Mr. Goulburn concluded by observing, that great part of the increased expenditure observable in the present estimates must be considered as arising out of the glory we had won in the war, and the advantages we had gained by the peace. It had been said by gentlemen, that we could but judge of the value of a peace from the diminution of the national expenditure consequent on its conclusion. From those who maintained such an opinion, he must altogether dissent. If the advantage of a peace consist in the acquisition of new territory-of territory situated in different quarters of the globe, important from its immediate position, or from the power which it afforded of checking the operations of future war, an increased military establishment was the necessary and inevitable consequence of the acquisition. But although the military establishment was increased, it was not, as some gentlemen seemed inclined to argue, to the detriment of the navy. From the very extension of our territory, and the increased employment which the trade with them afforded to British shipping and seamen, we had always within our reach the means of commanding a naval force without delay. The increased military force, therefore, was not more effective in securing the colonies in which it was stationed, than in giving us a command of naval means whenever the exigencies of the country might require them.

Lord Castlereagh thought it necessary to make a few observations on what had passed in the present debate, and to state what was the impression which had been left on his mind by the arguments of the gentlemen opposite. He was extremely sensible of the importance of the question, and he begged to state that no false pride on the part of the government would make them object to the economical plans of their opponents if they thought they could have adopted them consistently with prudence. Ministers wished to confine their military establishments within the narrowest possible limits, but the saving which would arise from the reductions which had been suggested, was so paltry, compared with the great sacrifice which was the condition of attaining it, that he was confident in pursuing the course recommended they would not fulfil the wishes of the nation. The government had come to the discussion of this question with the greatest desire to make every pe

cuniary saving that could prudently be attempted, and if they differed from those who opposed them on this point, he was sure it was in consequence of their duty having imposed upon them the task of looking more closely into the subject than the individuals had been compelled to do who had taken part in this debate. It was some satisfaction to ministers to know that those who differed from them with respect to the military establishments proper to be kept up, differed equally from each other. The hon. gentleman opposite had taken for his data what he (lord Castlereagh could never subscribe to, namely that the arrangement of 1792 was that which was perfectly satisfactory, and which it would be wise, under all circumstances and at all times, to recur to. What was the proof of its being applicable to every situation in which the empire could be thrown? Why this; that in almost every instance it was admitted it could not now be acted upon. It could not be acted upon in Ireland; it could not be acted upon in Canada ́; nor could it be acted upon in our new colonies. It had been thought that 12,000 troops were more than enough for the defence of the possessions last mentioned. He could not understand which way this was assumed; for he could not tell on what principle it was supposed that our newly-acquired territories could be maintained by a smaller force than was judged necessary for our old colonies. It ought to be borne in mind, that in our new possessions we had to maintain some of the strongest military stations in the world, namely, Corfu, Malta, Ceylon, Trinidad, and St. Lucie. His hon. friend had supposed that a saving of 23,000 men might be effected, but in doing this he had assumed that the total force which it was proposed to give the Crown, were to be considered as effectives. The statement which he (lord Castlereagh) had formerly made, that a tenth ought to be deducted from their number for non-effectives, he found on inquiry, was rather under than over the mark. From the ninety-nine thousand men thus to be kept up, ten thousand at least were to be deducted, and when to these were added the number that must every year be in transitu for reliefs, on the principle that the force stationed in the colonies should be relieved once in ten years, it would be found that to the 10,000 non-effectives, 7000 men who must always be on the seas on their passage out or home, ought to be

subjoined. These 17,000 men taken from the 99,000, left an effective force of but $2,000 men. Did the hon. gentleman reckon the non-effectives and the reliefs when he made his calculation? If he did not, it would be seen there was after all but a difference of five thousand men between the force his hon. friend proposed to maintain, and that which the government desired should be kept up. He apprehended the hon. gentleman had not reckoned the non-effectives and the reliefs, when he thought an army of seventy-seven thousand men would be sufficient, and had hardly a doubt that the error into which he had fallen was that of founding his calculations on the gross amount of the force which was to be maintained, and not on the presumable effectives. It had been thought that a reduction might well be made in the household troops. The duties of this description of force, it was proper to observe, were not now circumscribed as they were by custom in 1792. Latterly he thought a wise arrangement had been carried into effect with respect to them, which left them applicable to foreign service. This had been of great importance to the country, as they had nerved its arm to strike a great blow at a most critical moment, when the requisite force could not have been obtained from any other quarter. This part of the army was always likely to be available on any sudden emergency, as from none of its detachments being abroad in a common way, as was usual with the rest of the army, three, four, or five thousand men could always be gained from the household troops on the spur of the moment. They had been much ri diculed when they were first sent out of the country, and the idea of sending our heavy cavalry to meet the cavalry of France had been laughed at. He had, however, on that occasion preferred the opinion of the Duke of Wellington as to their fitness for service to that of the high military authorities who had not admired this arrangement; and much as their dress had been quizzed at that period (those who had seen the continental armies knew that their dress was not the most extravagant in the world), time had proved that the duke of Wellington was the best judge of their merits. On a variety of occasions they had greatly distinguished themselves, and more than ever at the battle of Waterloo. The cavalry, which had been so much scouted, had overthrown that which

