that the attached assumptions are appropriate to our own political analysis. No matter how rigorous their structure or intuitively appealing their assumptions. models can not perform the crucial analysis themselves, any more than computer routines based on models can substitute for human thought. Political scientists must give great care to constructing models useful to their purposes and interpreting the results so as to illuminate the political process outside the models.

[APPENDIX 12]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL BROCK, CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the distinguished Committee, I am Bill Brock. Chairman of the Republican National Committee, which is comprised of members elected by party professionals in each of the states. Each represent their states in a federation of the 50 state Republican parties.

It is a pleasure to share with you the views of the Republican National Committee concerning S.J. Res. 1, proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for direct popular election of the President and Vice President of the United States.

On April 30, 1977, the Republican National Committee met in Chicago and, by unanimous vote, adopted a resolution recording its "firm opposition" to modification of the Nation's present electoral system, including that proposed in S.J. Res. 1.

That resolution said in part: "Whereas, The American political system has served this country well with two hundred years of enviable political stability maintained by the grass roots political participation of its citizens, . . . and . . . Whereas, The changes in our election system proposed by President Carter would, . . . federalize our elections process, undermiine our two-party system and weaken the role of the States; . . . Now Therefore Be It Resolved, That the Republican National Committee hereby records its firm opposition to such ill-advised modification of the current electoral system . . .”

These are the portions of the resolution pertinent to S.J. Res. 1. Other portions relate to legislative proposals not the subject of this present hearing. The position of the Republican National Committee is clear and unequivocal. We oppose S.J. Res. 1.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to us that the thrust of this Committee's hearing on S.J. Res. I has been misdirected. Any objective view, particularly with regard to a proposed Amendment to the Constitution, would suggest that the burden of proof should rest with the advocates of such change. Proponents should be required to prove that there is a clear need for their proposed Amendment; that it would clearly and beyond doubt improve and enhance the political process of our Nation; and that refusal to incorporate it in our Constitution would cause a continuation of a situation in which a substantial number of our citizens are specifically wronged in specific ways.

That case has not been made by the advocates and sponsors of S.J. Res. 1nor can it be. Unfortunately, because of the quadrennial rebirth of proposals such as S.J. Res. 1, the public's perception of the issue has shifted in such a manner as to place the burden of proof on the defenders of that which S.J. Res. 1 would abolish-the Electoral College system. That has been done largely through misstatement of fact, inaccurate citation of history, and the creation of a straw-man that poses a risk that has never materialized-the electoral college victory, of a President who clearly failed to achieve plurality of the popular vote.

The fact of the matter, Mr. Chairman, is that the Electoral College system has worked and worked well for this Nation. While proponents of S.J. Res. 1 have failed to make the necessary case for the change, a good case can be made for retention of the Electoral College; so good a case, in fact, that it can be said that the present system, with one possible exception, has never failed us.

Advocates of S.J. Res. 1 cite the elections of 1824, 1876 and 1888 as breakdowns in the Electoral College system, as elections in which the will of the majority was thwarted by the Electoral College system.

The eminent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has a different view of those elections. In an article, entitled "The Electoral College Conundrum," in the April 4. 1977, editions of The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Schlesinger wrote in part: "As for President Carter's three second-choice Presidents, two of his cases

in 1824 and 1876-had little to do with the Electoral College. Eighteen-twentyfour is no test of the present system since that system did not exist in 1824, when there were no parties, no popular vote in six states and no unit electoral vote in six others. In any event, it was the House of Representatives, not the Electoral College, that put in Adams over Jackson. In 1876, Tilden had a majority in the Electoral College; it was a rigged electoral commission that put in Hayes."

Mr. Chairman, in 1824, by best estimates, only 350,000 votes were cast for President, with Jackson achieving about 150,000, a plurality. With no popular vote in six states where legislatures made the decision, it's anybody's guess which candidate was "the people's choice."

In 1876, Tilden is said to have had a popular vote majority of 250,000 over Hayes. Election fraud was rampant. Electors' credentials were challenged in at least 10 states. It is impossible now to determine what the actual popular vote was. Again, it's anybody's guess which candidate was "the people's choice." "In short," Schlesinger adds, "there has been only one occasion in American history where the Electoral College denied the popular-vote winner the presidency. That was in the dead heat election of 1888 when neither candidate received a majority and the gap between them was only 91,000 votes."

In the election of 1888, Harrison received 47.9 percent of the vote, while Cleveland got 48.6 percent. Neither had a majority. It is difficult, it seems to me, to portray either as "the people's choice" when more than 50 percent of the voters cast ballots against each of them and widespread fraud further clouded the credibility of vote tallies.

In short, with the arguable exception of the election of 1888, the popular vote winner has been the Electoral College winner in every instance in which popular vote totals are reliable.

