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forces Americans into smaller, less-safe cars) has yet to be seriously challenged, should make us very cautious about imposing any new energy restrictions. Why should a Kyoto decision be any less reversible, any less permanent?

The case for a carbon withdrawal policy is further weakened when one seriously considers the likely costs of proposed anti-energy use policies. The Administration pledged to review the economic consequences of a Kyoto treaty but has yet to do so. But computer models suggest that the fossil fuel restrictions required to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gases would have to be massive - restrictions on the order of those experienced by nations blockaded during wartime. The United States, for example, would have to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 60 to 80 percent to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentrations, necessitating severe rationing and/or high energy taxes. Recent efforts to raise gasoline taxes and to impose BTU taxes have fared badly. This suggests that any U.S. action in this area would be indirect and regulatory in more restrictive Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards program, for example, or a further slowdown in new power plant permitting. Such approaches are less effective and more costly than the measures made unfeasible by political reality.

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The domestic economic repercussions of Kyoto would likely be severe. Even more worrisome, however, are the potential impacts on the world trading system. As the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory study concluded, the global warming policies under discussion would dramatically redistribute comparative economic advantages around the world. Protectionist pressures are already significant. The flight of capital and jobs from Annex I to non-Annex I countries - the so-called carbon leakage effect - would almost certainly inflame these sentiments. Were Kyoto to lead to a new era of protectionism, the consequences of global warming policies would be far worse.

The Superiority of Resiliency

Those favoring expanded political control of the world economy ignore such risks, arguing that only a political approach and then only one focused on stopping change, not adapting to it, offers a true "solution." Disingenuously, greenhouse lobbyists often argue that, minimally, we should adopt a “no regrets" policy - do those things that should be done in any event. What they have in mind, of course, are coercive conservation policies to reduce America's allegedly "wasteful" use of energy and materials. But a true "no regrets" policy would emphasize reforming the political process, freeing up industry to play a more effective role in improving our ability to address whatever risks the future may bring.

A thoughtful policy would rely on improving society's generalized abilities to address disaster, not to seek to prevent the one possible disaster focused upon by the environmental establishment. Consider the way in which storms affect various nations. Violent tropical storms

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occur in both America and Asia. When a hurricane occurs in Florida, people are alerted early and move out of the path of the storm. Our nation's sophisticated communication and technological infrastructure make possible such targeted and timely warnings. The widespread availability of private automobiles gives people the mobility to act accordingly. The wealth of our society makes it possible for our people to incur the expenses of such temporary relocation, and funds rapid clean-up, restoration, and recovery.

The storms in Bangladesh are not dissimilar. Yet Bangladesh lacks the wealth, the communication technology infrastructure, and the mobility needed to respond to such risks. The risks are the same, but the resiliency of our two countries is very different. The results reflect this. In the United States, very few people die from climatic disturbances. In Bangladesh and the poorer areas of the world, the fatality lists are tragically long. Is it better to divert wealth to reduce an already low likelihood that current fossil fuel might increase the severity and/or frequency of storms, or would we achieve more by assisting these poorer nations to gain the greater wealth and technological skills which make such climatic disturbances less risky to our own societies? This is the question on which the global warming debate should focus.

A true "no regrets" policy would improve our resiliency and capacity for adaptation. This would involve a series of initiatives like deregulation, elimination of government subsidy programs, and privatization of government enterprises. We should eliminate the political preferences and subsidies that encourage certain fuels (coal, ethanol, solar) to be used rather than others that are more efficient. We should deregulate electricity generation and transmission to allow the most efficient (and typically least-polluting) firms to expand output. We should remove all regulatory barriers that now limit our ability to innovate (for example, government restrictions on biotechnology pose major threats to our ability to produce more weather-robust crops and to fend off future insect infestations). We should encourage such free-market reforms throughout the world (by. for example, eliminating World Bank and other foreign aid programs that shore up oppressive regimes). Finally, we should encourage free trade to strengthen domestic pressures for sensible fiscal and regulatory policies. This would accelerate a shift away from wasteful material and energy policies, lightening mankind's footprint on the planet.

Evidence for the superiority of the Resiliency strategy is suggested by the fact that while in 1992 all the developed countries agreed to voluntary reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, only Germany and Great Britain were successful. It is ironic that these two countries, who most avidly support stringent international political controls over the world's energy consumption, achieved their reductions by liberalizing and de-politicizing their energy markets. Germany ended support for the inefficient East German energy sector, and Great Britain stopped subsidizing her coal industry.

Whether the future will be warmer or colder, wetter or drier, stormier or more tranquil, some risks will increase and others will decline. Hampering the ability of private markets to

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respond to changing conditions serves no bona fide public interest. Indeed, it can be destructive. Stanford University's Stephen Schneider suggests that those who oppose precipitous action to avert global climate change are willing to run an uncontrolled experiment on the only planet we've got. Yet Schneider and those who join him in calling for dramatic emission reductions are all too willing to run an uncontrolled experiment on the only civilization we've got.

The proper question to ask is: Should we seek to eliminate change or should we improve our abilities to adapt to an ever-changing world? America and the world will certainly face severe risks in the future; whether these will be climatic, tectonic, biological, or political is unclear. Since we cannot be sure which risks will prove dominant, we ought to improve our generic ability to survive and recover from whatever shocks and surprises the future may hold. Rather than herd America's entrepreneurs, inventors, and workers into some elite's politicallycorrect industrial policy scheme, we should remove political impediments to production, marketdriven innovation, and intelligent adaptation.

The greatest risk of current carbon withdrawal policies is that they will fail to achieve any useful result while imposing major costs on the world's economy. The economic repercussions will fall most heavily on the poor at home and abroad. Starving the world of energy is all too likely to produce a world of starving people. The risks of climate change are speculative; those of climate change policy are all too real. Once this is realized, it is likely that few policymakers here or abroad will rush to join the global warming bandwagon. At Kyoto, the U.S. should advocate and promote the Adaptation Policy, thus encouraging greater resiliency throughout the world, not endorse an anti-energy Malthusian policy. The road to Hell, we all realize, is often paved with good intentions. The global warming debate illustrates that symbolic principle very well; even a baby step on this destructive path should be avoided.

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Notes

1 Al Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), pp. 177.

2 Dianne Rehm Show, July 21, 1997.

3 N. Nichols, G.V. Gruza, J. Jouzel, T.R. Karl, L.A. Ogallo, D.E. Parker, "Observed Climate Variability and Change," Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, J.T. Houghton, L.G. Meira Filho, B.A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Kattenberg and K. Maskell, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 173.

4 Hubert H. Lamb, The Changing Climate (London: Methuen, 1968).

5 Thomas Gale Moore, "Why Global Warming would be Good for You," Public Interest, Winter 1995.

6 Sherwood Idso, "Plant Responses to Rising Levels of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide," The Global Warming Debate: The Report of the European Science and Environment Forum, John Emsley, ed. (London: Bourne Press Limited, 1996).

TABLE I

An Assessment of Global Warming Outcome Under the Prevention and Adaptation Responses