communication from the throne, stating the reasons why the act had not been complied with. Their lordships must know with what attention the returns or dered by the revenue acts were enforced; and why should not the subject have the security of an equal degree of attention to returns under acts of this description? They had now waited till the very last day, and no return had been made, nor any information given why the papers had not been presented within the proper time. Acquiescing, however, for the present, in the noble earl's statement, that unavoidable causes had prevented the return, he again insisted that a communication ought to have been made from the Prince Regent, stating the reasons why the act had not been complied with.

Lord Holland said, that the noble earl seemed to consider the not presenting the papers as an irregularity of little consequence: but it was disobedience to an act of parliament in a matter of great importance of importance at all times, and peculiarly so at present. The noble earl ought at least to have before stated to the House what was the amount of the excess, how it had taken place, why the accounts had not been presented, and when he expected they would be presented.

The Earl of Liverpool said, he had merely stated that he was sure the delay could not have been the effect of wilful negligence. He could not name a day for their being presented.

Lord Holland said, that this was an illegal delay, and peculiarly objectionable at present, when parliament was engaged in the consideration of matters with respect to which the public mind was strongly irritated, from a dreaded violation of a pledge of government and parliament that the income tax would not be continued during peace, If the accounts were not soon presented, he trusted his noble friend would bring the question before the House by motion.

AUSTRIAN LOAN-PECUNIARY SACRIFICES.] Lord King rose, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the pecuniary sacrifices which had been made by this country in its treaties and transactions with the continental powers. It was his intention to submit two motions to their consideration with reference to this subject. The first was, for a communication to the House of what measures had been taken by ministers to recover

all or any part of the sums due on account of the loan made to Austria in 1796; and the other was, for an account of the steps which had been taken to recover from Russia the sums paid for interest in respect of the loan obtained by Russia in Holland, and to procure a discharge to this country from its engagements on account of that loan. It was necessary, for the right understanding of these treaties, to look at the accounts connected with them, in order to see the amount of pecuniary sacrifice which this country had made. In these treaties he believed there were no less than twenty-five subsidies, exclusive of the subsidies to the great powers. The omissions in the treaties in this respect were not less extraordinary than the matter contained in them. No attempt whatever appeared to have been made, in the course of the negociations to claim for this country the just debts and large balance due to her on account of loans made to foreign powers. In order to bring into one view the amount of sacrifices on the part of this country, the particulars might be classed under the following heads: 1st, the Austrian loan of 1796; 2d, the balance due from France on account of prisoners of war; 3d, the Russian loan in Holland; 4th, the advances of 600,000l. and afterwards of 300,000/. to Portugal. As to the Austrian loan, their lordships, or some of them at least, would remember the circum, stances under which it was contracted for, and the statements made to parliament, at that period. Great stress was then laid on the good faith of the Austrian government, and the confidence that might be reposed in it for repayment. Securities were formally taken, and we were to have the right of sueing the emperor on these securities in his own courts. This was surely a matter of too much importance to have escaped the attention of the negocia tors on the part of this country, and he hoped some representations had been made on this subject. But it was with a view to have that matter brought regularly be fore their lordships by an official return, that he now proposed to move for these papers. The sum was too large to have escaped attention, and some representations must have been made, or some satisfactory reason ought to be given, for the omission to make the demand. If their lordships would look at the original amount of the loan, which was seven millions three per cents. together with the interest which had accrued upon it, they would find that

thought of risking the fate of that confederacy by pressing this demand so unseasonably. The result of that coalition with respect to Austria was, that after the capture of Vienna, she was compelled to sign a separate treaty of peace. After that event not a word was said of enforcing this claim; so far from that, in the adjustment of some other matters of this description between this country and Austria, a balance of 500,000l. was recognised as due to Austria, without any reference to this demand. He thought that this was a just and politic proceeding. But, at any rate, such was the fact; and if it had been understood that there was any intention to enforce the demand in question, something then would have been said about it. The next coalition was in 1809: a subsidy was again advanced, but not a word was said about this demand. A loan, indeed, was then out of the question; and he believed it became a maxim with every administration, after the experience of the Austrian loan, not to engage in any transaction of that kind. Russia had applied to the administration, of which the noble lord opposite (lord Holland) formed a part, for permission to negociate a loan in this country. This was refused, and, he believed, upon the acknowledged ground of the fate of the Austrian loan; and in that he thought they had acted rightly. Whether they did right in refusing to support Russia in another way was a different question, which he would not now stop to consider. Such was the state of matters with respect to this loan in 1813. Their lordships were aware how much depended upon Austria at that period. If it had been intended to enforce this claim, he thought it ought to have been stated distinctly to Austria, when, she was called upon to join the confederacy for the salvation of Europe, that such was the intention. But was it advisable then, when the fate of Europe hung as it were by a thread, to throw any difficulty in the way of the formation of the great confederacy of that period, by bringing forward this demand? Why, then, as no intimation was given at the time of the Austrian accession, that it was intended to insist upon this demand, the claim could not afterwards be fairly made. It ought to be recollected how much Austria had exerted herself in the cause of Europe-how many partial defeats she had suffered, and how soon she had arisen therefrom. We ourselves had suffered much by the war.

