S.J. Brams, M.D. Davis / Optimal resource allocation in presidental primaries significant 0.45, which is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the Democratic race was not a two-person one (there were thirteen candidates in all, with some, like Jerry Brown and Frank Church, entering only later primaries), with different candidates placing their bets on different states. 5.2. There is 'overspending' in early primaries, but it occurs in phases Considering the first two sets of primaries as Phase I (New Hampshire, followed by Massachusetts and Vermont a week later), and the second two sets as Phase II (Florida, followed by Illinois a week later), Republican and Democratic candidates in 1976 tended to overspend, as predicted by the model, in the earlier primaries (New Hampshire and Florida), though these states are smaller than those going a week later. For example, Republican expenditures to New Hampshire were 57.3 percent of the Phase I total (model prediction: 56.6 percent). The exception to this rule is spending by the nine Democratic candidates in Phase I in 1976, which was almost three times as much in Massachusetts and Vermont as in New Hampshire, in part because Henry Jackson made Massachusetts a key test and spent massively there. (Since Massachusetts and Vermont had seven times as many Democratic delegates as did New Hampshire, however, there was still disproportionately greater spending in New Hampshire – and accompanying media ‘overkill', as one analyst aptly put it (Matthews, 1978, p. 64).) Significantly, Jimmy Carter was the only Democratic candidate in 1976 to spend more in New Hampshire (53.1 percent), practically duplicating the model prediction (53.4 percent), which may say something about the normative value of the model, and Carter's political astuteness in staying close to its prescription for the Phase I primaries." 5.3. The phases changed in 1980, with even greater overspending in the early primaries In 1980, Iowa, the first caucus state on January 22, seriously rivaled New Hampshire, whose primaries were on February 26, as the early focus of attention: 6 "It should be noted that only 18.6 percent of Boston media time purchased to influence the New Hampshire primary was attributed to the New Hampshire campaign budget (Keefe, 1980; p. 236), so this figure probably understates the media blitz in New Hampshire. 7 Consistent with their financial expenditures, the Democrats spent more time in Massachusetts and Vermont than New Hampshire (an average of 17.5 days versus 10.0 days) in Phase I, though Jimmy Carter reversed this pattern in accordance with the model's predictions (15 days in New Hampshire, 8 days in Massachusetts, none in Vermont) (Aldrich, 1980a; pp. 226–229). In fact, Hamilton Jordan, Carter's campaign director, devised a numerical scheme for assigning points to states that gave extra 'strategy' points to states – in addition to their 'delegate' points – the earlier they went in the sequence of primaries (Witcover, 1977; pp. 135-137). His calculations appear to be totally ad hoc but mirror the thrust of the basic model's predictions. Finally, it is worth noting that New Hampshire dominated in Phase I with respect to television network news stories (63.3 percent) (Robinson, 1976; cited in Matthews, 1978; p. 65). 386 S.J. Brams, M.D. Davis / Optimal resource allocation in presidental primaries the candidates reportedly spent an astonishing ten times the amount they spent in 1976 to influence caucus selection there (New York Times, January 21, 1980). As Reagan's successful candidacy demonstrated, however, Iowa is still not a make-orbreak state for a presidential candidate (he was beaten by Bush there), as New Hampshire (where Reagan won) has been since 1952 with respect to supporting future presidents. Preliminary FEC 1980 financial expenditure data indicate that candidates in both parties spent less in New Hampshire than Massachusetts and Vermont, in part because some approached or reached the New Hampshire limit (a constraint, as mentioned earlier, not incorporated into the model). Overall, 1980 spending seems to have been greater, proportionately, in most early primaries. In fact, with the races already decided by the time of 'super Tuesday' on June 3 - when there were eight Democratic and nine Republican primaries – candidates spent only about 3 percent of their permitted maximums in these last states. From a normative point of view we believe that our research helps to clarify certain problems that attend presidential nominations and suggests possible solutions. Consider, for example, the proliferation of individual state primaries and caucuses that has led to a season of contests from January to June in a presidential election year. Is there any reasonable way that delegates could be apportioned to states going later in the season to make up for the seeming advantage that a state gains by going early? One possible solution would be to give early states disproportionately fewer delegates, later states disproportionately more, so as to render a state's influence proportionate to its size, regardless of when it goes