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ing v. Home Ins. Co. 71 N. Y. 508, 27 Am. Rep. 86; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 187 Ill. 73, 58 N. E. 314; Hill v. Cumberland Valley Mut. Protection Co. 59 Pa. 474; O'Neil v. Franklin F. Ins. Co. 159 App. Div. 313, 145 N. Y. Supp. 432, affirmed in 216 N. Y. 692, 110 N. E. 1045; Trumbull v. Portage County Mut. Ins. Co. 12 Ohio, 305; Arkansas F. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 67 Ark. 553, 48 L.R.A. 510, 77 Am. St. Rep. 129, 55 S. W. 933; Pringle v. Des Moines, 107 Iowa, 742, 77 N. W. 521; International Wood Co. v. National Assur. Co. 99 Me. 415, 105 Am. St. Rep. 288, 59 Atl. 544, 2 Ann. Cas. 356; Boston & S. Ice Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. 12 Allen, 381, 90 Am. Dec. 151; Washington F. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421, 3 Am. Rep. 149; Zeitler v. Concordia F. Ins. Co. 169 Mich. 555, 135 N. W. 332; Masters v. Madison County Mut. Ins. Co. 11 Barb. 624; Russell v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. 4 L.R.A. 538, note; National F. Ins. Co. v. Itasca Lumber Co. 148 Minn. 170, 181 N. W. 337; King v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 133 Minn. 322, 158 N. W. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 861.

Plaintiff complied with all the terms of the policy.

19 Cyc. 710; Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 90 Ill. 121; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 11 C. C. A. 503, 24 U. S. App. 493, 63 Fed. 925; Feibelman v. Manchester F. Assur. Co. 108 Ala. 180, 19 So. 540; Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. United States Casualty Co. 172 Mo. 135, 61 L.R.A. 766, 95 Am. St. Rep. 500, 72 S. W. 635.

Mr. Rollo N. Chaffee for respondent intervener.

Dibell, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Action on two policies of fire insurance aggregating $3,000, issued by the defendant to the plaintiff on a building in Duluth. The Northern Title Company, a mortgagee of the plaintiff, intervened, claiming that the insurance company agreed, but failed, to attach a mortgage clause to the policies, making the insurance payable to it, and asked a reformation. The trial court found that the loss was total, decreed a reformation, and directed judgment for the plaintiff for one sum and for the intervener for an

other, the two sums aggregating

$3,000 and interest. The defendant appeals from the judgment.

1. The policies are of the Minnesota standard form. They provide for forfeiture "if without such assent [of the insurer] the situation or circumstances affecting the risk shall, by or with the knowledge, advice, agency, or consent of insured, be so altered as to cause an increase of such risks, or if, without such assent, the property shall be sold or this policy assigned.

Gen. Stat. 1913, § 3318. The issue between the plaintiff and the defendant is whether the property was "sold" within the meaning of the policy. There is no claim that there was an assent by the insurer.

The facts are not in dispute. One policy was dated February 26, 1921; the other March 31, 1921. The property was destroyed by fire on August 18, 1921. On May 13, 1921, the plaintiff entered into a contract of sale with one Radovich for $3,680. He paid $400 in cash, assumed two mortgages made by the plaintiff to the intervener, aggregating $1,800, agreed to pay the balance of $1,480 in monthly instalments, and took possession. The plaintiff endeavored to sell to the People's State Bank. He was engaged in building and selling houses and wanted to buy property and build. The bank refused to purchase, but offered to advance the money due on the contract if Radovich would make a note directly to the bank, and the plaintiff would indorse it. The plaintiff accepted. The bank paid $300 in cash. The balance was represented by two lots deeded to the plaintiff by an officer of the bank. The plaintiff, his wife joining, exerty, the name of the grantee blank, ecuted a deed of the insured propand delivered it to the bank to be delivered to Radovich when his payments were completed. Such a transaction passes the equitable title in fee to the vendee, leaving the legal title in fee in the vendor as se- forfeiturecurity; and when instalment sale formed the vendor holds the legal the contract is per

Insurance

of property.

