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Haste Makes Waste

Q4.

A4.

David Montgomery testified before this Subcommittee recently and said regarding commitments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that “haste makes waste" because of the many cost-saving opportunities that would go begging if action were rushed. I take it, based on your testimony, that you would agree with that analysis. Is that so?

I certainly would support Dr. Montgomery's comment that “haste makes waste." Just as spending money today creates irreversible losses down stream, foregoing spending today creates benefits downstream benefits that, in the light of the improved abilities to address all social problems over time suggests that problems are best addressed when they occur, not when they are dim potentials in the far future. Indeed individuals who support global warming policies have conceded in scientific articles that were we to delay action for one or two decades, the effect some hundred years hence would be at most a few fractions of a degree centigrade change in equilibrium temperatures. That is, even given all the assumptions made by the global warming advocates, the cost of delay would be minimal. This is amply demonstrated by the work of Manne and Richels. Their effort to identify the least-cost trajectory to atmospheric stabilization of CO2-equivalent determined that no reductions are required in the next several years, even if atmospheric stabilization is the ultimate policy goal.

Removing Barriers to Technology

Q5. Mr. Chupka has testified that the Administration is "committed to working to remove barriers to expanded markets for existing energy-efficient technologies." What are these barriers to which Mr. Chupka refers?

A5.

Former OMB official Glenn Schleede defined "market barriers" as the phrase is typically used in political debates:

"Market barrier, n. a decision by a hard-working consumer in a market economy to spend his or her after-tax dollars in a way that is not pleasing to a government bureaucrat, energy efficiency advocate, or other central planner (each of whom probably derives his or her salary from taxes paid by the hard-working consumer)."

This is the concept to which I believe Mr. Chupka is referring.

The very concept of market failures obscures the complex questions society must
face in addressing any economic issues, energy or otherwise. In the real world,
there are many costs associated with reaching intelligent decisions - many costs in
reaching agreement as to how resources are to be used. These costs
the so-
called transaction costs of reaching agreement have long been recognized as real.
Whether political means or private means are most effective at reducing such
transaction costs is an interesting question, but one not addressed by focusing only
on market failures. Market failures and political failures are both realities of the
real world and, in the world of the blind, the one-eyed market clearly out-performs
the too-often blind political bureaucracy.

That said, there are real regulatory barriers to the adoption of cleaner and more efficient technologies, and this administration has done little to address them. For instance, permitting rules, such as those found under Title V of the Clean Air Act, can significantly increase the economic cost and time associated with bringing a modern facility on-line. The result is that such regulations delay the replacement of older, heavier-polluting facilities with newer, cleaner facilities. If the Administration is concerned about barriers to emission reductions, streamlining or eliminating permitting requirements would be a good place to focus its efforts.

Types of Administration Errors

Q6.

A6.

It would seem, based on Mr. Chupka's testimony, that the Clinton Administration is making both a Type I and a Type II error. Would that be a fair assessment?

The Clinton Administration's energy reduction policies would push untested technologies aggressively into the future, that is, risking adoption of the wrong technology. Given the DOE's preference for politically-preferred energy technologies (renewable fuels, solar, electric cars), such risks are likely to be high. Such poorly thought-through policies are common: energy efficiency standards, the synthetic fuels program mentioned earlier, the effort to advance electrical cars. At the same time, the Administration, by blocking promising areas of technological advance such as biotechnology, create major barriers to a more adaptive and resilient society. Both by moving ahead too rapidly in politically preferred directions while blocking political pariah technologies where political sensitivity is high (nuclear power, for example), we find ourselves committing both Type I and Type II errors.

Let me also suggest that in assessing the efficacy of government directed R&D, the committee is well advised to be extremely modest. Glenn Schleede, who I referenced earlier, has submitted testimony on the DOE's calculations of the economic benefits of various conservation measures, including energy appliance standards. His work indicates quite clearly that DOE's analysis is more advocacy than objective analysis. In short, DOE greatly exaggerates the benefits to be gained from conservation measures and ignores their costs.

WMO

Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change

UNEP

HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

Countdown to Kyoto-Part 3: The Administration's Global Climate Change Proposal

Thursday, November 6, 1997

Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Robert Watson
Chairman

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Scientific Consensus

Q1.

The Administration is fond of claiming that the IPCC report represents the consensus of 2,500 scientists. Concerning this:

Q1.1. Were contributing scientists asked to vote on chapters written by lead authors?

A1.1. IPCC does not use a system of voting. The lead authors for each chapter were responsible for ensuring that the chapters represented the consensus view of authors, including contributing authors, and reviewers. Where significant differences of opinion occurred, the divergence of views was discussed in the relevant chapters. Authors who felt their views were not adequately represented and objected to the conclusions of the report could have taken their name off the report, but to my knowledge none did.

While this approach may appear to give lead authors the power to pick and choose which comments they wanted to take into account, there were checks and balances. For example, in WG II there were a series of unofficial "editors" who worked with the lead authors to ensure that all significant comments were dealt

While I believe the preparation and peer-review system was credible and transparent for the Second Assessment Report, I have taken steps to ensure an even more credible and transparent approach for the Third Assessment Report, i.e., the addition of one or two official review editors for each chapter. The primary responsibilities of the review editors will include: (i) ensuring that all substantive expert and government review comments are afforded appropriate consideration; (ii) advising lead authors on how to handle contentious and controversial issues; and (iii) ensuring genuine scientific controversies are reflected adequately in the text.

Q1.2. Were contributing scientists asked to review or vote on the "Summary for
Policymakers"?

A1.2. Many contributing authors, but certainly not all, were involved in the simultaneous expert-government review of the three Summaries for Policymakers-again no votes were taken.

Q1.3. Did all the scientists who contributed to the report agree to the conclusions of the report and if so, how was that agreement made apparent?

A1.3. Clearly not all scientists agreed with every single word of the Second Assessment Report. As stated in the answer to question 1.1, major differences of opinion were included within each of the assessment reports.

IPCC Third Assessment Report: Decision Paper - Synthesis Report

Q2.

The IPCC Third Assessment Report: Decision Paper refers to a new Synthesis Report.
For the record:

Q2.1. What is the purpose of this new report?

A2.1. The IPCC Third Assessment Report will include a Synthesis Report that will be written in a non-technical style suitable for policymakers and will address a broad range of key policy-relevant questions. The Synthesis Report will consist of a short SPM and a longer report. The IPCC Chairman and the Working Group Cochairs will develop a list of key policy-relevant scientific questions in consultation with the President of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the chairs of the subsidiary, and other, bodies of the COP, using the mechanism of the IPCC/FCC Joint Working Group. The list will be circulated to governments for comment and the IPCC will approve the list at its Fourteenth Session (mid-1998). This list can be revised at a later date under the responsibility of the IPCC Chair, and with the

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