in the sequence. To illustrate, state primaries or caucuses held before March 1 of a presidential election year might have their ‘normal' apportionments (based on size) depreciated by 75 percent; those held in March might be depreciated 50 percent, those held in April 25 percent, and those held in May or later might not be depreciated at all. In this manner, a state would not be so anxious to get the jump on other states if its delegate votes were progressively cut the earlier it scheduled its primaries/caucuses. Although this might sound like a strange - if not radical proposal, we believe the evident inequities in the present system need careful and rigorous analysis if we are to avoid further burdening a system, already a hodgepodge, with ill-thought-out new reforms. Models like that in this paper, in our opinion, can not only facilitate an understanding of sequencing effects but also can provide a basis for developing weighted voting schemes that ensure equal representation of citizens, and proportional representation of states, in the nomination process. 4. Conclusions Presidential elections are the most dramatic recurring political event in American politics. The nomination phase of a presidential race, considered by some the most important because it (usually) narrows down a large field of candidates to only two, S.J. Brams, M.D. Davis / Optimal resource allocation in presidental primaries 387 consumes our attention for months. Nominations today are governed by a hopelessly complex and little understood set of rules, but probably the most consequential ones are those that provide for the sequence of state primaries and caucuses. We have proposed a basic model for the optimal allocation of resources in these contests, under the assumption that candidates seek to maximize their expected delegate vote in a sequential game that allows for momentum transfer from early to later contests. Data to test the basic model, and modifications of it, have been described, and possible normative implications of changes in the rules have been briefly discussed. References J.H. Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nominating Campaigns (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980a). J.H. Aldrich, A dynamic model of presidential campaigns, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 74 (1980b) 651-669. J.H. Aldrich, A model of the U.S. presidential primary campaign, in: S.J. Brams, A. Schotter and C. Schwödiauer, eds., Applied Game Theory: Proc. Conf. at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, 1978 (Physica-Verlag, Würzburg-Wien, 1979) pp. 99–117. J.H. Aldrich, Rational choice and systems modeling: the case of voting and presidential primaries, H. Alexander, Financing the 1976 election, Congressional Quart. Washington, DC, 1979. F.C. Arterton, The media politics of presidential campaigns: a study of the Carter nomination drive, in: J.R. Beniger, Polls and primaries, in: J.W. Davis, Presidential Primaries: Road to the White House (Greenwood, Westport, 1979) Chapter 5. J.R. Beniger, Winning the presidential nomination: national polls and state primary elections, 1936– 1972, Publ. Opinion Quart. 40 (1976) 22–38. K.W. Brace, The 1976 presidential primaries: an analysis of how many people participated and how much money was spent, Report compiled for the (Democratic Party) commission on presidential nomination and party structure, Washington, DC (1977). S.J. Brams, But they say he won the primary, New York Times (November 27, 1979), p. A23 (Op-Ed page). S.J. Brams, The Presidential Election Game (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978a). S.J. Brams, Resource allocations in the 1976 campaign, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 72 (1978b) 1365–1366. S.J. Brams and M.D. Davis, Models of resource allocation in presidential campaigning: implications for democratic representation, in: L. Papayanopoulos, ed., Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures, and Criteria, Ann. New York Academy of Sciences 219 (1973) pp. 105-123. S.J. Brams and M.D. Davis, The 3/2's rule in presidential campaigning, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 68 (1974) 113-134; reprinted in the Electoral College and Direct Election, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session, Washington, DC (1977) 515–537. 388 S.J. Brams, M.D. Davis / Optimal resource allocation in presidental primaries S.J. Brams and P.D. Straffin Jr., The entry problem in a political race, in: P.C. Ordeshook and W.R. Keech and D.R. Matthews, The Party's Choice (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1977). M. Lake, A new campaign resource allocation model, in: S.J. Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, eds., Applied Game Theory: Proc. Conf. at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, 1978 (Physica-Verlag, Würzburg-Wien, 1979) pp. 118–132. D.R. Matthews, 'Winnowing': the news media and the 1976 presidential nominations, in: J.D. Barber, ed., Race for the Presidency: the Media and the Nominating Process (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1978) pp. 55-78. S. Merrill III, Personal communication, 1982. J. Moore and J. Fraser, eds., Campaign for President: The Managers Look at '76 (Ballinger, Cambridge, 1977). New York Times, Candidates spending a total of $2.8 million in lowa caucuses, 10 times the '76 level (January 21, 1980) p. A13. B.I. Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978). M.J. Robinson, Television news and the presidential primary process, unpublished paper (1976). H.D. Shane, Mathematical models for economic and political advertising campaigns, Oper. Res. 25 (1977) 1-14. J. Witcover, Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972–76 (Viking, New York, 1977). PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARIES IN 1988: PROJECTED SCHEDULING AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS [By Thomas H. Neale and Kevin J. Coleman, Analysts in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress] INTRODUCTION The presidential preference primary has achieved a dominant position as the method most widely used in the process of selecting delegates to the national party nominating conventions. In 1968 the 15 primaries held by both parties accounted for 40 percent of delegates to the Democratic National Convention, and 38 percent of those attending the Republican Convention. In contrast, by 1980 the number of these contests had grown to an all-time high of 35 primaries and 72 percent of the delegates for the Democrats and 34 primaries and 76 percent of the delegates for the GOP.1 At the time of this writing, in May 1986, 33 States and the District of Columbia provide for presidential preference primary elections. The actual number held in 1988 will likely be fewer, however, as choice of the means of delegate selection, by primary or other method, is left to the discretion of the party apparatus in a number of States. Moreover, between 1976 and 1984, Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, and South Carolina abandoned the presidential primary in favor of other methods of delegate selection. Recent action by Kentucky, Missouri and Oklahoma to establish presidential preference primaries, and the reestablishment of a primary by Mississippi, as part of the southern regional primary movement, represent a reversal of the earlier trend. Perhaps the most significant development in the nomination process for 1988 is the proposal and campaign for a southern regional primary, initiated by the Southern Legislative Conference (SLC). The SLC is the southern States' component of the Council of State Governments, an information and research agency supported by the States for the purpose of monitoring State programs and problems. Under the Conference plan, all southern States would select convention delegates in either primaries or caucuses which would be held between March 8 and 12, 1988. The SLC began organizing the southern primary plan early in 1986, in an effort to increase the South's influence in the presidential nomination process. The second Tuesday in March was already used for primaries by Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, joined in 1984 by Oklahoma, which scheduled caucuses for the same date, popularly known as "Super Tuesday." An SLC task force settled on the March date an effort to counter the influence of the New Hampshire primary and Iowa caucuses. Proponents of the southern regional primary claim that these two States have an excessive impact on the nomimation process due to the early timing of the contests. They further argue that these two States are insufficiently representative of the nation as a whole to warrant such influence on the nomination process. To date, the southern regional primary effort has met with considerable success. During the first four months of 1986, Tennessee rescheduled its presidential preference primary from May to the second Tuesday in March, "Super Tuesday;" in Maryland, similar legislation has passed both houses of the Legislature and awaits action by Governor Hughes. In addition, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Oklahoma have established new primaries, scheduled for the March target date, while Virginia has rescheduled its delegate selection caucuses to fall on the second Saturday in March, which falls on March 12 in 1988. Thus far, only in West Virginia, where the State House defeated a proposal to switch the State's primary date to March 8, has the southern regional primary proposal been defeated outright. Further developments in this area remain a possibility, as a number of State legislatures have not yet convened for the 1986 session, still others will not assemble until 1987, while in the case of South Carolina, the primary date is left to the discretion of the State party chairmen. Critics of the "Super Tuesday" plan contend that its sponsors have not considered fully the consequences of a southern primary, contending that it would merely con 1 Crotty, William, and John S. Jackson, III. Presidential Primaries and Nominations. Washington, CQ Press, 1985. p. 16. 2 Southern Legislative Conference. Conversations with staff and various press releases, Jan. 1-April 3, 1986. |