(— Minn. —, 198 N. W. 1003.) title as trustee. This is settled law in Minnesota. Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N. W. 1032, and cases cited; Re Consolidation School Dist. 146 Minn. 403, 178 N. W. 892, and cases cited. The vendee is a freeholder within Gen. Stat. 1913, 6656, defining "estates of inheritance" as freeholds. Re Consolidation School Dist. 140 Minn. 475, 168 N. W. 552. So is the vendor. Re Consolidation School Dist. 146 Minn. 403, 178 N. W. 892. The interest of each is subject to a judgment lien. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 25 Minn. 382; Reynolds v. Fleming, 43 Minn. 513, 45 N. W. 1099; Hook v. Northwest Thresher Co. 91 Minn. 482, 98 N. W. 463. The interest of the vendor is as stated, though it passes as personalty upon his death. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Ct. 145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493. If the contract of sale does not forfeit the policy, the depositing of a deed in escrow, to be delivered on completion of the payments, does not. Moore v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 176 Iowa, 549, 156 N. W. 676. The deposit in escrow does not make the contract of sale anything more. The plaintiff remained liable on the mortgage notes. In the mortgages he had agreed to procure insurance for the protection of the mortgagee. He was liable on the Radovich note of $1,480. He was, in reality, borrowing from the bank. He had an insurable interest in the property; so had Radovich. See Banner Laundry Co. v. Great Eastern Casualty Co. 148 Minn. 29, 180 N. W. 997, and authorities cited; National F. Ins. Co. v. Itasca Lumber Co. 148 Minn. 170, 181 N. W. 337; 2 Joyce, Ins. §§ 977, 983; Cooley, Briefs on Ins. & Supp. 188-190; 14 R. C. L. 916.

ance if the insurer is not the entire, unconditional, and sole owner.

In construing such or similar conditions some courts emphasize the change of moral hazard attendant upon a change of interest or a change of possession; others direct serious attention to the question whether the insured retains an insurable interest. Both are legitimate considerations. In King v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 133 Minn. 322, 158 N. W. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 861, involving a Canadian policy forfeiting the insurance "if the property insured is assigned without a written permission indorsed hereon," it was held that an assignment of the property by way of security did not forfeit the insurance. Mr. Justice Bunn said: "The cases hold quite generally that what such a provision as the one under discussion is intended to provide against is a transfer or assignment of the insured's entire interest in the property, so that he does not retain an insurable interest and that a chattel mortgage is not such a transfer or assignment."

We are not cited a case construing a policy with a condition of forfeiture in the precise language of the one before us. Some policies protect against an alienation; others against a sale or conveyance or encumbrance; others against change in title, interest, or possession; and others avoid the insur

a

The plaintiff cites Gibb v. Fire Ins. Co. 59 Minn. 267, 50 Am. St. Rep. 405, 61 N. W. 137. The policy contained a condition of forfeiture "if any change other than by the death of an insured takes place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of insurance." It was held that an executory agreement to convey under which the vendee took possession and paid a portion of the purchase price worked a forfeiture because of the change of interest. The court said: "It is held by the great weight of authority that, where the condition is against any change in the title, there is no breach unless there is a change in the legal title-that, as long as the insured retains the legal title and an insurable interest in the premises, the policy is not avoided by a transfer of the equitable title or of equitable interests; but we cannot. apply this doctrine to a condition. against any change of interest. The terms are not synonymous, as contended by counsel. The word 'in

terest' is broader than the word 'title,' and includes both legal and equitable rights."

Under a like condition it was held in Garner v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. 73 Kan. 127, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 654, 117 Am. St. Rep. 460, 84 Pac. 717, 9 Ann. Cas. 459, that such a contract did not avoid the policy, either as affecting a change of title or a change of interest. And see Erb v. German-American Ins. Co. 98 Iowa, 606, 40 L.R.A. 845, 67 N. W. 583; Grable v. German Ins. Co. 32 Neb. 645, 49 N. W. 713. In Brighton Beach Racing Asso. v. Home Ins. Co. 113 App. Div. 728, 99 N. Y. Supp. 219, affirmed without opinion in 189 N. Y. 526, 82 N. E. 1124, it was held under a like provision that a contract of sale constituted a change both in title and interest and forfeited the policy. And see Grunauer v. Westchester F. Ins. Co. 72 N. J. L. 289, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 107, 62 Atl. 418.