had been thought to be the best in Europe, and had on every occasion proved itself to be superior to all that opposed it. The expense of this force might be about one-fourth greater than that of the rest of our cavalry but this he held to be more than compensated by the constant state of efficiency in which it was found.-An hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Calcraft) had suggested some considerations which he thought himself bound to answer. With respect to the home service, he must observe, that there was a considerable part of the duty of the country which could not be done either by the marines or the artillery. He readily admitted the efficiency of these troops, but their estimated establishment would not be sufficient. There were 3,000 of the marines which were always to be considered as afloat: (some of the opposition members observed, that 9,000 were voted)—he was aware of that, but he was now arguing a speculative establishment for next year. Upon the 3,000 thus afloat, all the casualties of the service would fall, and therefore as those casualties would have to be replaced out of the remaining 6,000, it would be impossible to calculate upon more than 1,500 at the highest, as disposable for that duty at home, in guarding our different arsenals, depôts, and dock-yards. Then, with respect to the artillery, of the 2,000 men kept up at home, after the regular duties were performed, what would remain applicable to that other description of duty which it was proposed they should undertake? He would leave it to the judgment and candour of his hon. friend-and he was sure he would feel convinced, that it was impossible to make from either of those branches of the military force of the country any deductions. He was satisfied, that so far from adding to the force maintained in 1792, it would be found, when all the different circumstances were taken into consideration, that the present estimate for the home service did not exceed that of 1792. As to the guards, it was to be remembered that they were not exclusively employed in the home district. They were sent to Chatham; indeed, there was no difficulty in appointing them to any duty to which their numbers were sufficient; and the only difference to be considered was between the expense of the guards and that incurred by the troops of the line. There seemed to be no diversity of opinion between him and the hon. gentleman as to the cavalry; but a

considerable one certainly subsisted upon the question of the West Indies, though he was satisfied, that when the hon. gen. tleman viewed the matter with more deliberation, that diversity would cease. As to Jamaica, the hon. gentleman had totally discarded that colony out of his calculation; but he wished to observe that it was a mistake to suppose that 4,000 men were to be employed exclusively for Jamaica. Out of those 4,000, there were 500 employed for Honduras, and therefore the real force at Jamaica amounted only to 3,500. With respect to the West India service, it should be considered how sudden the casualties were in that climate, and that a fever might consume from 800 to 1,000 men, before any relief could possibly be sent out from this country. But what was the state of the West Indian army now, as compared with that of 1792, setting Jamaica aside? It was proposed by his majesty's government to vote 9,500 men for the garrisoning those colonies, and if 3,000 were deducted from that number, there would remain only 6,500. In 1792, the force in the West Indies amounted to 4,800, so that there would be an increase of only 1,700, applicable to the existing exigencies in that quarter. Was it possible, however, that his hon. friend should consider it a safe line of policy, to garrison the six additional colonies of Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucie, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, with only 1,700 men? He was confident that such an idea never entered his mind; and therefore it was evident he could not stand upon his own principle, as he would not venture, under those circumstances, to recommend to government so considerable a reduction. He must beg leave also to deny that the situation of St. Do mingo bore only upon Jamaica. He was prepared to contend, that such an independent black empire as was now established in St. Domingo, was calculated to affect the whole hemisphere of the West Indies in its moral and political condition. -With respect to other savings that had been recommended, he must again press upon the consideration of the House, that the present establishments were not proposed by government as permanent ones. They applied only to this present year, and to that state of things which existed in many of the colonies, and which rendered it necessary that such a system of additional precautions should be adopted. The proposed reduction in the home esta

|blishments, however, he considered as untenable at present, and that in the West Indies was not only unsafe, but absolutely impracticable. In another year, he was perfectly aware, that many savings might take place, to the extent, perhaps, of 4 or 5,000 men, in our colonial garrisons; nor would that be the greatest possible saving, because Ireland held out a prospect of a still more considerable one. He admitted also, that in the Mauritius, at Ceylon, and in the Mediterranean, there might be reductions in the future estimates submitted to the House. What he contended for was, that the amount of force proposed for the present year was calculated upon the absolute necessities of the country, and that consequently such reductions as had been suggested were impossible. The House, he was sure, would feel that it was not pledged to vote the 99,000 men another year, because they had supported the government in granting that force now. At the same time, he wished it to be distinctly understood, that he himself was not pledged to any reduction beyond that of 4 or 5,000 men, arguing, as he then did, upon the actual condition of our colonial possessions. It was material also, that the House should recollect, that when they voted 99,000 men, they did not in fact give that force. to the government; they only gave to the government the faculty of raising it, which faculty was to be exerted under all those difficulties always attendant upon such measures. He apprehended that distinction had been lost sight of, and that the reductions proposed by some hon. members had a reference to the gross estimate of 99,000 men, and not to the effective force. He should not detain the House any longer at present, because, although there had been observations made upon some other of the estimates, he thought it better to confine himself now to the larger and more important estimate, reserving, for the subsequent ones, those remarks which might be more appropriately made when they were before the committee. Before he sat down, however, he was anxious to press once more upon their attention, that in voting for the present establishment, parliament was in

no

manner pledged to an approval of similar establishments hereafter, unless, indeed, the hon. gentlemen opposite should be disposed to insist upon such a pledge, in the same way as had been attempted upon another question. They would un