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requested that the IPCC provide information regarding the vulnerability of economic sectors, ecological systems, and other resources in major regions of the world. The special report on Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability describes the extent to which these sectors, systems, and resources would be affected by a range of potential changes in climate. The approach used in the assessment is to first evaluate how a given hypothetical change in climate would affect the output of a particular system, e.g., crop yields. Second, the assessment evaluates the adaptation options that are available to reduce any negative effects or capitalize of potentially beneficial ones. Finally, these estimates of sensitivity and adaptability are combined to develop an overall sense of the vulnerability of the system in the region. As the report states, the results are not predictions of impacts but assessments regarding how vulnerable different regions may be to climate change. This information is useful to planners and resource managers as they prepare to adapt to future climate change.

In fact it is important to note that some regional impact projections are quite robust, e.g., (i) a decrease in agricultural output is projected in Africa and Latin America when agricultural models are coupled to the output of a wide range of climate models; (ii) the incidence of vector-borne diseases is projected to increase in the tropics and sub-tropics; (iii) forest species are projected to be displaced polewards; and (iv) sea level rise is projected to displace tens of millions of people from low-lying deltaic areas and Small Island States.

Temperature Record

Q17. There seems to be some disagreement regarding interpretation of the historical temperature record between you and Dr. Michaels. You testified that, “If you actually go back before... to 1860, the 1900s, 1910s were particularly cold so this somewhat distorts the increase between 1900 and 1940 ..." Yet, later in the discussion you suggested that the record from 1860 to the early 1900s was "constant." Dr. Michaels also agreed that the temperature during this period was constant, but disagreed with your characterization of the record from this period (quoted above). It would appear, based on the data in Figure 3.3 (page 143) of the 1995 IPCC report, The Science of Climate Change, that the temperature from 1860 to about 1915, when temperature began to increase consistently, was indeed relatively constant, fluctuating between -0.2°C and -0.5°C relative to the 1961-1990 average. Could you please elucidate on the point you were trying to make?

A17. The point I was making was that the period between 1900 and 1920 is somewhat colder than most of the period between 1860 and 1920 by about 0.2 degrees Centigrade, while the period around 1940 is slightly warmer by about 0.1 degrees Centigrade than the decades before and after (Figure 8 on page 26 of the 1995 IPCC report, The Science of Climate Change). A number of global warming skeptics, including Dr. Michaels, have argued that most of the temperature increase over the last 100 years occurred prior to 1940. I was pointing out that this is only true if one takes the temperature difference between 1940 and 1910 (a difference of about 0.5 degrees Centigrade). If one takes the

difference between the 1930 to 1950 average and the 1860 to 1920 average, the difference is only about 0.2 degrees Centigrade. The skeptics also argue that there was little change in greenhouse gas concentrations pre-1940 hence the observed changes in temperature cannot be attributed to the greenhouse effect. However, a careful examination of the changing in radiative forcing shows that about 35% of the radiative forcing occurred before 1940, hence contributing to an enhanced greenhouse effect prior to 1940.

FCCC Article 2

Q18. Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change states: "The ultimate objective of this Convention . . . is to achieve ... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."

Q18.1. How is this level to be determined?

A18.1. The Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, informed by the latest scientific, technical and economic information, should determine both the appropriate stabilization level and the most appropriate pathway to stabilization. In addition, national policymakers should determine the appropriate choice of technologies, policies and practices that most suit their national circumstances.

The IPCC has already published two comprehensive assessments and a number of technical papers and special reports that can assist policymakers in this critical task. The IPCC Third Assessment Report will, like the first two assessment reports, be comprehensive, policy relevant, but not policy prescriptive. As discussed in the answer to question 2.1, the Third Assessment Report will include a Synthesis Report specifically designed to provide scientific, technical and economic information relevant to key policy-relevant questions. For example, the Synthesis Report could address the following questions related to assessing the most appropriate stabilization level;

What are the climatic, impact and economic consequences of different stabilization
levels of greenhouse gases and what are the technologies, policies and measures
that can be used (and at what cost) to realize different stabilization levels? For
each stabilization level of greenhouse gases, taking into consideration aerosols, the
implications of different pathways to stabilization should be assessed (to evaluate
the implications of rate of change):

projected changes in climate and sea level at the regional and global level;
the impacts of the projected changes in climate and sea level on human
health, ecological systems and socio-economic sectors at the regional and

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the economic costs and benefits and social issues (including equity) associated with the projected impacts and adaptation options;

the technologies, policies and measures that can be used for mitigation;

the economic costs and benefits and distributional/equity issues associated with mitigation.

