Even if the precise program which has been so successful elsewhere were not practical in these basins, there is still no reason not to undertake an intelligent development of our river valleys.

In the New England area, the trend so far has been toward singlepurpose dams and other projects, in spite of the fact that this region. is notorious for high power rates and underdevelopment of its hydroelectric power resources. In spite of the enormous human resources of the region, industry is not attracted to it because it cannot compete with other sections of the country enjoying lower rates.

I have some indications of what the rate variations are, and I will put them in the record.

Senator LEHMAN. There being no objection, it will be so ordered. (The material referred to follows:)

1 Medium users: 60,000 kilowatt-hours per month (300 kilowatt demand).

? Medium users: 100 kilowatt-hours.

Source: Typical electric bills, 1955, cities of 50,000 population and more. Federal Power Commission.

Mr. MCMURRAY. The per capita consumption of electricity in the New England States is one-third to one-fourth of what it is in many areas in the South and West. New York State's potential hydroelectric power resources are, according to the Federal Power Commission, only 29 percent developed. The opposition of the private power interests to programs of multipurpose flood control has in the past effectively blocked progress along these lines.

The table just inserted shows for selected cities the industrial rates average cost per kilowatt-hour; the typical net monthly industrial electric bills on January 1, 1955; and the residential electric bill; and the average residential electric energy used for various cities. Just by way of example, in Chattanooga, Tenn., the typical monthly residential bill is $2.50, and that compares with Waterbury, Conn., of $4.40 and Pawtucket, R. I., of $4.61. And the industrial rates vary pretty much the same way.

Senator LEHMAN. And on the Pacific coast, I think the rates are even lower. I don't know whether you have those.

Mr. MCMURRAY. I have Seattle, Wash., $2.52, and an industrial rate of $572, compared to New York City, Senator, of an industrial rate of $1,440-quite a difference.

The flood waters which inundated our 6 States this fall are sufficient testimony to their short-sightedness. The Hoover Commission's task force report on water resources and power recommends a restrictive policy which would maintain the monopoly of the area's private power interests at the expense of the flood-control program.

An illustration of the lag in providing needed flood-control facilities is Winsted, Conn. In the flood of 1927, the main street was flooded by the Mad River; 28 years later, the Diane floods sent the same river sweeping through the town again.

No program of flood insurance can hope to be effective in this region if the recommendations of the Hoover Commission are followed. The New England area will continue to be subject to these disastrous floods unless the region's opposition to the Federal multiple-purpose water-resources programs gives way. The region has the smallest share of Federal power projects in the country, and even of floodcontrol program only 22 percent has been completed, compared with 45 percent nationally.

The flood-control and power controversy has raged for a long time and is still far from being settled. I mention it only because it seems to me to have the most serious implications for a flood insurance or indemnity program. Can the Federal Government undertake to bail out property owners who suffer flood damages in areas that fight against the very measures which would reduce the damages they ask to be indemnified for? I think the answer is obvious, and that in setting insurance rates, consideration should be given to this factor, so as to encourage the vigorous implementation of such flood-control projects as may be needed to afford the maximum possible protection consistent with costs.

So far my comments have been on flood control. I forgot to mention, Senator, that time did not permit me to clear this statement with the Governor's office, nor have I had the time to exchange views with the superintendent of insurance, Mr. Holz-so that I am speaking in part on housing as commissioner of housing, but I am sure in many cases on my own-from a personal point of view. I would like to believe that the Governor would share these views, but I am not sure, and I do not intend to indicate that by my statement here today. Any insurance bill which is finally passed should not be limited to flood insurance alone. There are many other types of natural disasters against which the public has no protection which would fit into the framework of the legislation being considered. The inclusion of such other disasters would also help to spread the risk and lower the rates for all purchasers.

