[Collins v. The State.] counties therein specified, it would be legal to organize it as drawn, although the organization should take place subsequent to the date of the special act. In other words, the act in question was not intended to be retroactive, so as to affect the validity of any drawing which had taken place under the general law. Affirmed. Collins v. The State. Indictment for Betting at Cards at Public Place. 1. Sufficiency of indictment.-In an indictment for betting at a game of cards played in a public place, or other game prohibited by the statute (Code, § 4209); Form No. 29, p. 994), it is not necessary to specify the thing bet, nor to state its value. 2. Same.-Fractional currency of the United States, issued by authority of law, having the uses and purposes of money, an averment that such currency was bet, being equivalent to an averment that money was bet, is sufficient; and the additional words, "of a value and denomination to said jurors unknown," may be rejected as surplusage. FROM the Circuit Court of St. Clair. Tried before the Hon. LEROY F. BOX. The indictment in this case charged that the defendant, John Collins, "bet fractional currency of the United States, of a value and denomination to said jurors unknown, or other thing of value also unknown, at a game played with cards, or dice, or other substitute or device for cards or dice, at a tavern, inn," &c. The defendant demurred to the indictment, on these grounds: 1st, "because the value and denomination of the fractional currency of the United States, in said indictment alleged to have been bet by defendant, is not averred;" 2d, "because the denomination or value of any thing, in said indictment alleged to have been bet by defendant, is not averred;" 3d, "that said indictment is defective by reason of its failure to aver the denomination and value of the fractional currency of the United States, or other thing of value" The overruling of this demurrer is the only matter here presented for revision. J. F. OSBORN, for the appellant. H. C. TOMPKINS, Attorney-General, for the State, cited [Thomason v. The State.] Jacobson v. The State, 55 Ala. 150; Mitchell v. State, 55 Ala. 160; Code, SS 4789-90. BRICKELL, C. J.-The offense charged in the indictment, or intended to be charged, is the betting of money, bank-notes, or other thing of value, at a game with cards, or dice, or a substitute for either cards or dice, played at one of the places prohibited by the statute.--Code of 1876, 4209. The form of indictment prescribed by the statute does not contain an averment of the thing bet, or of its value. A mere general averment that the defendant bet at a gaming-table, or at a game called keno, or at a game played with cards or dice, or a device or substitute therefor, at one of the places where such playing is unlawful, is sufficient. The averment in the present indictment, that the thing bet was fractional currency of the United States, the denomination and value of which was unknown to the grand jury," or other thing of value," can well be rejected as mere surplusage. Without such averment, the indictment would have been sufficient.-Jacobson v. State, 55 Ala. 151; Mitchell v. State, Ib. 160. Fractional currency of the United States, issued by authority of an act of Congress, was intended for circulation, and had the uses and properties of money. The averment that it was bet is, therefore, the equivalent of an averment of the betting of money; and its denomination and value is not an ingredient of the offense. Whether the amount was large or small, the offense was complete. The only matter which is reserved for the consideration of this court is the sufficiency of the indictment; and that charged the offense designated by the statute. Affirmed. Thomason v. The State. Indictment for Selling Spirituous Liquors without License. 1. Selling spirituous liquors without revenue license; sale by physician, or for medical purposes.-The statute which prohibits the sale of spirituous liquors without a revenue license (Code, § 4204; Sess Acts 1878-9, p. 71) contains no exception of a sale for medicinal purposes by the family physician of the purchaser, who knew that the purchaser's wife was in delicate health; and if the statute contained such an exception, proof that the purchaser procured the liquor "for the purpose of making camphor, and that it was used in his family," the seller being his family physician, and knowing that his wife was in delicate health, would not bring the case within the exception, it not being shown that the seller [Thomason v. The State.] had prescribed the liquor for camphor, or knew the purpose for which it was intended, nor that it was in fact so used. 2. When appeal lies.-An appeal can not be taken in a criminal case, when the record does not show that judgment was rendered on the verdict. From the Circuit Court of Blount. Tried before the Hon. LEROY F. BOX. The indictment in this case, which was found at the September term, 1880, contained two counts; the first charging that the defendant, "before the finding of this indictment, sold vinous or spirituous liquors without license, and contrary to law;" and the second, that the defendant, "not having first procured a license as a retailer from the proper legal authority under the revenue law, did sell vinous or spirituous liquors, which was drunk on or about the premises, against the peace," &c. The bill of exceptions states, that the defendant pleaded not guilty, "and trial was thereupon had on both counts contained in the indictment." On the trial, as the bill of exceptions further states, "the State introduced one William Noble as a witness, who testified, in substance, that in said county of Blount, within twelve months before the finding of the indictment, he obtained from defendant some whiskey, a pint or half-pint, and paid him for it. Said witness further testified, in substance, on cross-examination by defendant, that defendant was, at the time witness obtained the liquor from him, a regular practicing physician, and was then the