ones had been fatal and disastrous. That, however, could be done only by repressing whatever of anarchial, anti-social, and revolutionary principles yet remained; and until that was effectually done, he could not venture to say that the spirit of Jacobinism was extinct. What had been the effect of the revolution, not only upon Europe, but upon a great proportion of France itself? A general love of order, and a general feeling of abhorrence at opposing upon slight and speculative grounds, any existing constitutional government; and he could not applaud the wisdom of allowing those feelings and propensities to be overlaid and smothered by the mass of revolutionary spirit which still existed in France. The danger of such a catastrophe was immediate and formidable; and how was the danger to be obviated? He had heard in that House, and knew that similar arguments prevailed elsewhere, that we had exasperated France, that we had poured insults upon her, and plunged her into a state of deep humiliation. It was, indeed partly true that such was the fact. From the circumstances of the case, it was impossible that Europe could interfere so as to overawe the dangerous and alarming dispositions of the French people, without offending them, without inflicting some mortifications, or withont wounding their national feelings. For that inevitable evil the allies ought to have been prepared. The great object with them was, not to avoid giving offence, for that was utterly impossible; but to mitigate, as far as they could, the exasperation of France. Did it follow, however, that because the allies must necessarily wound the feelings of the French people, that therefore they were to give up all idea of obtaining the requisite securities? He contended that the allies having that particular object in view, it was most desirable to obtain, for its accomplishment, that lapse of time which would soften down the feelings of the nation, and contribute to remove those sentiments of irritation which might otherwise impose its operation, and prevent the nation from rallying round the throne of the restored monarch. The rule which the allies had to prescribe to themselves was not to avoid giving mortifications (for how could they be prevented?), but to abstain from all wanton or gratuitous in sults, and that course they rigidly pursued. Some insults, indeed, it was not easy to escape from inflicting, and among these, in the estimation of the French, the battle

of Waterloo itself would no doubt be included. Let it not however be supposed that any wanton or unnecessary exercise of the power which victory had conferred; was indulged in. If they saw it necessary to exact certain sacrifices from France, they limited those sacrifices to the necessity of them; if they felt themselves compelled to demand certain limitations, they did not push their demands beyond the strict line of what their safety required. That was their policy, and so long as they acted upon that plain and direct line, though they might exasperate France, they were sure to have the approbation of all wise and honest men out of France, and even in France itself when the effer vescence of momentary irritation had subsided, because there was something in honest principles which was always certain to extort the ultimate approbation of all men.

With respect to the securities which were demanded, it was not his intention to enter into any minute examination of the character of those which came under a pecuniary compensation. But he had heard it stated that the pecuniary indem nities were those which, of all others were most calculated to afflict her, and that even territorial cessions would have been less galling. They had been told, in a tone of much exaggeration, that every time the meanest peasant paid his taxes, he would be reminded of the degradation into which his country had fallen, leaving it altogether out of the question, that their tributes would be blended in the general taxation of the state, and would not bear the distinct and specific form of a contribution towards their victors. But surely there was no comparison between territorial cession and pecuniary indemnification, with respect to the influence which either might be supposed to have upon the feelings of the nation. At the expiration of five years, the pecuniary indemnification would be paid off, and leave no trace behind, but territorial cessions would be permanent; they would leave a memory behind them of the subjugation of France, which would never be effaced. He was surprised also to hear it argued that the army of occupation would be more galling to the feelings of the French people than territorial cessions. If, indeed it was so terrible to France to have her frontier fortresses occupied by foreign troops, for a short and limited space of time, how much more terrible must it be to see those

fortresses permanently surrendered. But it was added, if territorial cessions have been made, then the armies of the allies might have been withdrawn from France. He would, however, ask the House whether, in the case of those fortresses being surrendered to Holland, the allies would have been justified in disbanding their armies; whether it would have been safe to leave the Netherlands a prey to the overwhelming superiority, and to the ambition of France? That, certainly would not have been the way to reduce our standing armies, or to reduce the military spirit upon the continent. The hon. gentleman in his zeal to prove that the Bourbons must have been forced upon a reluctant people, said that it was impossible for France to reflect upon their restoration without connecting it with invasion and the presence of foreign armies. He apprehended, however, that the return and second downfall of Buonaparté had materially altered the case; and that the meanest peasant in France was now able to draw a just inference upon the subject. In the peace which was signed in 1814 no harsh stipulations, no exactions were made, and they must therefore feel that whatever of moderation, magnanimity, and forbearance they experienced from the allies in that year, they . owed to the virtues and to the presence of Louis 18th; while whatever of misfortune and degradation awaited them in the following year they owed to Buonaparté. Buonaparte, the man who had raised the military glory of France to an unexampled height, entered the lists against us with every possible advantage, at the head of one of the finest armies, in point of number, bravery, discipline, and appointment, that had ever been assembled in that country. That army, however, suffered the consummation of military disaster. It sustained a defeat the most memorable in the annals of European warfare. The hon. and learned gentleman asked who was the author of their disgrace. Who was the author of it? Did not all France know that so far from the Bourbons having been the cause of it, had they never existed Buonaparte would not have been able to save Paris from the presence of the allied armies, determined as all Europe was, with an intensity of feeling never before experienced, never to allow military despotism again to tyrannize over it. He differed therefore most materially from the hon. and learned gentleman on this point; being fully persuaded that whatever might

have been the former opinions of the people of France, they had been taught by circumstances, accurately to distinguish between the real and the alleged author of the calamities which they suffered. In the prosecution of his argument the hon. and learned gentleman had alluded to that part of the treaty by which the allied powers pledged themselves to maintain the constitution of France, and Louis 18th on the throne of that kingdom. However the passage might be expressed, the meaning unequivocally was, that the allied powers were resolved to maintain an orderly government in France. Not only was this passage perfectly consistent with the other parts of the arrangements which had been made, but it was essential to them. There were many parts of the hon. and learned gentleman's speech, to which at an earlier hour he would have trespassed on the House by an endeavour to reply.

