General CONDON. Well, we would have to take people rather than sending them out. And that would apply to any area. It would apply to any area in Connecticut. We must contemplate that in our planning. So we have had the whole target-area theory, and some of us now prefer to call it the target-area-support-area theory, because we must be prepared as best we can to care for our people under almost any circumstances.

That, I may say, sir, reflects the intelligence of your question about our training and are we getting information. Because we must have that and plan for that. That is the purpose of these rather elaborate studies we are making now-one of the purposes, anyway.

Senator LEHMAN. You know, I have the feeling, rightly or wrongly, and I am probably wrong about this, that we had more shelters in 1942 than we have today. I am talking now of New York and Washington.

General CONDON. I do not know of any that have been eliminated. Whether those shelters are satisfactory we are now undertaking to discover. I may say quite publicly that I am discussing this with some people in the city of New York now, and we are urging builders of substantial buildings to consult with us and see if we cannot persuade them to put in shelters that would, we believe, serve the purpose even if the attack hit New York City. Some of use feel that they should do that. In two of our larger buildings going up now, we are dealing with the engineers in the hope that we can persuade them to develop the kind of a shelter in a place that would be available to a great many of our people, should an attack come.

Senator LEHMAN. I again want to repeat I have the highest regard and admiration for the patriotism and devotion of the people who make up the Civil Defense Corps. But I wonder whether they are taking the public sufficiently into their confidence in the way of instructing them, giving them directions.

I live in Washington-in the Government service. I think if we have an enemy attack, the Members of Congress would certainly be required to do their duty. I have heard a lot about this reducing the density of population, and I think it is probably wise. However, in order to reduce the density of population, in a city like Washington, for instance, you would have to reduce it my migration of many of the citizens of Washington to Virginia or Maryland or Delaware, or other places. I would not have the slightest idea where to go. I do not think you would either, Senator Ives. I do not think you have ever been advised.

Senator IVES. I would sit tight.

Senator LEHMAN. I would, too. I would stay. I just would not know where to go. I wonder whether other people know? I would not know whether that kind of instruction could be given to the general population. But I think there is a lot of confusion about it.

General CONDON. May I say very frankly that in my opinion, and this is a criticism of no one, the public has not been brought enough into the picture. We have this question of public apathy. Very frankly a lot of people use it as an excuse. Every time I bring up the subject they say that. In that case, I usually ask that person isn't he or she a part of the public.

We do have public apathy in connection with civil defense. We have too much of it. I am of the school of thought, sir, that we

had better have a program to go to the public with and tell them what kind of a program we have and what the program is. Then

I think the public will lose a lot of its apathy. I think in civil defense, as in most other things, it is very difficult to sell something so intangible that you cannot remember what the subject is after you have just discussed it. I think, however, that situation is improving a great deal.

I would like to make this little comment about this question of what the public will do if they have a chance. Only last week we had a State civil-defense test in the State of New Jersey. In the program it came out that the various modes of access and exit between New York City and New Jersey would be closed at 5:55-Staten Island to the George Washington Bridge, including our tunnels. I was not consulted about the closing of the tunnels. That was a port authority matter. They were to close at 5 minutes of 6 and be opened at 10 minutes past 6. The heavens almost descended on my modest offices down here from a number of people, some of my fellow commissioners and others, and the press had a lot of fun for several days on the subject of the snarling up of the traffic and the great disaster that was going to come to New York because our tunnels were going to be closed.

Well, I was either ignorant or stupid enough or bold enough to take the position that I thought here was the chance to find out what would happen-and I believed the public would cooperate 100 percent if they were told about it and given an opportunity to cooperate. I found no apostles in that area-and I apologize for the personal pronoun here. I was asked to intercede with the State of New Jersey to get this done at a different hour. Well, I do not mean to be facetious about it, but I took the position that I know of nothing in history where an attacker or where nature, in a natural disaster, sends us a telegram and tells us they will not come at the peak of traffic. It seemed to me the time to test these things ought to be at the peaks. If we could handle them at the peaks, we could do it at other times.

