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have and to hold the said hereinbefore described lot of ground, with the appurtenances, unto the said, their heirs and assigns, forever; in trust, nevertheless, to and for the erecting thereon a courthouse for the public use and service of the said county, and to and for no other use, intent, or purpose whatsoever." virtue of an act of assembly approved April 15, 1834 (P. L. p. 538), the title of the trustees became vested in the county of Northampton. The Northampton county courthouse was erected on the said lot of ground between the years 1763 and 1766, and remained on the lot from that time until 1862, in which year it was removed, and no other buildings were erected thereon. On the 25th day of July, 1888, William Stuart, who was the heir at law of Thomas and Richard Penn, caused an entry to be made on the said lot of ground for breach of the condition. subject to which, it is alleged, the lot was granted by the above-recited patent, and subsequently he brought an action of ejectment for the recovery of the lot. William Stuart having died after the commencement of the suit, his son, William Dugald Stuart, who succeeded to all the rights of the said William Stuart in and to lands in Pennsylvania, was substituted as plaintiff. Under the instructions of the court below, there was a verdict for the defendants, and afterwards judgment was entered in their favor. The court, in holding that the grant by the Penns was for a charitable use and in affirming a judgment for the defendants, said: "We confidently reach the conclusion that the grant by the Penns of the lot of ground in controversy, in trust for the erection thereon of a courthouse for the public use and service of the county of Northampton, was a grant for a charitable use, in the legal sense. Now, as we have already seen, the deed of conveyance contains no express provision

for a forfeiture or reverter to the grantors or their heirs in the event of nonuser or misuser, and in the absence of such express provision no right of re-entry to defeat the charitable use is to be implied. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff was without title to maintain this ejectment. For the nonuse or misuse of the trust property, the county of Northampton is answerable only to those immediately interested in the trust or to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania." In Goode v. McPherson (1872) 51 Mo. 126, the plaintiffs were heirs at law of James C. Goode who, in A. D. 1849, conveyed to the defendants as trustees for the Methodist Episcopal Church South, and the members of such church, the lots in dispute in trust, to erect a church building to be used as a place of worship, to be subject to the rules and regulations of that church. A house of worship was erected on the lots, but in 1862 or 1863 the house was torn down and the materials sold, and the plaintiffs claimed that the trust had ceased, and that the property ought to revert to them. The court said: "Where property has thus been donated to charitable uses, neither the donor himself, nor his heirs, can ever reclaim it. Courts of equity will protect the beneciaries as long as there are any of them in the enjoyment of the property or its proceeds, and, should such beneficiaries cease to exist, the property or its proceeds will still be applied to charities of a similar nature.

Under no view are these plaintiffs entitled to the relief they seek." See also Academy of Visitation v. Clemens (1872) 50 Mo. 167.

In Mott v. Morris (1913) 249 Mo. 137, 155 S. W. 434, it appeared that land had been conveyed to trustees for two designated churches. The deed provided: "This conveyance is made to said trustees, and said lot is conveyed to them for a site or lot upon which to erect a union church, to be owned and held by said trustees and their successors for the two churches above named; neither church nor its trustees are to convey away its half interest for other than church pur

poses. It is further understood and agreed that the church building to be erected on said lot, when completed, is to be used as a house of worship by the denominations above mentioned, and, when not occupied by either of said denominations, said church building may be used by any other orthodox or Christian church for public worship." About thirty years later the trustees brought suit to try, determine, and adjudge title to the property, making the sole heir of the grantors the defendant. It was alleged that a frame building had been erected on the premises for church purposes, but that the trustees no longer had any use for the premises for such purpose, and desired to sell the same for other than church purposes, but were unable to do so for the reason that the defendant claimed some sort of a reversionary interest in the premises. The defendant asked that the trust be preserved, denied the right of the plaintiffs to alienate the property, but also said that if the right was exercised then the land reverted to her. The court declared that the case was not one where the execution of the use had become impossible in fact, and denied the existence of any power of alienation. As to the question of any reversion to the heir of the donor, it was said: "Absent provisions to the contrary, a gift to charity is forever. It is on such premises that the general rule is deduced that when lands have been donated to charity, and the title is vested absolutely in trustees for charitable uses, as here, they are inalienable for other purposes. Not only so, but in Missouri the rule is, whatever it be in some jurisdictions, that they do not revert to the donor or to his heirs. Whatever the powers of a court of chancery to regulate or preserve in some form a charitable use, the terror of forfeiture is not one of them except under the guarded limitations that there is no escape from that construction.

