the demandant, "was in possession during the coverture, claiming title, or that he was in receipt of rents from the person in possession." And, we may add, there is no proof that Rathbone, whose title Brown purchased, had any title to the lands, or had ever been in possession, claiming title. Either of these lines of proof, supplementing the proof found in the record, would have made a prima facie case for the demandant. And, we may add, such proof would make a prima facie case that the title had been in Mr. Brown as alleged, in any suit affecting the title to the property. In a suit by A against B, it is enough for A to prove that he and B trace title to the same source, and that A's claim is paramount or superior to that of B. Not necessary in that case to prove title in the common source, under whom each litigant claims.-Pollard v. Cocke, 19 Ala. 188. So, prior possession, claiming title, or exercising acts of ownership, is good against any one not showing a paramount title, unless barred or estopped under some other principle of law.-1 Brick. Dig. 627, $$ 39, 40; 1b. 628, $54; Anderson v. Melear, 56 Ala. 621. The proof of seizin in these cases falls short of each of these requirements. Dower being allotted by metes and bounds, there was also error in awarding the demandant rents or profits from the death of the husband. It should have been computed from the filing. of the bill. Nor was this a case for allotment by metes and bounds. Beavers v. Smith, 11 Ala. 20; Slatter v. Meek, 35 Ala. 528. Dower being demandable, in these cases, of the value of the premises, irrespective of improvements placed there by the purchasers, they fall within the principles declared in Wood v. Morgan, 56 Åla. 497. Reversed and remanded. Maas & Block v. Long. Bill in Equity by Sureties on Forfeited Claim Bond, for Injunction of Judgments, and Adjustment of Priorities. 1. Forfeited replery and claim bonds; amount of judgment and execution on. Construing in pari materia the several statutes relating to summary judgments and executions on forfeited replevy and claim bonds (Code, §§ 3215, 3290-91, 3344), the court holds, that when a claim is interposed by a stranger, and bond given to try the right to property on which an attachment has been levied, and the claim suit is decided against the claimant, and the bond returned forfeited, the execution against the obligors should be, as when similar proceedings are had in reference to [Maas & Block v. Long.] property on which an execution has been levied, for the assessed value of the property, but not exceeding the amount of the plaintiff's judgment, together with the damages and costs; and that execution on a forfeited bond issues for the whole amount of the judgment and costs, without regard to the assessed value of the property, only when the property levied on is replevied by the defendant in execution or attachment. 2. Same; equitable relief to sureties against judgments.-Three several attachments, in favor of different plaintiffs, having been levied on successive days on the same stock of goods, and a claim interposed in each case by the same person, and bonds given for the trial of the right of property, with the same sureties, and conditioned as required by law; and the claim suits having been decided against the claimant, and judgments recovered by the plaintiffs in each attachment, the aggregate amount of the judginents being more than twice the assessed value of the property, though each judgment was for less than that value; and the bonds being returned forfeited, judgments were rendered against the obligors for the amount of the judgment in each case; held, that the sureties on the bond, not being concluded by the judgments, might maintain a bill in equity to adjust the priorities of the attaching creditors, and to settle their liability in the several cases. APPEAL from the City Court of Selma, sitting in Equity. Heard before the Hon. JONA. HARALSON. The bill in this case was filed on the 21st March, 1881, by Jacob Long and Herman Long, against the persons composing the several mercantile firms of Maas & Block, Bernstein & Co., Lienkauff & Strauss, Block Brothers & Co., and against Benjamin F. Long, as the assignee of said Bernstein & Co.; and sought equitable relief against several judgments, which were rendered, according to the allegations of the bill, under the following circumstances: On the 4th December, 1878, Bernstein & Co. sued out an attachment against one Albert Steiner, which was levied by the sheriff, on the same day, on a stock of goods as the property of said Steiner; on the 5th December, Maas & Block sued out an attachment against Steiner, and it was levied by the sheriff on the same stock of goods, which were then in his possession under the former levy; and on the next day, December 6th, Lienkauff & Strauss sued out an åttachment against said Steiner, which was levied by the sheriff on the same goods. These attachments were all returnable to then next term of the Circuit Court of Hale county, and were so returned, with the levies thereon indorsed. On the 12th December, 1878, while the goods were in the possession of the sheriff of Dallas county, under the said attachment levies, a claim was interposed to them by Block Brothers & Co., under an alleged purchase from Steiner made on the 3d December, the day before the first attachment was levied; and they made affidavit, and gave bond for the trial of the right of property, with the complainants, J. & H. Long, as their sureties. A claim was interposed, an affidavit made, and a bond given in each of these cases. The bonds are not set out, but the bill alleged that they were "in double |