to excite the French themselves to repel it, or, in case they had risen for that purpose, to excite them to greater alacrity and perseverance, by showing them that the allies were determined to support them. It was intended as a species of stimulus to the French for the accomplishment of a purpose in which all were so much interested. Such was the proceeding of the allies before they knew of Buonaparte's success. On the 25th of March that treaty was signed which had last year been laid on their lordships table. That treaty was entered into after the allies knew that the enterprise of Buonaparté had been, to a certain extent, successful. They were then aware, that he had entered Lyons. But it was material to observe, that it had been concluded before they knew that the king of France had been under the necessity of quitting Paris before they knew that Buonaparté had entered the French capital, and while they conceived, that, even if the king should be obliged to leave Paris, he would still be at the head of a powerful party in some other part of France. It was concluded in the belief that Louis 18, was then de facto king of France, at the head of a strong force, either at Paris or some other part of the country. This appeared from the terms of the treaty; for it was stated, that in case the king of France demanded assistance, he was to mention what force he himself could bring forward. Such were the circumstances under which the treaty was concluded at Vienna. When it came over to this country, it was known here that the king of France had left Paris and France, and had retired to Ghent; and, under these new circumstances, the ministers here had to consider how far they could adopt that treaty. They had therefore thought proper to accompany their acceptance of it with a declaration which their lordships were already acquainted with. The design of that declaration was to show, that in adopting the treaty, though we most anxiously desired the restoration of Louis 18, and considered that restoration as a matter of the first importance, yet we did not mean to bind ourselves to engage in a war with France merely for that object. When the treaty, with this declaration, was received again at Vienna, the allies concurred in the views of the government of this country, and made a counter-declaration to the same effect. Whether that was among the papers on the table, he was not cer tain; but, if it was not, their lordships had a complete view of the policy of the allies on that occasion in the clear and distinct letter of lord Clancarty. It then came to be considered, whether the 8th article of the treaty, by which the king of France was to be invited to accede to it (that article being inserted under the idea that Louis 18, was then de facto king), could be executed. Matters stood upon a different footing when it was understood that the king had quitted the French territory: and the consequence was, that the 8th article was never executed, and that the king of France had never been invited to accede to that treaty, and had not, in fact, acceded to it. It was necessary to go into this detail, in order to show the relation in which this country stood, with respect to France and the allied powers, at the time when the operations of the campaign commenced. The result, he conceived, was, that there was no engagement by this country and the allies with the French king. They were bound in regard to each other, unless any of them chose to release the rest; but they were under no engagements with the king of France, who had never been invited to accede to the treaty, and never had acceded. " On the other hand, though there was no positive engagement on our part with the French king, the noble lord was ready to admit, that from all that had passed, and the recognitions we had made, we were under a species of honourable and equitable engagement to support the pretensions of Louis 18th, as far as that could be done without touching on the principle which the government of this country had promulgated as the rule of its conduct. It was the anxious wish of the government of this country, that Louis 18 should be restored to his throne, and it was the professed object, to do every thing that could be done for that purpose, yet so as not to make that restoration a sine qua non of peace. Their lordships, therefore, would easily see the distinction between the terms of the treaty as it stood before it was known that the king had left France, and the nature of the engagements which were actually entered into after all the circumstances were under the view of the allied powers. The object of the treaty of the 25th of March was the *See Vol. 31, p. 311. general security of Europe. Experience had proved, that that security was essentially connected with the internal state of France, and that Europe never could be secure while the government of France was founded upon a military force, and a system of aggression and conquest. The great alliance of Europe could never have been cemented, unless the object had been the general security of Europe, without any view to the interests of any particular power, except in so far as they were connected with that grand object. Before hostilities commenced, three alternatives presented themselves for the consideration of the allies. The first was, to treat with the actual government of France, if it could be treated with upon any reasonable terms, which was highly improbable. The having to do with any government in France, except that which he considered as the legitimate government, was an alternative which he confessed he could not look at without dismay. If that alternative, however, had taken effect, we should have been entitled to insist on the principle of cession and dismemberment, to any extent that we might think expedient, and had power to enforce. No government, except the legitimate government of France, had any claim to the confidence of the allies, so as to induce them to forbear from insisting upon every thing that might be necessary for the security of Europe, whatever might be the sacrifice on the part of France. The second alternative was, that the French themselves might have risen and restored their exiled sovereign. If that had taken place if the French themselves had restored Louis 18, then he conceived that the government of France and the French nation would have stood, with respect to the rest of Europe, in the same situation as before, and that the stipulations of