The premises all considered, we are of opinion that plaintiffs are without power to alien the trust estate for any except church purposes, and, on the other hand, that defendant has no re

versionary interest under the terms of her ancestors' grant. . . . In so far as the decree gave defendant a reversionary interest, it should be reversed. In so far as it denied the right and power of plaintffs to sell for other than church purposes, it should be affirmed."

In Glaze v. Allen (1919) Mo.-, 213 S. W. 784, it appeared that the appellant and his wife, as grantors, executed a general warranty deed conveying the land, in dispute, to three persons designated as "trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church South." The deed contained the following clause: "In trust that said premises hereinafter set forth shall be used, kept, maintained, and disposed of as a place of divine worship, for the use of the ministry and membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, subject to the discipline, usage, and ministerial appointments of said church, as from time to time authorized and declared by the General Conference of said church and the Annual Conference, within whose hands bounds the said premises are situated." A church was erected on the property, but about six or seven years before the trial the property was sold and the church building removed by the purchaser. By order of the Quarterly Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, the proceeds. were used in repairing another church. At the time of the sale, the church had provided that church property which had gone out of use could be sold and the proceeds invested in other church property under the direction of the quarterly or district conference. An action was brought by the appellant to quiet title and also in ejectment to recover possession of the property. The court said: "Appellant contends that the title to this 1 acre of land reverted to him when the property was sold and its use as church property was abandoned. We are unable to agree with this contention. In determining this question, it is not necessary that we determine whether the sale of the property was in violation of the trust created by the grantor, --this because, even though it

should be conceded that it was a violation of the trust, it would not in this instance cause the title to revert to the appellant, the donor. The language of the deed by which appellant established the trust in this property is unambiguous, and contains no language that can be construed as a condition subsequent, or any words providing for a forfeiture or reverter. The rule may be considered as well established in this state under such circumstances. A gift to charity is forever,' and such gifts 'do not revert to the donor or to his heirs.' This exact point is so ruled in the fairly recent case of Mott v. Morris (1913) 249 Mo. 147, 155 S. W. 434. The question is there fully discussed, and the decisions from this state are cited.

For the reasons given in Mott v. Morris (Mo.) supra, we hold that the title to this land, under the facts here disclosed, did not revert to the appellant, the donor, and that therefore the judgment of the circuit court was proper and should be affirmed."

In Mills v. Davison (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 L.R.A. 113, 55 Am. St. Rep. 594, 35 Atl. 1072, there was involved the right of the donor of land to a religious society under a deed to such society and to its successors, with the words "but not to their assigns" added. The habendum was in these words: "To have and to hold unto the said party of the second part and their successors forever, with this express condition and limitation,-that neither the said party of the second part nor their successors shall at any time sell, mortgage, or in any way convey the said land and premises or any part thereof, and that no building shall be kept, maintained, or erected thereon, except for the purpose of public worship and teaching in accordance with the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, and also except the proper outbuildings appurtenant thereto." A church was erected the cost of which was about $6,500, of which sum the donor and his wife gave $2,900. To raise the money necessary to complete the building, after other voluntary contributions were ap

