(— N. M. -, 224 Pac. 1028.) immediately thereafter sought a writ of habeas corpus from the supreme court. The sole question involved and decided concerned the validity of the pardon. The Constitution of the state of Mississippi (Const. 1832, art. 5, § 10) bestowed upon the governor the "power to grant reprieves and pardons, and to remit fines in all criminal and penal cases, except in those of treason and impeachment." The court there held that wrongs are of two classes, public and private. That private wrongs are those which infringe upon the rights of individuals in their individual capacity, and that public wrongs are those which violate the rights which the individual owes to the entire community, when considered as a social entity. After declaring this distinction between the two classes of wrongs, it was held that criminal contempt came within the latter, and that it was a crime within the contemplation of the constitutional provision quoted, and hence within the range of the pardoning power. It was further pointed out that it differed from the ordinary criminal case, in that no jury trial was guaranteed, but it was nevertheless of that degree of public wrong as to fall within the pardoning power granted by the Constitution. It was said in that case: "But it has been insisted by counsel that contempts of court do not come under the class of criminal or penal cases. The attachment which issues upon the information of a contempt is a criminal process. 1 Tidd, Pr. 401. 4 Bl. Com. 231, calls the offense 'a criminal charge.' 'A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it.' 4 Bl. Com. 5. The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community in its social, aggregate capacity. Id. 6. Contempts of court are treated by all elementary writers as public wrongs. They are distinguished from ordinary crimes or misdemeanors, because in their punishment there is no intervention of a jury, the party being acquitted or condemned by the suffrage of such person only as the statute has appointed for his judge. Id. 279, title, 'Summary Conviction.' In short, the whole doctrine of contempts goes to the point that the offense is a wrong to the public, not to the person of the functionary to whom it is offered, considered merely as an individual. It follows, then, that the contempts of court are either crimes or misdemeanors in proportion to the aggravation of the offense, and, as such, are included within the pardoning power of this state." The case is directly in point with reference to both the law and the facts. The constitutional provision which confers the pardoning power upon the governor is, in effect, similar to the Constitution of this state, and the facts there involved were so nearly identical with those involved in the cases before us that the principles of law declared there are applicable here. The next case which assumed to discuss and decide the right to pardon for contempt was State ex rel. Van Orden v. Sauvinet, 24 La. Ann. 119, 13 Am. Rep. 115. In that case a writ of sequestration had issued, whereby it was sought to recover from the possession of the relator, Sauvinet, a certain cash box, with its contents, which he declined to surrender in obedience to the commands of the writ. He was adjudged to be in contempt, for which punishment was imposed. The governor granted him a pardon, but the sheriff declined to release him from custody, because said sheriff conceived that the pardoning power did. not extend to such a case; where upon he instituted proceedings in habeas corpus to secure his liberty. The whole case revolved around the validity of such pardon, which depended upon the power of the governor to pardon for contempt of court. A clear distinction between civil and criminal contempt is not drawn in the opinion in that case, but it is declared in general terms that contempt of court is an offense against the state, and not against the judge of the court personally, and that the state, being the offended party, had the right to grant a remission of that offense by a pardon duly granted through another department of its government,-the executive. The state contends such case is not authority here, because it clearly appears that it involved civil contempt. As we have previously stated, the court did not seem to clearly distinguish between the two classes of contempts, and while it may be argued with great force that the facts involved in that case constituted civil contempt, it seems that the court did not so treat it, but, to the contrary, regarded it as criminal contempt. This appears from the following language, to be found in the opinion: "It is proper to add that Lewis, the plaintiff in sequestration, has no interest or right of property in the punishment inflicted. It is no concern of his, but concerns the state alone; and the rule, therefore, that when a private person (as an informer, for example) has acquired a right of property in a penalty, the executive cannot pardon, can have no application to this case." In Sharp v. State, 102 Tenn. 9, 43 L.R.A. 788, 73 Am. St. Rep. 851, 49 S. W. 752, the relator had been adjudged guilty of contempt of court for endeavoring to influence the sheriff to summon certain persons to serve as jurors in a case in which the relator's son was being tried upon a charge of making false and fraudulent entries in the