Senator Lehman's bill, of course, does this in that it applies to all natural causes and even to man-made disasters, including war damage. We all hope and pray that the horrors of nuclear and radioactive warfare will never be visited upon this earth, but if, God forbid, we should permit this to happen, can we in honesty set up any workable system of insurance which could even begin to cope with the immensity of the problem? Much as we would like to do so, how could any government possibly pay off the claims which would result from a full-scale modern nuclear attack by a powerful enemy, out of any insurance reserves which could be collected out of premiums? Would such a system not have to be compulsory in order to be economically

feasible? If Congress doesn't want a mandatory program, is a voluntary program actuarially computable at all, since our experience with war-damage insurance is very limited and our knowledge of the insurance aspects of damage from nuclear, radiological, or biological warfare is, so far, praise God, nil? What would we, as decent human beings, do about the people who had not paid for insurance? Would we not in the end have to subsidize indemnities for all survivors as a matter of national policy and Christian charity? And are not losses of this kind, in any event, a proper charge on the Nation itself, to be shared equitably by all of us-or all of us who survive, to be more exact? Whether or not an insurance program of this kind is possible, there are, however, steps which could be taken to reduce the risk.

Just as in the case of floods there are measures which can be taken to reduce the danger or exposure of the community to flood, so there are measures which can be taken to reduce the vulnerability of our urban centers to damage from nuclear warfare. In project East River, the report made in 1953 for the United States Air Force, various proposals were suggested, including prohibition of new industrial development within a certain number of miles of the city's center, the setting up of varying residential density zones, and other measures. Incidentally, here I suppose I can speak as a member of the New York State Civil Defense Commission, where I have had some education on this subject.

Although a policy of dispersing industrial plants was established as early as 1951, its implementation was left to voluntary action. As the Kestnbaum report states conservatively

the accomplishments under the industrial dispersion policy have not been significant.

This report goes on to say that at the present time nearly three-fourths of the country's industrial-plant capacity and more than half its manufacturing workers are to be found in 50 large metropolitan areas, which comprise a major percentage of the areas the Civil Defense Administration considers to be the most likely targets. More than onefourth of our population lives in the 12 largest urban areas, and the concentration of people in the large urban centers is increasing constantly. It is not surprising that project East River concluded that reliance on volunteer action, local responsibility and Federal guidance alone would not result in the reduction of urban vulnerability through dispersion.

No community or local committee

observes project East River

can carry out what is essentially a major responsibility of the Federal Government. Until the Federal Government precisely defines the standards and the program to be undertaken, local action cannot be effective.

The increasing knowledge of the damage that can be inflicted by nuclear weapons, and especially by radioactive fallout, has led to the appropriation for the Civil Defense Administration of $10 million to make a study of the problems of evacuating the large cities of the country. I understand that the CDA will spend a few of these millions in studying the worst problem of evacuation, which is found in the New York metropolitan area.

Evacuation studies may seem a far cry on first thought from wardamage insurance. If, however, the current Russian smiles mean that war may be avoided for a decade or two, evacuation planning can take the long view that there is time to construct whatever bridges and highways are necessary in the metropolitan area to insure the quickest possible evacuation. In the same two decades there will be time to plan and build new cities to which those living in the central target areas can flee. There is time to plan and build proper shelters against radioactive fallout and to put into effect all the city and metropolitan planning regulations which will, in the long run, reduce urban vulnerability. This would insure that there will occur the least possible loss of life and property in the event of general war. As in the case of insurance against flood damage, so in the case of war damage there are measures which can be taken to reduce the possible charge against the possible charge against the Nation.

I would like to say that people sort of put it off and say it won't happen here. If that is so, I think we are spending an awful lot of money for war uselessly, $50 billion or $60 billion a year for war in the future, and I don't know how much the Russians are spending. If we are not serious about it, then we are spending an awful lot of money. If it is serious enough to spend that much for defense, for protection, it is certainly serious enough to do something about this. I would say to you, Senator Lehman and Senator Ives, it is up to statesmen such as you to make it known to all the people of our country just how serious this problem is. If there is nothing else you do, if you could make the people conscious of this one fact, you will live in history as I don't know any other Senator will. This is the most important problem that faces our Nation and our whole civilized life. We have to do something about this. I wish I could be a little more eloquent to say how important it is we do something about it and do it now, and not wait until later.