There were some topics, however, on which he begged their indulgence while he said a few words. The hon. and learned gentleman had observed a great deal on the relation in which Holland and France had been left. The security of Holland was in her situation. The treaty had been severely censured by some, because it annexed the Austrian Netherlands to Holland; and the House had heard from the noble lord opposite, an appeal on the subject to the established principles of European policy. The House, however, was not to decide the present question by the principles on which the great statesmen of former times acted with respect to it. Those persons were not at liberty on the subject. They were bound by treaty to give the Netherlands to Austria. They gave it thus in order to indemnify the emperor of Germany for the surrender of his pretensions to the throne of Spain. The consequence had, in fact, been most injurious. Was it not true that the Austrian Netherlands had been the great cause of Holland and England having been drawn into every great continental quarrel which had occurred? When the Netherlands were called the Spanish barrier, Louis the 14th perpetually invaded Holland. In later times not a single war had occurred in which that barrier had not been found insufficient for the protection of Holland. In the war of 1733, the only continental war in which this country had not been engaged, we were prevented from engaging in it by

having previously stipulated for the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands. When the hon. gentlemen talked of no security being derived to Holland from bringing Prussia down to the left bank of the Rhine, they seemed not to have well considered the subject. It was of the utmost advantage to Holland that a great power like Prussia should be so placed in relation to her. It was essential that there should be a great power on the left bank of the Rhine, to protect Holland. In one of the wars of Louis 14th, that monarch, by negociation and interest, previous to an intended attack on Holland, gained over the principal little powers on the Rhine. The only one which refused to unite with him was the elector of Brandenburgh, who well knew, that the subjugation of Holland must necessarily lead to the destruction of Dutch Cleves, on the left bank of the Rhine.

With respect to the question of the balance of power, he owned that he had been a little surprised to hear-first, that France had been left in too powerful a state, and, at the same time, that it was the policy of Russia that France should be left in the state in which she was left. This was surely inconsistent with the opinion, that Russia was a just subject of the jealousy of Europe. The fact was, that the security of Europe was to be sought not in one power, but in the combination of powers-not in Holland alone, or Prussia alone, or Austria alone, or France alone; but in the combined force of all these states; in the enlightened feeling which impressed the necessity of maintaining it; and, above all, he was sure he might say in that House without fear of contradiction, in the influence and guardianship of this country. Our great object, as we were not obliged to engage in the minor disputes of the Continent, would be to preserve, by our occasional interposition, the general balance and independence. This was the policy which at various times we had pursued with success. There were three particular cases of British interference with the continental powers, to which he would recall the attention of the House. The first was, when we checked the domination of Spain on our own shores and seas. The second was, when we assisted to defeat the attempt of Louis the 14th, to subjugate Europe; the third, a hundred years afterwards, when we had again defeated the efforts of France to triumph over the

Continent. The glorious war which we had thus waged, we followed up by a peace concluded, not on narrow and exclusive and local considerations, but with reference to the most extensive and common interests. He trusted that it would be maintained in the same spirit of moderation and magnanimity; and that we should continue to be actuated by the same cautious vigilance with respect to the general affairs of Europe. For to speak of relinquishing the influence we had obtained in Europe, and at the same time, of preserving our commercial preeminence, appeared to him to be one of the most extravagant of all possible propositions; firmly convinced as he was that we could never separate our prosperity from our political influence.

Mr. Ponsonby said, he had no objection to be designated one of the modern Whigs who had been alluded to by the noble lord; but all he wished was, that a definition of the practice of modern Whigs should not be given, which had no relation either to their opinions or their practice. The noble lord might call his adversaries Whigs, but it was too much to designate them as fools, for, according to the statement given of their opinions, they could be called nothing else. The part of this treaty which particularly struck him with a horror and detestation of its consequences was, that we were compelled to keep up an army of 30,000 men in France; but although he had read through the treaties, he could not see that we were bound to furnish a contingent of British armed troops; and if we were not bound, why, he wished to know, was it the choice of ministers to make the contingent consist only of British troops? Why should they not consist partly of continental troops? Why was it necessary to keep up nearly 100,000 men in the united kingdom and its colonies, and, at the same time, 30,000 men in France, which, he observed, was termed the advanced guard of the British army? Was this an example to the other great powers of Europe to lessen their military establishments? He defied the noble lord to state an instance, where the fall of any empire was not first caused by a standing army. These were, it was said, idle fears; but were they not supported by history? Germany lost her liberty by her standing army. Spain shared the same fate; for when Charles 5th, formed the project, in the plenitude of his power, of destroying