But

their lordships would consider the sufferings of Austria, who had lost some of her finest provinces, and whose capital had been twice in the power of the enemy. He was glad that Austria had been fayoured in the negociations; and it would be observed that even Russia, a power not in a very flourishing way in respect of her finances, had agreed that Austria and Prussia should have the greater part of the first French contribution, on account of the distressed financial situation of these two countries. The inference he drew from all this was, that it must have been understood long ago on all hands, that this demand was not to be insisted on. Then, with regard to the Russian loan, it had been thought most prudent and expedient, under the circumstances, not to stir the question. It was to be observed, that the interest was to be paid by this country only as long as the Low Countries remained united to Holland, and it therefore became the direct interest of Russia to support and maintain that union. If the period should arrive when that union should be endangered, posterity would say that it was an instance of the wisest policy to have committed Russia by these engagements to the support of this important arrangement. It was easy, when the difficulties were over, and arrangements had been completed, to criticise the trea ties in this and the other particular. But their lordships would look at the difficul ties which the government had to contend with, and what it had done. When Buonaparté was driven with such immense losses from Russia-when the Russian armies had passed the Vistula, and the Oder in pursuit, would it not have been easy for her to have concluded a separate treaty with France? Many in Russia thought that this would have been the wisest course of Russian policy, and were anxious for its adoption. That, however, was not the opinion of the Russian mo narch. The Russian armies, therefore, continued to advance, nor stopped till the independence of Europe was secured, as far as that object could by human pradence be accomplished. He contended, then, that Russia had a fair claim, he would not say upon the strict justice, but on the generosity of this country, for the pecuniary sacrifice which we had made on her account, more particularly when considered with reference to the arrangement with regard to the Netherlands. That was directly of the highest advantage to.

this country. Did their lordships recollect the former state of the Scheldt-of Antwerp? This country, as well as Holland, had largely profited by this arrangement; and our proceedings in this respect had been wise, just, and politic. He admitted, that the principle was not one which ought to be encouraged; but what he maintained was this, that, under the special circumstances in which this country had acted, the pecuniary sacrifices to which we had submitted were justified by the soundest views of prudence and expedience.

Lord Holland observed, that the noble earl had told the House, in the latter part of his speech, that it was extremely easy, after the contest was over, to criticise and find fault with arrangements that might have taken place in the course of it. But this remark was completely off from the point in question, for the drift of his noble friend's motion was, to ascertain the nature of the negociations that had taken place on the loan to Austria, after the danger was past. Neither had his noble friend passed any censure on the arrangements that might have been made, but merely wished to inquire why, when we had given up so many interests, this also had been relinquished? The noble earl had stated at some length, all that had occurred during the war as to the pecuniary assistance that had been afforded to Austria. He was extremely generous to those ministers that had gone before him, and had completely justified all prior administrations for not pressing our claims on Austria; but he had assigned no sufficient reason for not insisting, or at least asking, for the money she owed this country at present. It might have been impolitic and ungracious, when entering into a confederacy with her, to have at such a moment brought forward our claims; but when the war was over-when Austria had recovered all her own provinces, and more than her own-when the principle of indemnity for the past was acted upon in so many other instances, it was unaccountable that our just claims upon her should not only not have been pressed, but should have been entirely overlooked. The administration of which Mr. Fox formed a part, did not press the claims of this country, because they thought that the independence of Austria formed the best hope for the security of Europe. But did their reasoning, grounded on the difficulties in which that power was then placed, at all