Q18.2. What is the scientific justification for setting greenhouse-gas stabilization at this level?

A18.2. As I stated in the answer to question 18.1 the level should be set by policymakers, informed by scientific, technical and economic information. Setting the level will depend on a number of factors, including: (i) how risk adverse policymakers want to be--will they hide behind scientific uncertainty hoping that we are overestimating the impact of human activities on the climate system, or will they realize that we could be underestimating the impacts of human activities; (ii) to what degree they are willing to take a global view, rather than a national view, given there are "regional winners and losers”; (iii) to what degree they consider future generations that will bear the full impact on climate change; (iv) to what degree to they want to protect ecological systems such as forests and coral reefs.

Q18.3. How is the phrase “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" defined?

A18.3. Article 2 of the Convention states:

"the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner".

Q18.4. Will any of the emission reduction proposals currently under consideration achieve this goal of stabilization?

A18.4. No. Stabilization of carbon dioxide, the major anthropogenic greenhouse gas, will require global emissions reductions. Stabilization will eventually require global emissions to be reduced to between 2 and 3 billion tons of Carbon per year, in contrast to today's global emissions of about 6 billion tons of Carbon per year.

HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

Countdown to Kyoto-Part 3: The Administration's Global Climate Change

Proposal

Thursday, November 6, 1997

Post-Hearing Questions and Answers

Dr. Patrick Michaels

Professor of Environmental Sciences

University of Virginia

and Senior Fellow in Environmental Studies

Cato Institute

What Will an Agreement Accomplish for the Environment?

Q1.

Al.

Your analysis indicates very little benefit from the President's plan, even assuming the models are correct-a big if. How much would CO2 emissions have to be cut to have a substantial impact on projected warming if current models are correct?

This depends upon which climate model is used, and is indicative of the lack of reliability inherent in these models. The new model from the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (not yet published in the refereed literature) projects a warming of around 4.0° C over the course of the next century. While I do not believe this forecast is warranted by the observed data on global warming, it gives some guidance on how much emissions would have to be reduced to prevent “significant" warming, which I take to be around 2.0° over the next 100 years.

Roughly speaking, the GFDL model would require that the atmospheric concentration of equivalent CO2 be stabilized somewhere around the current effective value of 440 parts per million (ppm). This would require reducing emissions to the point that there is no longer any year-to-year increase in the overall concentration. I would estimate that is equivalent to an emission level observed somewhere back in the 1920s, or roughly an 80% reduction from

On the other hand, one could assume that the new model from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), as described in the May 16, 1997 issue of Science is correct. It does a better job than most of tracking past temperatures, it does not contain as many "fudge factors" (those are the words of Science and not mine), and it only projects a warming of about 1.4° C over the next 100 years if we continue our exponential growth of 0.7%/year in emissions. In other words, doing nothing is perfectly acceptable within the 2.0° C envelope.

All of this leads to a much more central policy question: If one believes in the more extreme models, current emission reduction proposals will be totally insufficient, only causing economic dislocation and not preventing much warming. On the other hand, if one believes that the cooler models are correct, why bother doing anything? In other words, what has been proposed will satisfy neither assumption.

Apocalyptic Politics

Q2.

A2.

In the July 1997 edition of New Scientist, you are quoted as saying, “You can't make a case for a global apocalypse out of a 1.5°C warming. It destroys the issue. If politics weren't driving this we could all meet on common ground." For the record, what did you mean by that statement?

The most likely warming scenario for the next century, based upon observed data and models that fit the observed data well is for a warming of 1.0-1.5° C, primarily in the coldest airmasses in winter. This is well within the "consensus" of 1.0-3.0° of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. I believe that most scientists who have looked carefully at the observed data would agree with the lower end of that range, and that it is not the apocalyptic problem that is often portrayed.

Unfortunately, the political process does not promote agreement, for several reasons. Probably the most prominent is scientific funding. Clearly a statement that warming will be in the low end of the range reduces the glamour of the issue and would result in a decrease in the current federal support level of $2.1bn/year for global change research. So scientists feel a pressure NOT to publicly acknowledge that the low end of the estimates is more likely.

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