This is overwhelming evidence that the Electoral College system works. Indeed, it makes it clear that S.J. Res. 1, which would permit inauguration of a "40 percent President," could create a situation far worse than the "specters" raised by its proponents.

S.J. Res. 1 would permit the seating of a candidate for President and a candidate for Vice President who got 40 percent or more of the vote; otherwise, the top two candidates for each office would meet in a "run-off" election. This hardly diminishes the danger of "electing" a minority President and Vice President. Indeed, the danger is compounded.

S.J. Res. 1 would transform the danger in the electoral college system, which is implicit and unlikely-the election of a minority President-into a danger which is both explicit and probable.

Last year, under the present primary system, there were 17 candidates who qualified for ballot positions across the Nation. Many of them fell by the wayside before the national conventions of the Republican and Democratic Parties. Others represented "third" and "splinter" parties. Only two candidates had a chance of election-those nominated by the two major parties.

It is conceivable, in a system established by S.J. Res. 1, that a runoff election could be held between the "high two" candidates, each with less than 40 percent of the popular vote. This is far from unlikely because third-party and "splinter" candidates, encouraged to stay in the race because of the public financing of presidential elections, could deny major-party candidates the needed 40 percent. It is easy to visualize such splinter candidates subsequently attempting to broker the runoff election-in effect, putting the White House up for sale. These are not implied dangers, such as those raised about the Electoral College by the proponents of S.J. Res. 1. They are dangers written into the proposed Amendment, the presence of which is evident from logical assessment. Senate Joint Resolution 1, if adopted, would destroy the two-party system in the United States

Broadly based moderate parties-and only two such parties-have emerged from the logical dictates of the Electoral College system. It imposes on a candidate for President the necessity of achieving a deliberate consensus of the body politic: not a majority or plurality of the popular vote, which could be achieved in major urban areas alone, but a majority of majorities in a variety of statesa broad spectrum of support throughout the population instead of narrow class or regional backing. It represents, in electoral terms, the reflection of our federal system of government.

To win, a presidential candidate must attain not just a simple majority, but a national majority of state majorities. Regional, sectional or narrowly ideological candidates have not potential for victory except in their narrow home base.

"But," columnist George Will has said, "under direct eection a candidate 'could' sweep Alaska's 231,000 eligible voters, lose 49 states by an average of 4,700 votes, and win."

The prospect is unlikely that such a result would occur, about as unlikely as those envisioned by direct election's advocates.

The Electoral College promoted moderate, stable politics in the United States. It has made it rightly necessary for presidential candidates to seek broad support. As distinct from the situation in parliamentary systems, where postelection compromise is necessary in order to form a government, the electoral college system requires that compromise be worked out within our parties before the elections. It has made it mandatory that presidential aspirants disclose their programs and make their commitments before the people vote.

In 1968, Governor George Wallace's American Indendent Party candidacy won approximately 10 percent of the popular vote and 46 electoral votes from Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana and North Carolina. As was noted by this Committee's minority in 1971, the decisive point is not what might have happened in that election; i.e., that Wallace might have deprived Nixon or Humphrey of an Electoral College majority. The decisive point is what did happen: Wallace was shown to be a regional candidate and Nixon got a majority in the Electoral College.

The Democratic Party is no less threatened by S.J. Res. I than is the Republican Party. If this proposed resolution becomes part of the Constitution the power of other parties would be increased and the power of the two major parties would be greatly diminished, if not extinguished. The birth of a multiple-party system-with all its snarls of ad hoc coalitions and pre-occupation with narrow short-range issues-would become inevitable, leading this Nation to the political stagnation we have seen in other countries.

S.J. Res. 1, if adopted, would reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the States as political entities in the United States, converting them instead into mere administrative and organizational arms of a central government.

Mr. Chairman, your Committee already has heard evidence that, on the basis of 1968 vote totals, direct election of the President and Vice President would have increased the ballot strength of the 15 states with the largest populations solely because of greater voter turnout. The ballot strength of the remaining 35 states would have been reduced, not on the basis of population as is the present Electoral College criterion, but rather on the shaky basis of how many people go to the polls on a date certain.

In addition, delegates to the Republican and Democratic National Conventions represent their states in the process of nominating candidates for President and Vice President. Direct election for these two offices could destroy this role of states as states in the selection process. It is likely that party conventions would be abandoned as a means of nominating candidates and national primaries would take their place, a further erosion of the role of states.