books of his employers. The relator secured from the governor a pardon, which the presiding judge of the court refused to recognize, upon the theory that the pardoning power did not exist in such a case. The court held that such power did exist under § 6 of article 3 of the Constitution, which vested the pardoning power in the governor in this language: "He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, except in cases of impeachment." No discussion will be found in that opinion concerning the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, but we think it indubitably appears that it was criminal rather than civil contempt. The action of the relator in attempting to influence the sheriff to summon certain persons to serve upon the jury was merely an act calculated to impede or obstruct the due administration of justice. It violated no order, mandate, or decree of the court. Neither did the relator fail or refuse to do something which the court had ordered or commanded him to do, and the punishment imposed was not to coerce compliance with any such order or mandate, nor to force him to yield obedience to any process of the court, but was purely punitive in character, to prevent a repetition of such conduct. It was therefore clearly criminal contempt, and was held by that court to come within the pardoning power under a constitutional provision almost identical with ours. The provision of the Constitution of the United States which vests the pardoning power in the President is quite similar to the provision contained in the Constitution of this state, vesting such power in the governor. It is in this language: "He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." U. S. Const. art. 2. The only differences between the two are that, under the Constitution of this state, such power can be exercised only after conviction, and treason is excepted; whereas, such limitation and exception are not to be found in the Constitution of the United States. Otherwise, the two provisions are identical. In Re Mul (N. M., 224 Pac. 1028.) lee. 7 Blatchf. 23, Fed. Cas. No. I That Judge Blatchford regarded the case as one embracing criminal contempt is fully disclosed from his opinion. This language is to be found near its close: "The contempt of court was an offense against the United States, and the fine was inflicted as a punishment therefor." Moreover, he cites with approval, and in a large measure bases his conclusion upon, what is referred to as the Dixon Case, 3 Ops. Atty. Gen. 622, wherein Dixon was punished for contempt committed by an affray had in the presence of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Mississippi, which was undeniable criminal contempt; and, we pause to suggest, the opinion further discloses that Justice McKinley, then associate justice of the United States, whose circuit embraced the district of Mississippi, recommended the pardon at the hands of the President. This may be regarded as a reflection of the views entertained by Justice McKinley with reference to the pardoning power in cases of that and this class. Before leaving the Mullee Case, it has been suggested that its force is weakened because Judge Blatchford, in the later case of Fischer v. Hayes (C. C.) 6 Fed. 63, abandoned his original position. The most that can be said is that he receded from the position that a violation of an injunction writ constituted criminal contempt. In the later case, he regarded such facts as constituting civil contempt; but he never even intimated that he doubted his position taken in the Mullee Case concerning the power of the President to pardon for criminal contempt. While the opinions of the Attorney General of the United States are neither precedent nor controlling, they may be considered as persuasive, especially upon a subject of this kind, which has been so infrequently decided by courts. It has been held in three different instances by Attorneys General of the United States that the President has the power, derived from the abovequoted constitutional provision, to pardon for criminal contempt. 3 Ops. Atty. Gen. 622; 4 Ops. Atty. But the provisions of the ConstituGen. 317, 458. Perhaps the strongest case construing this kind of charge is Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 58 L. ed. 1115, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1044. In that case, the proceedings were in the nature of a criminal contempt to punish for past acts done in violation of a writ of injunction, not to secure obedience in the future. The defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, which is in this language: "No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, except as provided in section one thousand and fortysix, unless the indictment is found, or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed. But this act shall not have effect to authorize the prosecution, trial or punishment for any offense, barred by the provisions of existing laws." Rev. Stat. § 1044, 19 Stat. at L. 32, chap. 56, Comp. Stat. § 1708, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 692. It is to be noted that the limitation applies to "offenses," being the word used in the Constitution of the state, governing the pardoning power. This fact, when considered in connection with the further fact that it is construed by the highest court of the