I took a helicopter and followed the situation, and I could not believe my own eyes. I think the press very faithfully and generously reported it the next day. We have not had in 20 years as good a traffic situation for those 2 hours between here and New Jersey in the streets coming up to those places as we had that afternoon, because the public was told and the public was asked to cooperate, and the public cooperated beautifully. With the management of our fine New York City police and their traffic control, there was not the congestion that happens 3 or 4 days a week when a blowout occurs going into the tunnel. or a fire. It is not unusual for us to have a 12- or 15-minute delay in the tunnel. But there was not one mishap.

So I believe we must take the public completely in on this thing. They are not interested in our classified information, but they should know more and more about what we proposed to do.

Senator LEHMAN. And what they are supposed to do.

General CONDON. Yes, sir. That is what we hope we are going to do here before very long.

Senator LEHMAN. General, do you believe that the working arrangement between State and Federal civil-defense activities could

be improved by a better definition of their respective powers and duties? I understand there is quite a lot of confusion about that.

General CONDON. I do, sir. I have a very happy relationship with the Federal Civil Defense and great appreciation of its personnel. I am a critic in this sense, sir. I think that the Federal Civil Defense Administration should take more responsibility. When I was asked by a very distinguished gentleman what I meant by that, I said "If I hire an architect to plan a house for me, I want him to sign his name to it." I would like to see a Federal civil-defense program, an operational program, that indicates that it is the national Federal program, and those of us down the line can then carry out a Federal program.

I must say that I think they have done some remarkable things in the few years they have had this. But I do not believe that there is a program sufficiently cohesively planned, with their name on it, a Federal program, in order to give the continuity of operation and training in civil defense throughout all communities and States that there should be.

Senator LEHMAN. I think you have answered the next question, because I was going to ask you whether you think the Federal Civil Defense Administration should have more authority to carry out its responsibilities.

General CONDON. I am not competent, Governor, to say whether they need more authority, because I do not know the extent of their authority.

Senator LEHMAN. Then I will ask you a concrete final question. This pertains to the questions I have already asked you. What do you think of the advisibility of allowing the Federal Civil Defense Administration to take State civil-defense workers into civil defense and disaster programs in time of emergency? In other words, that would be very similar to arrangements for calling the National Guard into the Federal service. Would you favor the Federal Civil Defense Administration having authority to take over command of the New York State or the New Jersey or the Connecticut civil defense, only in times of emergency?

General CONDON. I would have some hesitancy, sir, about this, because I see involved the case of regular civil-service employees in this city, for instance.

Senator LEHMAN. I am talking about civil defense.

General CONDON. The civil-service employees are involved a great deal, because as you well know an integral part of all civil defense are the various city agencies the police, fire, health, and all of that. I don't know whether or not they can be taken over. What would be necessary to bring that about, I do not know. Then another problem is whether or not you can order the volunteers out. It becomes a question of feasibility, it would seem to me.

Senator LEHMAN. We provided in my bill while the Federal agencies would have the authority to take over command in the State, they would not have the right to take over the local agencies.

Well, again, thank you, General.

We have 2 or 3 other witnesses, and the hour is already late. Therefore, we will recess until 2: 15.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p. m. the hearing was recessed until 2:15 p. m. of the same day.)

69096-56-pt. 1-20

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator LEHMAN. The hearing will resume. The next witness is the Reverend Roger C. Stimson, who is head of the Flood Control Committee of Stroudsburg, Pa.

STATEMENT OF REV. ROGER C. STIMSON, FLOOD RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMITTEE, STROUDSBURG, PA.

Reverend STIMSON. Senator Lehman, I have with me Mr. Sam Monatt, who is a certified public accountant, who has statistics and figures to give with my testimony.

Senator LEHMAN. I would be glad to hear from you.

Reverend STIMSON. I am not the head of the flood-control committee, as you have there. The only way in which somebody suggested I had anything to do with flood control was when one of the men in my shelter during the flood said "Reverend, were you praying for rain during the drought we had last summer?" I said "Yes. He said "Well, you prayed too hard.”