Advocates of S.J. Res. 1 note the complexity and awkwardness of the Electoral College system in attempting to further their argument. It certainly is complex and awkward, often clumsy, but those are its virtues rather than its shortcomings. It is because of its complexity, its awkwardness and its clumsiness that the will of the people has been protected. The Electoral College system is virtually impossible to "fix."

which direct-election ballot returns pour into a central location for countingOn the other hand, consider the temptation to corruption under a system in and inevitability under S.J. Res. 1, according to testimony by the late Professor Alexander Bickel. The potential for fraud-for "stealing the White House"-is enormous. As Professor Bickel observed. “Honest men,' when centrally in charge of a computer in Washington, may be under even stronger temptation than honest men in this or that county."

The "faithless elector" problem raised by S.J. Res. 1 proponents is one easily solved without resort to constitutional amendment. States can make the change. Simply eliminate electors and cast the Electoral College votes in accordance with each state's returns.

Mr. Chairman, in closing may I point out again that the Electoral College system has worked and worked well for us, and that abolishing it will alter our political process in America in ways we cannot fully predict.

In his Wall Street Journal article, Professor Schlesinger quoted Lord Salisbury as saying long ago: "A violent isolated artificial improvement in the institutions of a community, undertaken without regard to the condition of the other portions of the machinery in concert with which it is to work, is a danger so great that no improvement at all is almost to be preferred."

We have been lately reminded of the way rural Georgians say the same thing: "You don't fix something unless it's broken." Such is the case here. We oppose S. J. Res. 1.

[APPENDIX 14]

[From the Centennial Post, Dec. 31, 1876]

TILDEN? HAYES?-SOUTH HOLDS KEY-COMMISSION MAY RULE

DEEP SPLITS LIE AHEAD

The nation ends its centennial year tonight not knowing the identity of its next President. Will 1877 see Democrat Samuel J. Tilden of New York as President of the United States? Or will it be Republican Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio? Two weeks ago the House and Senate appointed special committees to count disputed electoral votes resulting from November's presidential election. The committees, which have not met, will consider the disposition of contested votes in four states. Three of these states are still under military rule in the South, and their post-war governments are Republican dominated.

A total of 20 electoral votes are at issue. Eight are in Louisiana; seven are in South Carolina, four in Florida, and one in Oregon. According to the contested count Tilden is ahead with 184 votes; Hayes has 165. To be declared the winner and the next President, Tilden needs to pick up only a single vote; Hayes, however, must sweep all 20 disputed votes to become chief executive.

Meantime teams of Republican and Democratic "visiting statesmen" have been sent to the three southern states in question to monitor the vote counts and to investigate alleged election irregularities. This has only intensified the dispute. The outcome may well revolve around what role, if any, the House is permitted to play in the ultimate electoral vote count. That body has had a Democratic majority since the off-year elections of 1874, for the first time since before the

war.

The Constitution requires that the President of the Senate, Republican Thomas W. Ferry of Michigan, in the presence of members of both Congressional houses "open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted" Republicans in control of the Senate argue that this language makes their leader, Ferry, the arbiter should returns from a state be questioned. But Democratic House leaders fear that Ferry would rule on disputes on a straight party basis, and they are demanding an alternative.

A joint committee of the two houses is also considering the creation of an electoral commission consisting of five senators, five representatives and five justices of the Supreme Court. Such a commission would have final authority to accept or reject electoral vote tallies from the states in dispute.

The Democrats would then select three of the five House members, the Republicans three of the Senate members. Two justices would have Republican affiliations, and two would have Democratic affiliations. The pivotal joint committee member would probably be a recognized independent from the Court-Associate Justice David Davis.

Republican Sen. Roscoe Conkling of New York has proposed the commission which will probably gather bipartisan support. Democrats feel that such a commission would not be so partisan as to give all 20 disputed votes to Hayes, and the Democrat, Tilden, needs only one vote to be declared winner.

According to the Democratic count November 7's election gave Tilden a popularvote lead of 254,235 seeming to assure him 204 electoral votes to 165 for Hayes. It appeared that Tilden had carried the entire South.

Republicans, however, are still in control of state governments in South Carolina, Louisiana and Florida. When it became apparent that their candidate needed victory, party leaders arranged to give Hayes a majority in each of these states. These electoral votes plus the one in Oregon certain to go to Hayes, would give the Republican standard-bearer the necessary 185 votes and the presidency. Democrats, outraged, have turned to Washington and the Congress to settle the dispute this after a fall campaign marked by unusual bitterness and invective. The two candidates entered the campaign as the nation was both celebrating its 100th birthday, and wallowing in governmental corruption. A Civil War, years of Reconstruction, the scandals of President Ulysses S. Grant's administration, and now a presidential election in doubt . . . These are some of the specters at the nation's centennial birthday party.

Hayes was selected by Republicans as Ohio's favorite son on the seventh ballot at the Cincinnati convention. His closest competitor was James G. Blaine of Maine.