land, makes the case of peculiar interest and of controlling force. It was argued that criminal contempts did not come within the purview of the statute, because they were not offenses. The court expressly held otherwise, saying if they were not criminal we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of "crimes" as that word has been understood in the English speech. This pertinent language was there used: "It is urged in the first place that contempts cannot be crimes, because, although punishable by imprisonment, and therefore, if crimes, infamous, they are not within the protection of the Constitution and the amendments giving a right to trial by jury, etc., to persons charged with such crimes. tion are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281, 282, 41 L. ed. 715, 717, 718, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326. It does not follow that contempts of the class under consideration are not crimes, or rather, in the language of the statute, offenses, because trial by jury, as it has been gradually worked out and fought out, has been thought not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right. These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of 'crimes' as that word has been understood in English speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems to be proved that in the early law they were punished only by the usual criminal procedure [3 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, N. S. p. 147 (1885)], and that, at least in England, it seems that they still may be, and preferably are, tried in that way." Later, and with particular reference to whether such proceedings came within the Statute of Limitations concerning "offenses," the court said: "Even if the statute does not cover the case by its express words, as we think it does, still, in dealing with the punishment of crime, a rule should be laid down, -if not by Congress, by this court." We consider this case far more than persuasive, it is decisive. If criminal contempt is an "offense" within the Statute of Limitations of the United States, we cannot appreciate why it is not embraced within the constitutional provision which vests the power in the government to pardon for "all offenses, except treason and in cases of impeachment." How can it be said that it is (N. M. 224 Pac. 1028.) an offense in one instance and not in the other? Counsel for the the state have strongly urged upon us the cases of Re Nevitt, 54 C. C. A. 662, 117 Fed. 448, and State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 23 A.L.R. 491, 187 N. W. 830, as two of the leading cases which deny the right to pardon. A casual reading of these demonstrates that in each instance the court determined that the facts set forth constituted civil contempt. All that is said with reference to the pardoning power in cases of criminal contempt is purely dictum, and was so regarded by the writers. This is particularly apparent from the language used by Judge Sanborn in the Nevitt Case: "It is not, however, necessary to a decision of the application before us, nor is it our purpose, to here decide whether or not criminal contempts-contempts instituted solely for the purpose of vindicating the dignity of the courts, preserving their power, and punishing disobedience of their orders-fall within the pardoning power of the executive." It is equally apparent in State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, by the use of this language: "This disposes of the case without reaching the question whether the governor has power to pardon in criminal contempt cases; that is, where the punishment is inflicted for purely punitive purposes and to expiate the contemner's public offense. This is a very interesting question, and one to which we have devoted no little thought and consideration. It may be said to be an unsettled question in this country, as instances of its judicial consideration are rare." What is said upon the subject is, therefore, neither precedent nor authority; at most, it can be considered in the nature of texts. We have carefully considered the further case of Taylor v. Goodrich, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 40 S. W. 515, which is strongly relied upon by counsel for the state. While the court expressly denied the power of the governor to pardon for criminal contempt, we think the conclusion "The design of enacting this Code is to define in plain language every offense against the laws of this state, and affix to each offense its proper punishment." Article 1. "The object of punishment is to suppress crime and reform the offender." Article 2. "In order that the system of penal law in force in this state may be complete within itself, and that no system of foreign laws, written or unwritten, may be appealed to, it is declared that no person shall be punished for any act or omission, unless the same is made a penal offense, and a penalty is affixed thereto by the written law of this state." Article 3. Since the enactment of such Penal Code, it has been uniformly held in that state that no act constitutes a crime for which punishment may be imposed, unless expressly denounced by the terms of the Code, and a penalty affixed therefor. In other words, words, no other law regarding crimes or offenses is known in that state. Scott v. State, 86 Tex. 321, |