the treaty of Paris of 1814 ought to be strictly adhered to. The third alternative was, that the king of France should be restored exclusively or chiefly by the efforts of the allies. In that point of view, the allies would act upon the most liberal policy with respect to the restored government, that circumstances would admit of; but, after what had happened, they were fully entitled to insist upon some indemnity for the past, and security against the recurrence of such an event in future. Thus it appeared that there was no specific engagement with the king of France, and that, upon his being restored by them, they were bound, by their duty to their own subjects, to accompany that restoration with such conditions as would afford sufficient security for the peace of Europe. Then, what was the course of events? On the 18th of June that memorable conflict took place which had decided the fate of Europe-a conflict the most tremendous and extraordinary that had ever happened in the annals of the world-a conflict remarkable, not only on account of the prodigious talents displayed by the general, and the exalted valour of the troops, but also on account of this peculiarity attending it, which had been noticed by the general himself—that it took place in so narrow a space (and narrow indeed it was, considering the immense force engaged in it), that it was, in fact, a trial of the moral and physical strength of the two nations. Their lordships knew the issue of that conflict. That power which had been raised by the sword fell by the sword. It had no hold in the affections of the country, or even in the two assemblies. It rested merely on the army: that army was crushed, and the country was open to the duke of Wellington and prince Blucher, who advanced without opposition to Paris. The provisional government, which had acted after the abdication of Buonaparté, dissolved itself, and the king returned, and was immediately received into his capital. The allies had then to consider, after the French army had been disbanded, what new arrangements were to be made, in order to provide for the future repose of France and of Europe. He had already stated, that the allies, under the events which now happened, were entitled to demand some indemnity for the past, and security for the future; and they had to consider how these objects could be attained, with the least possible hurt to the feelings of the French government and people. Here there were conflicting duties. In 1814, the allies had acted upon a principle of confidence in the French nation; that, however, could not now be done; and their duty to Europe, and to their own subjects, required that they should insist upon some effectual security for the future tranquillity of France and Europe. This led him to the consideration of the terms of the treaties now on their lordships' table; and if, in considering these, he did not enter into all the mi nute circumstances connected with the The next point was that of territorial cession; and there was no doubt but the allies were entitled to have demanded a much longer, cession than had been ac tually required. If it had stood merely on the right, however, it might have been a question how far it was expedient to insist upon it; but the allies had to revise the (VOL. XXXII.) treaty of Paris of 1814, with a view to on the Netherland frontier should be perfectly finished. The great object was to establish a sufficient frontier, partly by cession, and partly by military occupation an object of equal importance to the safety of the external territory and to the internal tranquillity of France. He was, however, still prepared to state, and to state it as a justification of the policy pursued by the allies, that a considerable majority, at least three-fourths of the people of France, were sincerely and ardently attached to their legitimate king, Louis 18. This opinion he had asserted in a former debate, and every thing he had heard or seen confirmed him in that opinion. things for one moment doubt, that a large: party existed in France, whose great wish. it was to overturn the government, to uphold that profession of conquest and spoil in which they had been nurtured, and to make the sword the sole instrument of external and internal rule. Were the allies to be blamed for this? Was England to be charged with this evil disposition of a French party? It had been their earnest wish and endeavour to reconcile the army. to the king: the project had failed: the army had been from necessity disbanded, and discontent and danger were the natural result. Till this discontent had been removed, till this danger had been subThere had been, as their lordships dued, would it have been wise, would it knew, two legislative assemblies called to- have been safe, to leave France to the gether within the course of the last year; machinations of those turbulent spirits, one elected under the direction of the in- uncontrolled by the presence of foreign dividual who at the time assumed the so- power? There was no inconsistency in vereignty, the other more recently elected this argument, or in this conduct. The under the auspices of the rightful mo- great majority of the French people were narch. It was no trifling argument in favour of the Bourbons, and yet there against the pretended popularity of the was also a great, and active, and powerful late chief, that even the assembly of his party anxious, from desperation, to overown selection had shown but little attach-whelm the throne; and which, from its ment to him or his fortunes. But a still stronger argument might be deduced from the dispositions and feelings evinced by the present chamber. If any noble lord would take the trouble of examining the lists of the electors of the two chambers, he would find that the partisans of the King were not merely double the supporters of Buonaparté, but that nearly three-fourths of the electors had shown by their votes their attachment to the legitimate government, while not more than one-fourth had declared their inclination for the unlawful sovereign. It was true, that the king had made a small addition to the number of the electors in each department, but the augmentation altogether was not more than one tenth of the whole. It was thus evident, that in point of numbers, as well as respectability, the king's government was the more popular. He did not, however, mean to assert (for how could any man venture such an assertion?) that there was not a very