plied, the sum of $2,000 was borrowed of the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. To enable the society to raise this money on mortgage, Mr. and Mrs. Mills made conveyance to the society by a deed containing a consent to a mortgage. On the same day, the society, in its corporate name, made and executed a mortgage on the lot so conveyed to it to the insurance company for the said sum of $2,000. Subsequently a judgment was recovered against the society by one Davison, and a suit was also commenced to foreclose the mortgage. Mills, who with his wife had also given the land, was, with his son, made party to the foreclosure suit, the wife having died. Davison was also made a party. The controversy was over the surplus money that might remain after paying the mortgage debt. Davison, by his answer, claimed that such surplus should be applied to the payment of his judgment. Alfred Mills in his answer denied that the Davison judgment was a lien on the mortgaged premises, and, by way of a cross bill, claimed that the surplus of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged premises should be paid to him and his son. The church society also answered, consenting to a sale of the mortgaged premises, and submitting to the determination of the court the question of the application of the surplus of the money realized from the sale after payment of the mortgage debt, interest, and costs. It was held that the consent to the mortgage would have the effect to validate the mortgage as a lien on the premises conveyed, and that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale would take the premises by title free from the trust, but that the surplus money arising from such sale would belong to the society, to be held on the original trust. The court said as to the right of the grantor: "The question is wholly one of construction. The dominating rule in the construction of deeds and other written instruments is to so construe them as to give effect to the intention of the parties as far as is permitted by the rules of law. The prefatory words in the habendum in the deed in question are, 'upon this

minister the trusts of the will. The attorney general took out a summons before Mr. Justice Kay to vary the certificate, but his lordship refused to vary it. The next of kin applied by summons for the payment out to them of the fund in court, on the ground that the bequest, being for a special charitable object which could not be carried out, had failed. It was held that, although the particular purpose of the will had failed, a general charitable intention to benefit the poor of the parish of Shoreditch was manifested and the court would execute the trust. Lindley, L. J., said: "If we were considering the question now for the first time the result might be different, but the whole doctrine is perfectly well settled. The object here is to establish a charity for the benefit of the poor, with a particular mode of doing it; and if you cannot accomplish the object in that mode, then in some other mode in which you can. pears to me that to give the next of kin this £10,000 would be quite contrary to the authorities."

It ap

In the case of Re Buck [1896] 2 Ch. 727, it appeared that a testator had bequeathed £500 to a friendly society for its purposes, which were to provide for the relief, by means of annuities, of members, their widows, and children, if in distressed circumstances. At the time of the testator's death there were only three annuitants entitled to relief, and about three years afterwards only one remained. It was held that the gift was to a charity, and that as the charity was existing at the time of the testator's death it had not lapsed. The court further held as to the application of the fund: "It is agreed on all hands not only that, at the death of the testator, but that up to the present time, there was and is at least one annuitant claiming against the fund.

seems to me there is a duty to provide for her annuity which is still existing, and consequently the charitable institution is still existing. It does not follow, however, that because it is still existing it has not failed practically. It seems to me that the institution has failed, except so far as it is necessary to provide for this particular annuitant. That is a matter of consideration as regards the fund in court, with which I am not now dealing. But as regards this legacy of £500, it is clearly not wanted for the particular annuity, and it must be applied, that is to say, put in process of application, to objects akin to those to which the testator devoted his legacy, but to which it cannot be strictly applied, because there are no means of so applying it. There must be a declaration that the society is a charitable institution and was existing at the testator's death, and that there was no lapse of the legacy of £500; and there must be an order for payment of the money into court to the same credit as the other funds of the society, but to a separate account. The costs of all parties, as between solicitor and client, will come out of the legacy; and there will be liberty to the attorney general to apply for a scheme."

The case of Re Cunningham [1914] 1 Ch. 427, while it involved the right of residuary charities, rather than that of the heirs, may be referred to in this connection. In that case the testatrix, in her will, gave a leasehold home to a charitable society, and directed her executors and trustees to pay the treasurer of the society a certain annuity a year "for the maintenance and expenses of maintaining" a home, and, "after the final expiration of the aforesaid trusts," the trustees were to hold the residuary trust funds in trust for certain residuary charities. After the testatrix's death, on November 6, 1910, the society carried on the home as before until May 27, 1913, when it was sold under the following circumstances: At some time after the expiration of a year from the testatrix's death, the Charity commissioners drew the society's at