The plaintiff cites, among other cases (and they directly or indirectly support his claim): Kempton v. State Ins. Co. 62 Iowa, 83, 17 N. W. 194; Grable v. German Ins. Co. supra; Browning v. Home Ins. Co. 71 N. Y. 508, 27 Am. Rep. 86; Hill v. Cumberland Valley Mut. Protection Co. 59 Pa. 474; Arkansas F. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 67 Ark. 553, 48 L.R.A. 510, 77 Am. St. Rep. 129, 55 S. W. 933; Washington F. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421, 3 Am. Rep. 149; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 187 Ill. 73, 58 N. E. 314, affirming 85 Ill. App. 104; National F. Ins. Co. v. Three States Lumber Co. 217 Ill. 115, 108 Am. St. Rep. 239, 75 N. E. 450.

The policy in the Kempton Case contained a condition of forfeiture "if said property shall be sold, conveyed or encumbered." It was held that an executory contract of sale did not work a forfeiture. Possession had not been taken at the time of the loss. The defendant urges that it is overruled by Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. 71 Iowa, 532, 60 Am. Rep. 818, 32 N. W. 514, involv

ing a policy with a like condition of forfeiture. The Davidson Case assumes to distinguish the Kempton Case. In Pringle v. Des Moines Ins. Co. 107 Iowa, 742, 77 N. W. 521, it is said that the two cases are not in conflict. In Moore v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 176 Iowa, 549, 560, 156 N. W. 676, involving a policy with a condition of forfeiture upon a change of title, interest or possession, the Kempton Case is cited with a statement that "the change in interest or title which will avoid the policy must be a present and absolute one." The Iowa cases, so far as we have traced them, consider possession an important factor, perhaps both because of the moral hazard attending a change and the character of the interest transferred. So do others. The defendant urges that the Illinois cases cited are without force because under the law of this state the vendee did not take an equitable title. This may be of some significance, but it is not controlling. The vendor retained the legal title, and had an insurable interest. So he does in Minnesota.

The defendant cites, among other cases (and they directly or indirectly support its claim that there was a sale and forfeiture): Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., noted above; Brighton Beach Racing Asso. v. Home Ins. Co., noted above; Brickell v. Atlas Assur. Co. 10 Cal. App. 17, 101 Pac. 16; Des Moines Ins. Co. v. Moon, 33 Okla. 437, 126 Pac. 753; Vancouver Nat. Bank v. Law, Union & Crown Ins. Co. (C. C.) 153 Fed. 440.

The

The defendant, in addition, makes an argument in support of a claim of forfeiture based upon the rule that the loss in the event of destruction falls upon the vendee. weight of authority is that under a contract such as the one before us the loss occasioned by the destruction of the insured property is that of the vendee. 1 Tiffany, Real Prop. § 126. The cases are collected in a note in 22 A.L.R. 575. The

(— Minn. -, 198 N. W. 1003.)

defendant refers to this rule, and cites many cases holding that, under policies requiring the ownership of the insured to be sole, unconditional, and entire, the vendee has an insurable interest, and his equitable title satisfies the condition. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Kerr, 66 L.R.A. 569, 64 C. C. A. 251, 129 Fed. 723; Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Rhea, 60 C. C. A. 103, 123 Fed. 9; Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 47 C. C. A. 459, 108 Fed. 497; Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co. 112 Ála. 108, 33 L.R.A. 258, 57 Am. St. Rep. 17, 20 So. 419; Arkansas Ins. Co. v. Cox, 21 Okla. 873, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 775, 129 Am. St. Rep. 808, 98 Pac. 552; Johannes v. Standard Fire Office, 70 Wis. 196, 5 Am. St. Rep. 159, 35 N. W. 298; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa. 460, 2 Am. St. Rep. 686, 12 Atl. 668. The cases of this kind are in substantial harmony. An occasional suggestion is found that there cannot be such ownership in the vendee and a like ownership in the vendor; but we do not take it to follow that, because the vendee's insurance is not forfeited by such a condition, the insurance of the vendor is forfeited because of a condition against a change of title, or sale, or a similar condition. The cases hardly say so. The law dislikes a forfeiture of the vendee's insurance, and it dislikes a forfeiture of the vendor's insur

ance.