considerable party hostile to the legitimate dynasty. When he looked at a large portion of the members even of the legislative assembly; when he considered that 30,000 officers had been disbanded, and must therefore continue to be an immense focus and centre of discontent and disaffection; he could not doubt, nor could any man who exercised a good and honest sense of military composition, would be able to overturn it, unless checked and rendered powerless by the vigilant interference of external force. Nor would the principle of dismemberment, which some had advocated, at all have tended to insure internal tranquillity, unless accompanied by military occupation; but would rather have added to the internal discontent, while it would have exasperated even the well-disposed against the government and its allies. Upon the whole, then, England had adopted the plan of military possession for a certain time, from a conviction that it was the most just, both for itself and for all Europe. He was aware that objections had been made to the right of interference with other governments. This had been so ably argued last session, that he should not now discuss the subject at length, though, as it had been renewed, he would just notice it. He must say, then, that he could not conceive on what ground this objection was founded. He could not find any, either in the writings of statesmen, or in recorded treaties, or in the traditionary principles which regulated the external policy of nations. The great principle of all government, in its domestic or foreign relations, was self-defence, either against direct attack, or against probable or premeditated danger. The 1 balance of power, if traced to its true "Hanover to the throne of Great Britain, source, would be found to be derivable "and to oppose the laws made to this from this principle. Certainly it was to purpose, by the crown and parliament be allowed, that in common cases the in- "of Great Britain, the states-general enternal concerns of a particular nation gage and promise to assist and maintain ought not to be meddled with by another "in the said succession, her or him to nation; but if these concerns affected the "whom it shall belong by virtue of the very existence of other nations, then it be- "said acts of parliament, to assist them came a duty to interfere, for the same "in taking possession, if they have not reasons which justified an interference of " already got it; and to oppose those who a third power between the quarrels of two "would disturb them in the taking such contending countries. If such a position "possession, or in the actual possession required illustration, he might refer to the" of the aforesaid succession." In the familiar case of a nuisance, or a fire. If treaty of Jan. 29, 1713, there was a simithe house of an individual presented cause lar article, where the states general further of just and manifest offence to the adjoin-engaged, after the decease of the queen, ing houses, both natural and municipal to assist the house of Hanover in obtainJaw allowed the neighbours to interfere, ing and keeping possession of the throne and insist on the abatement of the object of England. And in the 15th article of of offence. If a house were in flames, did this latter treaty, it is agreed, "that all either morality or law require, that a man "kings, princes, and states, that desire to should wait till his own house caught the "come into this treaty, may be invited conflagration, instead of rushing forward "and admitted thereunto." In the 7th at once to extinguish the danger, even by article of the treaty of triple alliance there the demolition of the house from whence it was likewise a stipulation, that if the goissued? The only question was-is the dan-vernment of the house of Hanover were ger evident? Is there a necessity for selfdefence? He would not say, that a mere apprehension of danger was sufficient; the danger should be open and apparent; but, in the case of France, he would ask, whether the danger had not been felt and experienced for twenty years? One would have thought, indeed, that the French revolution formed of itself such a case as should be made an example of; that if no precedent had existed which could be applied, a precedent might in this instance have been fairly created. But it had been asserted, that no examples existed, which could warrant the present conduct of England and her allies with respect to France. It was triumphantly maintained, that no treaties could be found where the principle of such interference had been avowed. How different, it was said, were the proceedings connected with the accession of king William and of the house of Hanover! In answer to such assertions, he would ask had the gentlemen who advanced such arguments ever looked into the treaties relative to the accession of those two houses? He would first call the attention of their lordships to a treaty between queen Anne and the states-general, concluded at the Hague on the 29th of October 1709, in the second article of which it was stipulated shat "no power having a right to call in question the succession of the house of disturbed by any internal plots, France and Holland should furnish the same succours as in case of foreign invasion. Here, then, were treaties and solemn engagements made under the sanction of the parliament of Great Britain, not against foreign enemies, but against internal conspiracy and sedition. There were indeed, some people who would maintain, that the accession of the house of Hanover was not then desired by the majority of the nation; and certainly all must allow that, at the time alluded to, there existed in this country a most formidable party in wealth, rank, connexions, and talent, which was decidedly hostile to that illustrious house. The wiser part of the nation, had however, demanded them for its rulers: and he would ask, whether there could be any principle which justified the English nation in then calling upon foreigners for interference, which would not now even more amply justify England in her interference with the internal direction of French affairs? man could be less willing to become an advocate for the house of Stuart than himself; but he could not help observing, as to the rival dynasties of Stuart and Brunswick and their probable influence and consequences upon foreign nations it could have been of very little importance to other states by which of the two houses England might be governed. But here, No |