apply at the present moment? As there had been so much talk of reading moral lessons to nations, and particularly France, he wondered that it should have been forgotten to suggest to Austria the moral lesson of paying her debts. The conduct of government towards France and Russia had been very different. In regard to them, the noble earl had insisted on the policy of enabling Russia to pay debts which she had contracted thirty years ago, and of compelling France to pay the sums which she owed to British creditors. There could be only two reasons for his forbearance towards Austria; they were theseeither that the debtor was in no condition to pay the debt, or that the creditor was in no want of the money; for no one would contend that the debt was not fairly due. First, then, as to the supposed plea of Austria being unable to pay the money. That she might be in some imaginary. financial difficulties he would not deny; but there was no reason to suppose that she was in greater difficulties, than ourselves. She had had her own provinces restored to her, and not only her own, but provinces had been detached from other countries, and given to her. She was more than indemnified for the loss of the Netherlands by the possession of the Venetian provinces. If France had despoiled Venice of her horses, Austria had taken the stable to herself. It seemed, according to the new doctrines of state policy by which the states of Venice and Genoa were transferred to sovereigns, that if any prince had a claim, either of convenience or ambition, to a territory, it was to be given him at once; but that English money, or popular rights, if once lost, could never be reclaimed. The people of Ve nice and of Genoa had no claim to the recovery of their lost liberty and independence! This, it seemed, would be the ripping up of old sores, just as it would be ungracious and unreasonable for the people of this country to ask for their own money! That Austria might not manage her finances with so much ability, nor be able to extract so much money from her people, as our government did, was very probable; but the fact was, that a large portion of her restored provinces came back to her in a much better state than when she relinquished them: this was a fact to which all travellers in those countries could bear testimony. And therefore, when we took into account her valuable Polish provinces and her Lombardo-Venetian states, there

seemed no reason to suppose her financial means were not most ample,-unless, indeed, according to the modern doctrine, we must consider her population as her natural enemy, and as placing her under the necessity of maintaining increased military establishments. The next question was, whether this country was in want of money?—and about this none of their lordships could have any doubt. They had been told, indeed, in the speech at the commencement of the session, of the high prosperity of the country-a prosperity that was flatly contradicted by the almost unanimous voice of the population. The people of this country, during a prolonged contest, had borne, with unparalleled fortitude, the burthens of a taxation unexampled in history. At the end of such a contest were they to be told-" you are still, even in peace, to be oppressed with taxes," while the other countries which they had rescued by their blood and treasure, were not even to pay their just debts, because, forsooth, they were unwilling, or said they were unable, though their resources had so greatly increased? This, however, was the sum and substance of the noble earl's statement. The noble lord, in further illustration of his argument, adverted to the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, enforcing the claims of British creditors on the French government. The reason there assigned was lord Auckland's commercial treaty of 1786. Now, he was not quite certain whether that treaty had not expired when the revolutionary government broke faith with the public creditor. [Here it was suggested to the noble lord, that the commercial treaty was to last for twelve years.] Well, then, it was then very near its expiration; but at any rate he very much doubted whether that treaty contemplated any thing but commercial debts, and therefore could not be founded upon as a ground why the British creditors of the French govenment should now be paid: but at any rate a peace was made in 1802 with the legitimate successor of the revolutionary government of France (though, according to the modern doctrine, he must not call a first consul or a republic legitimate). The noble earl opposite had himself negociated that peace. How did it happen that he did not then urge the claims of British creditors? He applauded him for not having done so. He should have said to those British creditors "you lent your money to a foreign go

vernment, for the benefit of a foreign country, and to the detriment of your own; and we are not called upon in justice, to argue in support of your claims." He considered any stipulation for the liquidation of these debts as mischievous in point of policy, and holding out a premium to the monied men of this country to lend their money to the French government. It was curious that lord Auckland's treaty had long gone to the tomb of all the Capulets; and yet it was now alleged as the reason for giving British creditors the money they were refused in 1802. Not only was this the case, but the treaty of Paris guaranteed to them the whole of their debts, while the other French fundholders had lost two-thirds of theirs. What was this, but saying to the monied men of Great Britain," you shall not only have the high premium which the distresses of the French government may force it to pay for loans, but also the guarantee of this government for its security." Such was the conduct of ministers in enforcing the claims of private individuals on France, while the just claims of the country on Austria were entirely overlooked. Let their lordships see how this proceeding cut in another way. This country, notwithstanding its proverbial good faith, might still, were another war speedily to break out, be under the necessity of making a composition with its creditors, and of saying to them, like the French revolutionary government, as we cannot give you the whole, you must take a part. In what situation would this provision of the treaty, in such event, place us with regard to the foreign creditor? What should we have to say to him?" Though compelled to break our faith with our own subjects, we cannot with you." Such were the nature and necessary effect of the notable contract into which we had entered. As to the transactions with Russia, it should never be forgotten that the debt, the payment of which we had guaranteed, origi. nated in one of the most hostile proceedings against this country, namely, the armed neutrality. In regard to France, ministers had given up six or seven millions, justly due to the country for the maintenance of prisoners of war, in return for three millions due to individuals. Thus, as the French negociators remarked on the occasion, we had given up five shillings to receive half-a-crown. The whole was a most suspicious transaction, and merited inquiry, particularly when no