The cases involving forfeitures are in confusion; partly so, because of the variant conditions of the policies, and partly because of the angle of approach taken by different courts in coming to a construction of them. We are of the view that the plaintiff's position is the better supported by the authorities. It may be noted that the condition of the standard policy provides a forfeiture in the event of an increase of risk through a change of situation or circumstances with the knowledge or consent of the insured and without the assent of the insurer. The insurer is not without

protection against an increase of hazard. We hold that the contract of sale did not forfeit the plaintiff's insurance.

2. The plaintiff covenanted in his mortgages to keep the property insured in the sum of $3,000 for the protection of the mortgagee. It seems that the plaintiff would be entitled in equity to a lien or charge upon the insurance money, there being no forfeiture, upon a failure. of the mortgagor to make the policy payable in case of loss to the mortgagee. Ames v. Richardson, 29 Minn. 330, 13 N. W. 137. Probably the mortgagee could come into the mortgagor's action on the policy and impress the proceeds with a lien. Under our holding that there was not a forfeiture, the defendant must pay somebody the full amount of the loss-either the plaintiff, or the plaintiff and the intervener. If the contract of sale forfeited the policy, then, under Gen. Stat. 1913, § 3318, protecting the rights of a mortgagee, when loss is payable to him, against a forfeiture for an act of the mortgagor, the question whether the intervener was entitled to relief by way of specific performance or reformation would be a practical one. Sterling F. Ins. Co. v. Beffrey, 48 Minn. 9, 50 N. W. 922; Magoun v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 86 Minn. 486, 91 Am. St. Rep. 370, 91 N. W. 5; Moore v. Sun Ins. Office, 100 Minn. 374, 111 N. W. 260. It does not seem important here; but the question whether the defendant agreed to make the policies payable to the intervener is before us for decision.

There is evidence that the intervener telephoned to the agent of the insurance company, requesting him to make the policies payable, in case of loss, to the mortgagee, and that he promised to do so. This the agent denies. There are circumstances in the case supporting the intervener's claim, and there are circumstances sustaining the insurance company's denial. There is evidence that the intervener relied

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whether the recovery is sustained upon the theory of a reformation or upon the theory of specific perform

ance.

3. The plaintiff claims that the finding that the loss was total is not sustained. The plaintiff, himself a contractor, made a sworn statement which fixed the value of $2,618.60. In it he said that he thought he would be willing to take that amount. At the trial his own testimony and that of two other contractors made the loss total, and in a sum equal to the amount of the policy. The value might have been found to be less, but the finding is sustained.

Judgment affirmed.

ANNOTATION.

-total loss.

What amounts to a sale within forfeiture provision of insurance policy forbidding property to be sold or conveyed without assent of insurer.

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As to whether the appointment of a receiver, bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, or assignment for the benefit of creditors is a change in interest, title, or possession within a policy provision in a fire policy, see annotation in 17 A.L.R. 382; and the question of whether a conditional vendor or vendee is the sole and unconditional owner within a provision in a fire insurance policy is covered in an annotation following Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Lennon, ante, 200. Generally an alienation of insured property will end the policy as to the insured, if he retains no further interest in the property, although, if an interest is retained, the policy will cover and protect that interest, in the absence of special stipulations to the contrary, except in cases where

VII. Foreclosure sales; judicial sales,

326.

VIII. Mortgage, 327.

IX. Bankruptcy; assignment for benefit of creditors, 329.

X. Lease, 330.

XI. Miscellaneous, 330.

a transfer would increase the temptation on the part of the insured to defraud the insurer; however, forms of policies in general use provide that they shall become void on any change in title or interest. 14 R. C. L. title, "Insurance," § 292.

The present annotation is, however, not concerned with general provisions forbidding a change in the title, interest, or possession of the insured, or those avoiding the policy, in case the insured is not the entire, unconditional, and sole owner, but is limited to a consideration of what amounts to a sale within the meaning of a provision avoiding the policy in the event that the property is "sold," or "conveyed," without the assent of the insurer. However, in regard to provisions against change of title or interest, it may be said that

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