Senator LEHMAN. Well, we will be very glad to hear from you, whatever your title. But would you identify yourself for the record? Reverend STIMSON. I am the pastor of the Stroudsburg Methodist Church. I want to give you a picture of what happens to a community in a flood situation and how a community meets it, and the gaps in it which need to be filled by insurance.

Our church was just 1 foot from the flood. The water came within 1 foot of the door of the church. I went down to the church to see what was going on. The president of my Youth Fellowship said "Why don't we open the church and let them bring in some of the people from the flooded area?" I said, "All right, let's do it."

We opened the church and got some candles out and had a shelter established. We brought in 120 people the first night and 85 of them stayed with us for 4 weeks. We broadcast an appeal for cots and got them, and we took care of that group of people.

We had an emergency feeding kitchen which ran for 4 weeks serving coffee, sandwiches, and soup 24 hours a day. We serviced the rolling canteens that went out in the community to help feed the people working around the clock to help get the utilities back in service. The Salvation Army had 3 canteens there, and the Red Cross had 1. We also had some station wagons operating.

At the peak of it we were making 4,000 sandwiches a day, about 90 gallons of coffee, and 50 gallons of soup. We opened a dispensary. In fact, that very first night one of my young women, who is a graduate nurse, came in from the street where she had been out to see what was happening. She asked me if she should go home and put her uniform on. She did that, and that was the start of the dispensary. Eight of our doctors and forty nurses, people who had formerly been nurses in the community, come out and enlisted, and we had 24 hours a day 1 doctor and at least 2 nurses on duty right along.

We were cut off from the hospital, and we had a baby born in the church. We had an appendectomy, and we had many of the regular first aid cases. We also started an inoculation program. We gave 16,000 of the first typhoid inoculations. We gave 8,000 of the second

round, and 6,000 of the third round. I think largely as a result of this there was no typhoid developed in Stroudsburg at all.

Mrs. Butler, the wife of a doctor, took charge of the public health end, operating from our church, and dysentery and cases of digestive upset that started were nipped right in the bud through certain measures she took.

The public health, with the help of the board of health of the community, instituted measures which gave excellent control of all the diseases that might have developed.

We broadcast over the radio for food and clothing, and we received an abundance of both, and plenty of volunteer help. People of all denominations just walked into the church and said "What can we do?" There was no disaster organization. We simply followed the ball, as you say in a football game, of trying to meet the needs as they came up.

The Red Cross came in and supported us. They found us operating, and so they gave us full support. I certainly appreciate all they did, because we could never have done as much as we did if it was not for the fact that they gave us the financial support and supplied some of the things we needed.

We kept moving along with the needs. We discovered that the big need immediately after the flood was what to do with the mud that had accumulated in the homes.

I went down in the flood area, among my people and in other homes, and discovered about 8 inches of slippery, slimy mud, and people wandering around, picking up this and that, with the most forlorn expression on their faces. I realized they needed some kind of shot in the arm.

The flood was on a Thursday night, and it was, of course, a result of the Diane hurricane, which dumped 13 inches of rain in 4 hours on the Poconos. Stroudsburg and the East Stroudsburg Boroughs in Monroe County suffered the heaviest, although, of course, there were losses up and down the tributary creeks that run into the Delaware. We are not on the Delaware. It was the creeks that brought the 30-foot flood down into Stroudsburg that did the damage.

Some of the homes had as high as 22 feet of water in them, going up to the ceiling of the second floor.

Our duty then was to see what we could do about helping clean up. I urged some of our service clubs in town and our JC organization to get back of helping the people clean up. And some local people enlisted.

Through the secretary of the State council of churches we interested religious groups in the State, so that the Mennonite disaster unit and the American Friends Service Committee work camp came in to help us, along with several laymen's Bible associations throughout the State and some of the service clubs as well.

The result was that we had for 2 weeks from 200 to 300 volunteers from outside the community, who were coming in to give us a lift in cleaning up. There were 500 there on Labor Day. It was amazing the volunteer help that we received.

We fed and housed the workers who stayed overnight. Some Amish people, for instance, from out in Somerset County, over 500 miles away, came in one morning about 7 o'clock, just as we were opening up the church, and they said "Where do we go to work?" They had