Senator LEHMAN. May I say this. I do not intend to live in history. But I have spent a great part of my time in the last 3 or 4 years urging this thing, both on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere. I am in full agreement that we have not taken the steps necessary to lessen the danger. We cannot eliminate it. We have not taken steps in New York City, in Washington, or other parts of the country. I can assure you as far as I am concerned I will continue to speak out.

Mr. MCMURRAY. I am aware of what you said, sir.

In the New York metropolitan area, two basic climatic and geographic considerations govern the lines of any evacuation study. The first is that the wind may be expected to blow generally from west to east, thereby carrying the radioactive fallout to sea or over Long Island. The second is the location of New York on a series of islands, which bars easy access to the west and north because of land bottlenecks and the Hudson River. It follows that it may not be wise to plan to evacuate millions of New Yorkers to eastern Long Island. They would find themselves in a likely fallout area; there would be immense difficulties in feeding and sheltering them. Shipping in the quantity required to evacuate the refugees to the mainland is not likely to be available. Thus, most people may have to be evacuated to the west, into New Jersey and upper New York State. In this direction the refugees would have the best hope of escaping the fallout and an

opportunity ultimately to find temporary homes in unbombed areas of the country.

But to do this requires more bridges over the Hudson and the Narrows, highways and rail transport to take the immense horde of refugees quickly back into the countryside, and places for them to be

sheltered and housed.

Taken together, these measures mean more than just new transport facilities, though these are the key to the problem and the point at which an evacuation study may show that extensive increases in Federal aid to the metropolitan area will be necessary. The need for places where the people may go to be sheltered and fed calls for plans for the comprehensive development of areas 20 to 50 miles from the edge of the probable target zone development which will also be economical and attractive in times of peace, but which can be so designed that in case of need, shelters and homes for the reception of refugees will be available.

One more thing will be necessary. If the new escape transport system is to be available in time of need, such development as might constrict it will have to be controlled. It is just as important to make provisions to prevent development where it will be harmful as to promote it where necessary. Hence a good evacuation plan essentially is a comprehensive metropolitan development plan.

In view of the fact that there is already an extensive study in this field provided for, it seems to me that this study by the CDA ought to be broadened somewhat to consider specifically the whole problem of reducing or preventing loss of life and property in the event of war rather than being limited to saving life by evacuation. The study need not be broadened very much, for an honest evacuation study would have to consider these aspects of the problem once the possibility of a decade or more of an uneasy peace is understood. When the results of such a study are in, it will be easier to assess what form warrisk insurance should take.

I hope that your committee will forgive me if I seem to have strayed rather far afield from the subject of disaster insurance, but it seemed to me that the whole question is so closely bound up with these other problems that it is necessary to solve these at the same time we undertake any insurance program if it is to have any hope of succeeding.

Many persons seem to feel that a disaster-insurance program is impossible because the rates would be too high if they were not subsidized, and they are against a subsidized program. I do not share this view. Many of our most successful programs started out on the theory that they would require subsidies, only to gather momentum and eventually become self-sustaining. The FHA itself was set up with the expectation that any losses in excess of those covered by the premiums received would be paid out of the National Treasury. As a matter of fact, there are some people who feel the reserves are still not adequate, and the national reserves still would be tapped if the FHA houses didn't sustain themselves. The RFC is another example.

I don't know that a national disaster insurance program could ever become self-sustaining. It may be that as the program gets going, experience would show that rates can be set high enough to pay all claims and still be low enough that the people in the affected areas would buy the insurance. Perhaps this will never be possible, no