regular family physician of witness; that witness' wife was at the time in delicate health, and this fact was known to defendant as such physician; that he obtained the liquor for the purpose of making camphor, and wanted it for that purpose, and that it was used by his family. On motion of the solicitor, the court excluded from the jury all the evidence above stated, on cross-examination of said, witness; and to this action defendant excepted." The record further shows, that the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and assessed a fine of $50 against the defendant. "Whereupon," as the judgment entry recites, "the defendant, with Thomas J. Griffith and Erastus P. Puckett as his sureties, in open court confesses judg ment in favor of the State of Alabama, for the said fine of fifty dollars, and the costs of this prosecution; and it is therefore considered by the court, that the State of Alabama, for the use of Blount county, have and recover judgment against the said William L. Thomason, Thomas J. Griffith, and Erastus P. Puckett, for the said fine of fifty dollars and costs of prosecution, by them so confessed; for which let execution issue. But, the defendant having reserved questions of law for the consideration of the Supreme Court, the judgment is suspended, under section 4981 of the Code of 1876," &c. [Thomason v. The State.] HAMILL & DICKINSON, for appellant. II. C. TOMPKINS, Attorney-General, for the State. STONE, J.-The defendant was indicted under section 4202 of the Code of 1876, as amended December 3d, 1878.-Pamph. Acts, 1878-9, page 71. The only exception reserved was to the refusal of the court to allow the defendant to make certain proof. We think there was no error in this. The testimony offered proved nothing material. The substance of it was, that the seller was a practicing physician, and the family physician of the buyer; "that he [the buyer] obtained the liquor for the purpose of making camphor; that he wanted it for that purpose; that the liquor was used by his family;" and "that the wife of the witness [the buyer] was at the time in delicate health, and this was known to defendant as such physician." We suppose the purpose of this testimony was, to raise the inference that the liquor-a half-pint-was wanted for medicinal use, was so used, and that this was under the sanction and advice of the family physician, who himself made the sale. The statute contains no such exception; and if it did, the testimony would not tend to raise such inference. The testimony fails to affirm that the physician was informed of the use for which it was wanted, and therefore it could not be inferred he prescribed its use, or would have prescribed it, if he had known the purpose of the purchase. Nor does the testimony tend to show that the liquor was used in making camphor. That the liquor "was used by the family," does not conduce to show in what particular form it was used. There is, however, a defect in the present record, which for bids us to decide this case on the merits. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, but no judgment of the court was pronounced on that verdict. There is, consequently, no final judgment in the court below, which will authorize us to review the rulings. This omission can probably be remedied by judgment nunc pro tunc. Appeal dismissed. [Henderson v. The State.] Henderson v. The State. Indictment for Burglary. 1. Sufficiency of indictment, in description of building, goods, &c.—In an indictment for burglary in breaking and entering a house "in which any goods, merchandise, or other valuable thing, is kept for use, sale. or deposit" (Code, § 4343), if any thing else than goods or merchandise is alleged to have been kept, it must be alleged to be valuable; but an averment that "goods or merchandise were kept for use," &c., is sufficient without any additional averment of value, and shows with sufficient certainty that the goods were there kept at the time of the alleged burglary. 2. Competency of co-defendants as witnesses for each other.-When two persons are jointly indicted, neither is a competent witness for or against the other, unless there has been an order of severance, a nolle-prosequi, or a verdict of acquittal entered in favor of the one offered as a witness; and one who has pleaded guilty, but against whom no judgment has been rendered, is not, within this rule, competent to testify for the other. 3. Recent possession of stolen property, and declarations explanatory thereof.-The possession of stolen goods, or other fruits of crime, recently after the commission of the offense, is prima facie guilty possession; yet, if the accused, when first found in the possession of such property, and before he has had an opportunity to fabricate evidence exculpatory of himself, gives a reasonable and probable account of the manner in which he acquired the possession, such evidence should always be allowed to go to the jury, as tending to rebut the presumption of guilt which might otherwise arise. "This principle has not always been observed in the past decisions of this court-notably in the case of Taylor v. The State, 42 Ala. 529; and, perhaps, in Maynard v. The State, 46 Ala. 85." 4. Same.-Under an indictment for burglary, the prosecution having proved that a valise, part of the property stolen from the house at the time the offense was committed, was found in the defendant's house a short time afterwards, while the defendant's evidence tended to show that he was in Georgia when the alleged burglary was committed; held, that it was permissible for him to prove, by a witness who was present, "that on his return home, and so soon as he first discovered the valise, he asked his wife, Whose valise is that? and how came it here?" FROM the Circuit Court of Talladega. WM. IVEY, for the appellant. H. C. TOMPKINS, Attorney-General, for the State. SOMERVILLE, J.--The indictment in this case is for the crime of burglary, as defined and prohibited by section 4343 of the Code of 1876. It charges that, before the finding of the |